The first pass left routes that hand the body straight to a service
(create_zone(data), MonitorService.create(data), ...). Those services
read it as a dict, so a body of null, [] or a bare string still
crashed them into a 500. Agent long-poll, external webhook receivers
and the routes that already type-check their body are left alone.
328 more routes used a JSON body as a dict straight from
request.get_json(), so a body of null, [] or a bare string crashed them
into a 500. Bare reads become json_object(); the
'get_json(silent=True) or {}' reads of action routes become
json_object(optional=True), which still treats a missing body as {}.
Routes that take arrays or pass the body through untouched are left
alone. The full backend suite shows no new failures.
Also carries three files' bare section citations (apps, backups,
notifications) and the extended citation guard, which needed them.
update_ip raises AuthenticationError for a bad/disabled token (401 via the
global handler, as before) and ValidationError for a bad IP; the route's
except-ValueError message sniff is gone. Sniffing census 8 -> 7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan 76 milestone A, drift/bug row 2 — scheduled as a fix, not a refactor,
because it is a behaviour difference shipping today.
rbac.get_current_user() is the only lookup that knows about both auth
mechanisms: it returns g.api_key_user for an X-API-Key request and falls back
to the JWT. 73 call sites answered "who is calling" with
`User.query.get(get_jwt_identity())` instead, behind 19 near-identical private
helpers (12 named get_current_user(), shadowing the real door).
The audit that scheduled this row predicted those return None for API-key
callers. Measured, it is worse: auth_required() deliberately skips
verify_jwt_in_request() once the key middleware has authenticated, so there is
no JWT context and get_jwt_identity() *raises*. Nine handlers reached through
an API-key-capable policy decorator therefore returned 500 to every API-key
caller:
bandwidth.get_app_bandwidth @viewer_required
servers.set_server_workspace @developer_required
servers.create_server @developer_required
sso.get_sso_config / update_provider_config / update_general_settings
source_connections.update_{github,gitlab,bitbucket}_admin_config
source_connections.complete_github_app_manifest
databases.execute_{mysql,pg,sqlite,docker}_query (see below)
Three service helpers had the same lookup inside a blanket `except Exception`,
which converted the raise into a silent user_id=None — the write landed and
the audit trail lost the actor (shared_resource_service, cf_ops_change_service,
secrets_webhooks).
The four databases.execute_*_query sites were a second admin check *inside* an
already-@admin_required route: dead code that always passed for JWT callers and
crashed for API-key ones. They now call require_admin_user() rather than
re-deriving the answer.
Also folds in a sixth _require_admin() found in the cloudflare-ops extension
source (29 gates, the same inverted contract as jobs.py), and fixes
serverkit-gui's blueprint at its sibling-repo source rather than in this repo's
live copy.
Ratchet (second-wave rule 1 — a migration without one regrows):
tests/identity_door_census.py counts both bypass shapes by AST, direct and the
two-line `uid = get_jwt_identity(); User.query.get(uid)` variant. The ceiling is
87, all of them on @jwt_required()-only routes where reading the JWT is correct
today; the ratchet's third assertion holds the API-key-capable population at
exactly zero, so migrating one of those routes to a policy decorator without
fixing its lookup now fails. Verified non-vacuous: an injected bypass fails both
assertions and passes again on revert.
The first wave's controller-boundary baseline is regenerated — this removes 74
persistence crossings (593 -> 519), a debt reduction with no new entries.
Gate: tests/test_api_key_identity.py (7, each red before the fix),
test_identity_door_ratchet.py (10), test_api_controller_boundaries.py (4), plus
the 65 test files covering every touched module: 1024 passed, 10 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rate-limit buckets, login lockout and audit-log source IPs hand-parsed the
leftmost X-Forwarded-For token — a client-controlled value — letting an
attacker rotate it to dodge per-IP limits or forge audit trails.
- config: add TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS / TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS (+ _env_bool/_env_int)
- create_app: wrap in gated Werkzeug ProxyFix (rightmost trusted hops) before
the limiter/handlers so every remote_addr consumer sees the real client
- new app/utils/client_ip.py::get_client_ip() — the single trusted seam
- replace all six leftmost-XFF parsers (rate_limit, audit middleware,
api_key_auth, api_analytics, audit_service, ddns) with get_client_ip()
- deploy: root .env.example ships TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true (behind nginx);
backend/.env.example documents it off for dev
- tests: test_trusted_client_ip.py (7) incl. real flask-limiter bucket isolation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- DdnsHost model: a hostname bound to a DNS zone plus a secret token; the
token is masked in API responses except when first minted.
- DdnsService.update_ip reuses DNSZoneService so a configured provider
(e.g. Cloudflare) is synced automatically; chooses A vs AAAA by IP family;
no-op when the IP is unchanged.
- API: admin CRUD for hosts + a public, token-authenticated /ddns/update
endpoint that a router or cron calls when its IP changes (IP from ?ip= or
the request source). Wrong token -> 401, bad IP -> 400.
- 8 tests covering the service flow and both endpoints.
UI panel to follow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Juan Denis