328 more routes used a JSON body as a dict straight from
request.get_json(), so a body of null, [] or a bare string crashed them
into a 500. Bare reads become json_object(); the
'get_json(silent=True) or {}' reads of action routes become
json_object(optional=True), which still treats a missing body as {}.
Routes that take arrays or pass the body through untouched are left
alone. The full backend suite shows no new failures.
Also carries three files' bare section citations (apps, backups,
notifications) and the extended citation guard, which needed them.
GHSA-r4q7-x795-vr4j was one forgotten check, but the audit behind it found
the same shape across the surface: `@jwt_required()` authenticates, it does
not authorize, and ServerKit has no default-deny to catch the difference.
This closes the routes that audit left open — fleet-monitor alert
acknowledge/resolve, recycle-bin restore, nginx test/diff, registrar
sync/test, server-template drift checks, uptime tracking on/off, server ping
and remote compose ps/logs, refresh-capabilities, template
test-db-connection, deploy branches, buildpack detect — plus three inline
gaps: a viewer could widen their own API key's scopes, the demo-deploy flag
was doing double duty as an authorization one, and tagging a shared resource
had no write check at all while attaching one did.
`_ensure_group_mutable` only ever blocked *system* queue groups, so every
queue_bus mutation now also calls `_ensure_group_accessible` (owner-or-admin)
— renaming, draining or deleting another user's group was open to any
authenticated caller.
The rbac policy decorators authenticate through `auth_required()`, so they
replace `@jwt_required()` rather than stack under it; stacking rejects
API-key callers before the policy can authorize them
(tests/test_auth_decorator_boundaries.py enforces this). Where a route then
needed the caller it reads `get_current_user()` — `get_jwt_identity()` raises
for an API-key request. The decorators also carry a `_sk_authz` marker so a
static test can see the decision from the source.
`migrations.get_migration_history` moves to `require_admin_user()` for the
same reason its siblings did: the inline `User.ROLE_ADMIN` check it kept was
already reading two names this module no longer imports, so the route raised
NameError for every caller, admin included.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
First of the regret-ranked adoptions: a plain delete now tombstones the
row (migration 088; no unique constraints, so no partial-index rewrite).
The database content and its managed BackupPolicy survive the bin window
— restore brings everything back intact; PURGE removes the policy but
NEVER drops database content; the explicit ?drop=true path stays
immediately destructive. Active read paths (list/get/adopt/manifest/env
references/app detail) switch to query_active(); the backup executor
deliberately stays tombstone-blind so bin-parked data keeps backing up.
Server (98 query sites, fleet enrollment + HMAC secrets) is the next
ranked adoption — deliberately its own pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan 70. Domain went through this and TEN read paths were wrong, four with
effects outside the panel. Application has 211 call sites across 68 files and
drives more -- container lifecycles, nginx, backups, registry pulls, the OS
crontab -- so it was audited in full first (docs/plans/70_...md). 180 sites are
now query_active(); the 35 left unfiltered are each commented in place.
**The delete / purge split is what makes the tombstone honest.** delete_app used
to run compose_down(volumes=True) and rmtree(). Keeping a tombstone AND doing
that would put a Restore button next to a row whose data the delete had already
destroyed -- the one promise a recycle bin cannot break. So:
DELETE containers down (VOLUMES KEPT), vhost removed, firewall closed,
cron suspended, row tombstoned. All reversible.
RESTORE vhost rewritten, firewall reopened, cron resumed. Containers left
STOPPED -- "put it back" must not silently start processes or open
ports, the same reasoning that stops domain restore re-issuing certs.
PURGE volumes removed, uploaded source deleted, cron detached.
register() gained on_purge for that, wired into BOTH purge paths. And
purge_expired had NO scheduler -- fine when a tombstone was just a row, not fine
when it holds data volumes and a source tree, so a daily builtin job now runs
it. Without that, "kept until purge" would have meant kept forever and delete
would have quietly stopped reclaiming disk.
A side effect worth naming: the old _remove_data_flag protection for database
engines is now the DEFAULT for every app, and the flag is carried into
?purge=true so an explicit skip-the-bin delete still honours it.
**Cron was the blocker with no mechanical answer.** before_delete never fires on
a soft delete, and clear_application is LOSSY -- it nulls the association
without recording it, so nothing could put it back. suspend_for_application
instead disables only the jobs that were CURRENTLY ENABLED and stamps each
suspended_by_app; resume re-enables exactly those. That flag is the whole point:
without it a restore switches back on jobs the user deliberately turned off.
clear_application survives as purge-only, where lossiness is correct.
**The indirect reach (audit 3.1) is the class that grep cannot find.**
ContainerSleepPolicy, BackupPolicy, DeploymentJob and WafPolicy are enumerated
on a SCHEDULE and resolve application_id afterwards, so they never appear in a
search for Application.query. Left alone, a tombstoned app's sleep policy is
swept forever and wake_app restarts the containers the delete tore down. Those
loops test Application.deleted_ids().
Deliberately NOT scoped: reservation checks (port, name, directory) -- a
tombstone must keep holding those or a new app takes them and the restore is
refused; api/git.py's webhook VISIBILITY gate, which falls through to
"panel-wide visible" so hiding a tombstone would WIDEN access; and cron
attribution, which only labels a row.
Verified: 15 new tests, the migration replayed on a fresh DB (a tombstone frees
its private_slug, two live rows still collide), and a full delete -> restore
round trip. The 20 remaining full-suite failures are the known
serverkit-wordpress-not-installed class and are identical on a clean tree.
Two traps caught by testing, both recorded in the plan: a bad import made the
ENTIRE purge cleanup silently no-op while purge() still reported success
(_run_purge_hook swallows by design, so assert on the warning, not just ok), and
private_slug had to lose unique=True at the MODEL level or a models-built
database burns the slug regardless of the migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Proactive hardening from an internal audit of the same broken-authorization
class as GHSA-6w78-q5vm-rfmh (authentication checked, app/workspace-level
authorization skipped):
- deployment_jobs: job detail/logs/retry resolve the job and gate on
can_access_app / can_operate_app (app-less jobs: requester or admin);
global job listing is admin-only
- secrets_webhooks: every vault/secret/webhook-endpoint/delivery by-id
route resolves to its workspace and 404-seals non-members; secret
reveal and signing-secret regeneration require workspace owner/admin;
dead local admin_required placeholder removed
- shared_resources: variable-group CRUD and attach/detach gate on the
resolved scope (workspace role / can_edit_app / can_operate_app),
closing deploy-time env injection into foreign apps
- queue_bus: message receive/complete/fail/list on system-owned groups
are admin-only; user-owned groups restricted to their owner
- docker: raw container inspect (exposes env vars) and container logs
are admin-only, matching Decision 7; per-app logs stay app-gated
- databases: raw SQL query endpoints, host-level metadata reads, and
process lists are admin-only; per-app managed database flows unchanged
Adds 4 persona-matrix regression suites (74 tests) and bumps the
test-count ratchet.
A variable can now land on one compose service instead of all of them. Both
EnvironmentVariable and SharedVariable gain an optional target_service
(NULL = all services), threaded through the shared resolver as an inclusion
filter (a var applies to a service when it targets all OR that service).
EnvService.get_effective_env_for_services(app, services) computes each service's
merged env (all-services vars + that-service vars, local overriding shared), and
ComposeEnvService builds the override's per-service environment from it — so a
var targeted at "db" only appears under the db service, untargeted vars appear
everywhere. The single-container docker-run path is unchanged (one container
gets the full effective env regardless of target).
API: env-var create/update and shared-variable create/update accept
target_service; GET /apps/<id>/compose-services lists a compose app's services.
UI: the Environment tab shows an "Applies to" selector (gated to compose apps via
the service list) with a per-row target chip; the shared variable editor gains a
target-service field.
Migration 036 adds the two columns; single Alembic head; chain applies from
empty. Proving tests cover per-service distribution + the resolver helper. Full
backend suite: 949 passed, 14 skipped; frontend builds clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Server onboarding completion (C8): a pure pre-flight compatibility check
(arch/distro/kernel/cpu/memory) gating validate; real-but-guarded
distro-aware install_prerequisites/install_docker/pair_agent steps that
no-op safely on dev/Windows and never raise; audit + best-effort
notifications on each transition; and a live auto-scrolling log trail +
elapsed timer in the onboarding wizard.
- Fleet-wide proxy dashboard (C6): ProxyStackService.fleet_overview aggregates
every server's proxy posture (configured stack vs host Nginx default) behind
GET /api/v1/servers/proxy/overview, surfaced as a new Fleet Proxy page in the
Servers tab group with summary tiles + click-through to each server's proxy.
- Polymorphic shared resources depth (C9): hierarchical variable resolution
(workspace < project < environment < direct attachment < resource) with
source provenance and {{group.KEY}} interpolation, an audit trail on every
tag/group/variable/attachment mutation, GET /api/v1/shared/resolved/
hierarchical, and the reusable Tags/Environment-Variables panels embedded on
the application and server detail pages.
- Docs & coverage: docs/ENHANCEMENTS.md (brand-neutral guide to all ten
capabilities + verified endpoints), README/CHANGELOG updates, and a
cross-cutting integration test asserting the new endpoints are wired.
Full backend suite: 924 passed, 14 skipped; frontend builds clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Project / Environment hierarchy (C2): Workspace -> Project -> Environment
org model. New Project/Environment models + CRUD APIs, nullable
applications.project_id/environment_id (opt-in, no destructive backfill),
ProjectService.ensure_default, a Projects list + ProjectDetail (env tabs),
a project/environment selector in the create wizard, and sidebar nav.
- Polymorphic shared resources facade (C9): ResourceTag + SharedVariableGroup
/SharedVariable/attachment models keyed by (resource_type, resource_id),
reusing the env-var Fernet encryption; SharedResourceService resolves merged
variables (most-recent attachment wins) with secrets masked. /api/v1/shared
endpoints + reusable TagsPanel/EnvironmentVariablesPanel + a Shared Variables
management page. Existing per-resource tables untouched (facade first).
- PR preview environments (C3): ApplicationPreview + settings models, a
PreviewService with pure domain-templating + reconcile (open PRs vs active
previews) cores and best-effort provisioning (incl. guarded WordPress
file+DB clone), a pull_request webhook endpoint, preview.* jobs, and a
Previews tab on the app detail page.
- Per-server managed proxy stack (C6): opt-in Dockerized Traefik/Caddy as a
Compose stack (host Nginx stays default and superior for PHP/WordPress).
ProxyStack model + ProxyStackService with pure compose/config generators and
versioned config backups, /api/v1/servers/<id>/proxy endpoints, and a Proxy
tab on the server detail page.
Migrations 031-034 add the new tables/columns; the full chain applies cleanly
from an empty DB. Full backend suite: 871 passed, 14 skipped; frontend builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Juan Denis