328 more routes used a JSON body as a dict straight from
request.get_json(), so a body of null, [] or a bare string crashed them
into a 500. Bare reads become json_object(); the
'get_json(silent=True) or {}' reads of action routes become
json_object(optional=True), which still treats a missing body as {}.
Routes that take arrays or pass the body through untouched are left
alone. The full backend suite shows no new failures.
Also carries three files' bare section citations (apps, backups,
notifications) and the extended citation guard, which needed them.
Comments, docstrings and a few strings cited plan numbers ("plan 29
#9", "plan 86 §B2") from a git-ignored folder, so they pointed at
nothing; one reached users in a bottleneck hint. Code and frontend
strings are unchanged apart from those citations (checked by AST and
token comparison). A vhost still carrying the old asset comment reads
as undrifted, and a guard test keeps new citations out.
Toasts showed backend prose verbatim, with no code to translate
against and "application" where the UI says "service". Not-found,
missing-field, permission, conflict and agent-offline errors now come
from factories in app/exceptions.py that pair one fixed message with
a dotted code (not_found.<resource>, validation.required,
permission.denied, conflict.exists, agent.offline), so the client can
translate them.
The shared app-loading helpers and the apps, domains, servers,
databases and backups routes raise those errors instead of hand
shaping bodies, which drops the hand-shaped body count from 1132 to
850. Five routes picked an HTTP status by comparing error text; they
now key off a result code or a sentinel so rewording can't change a
status. Five broad excepts that echoed str(exc) now log the crash and
return the request id instead.
Plan 76 milestone A, drift/bug row 3. Five API modules had grown a private
_require_admin() with *three mutually incompatible* return contracts:
jobs.py -> returns the user; None means DENIED
dns_cutover.py -> returns None on success; a response tuple means denied
waf.py -> same as dns_cutover
manifests.py -> (user, None) on success, (None, response) on denial
themes.py -> same as manifests
jobs.py's is the exact inverse of dns_cutover.py's, so a guard copied between
the two reads identically at the call site and fails open. Nothing in the code
told you which contract you were looking at.
Replace all five with rbac.require_admin_user(), which raises a typed
PermissionDeniedError the global ApplicationError handler already renders. A
gate that raises has no return contract to get backwards.
Two convergences ride along, both toward the stricter shared behaviour:
- manifests.py gated on `user.role != 'admin'` where the others used
`is_admin`. These are the same predicate today (is_admin is defined as
role == ROLE_ADMIN), so no route changes status, but there is now one
truth source rather than two.
- none of the five checked is_active, so a deactivated admin still passed
them; @admin_required has always checked it. The shared door checks it, so
these 25 call sites now reject deactivated admins like every other
admin route.
The unknown-user case keeps its 403 'Admin access required' rather than
becoming a 401/404: a non-admin caller should not learn from the status code
whether the account behind the token still exists.
Gate: tests/test_jobs.py, test_themes.py, test_waf.py, test_dns_cutover_api.py
(82 passed) and -k manifest (152 passed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan 70. Domain went through this and TEN read paths were wrong, four with
effects outside the panel. Application has 211 call sites across 68 files and
drives more -- container lifecycles, nginx, backups, registry pulls, the OS
crontab -- so it was audited in full first (docs/plans/70_...md). 180 sites are
now query_active(); the 35 left unfiltered are each commented in place.
**The delete / purge split is what makes the tombstone honest.** delete_app used
to run compose_down(volumes=True) and rmtree(). Keeping a tombstone AND doing
that would put a Restore button next to a row whose data the delete had already
destroyed -- the one promise a recycle bin cannot break. So:
DELETE containers down (VOLUMES KEPT), vhost removed, firewall closed,
cron suspended, row tombstoned. All reversible.
RESTORE vhost rewritten, firewall reopened, cron resumed. Containers left
STOPPED -- "put it back" must not silently start processes or open
ports, the same reasoning that stops domain restore re-issuing certs.
PURGE volumes removed, uploaded source deleted, cron detached.
register() gained on_purge for that, wired into BOTH purge paths. And
purge_expired had NO scheduler -- fine when a tombstone was just a row, not fine
when it holds data volumes and a source tree, so a daily builtin job now runs
it. Without that, "kept until purge" would have meant kept forever and delete
would have quietly stopped reclaiming disk.
A side effect worth naming: the old _remove_data_flag protection for database
engines is now the DEFAULT for every app, and the flag is carried into
?purge=true so an explicit skip-the-bin delete still honours it.
**Cron was the blocker with no mechanical answer.** before_delete never fires on
a soft delete, and clear_application is LOSSY -- it nulls the association
without recording it, so nothing could put it back. suspend_for_application
instead disables only the jobs that were CURRENTLY ENABLED and stamps each
suspended_by_app; resume re-enables exactly those. That flag is the whole point:
without it a restore switches back on jobs the user deliberately turned off.
clear_application survives as purge-only, where lossiness is correct.
**The indirect reach (audit 3.1) is the class that grep cannot find.**
ContainerSleepPolicy, BackupPolicy, DeploymentJob and WafPolicy are enumerated
on a SCHEDULE and resolve application_id afterwards, so they never appear in a
search for Application.query. Left alone, a tombstoned app's sleep policy is
swept forever and wake_app restarts the containers the delete tore down. Those
loops test Application.deleted_ids().
Deliberately NOT scoped: reservation checks (port, name, directory) -- a
tombstone must keep holding those or a new app takes them and the restore is
refused; api/git.py's webhook VISIBILITY gate, which falls through to
"panel-wide visible" so hiding a tombstone would WIDEN access; and cron
attribution, which only labels a row.
Verified: 15 new tests, the migration replayed on a fresh DB (a tombstone frees
its private_slug, two live rows still collide), and a full delete -> restore
round trip. The 20 remaining full-suite failures are the known
serverkit-wordpress-not-installed class and are identical on a clean tree.
Two traps caught by testing, both recorded in the plan: a bad import made the
ENTIRE purge cleanup silently no-op while purge() still reported success
(_run_purge_hook swallows by design, so assert on the warning, not just ok), and
private_slug had to lose unique=True at the MODEL level or a models-built
database burns the slug regardless of the migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Persist manifest disk `size` onto AppVolume.declared_size; route disk backups to
the docker volume's live host mountpoint (VolumeService.host_path_for_mount +
volume_mount meta in BackupPolicyService._resolve_target). Add `bootstrap`
schema + BootstrapService.run_once (docker compose run --rm, injectable runner
seam), a bootstrap apply step that stamps applications.bootstrap_done once, and
POST /manifests/bootstrap/reset to re-arm it. Scaffold round-trips disk size.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rebuild of plan 35 Phase 1 against the surviving migrations (ports as a JSON
column on applications, not a separate table). Adds typed `ports[]` to the
serverkit.yaml schema/normalizer, AppPortService (persist/compose-emit/firewall),
open_port apply step + firewall open on apply / close on app delete, and the
blockers engine (port_conflict/remote_target/observed_server/firewall_undetected)
that refuses apply instead of half-deploying.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add manifest_apply_service (resolve -> ordered plan -> idempotent apply inside a
manifest.apply DeploymentJob with before/after snapshots), covering app create/
update, env, volumes, managed databases, backup policies and domain attach.
Extract the WordPress one-call domain+SSL pattern into a core DomainAttachService
(DNS -> vhost -> best-effort cert, each stage degrading to a warning). Wire the
/api/v1/manifests blueprint with get/plan/apply (admin-gated, audit-logged).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add the declarative serverkit.yaml v1 spec: JSON Schema + reference doc, a pure
parse/validate/normalize service, version:1 recognition in the repo manifest
detector (legacy flat files unchanged), and a scaffold endpoint that renders a
manifest from a live app.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Juan Denis