328 more routes used a JSON body as a dict straight from
request.get_json(), so a body of null, [] or a bare string crashed them
into a 500. Bare reads become json_object(); the
'get_json(silent=True) or {}' reads of action routes become
json_object(optional=True), which still treats a missing body as {}.
Routes that take arrays or pass the body through untouched are left
alone. The full backend suite shows no new failures.
Also carries three files' bare section citations (apps, backups,
notifications) and the extended citation guard, which needed them.
Comments, docstrings and a few strings cited plan numbers ("plan 29
#9", "plan 86 §B2") from a git-ignored folder, so they pointed at
nothing; one reached users in a bottleneck hint. Code and frontend
strings are unchanged apart from those citations (checked by AST and
token comparison). A vhost still carrying the old asset comment reads
as undrifted, and a guard test keeps new citations out.
Toasts showed backend prose verbatim, with no code to translate
against and "application" where the UI says "service". Not-found,
missing-field, permission, conflict and agent-offline errors now come
from factories in app/exceptions.py that pair one fixed message with
a dotted code (not_found.<resource>, validation.required,
permission.denied, conflict.exists, agent.offline), so the client can
translate them.
The shared app-loading helpers and the apps, domains, servers,
databases and backups routes raise those errors instead of hand
shaping bodies, which drops the hand-shaped body count from 1132 to
850. Five routes picked an HTTP status by comparing error text; they
now key off a result code or a sentinel so rewording can't change a
status. Five broad excepts that echoed str(exc) now log the crash and
return the request id instead.
GHSA-r4q7-x795-vr4j was one forgotten check, but the audit behind it found
the same shape across the surface: `@jwt_required()` authenticates, it does
not authorize, and ServerKit has no default-deny to catch the difference.
This closes the routes that audit left open — fleet-monitor alert
acknowledge/resolve, recycle-bin restore, nginx test/diff, registrar
sync/test, server-template drift checks, uptime tracking on/off, server ping
and remote compose ps/logs, refresh-capabilities, template
test-db-connection, deploy branches, buildpack detect — plus three inline
gaps: a viewer could widen their own API key's scopes, the demo-deploy flag
was doing double duty as an authorization one, and tagging a shared resource
had no write check at all while attaching one did.
`_ensure_group_mutable` only ever blocked *system* queue groups, so every
queue_bus mutation now also calls `_ensure_group_accessible` (owner-or-admin)
— renaming, draining or deleting another user's group was open to any
authenticated caller.
The rbac policy decorators authenticate through `auth_required()`, so they
replace `@jwt_required()` rather than stack under it; stacking rejects
API-key callers before the policy can authorize them
(tests/test_auth_decorator_boundaries.py enforces this). Where a route then
needed the caller it reads `get_current_user()` — `get_jwt_identity()` raises
for an API-key request. The decorators also carry a `_sk_authz` marker so a
static test can see the decision from the source.
`migrations.get_migration_history` moves to `require_admin_user()` for the
same reason its siblings did: the inline `User.ROLE_ADMIN` check it kept was
already reading two names this module no longer imports, so the route raised
NameError for every caller, admin included.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan 70. Domain went through this and TEN read paths were wrong, four with
effects outside the panel. Application has 211 call sites across 68 files and
drives more -- container lifecycles, nginx, backups, registry pulls, the OS
crontab -- so it was audited in full first (docs/plans/70_...md). 180 sites are
now query_active(); the 35 left unfiltered are each commented in place.
**The delete / purge split is what makes the tombstone honest.** delete_app used
to run compose_down(volumes=True) and rmtree(). Keeping a tombstone AND doing
that would put a Restore button next to a row whose data the delete had already
destroyed -- the one promise a recycle bin cannot break. So:
DELETE containers down (VOLUMES KEPT), vhost removed, firewall closed,
cron suspended, row tombstoned. All reversible.
RESTORE vhost rewritten, firewall reopened, cron resumed. Containers left
STOPPED -- "put it back" must not silently start processes or open
ports, the same reasoning that stops domain restore re-issuing certs.
PURGE volumes removed, uploaded source deleted, cron detached.
register() gained on_purge for that, wired into BOTH purge paths. And
purge_expired had NO scheduler -- fine when a tombstone was just a row, not fine
when it holds data volumes and a source tree, so a daily builtin job now runs
it. Without that, "kept until purge" would have meant kept forever and delete
would have quietly stopped reclaiming disk.
A side effect worth naming: the old _remove_data_flag protection for database
engines is now the DEFAULT for every app, and the flag is carried into
?purge=true so an explicit skip-the-bin delete still honours it.
**Cron was the blocker with no mechanical answer.** before_delete never fires on
a soft delete, and clear_application is LOSSY -- it nulls the association
without recording it, so nothing could put it back. suspend_for_application
instead disables only the jobs that were CURRENTLY ENABLED and stamps each
suspended_by_app; resume re-enables exactly those. That flag is the whole point:
without it a restore switches back on jobs the user deliberately turned off.
clear_application survives as purge-only, where lossiness is correct.
**The indirect reach (audit 3.1) is the class that grep cannot find.**
ContainerSleepPolicy, BackupPolicy, DeploymentJob and WafPolicy are enumerated
on a SCHEDULE and resolve application_id afterwards, so they never appear in a
search for Application.query. Left alone, a tombstoned app's sleep policy is
swept forever and wake_app restarts the containers the delete tore down. Those
loops test Application.deleted_ids().
Deliberately NOT scoped: reservation checks (port, name, directory) -- a
tombstone must keep holding those or a new app takes them and the restore is
refused; api/git.py's webhook VISIBILITY gate, which falls through to
"panel-wide visible" so hiding a tombstone would WIDEN access; and cron
attribution, which only labels a row.
Verified: 15 new tests, the migration replayed on a fresh DB (a tombstone frees
its private_slug, two live rows still collide), and a full delete -> restore
round trip. The 20 remaining full-suite failures are the known
serverkit-wordpress-not-installed class and are identical on a clean tree.
Two traps caught by testing, both recorded in the plan: a bad import made the
ENTIRE purge cleanup silently no-op while purge() still reported success
(_run_purge_hook swallows by design, so assert on the warning, not just ok), and
private_slug had to lose unique=True at the MODEL level or a models-built
database burns the slug regardless of the migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An authenticated user of any role could inject arguments into git
subprocesses running as the backend user (root under systemd):
- repo_url was passed unvalidated to git ls-remote/clone, enabling the
ext:: transport (host command execution on git < 2.52 defaults) and
file:// local-repository disclosure (all git versions).
- app_path on POST /deploy/clone was passed without a '--' terminator,
enabling --upload-pack=<cmd> option injection independent of git
version and protocol.*.allow policy.
- branch flowed into 'git fetch origin <branch>' as an unterminated
refspec.
Fix (new app/utils/git_security.py applied at every affected sink):
- repo_url scheme allowlist (https/http/git/ssh + scp-like SSH);
rejects ext::/file://, local paths, leading '-', whitespace.
- '-c protocol.ext.allow=never -c protocol.file.allow=never' pinned on
every remote-touching git call, plus a restrictive GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL
in the subprocess environment.
- '--' positional terminator before URL/path/refspec arguments —
co-load-bearing with protocol pinning, which alone does not stop
option injection such as --upload-pack=<cmd>.
- branch/ref validation (leading '-', ref-format metacharacters) for
clone --branch, fetch refspecs and stored deploy configs.
- POST /deploy/clone now confines app_path to the managed apps root,
mirroring how /apps/from-repository derives it server-side.
Adds 31 regression tests; bumps version to 1.7.86.
Reported-by: CaptBoykin
Co-authored-by: Tyler Boykin <25166954+CaptBoykin@users.noreply.github.com>
GHSA-6w78-q5vm-rfmh: four git deployment/webhook read endpoints checked
authentication but skipped app-level authorization, letting any active
user (even a foreign viewer) read cross-tenant deployment history and
logs that can contain secrets from pre/post-deploy scripts.
- git.deployments/<id>: resolve deployment -> app, 404/403 via
app_access_tier before returning any log bytes
- git.deployments/webhook/<id>: gate on _webhook_visible_to (app-linked
webhooks follow app visibility; unlinked stay panel-wide, plan 29 #11)
- deploy.history & deploy.webhook-logs: app_id queries require
app_access_tier; global (no app_id) queries are panel-admin only
Adds backend/tests/test_git_deployment_authz.py (9 persona-matrix
regression tests) and bumps the test-count ratchet.
Co-authored-by: Tyler Boykin <25166954+CaptBoykin@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add app/utils/formatting.py with format_bytes() and delegate 9 duplicated
human-readable byte formatters across services.
- Import admin_required from app.middleware.rbac in 15 API modules instead of
redefining it locally.
- Extend app/utils/slug.py with validate_app_name() and use it for template
install/validation and apps slug normalization.
A grant now reaches every app-related blueprint, not just apps.py + WordPress, so
a shared application is fully manageable by its grantees.
- Promoted the access helpers to a shared seam: ResourceGrantService.can_access_app
(owner/admin/any grant -> reads) and can_edit_app (owner/admin/editor grant ->
mutations); apps.py now delegates to them.
- Swept 33 ownership checks across 6 blueprints (categorized read vs mutate via a
parallel mapping workflow): builds.py (12), domains.py (7, incl. SSL + domain
CRUD), deploy.py (6), private_urls.py (5), templates.py (2), databases.py (1).
Reads -> any grant; mutates -> editor grant.
- Fixed the same latent int-vs-str ownership bug in all 33 (now user.id).
Deferred: python.py's single get_app_or_404 helper gates read+mutate+delete
together and needs per-method splitting before it's safe to make grant-aware.
Verified: cross-blueprint integration test (grantee reaches builds deployments;
stranger 403), full suite 131 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaced all uses of app.path with app.root_path in backend API and service layers for consistency and correctness. Renamed the 'metadata' field to 'extra_data' in the Deployment model to avoid SQLAlchemy reserved word conflicts and updated related methods. Also updated frontend to import Toast context from the correct location and added new border and font size variables in styles.
Implements backend and frontend support for listing remote Git branches (by app or repo URL) and selecting them during deployment configuration. Adds webhook log viewing for debugging, with backend endpoints and UI in the deploy tab. Updates webhook verification to support GitHub, GitLab, and Bitbucket, and introduces new styles for the deploy tab.
Introduces new API endpoints and services for backups, monitoring, and Git deployment. Adds security middleware, account lockout on failed logins, and improves domain/SSL management. Updates Dockerfiles, deployment configs, and frontend to support new features and UI components.
Juan Denis