diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 3f87763d..911ebf84 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -137,6 +137,13 @@ carry a `sink-safe: <sanitizer> — <why>` comment. `scripts/check-html-sinks.mj
 fails CI on any new unannotated sink, so a raw-HTML injection point can't land
 silently.
 
+## Known Limitations
+
+- **Tokens in `localStorage`.** The SPA keeps its JWT access/refresh tokens in
+  `localStorage`, so an XSS bug would expose them. The production CSP now
+  forbids inline and `eval` scripts (`script-src 'self'`) to reduce that risk;
+  planned follow-up: move tokens to `httpOnly` `SameSite` cookies with CSRF protection.
+
 ## Extension Trust Model
 
 Extensions are **in-process code**. An installed extension runs with the panel's
diff --git a/backend/app/api/advanced_ssl.py b/backend/app/api/advanced_ssl.py
index e8045663..dd949d93 100644
--- a/backend/app/api/advanced_ssl.py
+++ b/backend/app/api/advanced_ssl.py
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import logging
 from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 from app.services.advanced_ssl_service import AdvancedSSLService
@@ -6,6 +7,8 @@ from app.models.audit_log import AuditLog
 from app.middleware.rbac import get_current_user
 from app.api._request import json_object
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 advanced_ssl_bp = Blueprint('advanced_ssl', __name__)
 
 
@@ -79,8 +82,9 @@ def upload_cert():
     try:
         result = AdvancedSSLService.upload_custom_cert(domain, cert, key, chain)
         return jsonify(result), 201
-    except Exception as e:
-        return jsonify({'error': str(e)}), 400
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception('Custom certificate upload failed')
+        return jsonify({'error': 'Could not install the certificate'}), 400
 
 
 @advanced_ssl_bp.route('/health/<domain>', methods=['GET'])
diff --git a/backend/app/api/backups.py b/backend/app/api/backups.py
index 609304a4..9578f935 100644
--- a/backend/app/api/backups.py
+++ b/backend/app/api/backups.py
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import logging
 import os
 from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
@@ -7,10 +8,21 @@ from app.services.backup_service import BackupService
 from app.services.backup_policy_service import BackupPolicyService, BackupPolicyError
 from app.services.storage_provider_service import StorageProviderService
 from app import db, paths
-from app.exceptions import field_required, not_found
+from app.exceptions import DependencyUnavailableError, field_required, not_found
 from app.api._request import json_object
 
 backups_bp = Blueprint('backups', __name__)
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+_STORAGE_UNAVAILABLE = ('Backup storage is not accessible: the panel cannot create or read '
+                        'its backup directory. Check its ownership and permissions.')
+
+
+@backups_bp.errorhandler(PermissionError)
+def _backup_dir_unavailable(exc):
+    logger.error('Backup directory is not writable: %s', exc)
+    err = DependencyUnavailableError('Backup directory is not writable', code='backup_dir_unavailable')
+    return jsonify(err.to_dict()), err.status_code
 
 
 # UI-facing metadata for the CORE target types. Extension kinds
@@ -62,7 +74,12 @@ def list_target_types():
 def list_backups():
     """List all backups."""
     backup_type = request.args.get('type')
-    backups = BackupService.list_backups(backup_type)
+    try:
+        backups = BackupService.list_backups(backup_type)
+    except OSError:
+        # e.g. PermissionError creating /var/backups/serverkit: keep the page usable.
+        logger.exception('Backup directory is not accessible')
+        return jsonify({'backups': [], 'warning': _STORAGE_UNAVAILABLE}), 200
     return jsonify({'backups': backups}), 200
 
 
@@ -70,7 +87,14 @@ def list_backups():
 @admin_required
 def get_stats():
     """Get backup statistics."""
-    stats = BackupService.get_backup_stats()
+    try:
+        stats = BackupService.get_backup_stats()
+    except OSError:
+        logger.exception('Backup directory is not accessible')
+        stats = {'total_backups': 0, 'application_backups': 0, 'database_backups': 0,
+                 'file_backups': 0, 'total_size': 0, 'total_size_human': '0 B',
+                 'remote_count': 0, 'remote_size': 0, 'remote_size_human': '0 B',
+                 'warning': _STORAGE_UNAVAILABLE}
     return jsonify(stats), 200
 
 
diff --git a/backend/app/api/buildpacks.py b/backend/app/api/buildpacks.py
index 2eec6ad8..55d0bb7c 100644
--- a/backend/app/api/buildpacks.py
+++ b/backend/app/api/buildpacks.py
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Two endpoints:
   * POST /generate  — pure: given a plan dict, return Dockerfile + compose.
 """
 
+import logging
 import os
 import shutil
 import tempfile
@@ -25,6 +26,8 @@ from app.services.source_connection_service import SourceConnectionService
 from app.middleware.rbac import developer_required, get_current_user
 from app.api._request import json_object
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 buildpacks_bp = Blueprint('buildpacks', __name__)
 
 
@@ -113,8 +116,9 @@ def detect():
         plan = BuildpackService.detect(clone_target)
         BuildpackService.cache_plan(cache_key_url, plan, commit or branch)
         return jsonify(_build_response(plan, app_name)), 200
-    except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
-        return jsonify({'error': str(exc)}), 400
+    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        logger.exception('Buildpack detection failed')
+        return jsonify({'error': 'Could not detect a build plan for this repository'}), 400
     finally:
         shutil.rmtree(workdir, ignore_errors=True)
 
diff --git a/backend/app/api/docker.py b/backend/app/api/docker.py
index 86fcc648..7aeec0b4 100644
--- a/backend/app/api/docker.py
+++ b/backend/app/api/docker.py
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import logging
+
 from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required, get_jwt_identity
 from app.models import User, Application
@@ -7,6 +9,8 @@ from app import db, paths
 from app.error_reporting import unexpected_response
 from app.api._request import json_object
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 docker_bp = Blueprint('docker', __name__)
 
 
@@ -505,8 +509,9 @@ def docker_cleanup():
             }
         else:
             results['containers'] = {'removed': 0, 'success': True}
-    except Exception as e:
-        results['containers'] = {'error': str(e)}
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception('Docker cleanup step failed')
+        results['containers'] = {'error': 'Cleanup step failed; see server log'}
 
     # Remove dangling images
     try:
@@ -515,8 +520,9 @@ def docker_cleanup():
             'success': result['success'],
             'output': result['output'].strip()
         }
-    except Exception as e:
-        results['images'] = {'error': str(e)}
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception('Docker cleanup step failed')
+        results['images'] = {'error': 'Cleanup step failed; see server log'}
 
     # Remove unused networks
     try:
@@ -525,8 +531,9 @@ def docker_cleanup():
             'success': result['success'],
             'output': result['output'].strip()
         }
-    except Exception as e:
-        results['networks'] = {'error': str(e)}
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception('Docker cleanup step failed')
+        results['networks'] = {'error': 'Cleanup step failed; see server log'}
 
     # Remove unused volumes (optional)
     if include_volumes:
@@ -536,8 +543,9 @@ def docker_cleanup():
                 'success': result['success'],
                 'output': result['output'].strip()
             }
-        except Exception as e:
-            results['volumes'] = {'error': str(e)}
+        except Exception:
+            logger.exception('Docker cleanup step failed')
+            results['volumes'] = {'error': 'Cleanup step failed; see server log'}
     else:
         results['volumes'] = {'skipped': True, 'message': 'Volume cleanup not requested'}
 
@@ -581,24 +589,27 @@ def cleanup_all_apps():
             try:
                 compose_result = DockerService.compose_down(app.root_path, volumes=True, remove_orphans=True)
                 app_result['steps'].append({'action': 'docker_down', 'success': compose_result.get('success', False)})
-            except Exception as e:
-                app_result['steps'].append({'action': 'docker_down', 'error': str(e)})
+            except Exception:
+                logger.exception('App cleanup step failed')
+                app_result['steps'].append({'action': 'docker_down', 'error': 'Step failed; see server log'})
                 app_result['success'] = False
 
             # Delete folder
             try:
                 shutil.rmtree(app.root_path)
                 app_result['steps'].append({'action': 'delete_folder', 'success': True})
-            except Exception as e:
-                app_result['steps'].append({'action': 'delete_folder', 'error': str(e)})
+            except Exception:
+                logger.exception('App cleanup step failed')
+                app_result['steps'].append({'action': 'delete_folder', 'error': 'Step failed; see server log'})
                 app_result['success'] = False
 
         # Remove from database
         try:
             db.session.delete(app)
             app_result['steps'].append({'action': 'delete_db', 'success': True})
-        except Exception as e:
-            app_result['steps'].append({'action': 'delete_db', 'error': str(e)})
+        except Exception:
+            logger.exception('App cleanup step failed')
+            app_result['steps'].append({'action': 'delete_db', 'error': 'Step failed; see server log'})
             app_result['success'] = False
 
         results.append(app_result)
diff --git a/backend/app/api/servers.py b/backend/app/api/servers.py
index b1c81b8e..44121353 100644
--- a/backend/app/api/servers.py
+++ b/backend/app/api/servers.py
@@ -883,15 +883,15 @@ def get_server_metrics(server_id):
         try:
             from_dt = datetime.fromisoformat(from_time.replace('Z', '+00:00'))
             query = query.filter(ServerMetrics.timestamp >= from_dt)
-        except:
-            pass
+        except ValueError:
+            raise ValidationError("Invalid 'from' timestamp; use ISO 8601")
 
     if to_time:
         try:
             to_dt = datetime.fromisoformat(to_time.replace('Z', '+00:00'))
             query = query.filter(ServerMetrics.timestamp <= to_dt)
-        except:
-            pass
+        except ValueError:
+            raise ValidationError("Invalid 'to' timestamp; use ISO 8601")
 
     metrics = query.order_by(ServerMetrics.timestamp.desc()).limit(limit).all()
 
diff --git a/backend/app/api/servers_agents.py b/backend/app/api/servers_agents.py
index db47e704..34ed92cf 100644
--- a/backend/app/api/servers_agents.py
+++ b/backend/app/api/servers_agents.py
@@ -409,7 +409,8 @@ def _compare_versions(v1, v2):
             elif a > b:
                 return 1
         return 0
-    except:
+    except (ValueError, AttributeError, TypeError):
+        current_app.logger.warning('Could not compare versions %r and %r', v1, v2)
         return 0
 
 
diff --git a/backend/app/api/sso.py b/backend/app/api/sso.py
index d8a831aa..52c24cd4 100644
--- a/backend/app/api/sso.py
+++ b/backend/app/api/sso.py
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 """SSO / OAuth API blueprint."""
+import logging
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta
 from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify, session
 from flask_jwt_extended import (
@@ -16,6 +17,8 @@ from app.error_reporting import record_unexpected
 from app.exceptions import NotFoundError
 from app.api._request import json_object
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 sso_bp = Blueprint('sso', __name__)
 
 VALID_PROVIDERS = ('google', 'github', 'oidc', 'saml')
@@ -47,8 +50,9 @@ def authorize(provider):
     try:
         auth_url, state = sso_service.generate_auth_url(provider, redirect_uri)
         return jsonify({'auth_url': auth_url, 'state': state}), 200
-    except Exception as e:
-        return jsonify({'error': str(e)}), 400
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception('SSO authorize failed for %s', provider)
+        return jsonify({'error': 'Could not start single sign-on'}), 400
 
 
 @sso_bp.route('/callback/<provider>', methods=['POST'])
@@ -169,8 +173,9 @@ def link_provider(provider):
 
     try:
         profile = sso_service.handle_oauth_callback(provider, code, state, redirect_uri)
-    except Exception as e:
-        return jsonify({'error': str(e)}), 400
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception('SSO link callback failed for %s', provider)
+        return jsonify({'error': 'Single sign-on failed'}), 400
 
     # Check if this identity is already linked to another user
     existing = OAuthIdentity.query.filter_by(
diff --git a/backend/app/api/system.py b/backend/app/api/system.py
index 68b5b9f0..39aa3849 100644
--- a/backend/app/api/system.py
+++ b/backend/app/api/system.py
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ def check_update():
             def parse_version(v):
                 try:
                     return tuple(int(x) for x in v.split('.'))
-                except:
+                except ValueError:
                     return (0, 0, 0)
 
             if parse_version(latest_version) > parse_version(current_version):
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ def check_update():
         else:
             result['error'] = f'GitHub API error: {e.code}'
     except Exception as e:
-        result['error'] = f'Failed to check for updates: {str(e)}'
+        current_app.logger.warning('Update check failed: %s', e)
+        result['error'] = 'Failed to check for updates'
 
     # Cache the result
     _update_cache['last_check'] = time.time()
diff --git a/backend/app/api/waf.py b/backend/app/api/waf.py
index cf0fac0d..c1bc9554 100644
--- a/backend/app/api/waf.py
+++ b/backend/app/api/waf.py
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Routes are mounted at ``/api/v1/waf``. Reads require access to the target app;
 mutations and install require an admin user (mirrors ``app/api/dns_zones.py``).
 Service ``ValueError``s map to HTTP 400.
 """
+import logging
 from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 
@@ -14,6 +15,8 @@ from app.middleware.rbac import require_admin_user
 from app.api._access import require_app
 from app.api._request import json_object
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 waf_bp = Blueprint('waf', __name__)
 
 
@@ -47,8 +50,9 @@ def update_policy(app_id):
     # ModSecurity isn't present on the host.
     try:
         apply_result = WafService.apply(app_id)
-    except Exception as e:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
-        apply_result = {'success': False, 'error': str(e)}
+    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        logger.exception('WAF apply failed for app %s', app_id)
+        apply_result = {'success': False, 'error': 'Failed to apply WAF policy'}
 
     response = policy.to_dict()
     response['apply'] = apply_result
diff --git a/backend/app/middleware/security.py b/backend/app/middleware/security.py
index 9c9b5ea9..3dfa8676 100644
--- a/backend/app/middleware/security.py
+++ b/backend/app/middleware/security.py
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 
 from flask import Flask
 
+# sha256 of the build-injected import map (frontend/vite.config.js, from
+# src/plugins/runtime/vendorManifest.js). test_security_headers recomputes it.
+VENDOR_IMPORTMAP_HASH = 'sha256-lIJXjhqB4GwFLcjRTSjM91Q7vwXxH4Wbcn475CzkW4U='
+
 
 def register_security_headers(app: Flask):
     """Register security headers as an after_request handler."""
@@ -37,9 +41,13 @@ def register_security_headers(app: Flask):
                 "form-action 'self' https://github.com",
             ]
         else:
+            # style-src keeps 'unsafe-inline' because React renders style="" attributes;
+            # script-src has no 'unsafe-inline'/'unsafe-eval': the FOUC snippet is
+            # /theme-init.js; the one inline script (build-injected vendor importmap)
+            # is allowed by hash; blob: is for runtime extensions (plugins/runtime/loader.js).
             csp_directives = [
                 "default-src 'self'",
-                "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'",
+                "script-src 'self' '%s' blob:" % VENDOR_IMPORTMAP_HASH,
                 "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
                 "img-src 'self' data: https:",
                 "font-src 'self'",
diff --git a/backend/app/services/chat_webhook_service.py b/backend/app/services/chat_webhook_service.py
index 65d5acaf..99473a6b 100644
--- a/backend/app/services/chat_webhook_service.py
+++ b/backend/app/services/chat_webhook_service.py
@@ -19,10 +19,9 @@ import logging
 import re
 from datetime import datetime
 
-import requests
-
 from app import db
 from app.models.chat_webhook import ChatWebhookConnection
+from app.utils import safe_http
 from app.utils.crypto import encrypt_secret
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -405,8 +404,11 @@ class ChatWebhookService:
             headers[SIGNATURE_HEADER] = 'sha256=' + signature
 
         try:
-            resp = requests.post(url, data=body, headers=headers,
-                                 timeout=_REQUEST_TIMEOUT)
+            resp = safe_http.post(url, data=body, headers=headers,
+                                  timeout=_REQUEST_TIMEOUT)
+        except safe_http.UnsafeURLError as exc:
+            # Non-retryable: the URL itself is the problem, retrying can't help.
+            return DeliveryResult.skipped(f'webhook url refused: {exc}')
         except Exception as exc:  # network error -> retryable failure
             return DeliveryResult.failed(str(exc))
 
diff --git a/backend/app/services/monitoring_service.py b/backend/app/services/monitoring_service.py
index cba6d702..ed8a576a 100644
--- a/backend/app/services/monitoring_service.py
+++ b/backend/app/services/monitoring_service.py
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ class MonitoringService:
     @classmethod
     def send_webhook_alert(cls, alerts: List[Dict]) -> Dict:
         """Send webhook alert notification."""
-        import requests
+        from app.utils import safe_http
 
         config = cls.get_config()
         webhook_config = config.get('webhook', {})
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ class MonitoringService:
                 'alerts': alerts
             }
 
-            response = requests.post(
+            response = safe_http.post(
                 webhook_config['url'],
                 json=payload,
                 timeout=10
@@ -239,6 +239,8 @@ class MonitoringService:
                 return {'success': True, 'message': 'Webhook sent'}
             return {'success': False, 'error': f'Webhook returned {response.status_code}'}
 
+        except safe_http.UnsafeURLError as e:
+            return {'success': False, 'error': f'Webhook URL refused: {e}'}
         except Exception as e:
             return {'success': False, 'error': str(e)}
 
diff --git a/backend/app/services/nginx/templates.py b/backend/app/services/nginx/templates.py
index e60ec4de..ba6bbeff 100644
--- a/backend/app/services/nginx/templates.py
+++ b/backend/app/services/nginx/templates.py
@@ -214,13 +214,13 @@ SSL_BLOCK = '''
     add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload" always;
 
     # Baseline response-header hardening. These are safe for reverse-proxied apps;
-    # the CSP is deliberately permissive so it does not break managed apps while
+    # the CSP is permissive (inline allowed, no eval) so it does not break managed apps while
     # still satisfying "a CSP is present" and blocking cross-origin framing.
     # Tighten the CSP per-app when the upstream can support a stricter policy.
     add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
     add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
     add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
-    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' data: blob: https:; frame-ancestors 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests" always;
+    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' data: blob: https:; frame-ancestors 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests" always;
 '''
 
 SSL_REDIRECT_TEMPLATE = '''server {{
diff --git a/backend/app/sockets.py b/backend/app/sockets.py
index a20153ce..6bb0c1a5 100644
--- a/backend/app/sockets.py
+++ b/backend/app/sockets.py
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import threading
 import time
 import queue
 import re
+import logging
+import subprocess
 
 from app.services.system_service import SystemService
 from app.services.log_service import LogService, LogStreamer
@@ -12,6 +14,8 @@ from app.services.docker_service import DockerService
 from app import sockets_rooms as rooms
 from app.utils.background_loop import BackgroundLoop
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 
 class AuthorizedSocketIO(SocketIO):
     """Recheck audience authorization before every server-side delivery.
@@ -775,11 +779,11 @@ def handle_subscribe_container_logs(data):
             try:
                 process.terminate()
                 process.wait(timeout=2)
-            except:
+            except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
                 try:
                     process.kill()
-                except:
-                    pass
+                except OSError as kill_err:
+                    logger.debug('Could not kill log stream process: %s', kill_err)
 
     thread = threading.Thread(target=stream_logs, daemon=True)
     thread.start()
@@ -836,11 +840,11 @@ def stop_container_log_stream(sid: str):
             try:
                 process.terminate()
                 process.wait(timeout=2)
-            except:
+            except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
                 try:
                     process.kill()
-                except:
-                    pass
+                except OSError as kill_err:
+                    logger.debug('Could not kill log stream process: %s', kill_err)
 
 
 def emit_container_log(app_id: int, line: str, level: str = 'info'):
diff --git a/backend/tests/BASELINE_COUNT b/backend/tests/BASELINE_COUNT
index 844039bc..7e8c942e 100644
--- a/backend/tests/BASELINE_COUNT
+++ b/backend/tests/BASELINE_COUNT
@@ -1 +1 @@
-5279
+6102
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/nginx-render-contract.json b/backend/tests/fixtures/nginx-render-contract.json
index 4d1497e6..f1f62200 100644
--- a/backend/tests/fixtures/nginx-render-contract.json
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/nginx-render-contract.json
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 {
-  "php": "e6d77fd5ac90d438b9f694b3dcf50d63746bd87f3e20030e0c4bd6e94c6f372a",
-  "wordpress": "e6d77fd5ac90d438b9f694b3dcf50d63746bd87f3e20030e0c4bd6e94c6f372a",
-  "flask": "dba3ba47c2d2407bcbcf3b8014bc6f5dc105db8a7e5837f849b871fd5960329b",
-  "django": "dba3ba47c2d2407bcbcf3b8014bc6f5dc105db8a7e5837f849b871fd5960329b",
-  "python": "dba3ba47c2d2407bcbcf3b8014bc6f5dc105db8a7e5837f849b871fd5960329b",
-  "docker": "a18576b49626ed0f88126de8946163720d715016ee24119de22afdb38fda4400",
-  "remote": "7bc871f2c95a333cfe14129ae40df409a3a2165e79fb7c9205510957c95af99f",
-  "static": "91d63c4279f9fa1fa1ecc1cfd0e3f8c5b63e134613d319ae189a4560d3738e28"
+  "php": "a1de4fd08a9d277ecf4c7aaa46514bcae28a05b0a90a87bc2190cfa18dbb237f",
+  "wordpress": "a1de4fd08a9d277ecf4c7aaa46514bcae28a05b0a90a87bc2190cfa18dbb237f",
+  "flask": "15ffdb7f2221e465689f1662d49cf913861032d1ba1689f71ed78cd0dc2d963c",
+  "django": "15ffdb7f2221e465689f1662d49cf913861032d1ba1689f71ed78cd0dc2d963c",
+  "python": "15ffdb7f2221e465689f1662d49cf913861032d1ba1689f71ed78cd0dc2d963c",
+  "docker": "362d30566ba5452cb3ed9e7376da4f95c1fda61e6ec5b6a65b1ef98aa461aca5",
+  "remote": "0589dd632da88d569e41c339681c0a38656037d40b733179986bfc5f80f5bd27",
+  "static": "d3ff984ff1aac1c22e8e59f70f7fdf0c3d838726b4621f3313aa7cd4d78ee139"
 }
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_backups_unwritable_dir.py b/backend/tests/test_backups_unwritable_dir.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6a7e7d20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/test_backups_unwritable_dir.py
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+"""GET /backups must not 500 when the backup directory cannot be created."""
+import pytest
+
+from app.services.backup_service import BackupService
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def unwritable(monkeypatch):
+    def deny():
+        raise PermissionError(13, 'Permission denied', '/var/backups/serverkit')
+    monkeypatch.setattr(BackupService, 'ensure_backup_dirs', deny)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('path', ['/api/v1/backups', '/api/v1/backups/stats'])
+def test_get_degrades_with_a_warning(client, auth_headers, unwritable, path):
+    resp = client.get(path, headers=auth_headers)
+
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    body = resp.get_json()
+    assert 'not accessible' in body['warning']
+    assert '/var/backups' not in body['warning']
+    assert body.get('backups', []) == []
+
+
+def test_create_returns_503_with_code_when_dir_unwritable(client, auth_headers, unwritable):
+    resp = client.post('/api/v1/backups/database', headers=auth_headers,
+                       json={'db_type': 'mysql', 'db_name': 'x'})
+
+    assert resp.status_code == 503
+    body = resp.get_json()
+    assert body['code'] == 'backup_dir_unavailable'
+    assert body['error'] == 'Backup directory is not writable'
+    assert '/var/backups' not in resp.get_data(as_text=True)
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_no_exception_text_leak.py b/backend/tests/test_no_exception_text_leak.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e8f19e4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/test_no_exception_text_leak.py
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+"""Unexpected failures answer with a generic message; the detail is only logged."""
+from app.services import sso_service
+
+
+def test_sso_authorize_does_not_echo_exception_text(client, monkeypatch):
+    def boom(*a, **kw):
+        raise RuntimeError('secret internal path /etc/serverkit/oidc.key')
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sso_service, 'generate_auth_url', boom)
+
+    resp = client.get('/api/v1/sso/authorize/google?redirect_uri=http://localhost/cb')
+
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+    assert '/etc/serverkit' not in resp.get_data(as_text=True)
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_notification_chat_connections.py b/backend/tests/test_notification_chat_connections.py
index 202b8b09..ec1f3df0 100644
--- a/backend/tests/test_notification_chat_connections.py
+++ b/backend/tests/test_notification_chat_connections.py
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ class TestSigningAndDelivery:
             captured.update({'url': url, 'data': data, 'headers': headers})
             return _Resp()
 
-        monkeypatch.setattr('app.services.chat_webhook_service.requests.post', fake_post)
+        monkeypatch.setattr('app.services.chat_webhook_service.safe_http.post', fake_post)
 
         user = _make_user()
         conn = ChatWebhookService.add({'kind': 'webhook', 'name': 'Ops', 'url': 'https://hooks/x',
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ class TestConnectionTesting:
             status_code = 503
 
         monkeypatch.setattr(
-            'app.services.chat_webhook_service.requests.post',
+            'app.services.chat_webhook_service.safe_http.post',
             lambda *args, **kwargs: _Resp(),
         )
         conn = ChatWebhookService.add({
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ class TestConnectionTesting:
             raise RuntimeError(f'failed POST {url}')
 
         monkeypatch.setattr(
-            'app.services.chat_webhook_service.requests.post', fail_post,
+            'app.services.chat_webhook_service.safe_http.post', fail_post,
         )
         secret_url = 'https://hooks.example/super-secret-token'
         conn = ChatWebhookService.add({
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ class TestConnectionTesting:
             raise RuntimeError(f'failed POST {url}')
 
         monkeypatch.setattr(
-            'app.services.chat_webhook_service.requests.post', fail_post,
+            'app.services.chat_webhook_service.safe_http.post', fail_post,
         )
         conn = ChatWebhookService.add({
             'kind': 'webhook',
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ class TestApi:
             status_code = 503
 
         monkeypatch.setattr(
-            'app.services.chat_webhook_service.requests.post',
+            'app.services.chat_webhook_service.safe_http.post',
             lambda *args, **kwargs: _Resp(),
         )
         conn = ChatWebhookService.add({
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_permission_service.py b/backend/tests/test_permission_service.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c3e99165
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/test_permission_service.py
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+"""PermissionService + User permission resolution per role."""
+import pytest
+from werkzeug.security import generate_password_hash
+
+from app import db
+from app.models import User
+from app.services.permission_service import PermissionService
+
+
+def _user(role, name=None):
+    u = User(email=f'{name or role}@example.com', username=name or role,
+             password_hash=generate_password_hash('x'), role=role, is_active=True)
+    db.session.add(u)
+    db.session.commit()
+    return u
+
+
+def test_role_templates_cover_every_feature_for_admin():
+    admin = PermissionService.get_role_template('admin')
+    assert set(admin) == set(User.PERMISSION_FEATURES)
+    assert all(v == {'read': True, 'write': True} for v in admin.values())
+
+
+def test_unknown_role_has_no_permissions(app):
+    assert PermissionService.get_role_template('wizard') == {}
+    u = _user('viewer', 'nobody')
+    u.role = 'wizard'
+    assert not u.has_permission('files')
+
+
+def test_developer_defaults_follow_template(app):
+    dev = _user('developer')
+    assert dev.has_permission('applications', 'write')
+    assert dev.has_permission('monitoring', 'read')
+    assert not dev.has_permission('monitoring', 'write')
+    assert not dev.has_permission('users')  # not in the developer template
+
+
+def test_admin_always_allowed(app):
+    admin = _user('admin')
+    assert all(admin.has_permission(f, 'write') for f in User.PERMISSION_FEATURES)
+    assert admin.has_permission('anything-at-all')
+
+
+def test_viewer_cannot_write_anything(app):
+    viewer = _user('viewer')
+    assert not any(viewer.has_permission(f, 'write') for f in User.PERMISSION_FEATURES)
+
+
+def test_get_user_permissions_missing_user(app):
+    assert PermissionService.get_user_permissions(999999) is None
+
+
+def test_update_custom_permissions_overrides_role(app):
+    dev = _user('developer')
+    res = PermissionService.update_user_permissions(
+        dev.id, {'files': {'read': True, 'write': False}})
+    assert res['success']
+    assert res['permissions'] == {'files': {'read': True, 'write': False}}
+    assert not dev.has_permission('files', 'write')
+    assert not dev.has_permission('applications')  # custom set replaces the template wholesale
+
+
+def test_reset_restores_role_template(app):
+    dev = _user('developer')
+    PermissionService.update_user_permissions(dev.id, {'files': {'read': True}})
+    res = PermissionService.reset_to_role_defaults(dev.id)
+    assert res['success'] and res['permissions'] == User.ROLE_PERMISSION_TEMPLATES['developer']
+    assert dev.permissions is None
+
+
+def test_admin_permissions_cannot_be_customized(app):
+    admin = _user('admin')
+    res = PermissionService.update_user_permissions(admin.id, {'files': {'read': False}})
+    assert res == {'success': False, 'error': 'Admin permissions cannot be customized'}
+
+
+def test_unknown_user_is_reported(app):
+    assert PermissionService.update_user_permissions(424242, {}) == {
+        'success': False, 'error': 'User not found'}
+    assert PermissionService.reset_to_role_defaults(424242) == {
+        'success': False, 'error': 'User not found'}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('perms, fragment', [
+    ('nope', 'must be an object'),
+    ({'bogus': {'read': True}}, 'Unknown feature'),
+    ({'files': True}, 'read/write object'),
+    ({'files': {'execute': True}}, 'Invalid permission key'),
+    ({'files': {'read': 'yes'}}, 'must be boolean'),
+    ({'files': {'read': False, 'write': True}}, 'without read'),
+])
+def test_validate_permissions_rejects(perms, fragment):
+    assert fragment in PermissionService.validate_permissions(perms)
+
+
+def test_validate_permissions_accepts_good_input():
+    assert PermissionService.validate_permissions({}) is None
+    assert PermissionService.validate_permissions(
+        {'files': {'read': True, 'write': True}, 'cron': {'read': True}}) is None
+
+
+def test_invalid_update_does_not_persist(app):
+    dev = _user('developer')
+    res = PermissionService.update_user_permissions(dev.id, {'bogus': {}})
+    assert not res['success']
+    assert dev.permissions is None
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_security_headers.py b/backend/tests/test_security_headers.py
index 2d3f06be..9e60d855 100644
--- a/backend/tests/test_security_headers.py
+++ b/backend/tests/test_security_headers.py
@@ -20,6 +20,14 @@ PANEL_NGINX_CONFIGS = [
     / 'sites-available'
     / 'serverkit.conf',
 ]
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+ALL_CSP_CONFIGS = PANEL_NGINX_CONFIGS + [
+    ROOT / 'nginx' / 'sites-available' / 'example.conf.template',
+]
+
+
+def _script_src(csp):
+    return next(d.strip() for d in csp.split(';') if d.strip().startswith('script-src '))
 
 
 def _make_app(hsts_enabled, debug):
@@ -86,3 +94,43 @@ def test_resolve_ssl_mode(monkeypatch):
     assert cfg._resolve_ssl_mode() == 'insecure'
     monkeypatch.delenv('SERVERKIT_SSL_MODE', raising=False)
     assert cfg._resolve_ssl_mode() == 'insecure'
+
+
+def test_prod_csp_script_src_is_strict():
+    r = _make_app(hsts_enabled=False, debug=False).test_client().get('/ping')
+    script_src = _script_src(r.headers['Content-Security-Policy'])
+    assert 'unsafe-eval' not in script_src
+    assert 'unsafe-inline' not in script_src
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('config_path', ALL_CSP_CONFIGS)
+def test_nginx_csp_script_src_is_strict(config_path):
+    line = next(
+        l for l in config_path.read_text(encoding='utf-8').splitlines()
+        if 'Content-Security-Policy' in l
+    )
+    script_src = _script_src(line.split('"')[1])
+    assert 'unsafe-eval' not in script_src
+    assert 'unsafe-inline' not in script_src
+
+
+def test_index_html_has_no_inline_script():
+    html = (ROOT / 'frontend' / 'index.html').read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+    assert '<script>' not in html
+
+
+def test_csp_importmap_hash_matches_vendor_manifest():
+    import base64, hashlib, json, re
+    from app.middleware.security import VENDOR_IMPORTMAP_HASH
+    src = (ROOT / 'frontend/src/plugins/runtime/vendorManifest.js').read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+    pairs = re.findall(r"specifier: '([^']+)', file: '([^']+)'", src)
+    body = json.dumps({'imports': {s: '/serverkit-vendor/' + f for s, f in pairs}}, separators=(',', ':'))
+    digest = base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(body.encode()).digest()).decode()
+    assert VENDOR_IMPORTMAP_HASH == 'sha256-' + digest
+    for path in ALL_CSP_CONFIGS:
+        assert VENDOR_IMPORTMAP_HASH in path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+
+
+def test_managed_app_nginx_template_has_no_unsafe_eval():
+    from app.services.nginx import templates
+    assert 'unsafe-eval' not in Path(templates.__file__).read_text(encoding='utf-8')
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_servers_list_metrics.py b/backend/tests/test_servers_list_metrics.py
index d6010bb5..8d72627c 100644
--- a/backend/tests/test_servers_list_metrics.py
+++ b/backend/tests/test_servers_list_metrics.py
@@ -108,3 +108,17 @@ def test_list_servers_metrics_are_batched_not_per_row(client, auth_headers, serv
     assert count_metric_queries() == baseline, (
         'metrics lookup grew with the server count — it must stay batched'
     )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('param', ['from', 'to'])
+def test_metrics_rejects_a_malformed_timestamp_with_400(app, client, auth_headers, param):
+    with app.app_context():
+        server = _mk_server('delta')
+        db.session.commit()
+        server_id = server.id
+
+    resp = client.get(f'/api/v1/servers/{server_id}/metrics?{param}=not-a-date',
+                      headers=auth_headers)
+
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+    assert resp.get_json()['error']
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_totp_service.py b/backend/tests/test_totp_service.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ee248b04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/test_totp_service.py
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+"""TOTPService / TwoFactorSetup behaviour (RFC 6238 via pyotp)."""
+import time
+from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
+
+import pyotp
+import pytest
+from werkzeug.security import generate_password_hash
+
+from app import db
+from app.models import User
+from app.services.totp_service import TOTPService, TwoFactorSetup
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def secret():
+    return TOTPService.generate_secret()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def user(app):
+    u = User(email='t@example.com', username='totp-user',
+             password_hash=generate_password_hash('x'), role='developer', is_active=True)
+    db.session.add(u)
+    db.session.commit()
+    return u
+
+
+def test_generate_secret_is_random_valid_base32():
+    a, b = TOTPService.generate_secret(), TOTPService.generate_secret()
+    assert a != b
+    assert len(a) == 32
+    pyotp.TOTP(a).now()  # decodes as base32
+
+
+def test_current_code_verifies(secret):
+    code = TOTPService.get_current_code(secret)
+    assert len(code) == 6 and code.isdigit()
+    assert TOTPService.verify_code(secret, code)
+
+
+def test_code_with_spaces_and_dashes_is_normalised(secret):
+    code = TOTPService.get_current_code(secret)
+    assert TOTPService.verify_code(secret, f'{code[:3]} {code[3:]}')
+    assert TOTPService.verify_code(secret, f'{code[:3]}-{code[3:]}')
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('bad', ['', None, 'abcdef', '12345', '1234567', '000000x'])
+def test_malformed_or_missing_code_is_rejected(secret, bad):
+    # A wrong 6-digit code could collide with the real one 1-in-a-million; use a shape check only.
+    assert not TOTPService.verify_code(secret, bad)
+
+
+def test_missing_secret_is_rejected():
+    assert not TOTPService.verify_code(None, '123456')
+    assert not TOTPService.verify_code('', '123456')
+
+
+def test_wrong_code_is_rejected(secret):
+    real = TOTPService.get_current_code(secret)
+    wrong = f'{(int(real) + 1) % 1000000:06d}'
+    # Neighbouring-window codes are also valid, so make sure we truly picked a stranger.
+    totp = TOTPService.get_totp(secret)
+    now = time.time()
+    valid = {totp.at(now + d * 30) for d in (-1, 0, 1)}
+    if wrong in valid:
+        pytest.skip('collided with a neighbouring window')
+    assert not TOTPService.verify_code(secret, wrong)
+
+
+def test_window_drift(secret):
+    totp = TOTPService.get_totp(secret)
+    prev = totp.at(time.time() - 30)
+    far = totp.at(time.time() - 120)
+    assert TOTPService.verify_code(secret, prev, valid_window=1)
+    assert not TOTPService.verify_code(secret, far, valid_window=1)
+    assert not TOTPService.verify_code(secret, far, valid_window=0)
+
+
+def test_provisioning_uri(secret):
+    uri = TOTPService.get_provisioning_uri(secret, 'me@example.com')
+    parsed = urlparse(uri)
+    assert parsed.scheme == 'otpauth' and parsed.netloc == 'totp'
+    qs = parse_qs(parsed.query)
+    assert qs['secret'] == [secret]
+    assert qs['issuer'] == ['ServerKit']
+    assert 'me%40example.com' in parsed.path or 'me@example.com' in parsed.path
+
+
+def test_qr_code_is_png_data_uri(secret):
+    qr = TOTPService.generate_qr_code_base64(secret, 'me@example.com')
+    if qr is None:
+        pytest.skip('qrcode not installed')
+    assert qr.startswith('data:image/png;base64,')
+
+
+def test_backup_codes_roundtrip():
+    plain, hashed = TOTPService.generate_backup_codes()
+    assert len(plain) == len(hashed) == TOTPService.BACKUP_CODE_COUNT
+    assert len(set(plain)) == len(plain)
+    assert all(len(c) == TOTPService.BACKUP_CODE_LENGTH for c in plain)
+    assert TOTPService.verify_backup_code(plain[0], hashed) == hashed[0]
+    assert TOTPService.verify_backup_code(plain[0].upper(), hashed) == hashed[0]
+    formatted = TOTPService.format_backup_codes([plain[0]])[0]
+    assert formatted == f'{plain[0][:4]}-{plain[0][4:]}'
+    assert TOTPService.verify_backup_code(formatted, hashed) == hashed[0]
+
+
+def test_backup_code_rejects_unknown_and_empty():
+    _, hashed = TOTPService.generate_backup_codes()
+    assert TOTPService.verify_backup_code('deadbeef', hashed) is None
+    assert TOTPService.verify_backup_code('', hashed) is None
+    assert TOTPService.verify_backup_code('abcd1234', []) is None
+
+
+def test_setup_flow_enables_2fa_and_returns_backup_codes(user):
+    setup = TwoFactorSetup(user)
+    assert setup.confirm_setup('123456') == (False, '2FA setup not initiated')
+
+    data = setup.initiate_setup()
+    assert data['issuer'] == 'ServerKit' and data['secret'] == user.totp_secret
+    assert not user.totp_enabled
+
+    ok, codes = setup.confirm_setup(TOTPService.get_current_code(user.totp_secret))
+    assert ok and len(codes) == 10
+    assert user.totp_enabled and user.totp_confirmed_at
+    assert setup.get_remaining_backup_codes_count() == 10
+
+
+def test_confirm_with_wrong_code_does_not_enable(user):
+    setup = TwoFactorSetup(user)
+    setup.initiate_setup()
+    totp = TOTPService.get_totp(user.totp_secret)
+    now = time.time()
+    wrong = next(f'{n:06d}' for n in range(1000000)
+                 if f'{n:06d}' not in {totp.at(now + d * 30) for d in (-1, 0, 1)})
+    assert setup.confirm_setup(wrong) == (False, 'Invalid verification code')
+    assert not user.totp_enabled
+
+
+def _enabled(user):
+    setup = TwoFactorSetup(user)
+    setup.initiate_setup()
+    _, codes = setup.confirm_setup(TOTPService.get_current_code(user.totp_secret))
+    return setup, codes
+
+
+def test_disable_with_totp_code(user):
+    setup, _ = _enabled(user)
+    ok, err = setup.disable(TOTPService.get_current_code(user.totp_secret))
+    assert ok and err is None
+    assert not user.totp_enabled and user.totp_secret is None and user.backup_codes is None
+
+
+def test_disable_with_backup_code(user):
+    setup, codes = _enabled(user)
+    ok, err = setup.disable(codes[0])
+    assert ok and err is None and not user.totp_enabled
+
+
+def test_disable_rejects_garbage_and_when_not_enabled(user):
+    setup = TwoFactorSetup(user)
+    assert setup.disable('123456') == (False, '2FA is not enabled')
+    setup, _ = _enabled(user)
+    assert setup.disable('zzzz-zzzz') == (False, 'Invalid verification code')
+    assert user.totp_enabled
+
+
+def test_regenerate_backup_codes_replaces_old_set(user):
+    setup, old = _enabled(user)
+    old_hashes = set(user.get_backup_codes())
+    ok, new = setup.regenerate_backup_codes(TOTPService.get_current_code(user.totp_secret))
+    assert ok and len(new) == 10
+    assert not old_hashes & set(user.get_backup_codes())
+    assert setup.regenerate_backup_codes('abc') == (False, 'Invalid verification code')
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_webhook_ssrf_guard.py b/backend/tests/test_webhook_ssrf_guard.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e5482724
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/test_webhook_ssrf_guard.py
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""User-configured webhook URLs must go through app.utils.safe_http."""
+import pytest
+
+from app.notifications.channels.base import DeliveryResult
+from app.services.chat_webhook_service import ChatWebhookService
+from app.services.monitoring_service import MonitoringService
+
+PRIVATE_URLS = ['http://127.0.0.1:5000/hook', 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data', 'http://localhost/x']
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('url', PRIVATE_URLS)
+def test_monitoring_webhook_refuses_private_targets(url, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(MonitoringService, 'get_config',
+                        classmethod(lambda cls: {'webhook': {'enabled': True, 'url': url}}))
+    result = MonitoringService.send_webhook_alert([{'type': 'cpu'}])
+    assert result['success'] is False
+    assert 'refused' in result['error']
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('url', PRIVATE_URLS)
+def test_chat_webhook_refuses_private_targets(url):
+    class _Notification:
+        severity = 'info'
+        event_key = 'x'
+        title = 't'
+        body = 'b'
+        created_at = None
+        category = 'c'
+        action_path = None
+        id = 1
+
+        def get_data(self):
+            return {}
+
+    result = ChatWebhookService._deliver_webhook(None, {'url': url}, _Notification())
+    assert result.status == DeliveryResult.SKIPPED  # terminal: the queue must not retry
+    assert 'refused' in result.error
diff --git a/frontend/index.html b/frontend/index.html
index 69b8a1d3..ee455da0 100644
--- a/frontend/index.html
+++ b/frontend/index.html
@@ -13,33 +13,7 @@
          No Google Fonts / third-party CDN: a self-hosted control panel must not
          leak every user's IP + usage to Google. Falls back to system-ui until
          the woff2 files are present (run frontend/scripts/fetch-fonts.mjs). -->
-    <script>
-        // Prevent flash of unstyled content (FOUC) by setting theme + accent before React loads
-        (function() {
-            var d = document.documentElement;
-            d.setAttribute('data-theme', localStorage.getItem('theme') || 'dark');
-            var accent = localStorage.getItem('accent_color');
-            if (accent) {
-                var m = accent.match(/^#?([a-f\d]{2})([a-f\d]{2})([a-f\d]{2})$/i);
-                if (m) {
-                    var r = parseInt(m[1],16), g = parseInt(m[2],16), b = parseInt(m[3],16);
-                    var hx = function(v){ return Math.max(0,Math.min(255,v)).toString(16).padStart(2,'0'); };
-                    var dk = function(v){ return Math.round(v*0.88); };
-                    var br = function(v){ return Math.round(v + (255-v)*0.30); }; // toward white
-                    var dm = function(v){ return Math.round(v*0.70); };
-                    d.style.setProperty('--accent-primary', accent);
-                    d.style.setProperty('--accent', accent);
-                    d.style.setProperty('--accent-hover', '#'+hx(dk(r))+hx(dk(g))+hx(dk(b)));
-                    d.style.setProperty('--accent-bright', '#'+hx(br(r))+hx(br(g))+hx(br(b)));
-                    d.style.setProperty('--accent-dim', '#'+hx(dm(r))+hx(dm(g))+hx(dm(b)));
-                    d.style.setProperty('--accent-bg', 'rgba('+r+','+g+','+b+',0.13)');
-                    d.style.setProperty('--accent-bg-soft', 'rgba('+r+','+g+','+b+',0.07)');
-                    d.style.setProperty('--accent-glow', 'rgba('+r+','+g+','+b+',0.35)');
-                    d.style.setProperty('--accent-shadow', 'rgba('+r+','+g+','+b+',0.3)');
-                }
-            }
-        })();
-    </script>
+    <script src="/theme-init.js"></script>
 </head>
 
 <body>
diff --git a/frontend/public/theme-init.js b/frontend/public/theme-init.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..276873dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frontend/public/theme-init.js
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// Prevent flash of unstyled content (FOUC) by setting theme + accent before React loads.
+// External file (not inline) so the CSP needs no 'unsafe-inline' for scripts.
+(function() {
+    var d = document.documentElement;
+    d.setAttribute('data-theme', localStorage.getItem('theme') || 'dark');
+    var accent = localStorage.getItem('accent_color');
+    if (accent) {
+        var m = accent.match(/^#?([a-f\d]{2})([a-f\d]{2})([a-f\d]{2})$/i);
+        if (m) {
+            var r = parseInt(m[1],16), g = parseInt(m[2],16), b = parseInt(m[3],16);
+            var hx = function(v){ return Math.max(0,Math.min(255,v)).toString(16).padStart(2,'0'); };
+            var dk = function(v){ return Math.round(v*0.88); };
+            var br = function(v){ return Math.round(v + (255-v)*0.30); }; // toward white
+            var dm = function(v){ return Math.round(v*0.70); };
+            d.style.setProperty('--accent-primary', accent);
+            d.style.setProperty('--accent', accent);
+            d.style.setProperty('--accent-hover', '#'+hx(dk(r))+hx(dk(g))+hx(dk(b)));
+            d.style.setProperty('--accent-bright', '#'+hx(br(r))+hx(br(g))+hx(br(b)));
+            d.style.setProperty('--accent-dim', '#'+hx(dm(r))+hx(dm(g))+hx(dm(b)));
+            d.style.setProperty('--accent-bg', 'rgba('+r+','+g+','+b+',0.13)');
+            d.style.setProperty('--accent-bg-soft', 'rgba('+r+','+g+','+b+',0.07)');
+            d.style.setProperty('--accent-glow', 'rgba('+r+','+g+','+b+',0.35)');
+            d.style.setProperty('--accent-shadow', 'rgba('+r+','+g+','+b+',0.3)');
+        }
+    }
+})();
diff --git a/frontend/src/pages/Backups.jsx b/frontend/src/pages/Backups.jsx
index 3a1f38a7..6777d799 100644
--- a/frontend/src/pages/Backups.jsx
+++ b/frontend/src/pages/Backups.jsx
@@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ const Backups = () => {
             ]);
 
             setBackups(backupsRes.backups || []);
+            if (backupsRes.warning) setError(backupsRes.warning);
             setStats(statsRes);
             setConfig(configRes);
             if (refreshSchedules) await reloadSchedules();
diff --git a/frontend/src/plugins/serverkit-gui/components/ServerGui.jsx b/frontend/src/plugins/serverkit-gui/components/ServerGui.jsx
index 78b33011..b853baab 100644
--- a/frontend/src/plugins/serverkit-gui/components/ServerGui.jsx
+++ b/frontend/src/plugins/serverkit-gui/components/ServerGui.jsx
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { useEffect, useRef, useState, useCallback } from 'react';
 import { useTranslation, useFormat } from 'serverkit-sdk';
 import SyntheticDesktop from './SyntheticDesktop.jsx';
 import { Button as SharedButton } from 'serverkit-sdk';
+import { storageKey } from '../../../services/tunnelBase';
 
 const FRAME_INTERVAL_MS_DEFAULT = 700;
 const STORAGE_KEY = 'sk-gui:prefs';
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ export default function ServerGui({ api, serverId }) {
         if (api && typeof api.request === 'function') {
             return api.request(path);
         }
-        const token = localStorage.getItem('access_token');
+        const token = localStorage.getItem(storageKey('access_token'));
         const r = await fetch(path, { headers: token ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : {} });
         if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`HTTP ${r.status}`);
         return r.json();
diff --git a/nginx/nginx.conf b/nginx/nginx.conf
index 7b9d80d9..66d0624e 100644
--- a/nginx/nginx.conf
+++ b/nginx/nginx.conf
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ http {
         add_header Permissions-Policy "geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()" always;
 
         # Content Security Policy
-        add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' ws: wss:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self' https://github.com;" always;
+        add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'sha256-lIJXjhqB4GwFLcjRTSjM91Q7vwXxH4Wbcn475CzkW4U=' blob:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' ws: wss:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self' https://github.com;" always;
 
         # Connection limits
         limit_conn conn_limit 20;
diff --git a/nginx/sites-available/example.conf.template b/nginx/sites-available/example.conf.template
index 8ac8aff4..adf08076 100644
--- a/nginx/sites-available/example.conf.template
+++ b/nginx/sites-available/example.conf.template
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ server {
     add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block" always;
     add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
     add_header Permissions-Policy "geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()" always;
-    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' blob:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' ws: wss:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self';" always;
+    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'sha256-lIJXjhqB4GwFLcjRTSjM91Q7vwXxH4Wbcn475CzkW4U=' blob:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' ws: wss:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self';" always;
 
     # Option 1: Proxy to a local app (Docker container, Node.js, etc.)
     location / {
diff --git a/nginx/sites-available/serverkit.conf b/nginx/sites-available/serverkit.conf
index a81a86a8..eaeb561a 100644
--- a/nginx/sites-available/serverkit.conf
+++ b/nginx/sites-available/serverkit.conf
@@ -103,9 +103,10 @@ server {
     add_header X-Robots-Tag "noindex, nofollow, noarchive" always;
 
     # Content Security Policy
-    # Note: 'unsafe-inline'/'unsafe-eval' are kept because many SPAs need them.
-    # Once your build is verified to work without inline scripts, remove them.
-    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' blob:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' ws: wss:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self' https://github.com;" always;
+    # script-src has no 'unsafe-inline'/'unsafe-eval' (theme init is /theme-init.js,
+    # the vendor importmap is allowed by hash). style-src keeps 'unsafe-inline'
+    # because React renders style="" attributes.
+    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'sha256-lIJXjhqB4GwFLcjRTSjM91Q7vwXxH4Wbcn475CzkW4U=' blob:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' ws: wss:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self' https://github.com;" always;
 
     # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
     # ServerKit frontend — served directly by host nginx from the built SPA