Plan 87 phase B. An app that opts in keeps two slots, like the
panel updater's two installs. A deploy boots the new release in the
idle slot on its own loopback port while the live one serves, holds
it to the health gate, then switches nginx by moving app.port to the
new slot and rewriting the vhost, so every app.port reader follows
without edits. A watch window switches back on its own if the
release falls over; the old slot stays warm for an instant switch
back, then is stopped (not removed) by a standby sweep.
Opting in adopts the running container as slot a with no restart.
Eligibility is shown with reasons and re-checked on every deploy;
opting out folds the slots back on the next in-place deploy. Slot
images are never pruned and slot ports stay reserved.
MinIO's images no longer pull, so object storage is now the Garage
template. Attach storage creates a bucket named for the app and a key
that can read and write only that bucket, keeps the secret in an
internal vault, and wires S3_* and AWS_* env through fromService and
fromSecret. Detach revokes the key and removes the env but keeps the
bucket and its objects. A docker leg proves the scope against a
real Garage.
A one-minute builtin tick tails each app's timed access log from a
stored byte offset and rolls it into minute and hour rows: status
classes, cache HIT/MISS/BYPASS/STALE and a latency histogram, so
p50/p95/p99 merge exactly across ticks and into hours. Minute rows
go after 48 h and hour rows after 30 days on the same tick. The
Overview tab gets a Traffic card.
Replaces the 29 hand-written cascade='all, delete-orphan' declarations
from c1d4c0af/1704d60b/79a78c3c with a single mapper hook
(_delete_cascade_policy): at configure time, every one-to-many whose
child FK is NOT NULL gets the delete cascade automatically — with a
NOT NULL FK the children cannot outlive the parent, so the only choice
is cascade or crash. New models (extensions included — registering one
re-fires the hook) are covered with zero ceremony; nothing to remember.
Relationships where the parent delete should be REFUSED instead opt
out in the module's DELIBERATELY_UNCASCADED registry with their
justification (User.applications guarded by delete_user's 409,
CloudProvider.servers with no delete path). The sweep test now proves
the door works rather than policing model authors, and pins the
registry so it can only shrink.
Model files revert to their pre-fix text: delete semantics live in one
place instead of twenty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
RunLogStream accepts any RunLike (__run_kind__ + id + to_dict, optional
result/step members): one room grammar run_<kind>_<id>, one batched
persisted run_log/run_status event pair, and a GET
/api/v1/runs/<kind>/<id>/logs?after_id polling twin over the new
run_log_entries table (migration 087). Deploys keep DeploymentJobLog and
dual-emit the legacy deploy_log/deploy_status during the migration
window. The unified Job runtime — which had NO live channel — adopts it
in the consumer (start/succeeded/failed frames; handlers can log via
stream_for(job)). The dead pipeline_* scaffolding was retired in E2.
Gate: emit -> persisted row -> after_id resync contract test; consumer
adoption test. MIGRATION_INVENTORY.md regenerated (census moved).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A VPS resized from 1 vCPU/1 GB to 4 vCPU/8 GB with a 60 GB volume attached,
and the panel never mentioned any of it. Not a stale cache: a resize forces a
power-off, so the process and its in-memory spec cache die and the next boot
reads the truth. The gap is that nothing ever persisted the PREVIOUS numbers,
so there was nothing to compare against — and the reboot that causes the
change is what destroys the only copy of the baseline.
Adds host_snapshots: capture specs + per-filesystem inventory at boot, diff
against the last row, and emit host.specs_changed / host.storage_advisory on a
real delta. Advisories fire on state transitions only, so an unfixed fstab
entry does not nag on every restart.
Repairs a divergence this exposed: resource_tier_service measured the first of
/var/lib/serverkit,/var/lib/docker,/ while capacity_service hardcoded /. Both
now use host_inventory_service.data_path(), and local headroom reports which
mountpoint it measured.
Notifications render in the existing bell UI, so no frontend change is needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SavedView model (user/page/name/state JSON/is_default, unique per
user+page+name), idempotent 082 migration, saved_view_service with
one-default-per-page enforcement, and a JWT-scoped /api/v1/views CRUD
blueprint. Covered by 9 endpoint tests.
An extension that needed to remember anything had to add a model to core AND an
Alembic migration for it — which is why extension tables like
ext_serverkit_minecraft_* sit in the panel's own migration history. That is a
steep tax on a small extension and it puts plugin schema in the panel's upgrade
path. A plugin now writes to a key/value store instead:
mine = store.for_plugin('serverkit-minecraft')
mine.set('world:1:seed', 8675309)
Values are JSON, so dicts and lists round-trip without hand-serialising, and
rows are namespaced by slug so two plugins cannot collide on a key. Reach for a
real table when you need to query BY the data — this is a key/value store, not
a database, and the docstring says so.
Because the table is shared by every installed plugin, three things are refused
rather than trusted: a value that isn't JSON-serializable, a value over 256 KB,
and an empty or overlong key. Validation happens at set() rather than at commit
— by commit time the error is opaque and the session is already poisoned, so
the next unrelated write fails too.
has() exists because get() cannot distinguish a stored None from a missing key,
and a plugin storing None deliberately would otherwise have no way to tell.
Concurrent writers race on insert; the unique constraint makes that safe and
the loser applies its write to the winner's row instead of failing the caller.
Store rows follow the same rule as extension-declared tables: an ordinary
uninstall leaves them, so a reinstall finds its state where it left it, and
"uninstall and delete data" removes them. The purge runs after the uninstall
lifecycle hook, since a hook may legitimately read its own store on the way out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lets a panel link itself to a master ServerKit panel as a worker WITHOUT
installing the standalone Go agent: the panel registers via the master's
existing token flow, then runs an embedded agent client (HMAC auth + HTTP
long-poll transport) that dispatches agent commands (file:write,
docker:compose:up/ps/logs, system:info/metrics) onto its own local
services. The master needs zero changes — a linked panel is just another
agent-backed Server row with scoped, revocable credentials.
- linked_panel_config table (migration 077) + Fernet-encrypted secret
- embedded agent client: connect/poll/result loop, heartbeat metrics,
per-command threads, allowed-roots guard on file:write
- API: GET/POST/DELETE /api/v1/linked-panel (+ startup resume hook)
- Servers page: LinkedPanelCard (link form, live status, unlink)
Introduces a full-stack Test Sandbox feature to run distro matrix tests in Docker from the UI: new backend API/service, sandbox_runs model + migration, run/log endpoints, and a new frontend page with mode selection, run history, live polling, cancel, and per-distro logs.
Also adds ARM64 scripts CI coverage (ubuntu-24.04-arm) and strengthens install/test automation for minimal images and overlay rebuilds: early curl/bootstrap index refresh, stricter venv validation, release-venv glibc fallback, Node reprovisioning on source fallback, rsync --delete overlay behavior, npm bootstrap in VM install, Windows tar pinning in PowerShell harness, plus updated test docs and distro coverage notes.
Stop dropping what import already detects. Add Application.healthcheck_path
(migration 054) and an application_manifests table (one row per project) storing
the normalized manifest, hash and provenance. Import now seeds non-secret env
values and records the health-check path, and the zero-downtime restart gate
polls that path instead of a blind sleep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Blueprint/model/job registrations and schedule seeding for drift,
doctor, support bundle, bandwidth, FIM, malware-scan and htaccess
tools; API module aggregation, SCSS imports and CHANGELOG for the
batch. Full backend suite: 1793 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Blueprint/model/job registrations for the migration pipeline, speed
test, metadata guard, login-link + SSO reapers (seeded with the
builtin schedules), demo-mode middleware, /imports route, API module
aggregation and SCSS imports; CHANGELOG for the batch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The DB-seeded Extension/ExtensionInstall catalog was dead weight:
nothing ever populated it on a real panel, so it fed Browse an empty
third lane redundant with the real sources (builtin folder scan, remote
registry, InstalledPlugin state), and its orphaned per-user config
plumbing connected to nothing a plugin could read (superseded by #49).
Removed: the two models, marketplace_service.py, all legacy /marketplace
CRUD/install/rate endpoints (the blueprint keeps only the registry
endpoints), the frontend published lane (catalog mappers, install/
uninstall handlers, rating stars, published stats) and its API methods.
Migration 046 drops the orphaned tables.
Pipeline + registry suites 29 green; lint 0 errors; build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Persist the databases ServerKit provisions (and let you adopt existing ones) so
backups, connection strings, and the UI have durable state -- beside, not
replacing, the live-introspection explorer. Not a DBaaS (no pooling/replicas).
- ManagedDatabase model (engine/name/host/port/origin/owner; admin secret
Fernet-encrypted, unique per engine+host+name) + migration 044.
- managed_database_service: record_provisioned (additive on the create routes),
adopt (idempotent), build_connection_uri (real URI, masked by default),
sync_state (drift detection), delete (optional drop), protect.
- Backup FK fix (the headline): a managed-DB BackupPolicy uses
target_id = managed_databases.id plus a `managed` marker, and _resolve_target
resolves the descriptor (incl. decrypted secret) from the row. Legacy
JSON-descriptor policies keep resolving unchanged (backward compatible).
- API under /api/v1/databases/managed (list/create/get+sync/delete?drop=/adopt/
connection-uri/protect); the connection-uri reveal is admin-only and audited.
- Frontend: a "Managed" panel on the Database Explorer (connection-string
reveal/copy, one-click Protect, Untrack/Drop).
- Tests: provisioning persists a row, adopt idempotent, connection URI per
engine + masking, sync_state drift, protect resolves via the real FK, legacy
policy still resolves, API masking/admin-gating/audited reveal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Give a service tracked, named persistent storage that survives redeploys,
replacing fragile relative bind mounts (./mysql-data:/var/lib/mysql).
- AppVolume model (namespaced serverkit-app-{id}-{slug}, unique per mount path)
+ migration 043.
- volume_service: create (docker volume + row, dup-path refusal), list_for_app
(rows + live inspect), delete (row-only by default; wipe only when the app is
stopped and no running container uses it), measure, convert_bind_mount,
run_args, compose_fragment, host_paths_for_app.
- Wired into the single-container deploy (_deploy_docker passes -v specs to
docker run) and new compose stacks (create_docker_app gains named_volumes ->
top-level volumes: block).
- API under /api/v1/apps/<id>/volumes (list/attach/detach?wipe=/convert), ACL
via ResourceGrantService.
- Frontend: Storage panel in Service detail Settings (attach/detach with an
off-by-default "also delete data" checkbox, disabled while running).
- Tests: create + namespaced volume, dup-path refusal, wipe safety, single-
container -v proving test, compose top-level named-volume generation, convert,
API CRUD.
Scoping: volumes are backup-addressable (mountpoints exposed; protect via the
files target) rather than force-folded into the app's single-parent incremental
tar chain, which would break restore. Live compose files (esp. the WP multidev
stack) are not rewritten -- convert_bind_mount is the opt-in migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Store per-registry credentials (Fernet-encrypted) and run `docker login`
before pulling a private image — GHCR, Docker Hub, GitLab, ECR, or any
generic registry. Public/anonymous pulls are unchanged.
- ContainerRegistry model (secret encrypted at rest; to_dict never returns it)
+ nullable applications.registry_id; migration 042.
- container_registry_service: CRUD + login/logout/test_connection (secret piped
via stdin, never on argv) + lazy ECR token exchange.
- DockerService.pull_image gains a registry= arg (login -> pull -> logout in a
try/finally). Wired into the deploy path (_deploy_docker) and the compose
path (start_app / apply_image_update): a docker login authenticates both
`docker pull` and `docker compose pull`.
- API under /api/v1/connections/registries (list=auth, writes=admin); registries
join the unified /connections list.
- Frontend: Connections hub "Container registry" card (add/test/remove with a
provider selector) + a per-app registry picker in Container Ops.
- Tests: encrypt/decrypt, stdin-not-argv, login->pull->logout ordering incl.
finally-on-failure, deploy + compose auth-before-pull, API CRUD/masking/admin.
Deviation from the plan's "single injection point": docker apps run via compose,
so login was wired into both the compose and run_container paths; remote-agent
compose is a follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Register WordPress plugins from GitHub repos or local paths in a global
library, then install or update them across any managed WP site from one
place. The per-site Plugins tab gains a "managed" badge and an
"update from library" action.
- models: WordPressCustomPlugin (library) + WordPressSitePlugin (installs)
- service: WordPressPluginLibraryService - sync, install, update, scan,
with a per-slug cache dir under paths.SERVERKIT_CACHE_DIR
- api: /plugins/library CRUD + sync/install/bulk-update on wordpress_bp
- migration 041_wordpress_plugin_library
- frontend: WordPressPluginLibrary page + "Plugin Library" tab; managed
badges and library-update action in PluginsTab
- tests: test_wp_plugin_library
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Managed sites had exactly one base domain (the sites_base_domain setting), so
every site was <slug>.<that-one>. Add a registry (site_base_domains) letting an
operator register several — example.com, toto.com — each with its own DNS mode,
HTTPS state, and DNS provider connection, so a new site can be published under
any of them (a.example.com or a.toto.com), defaulting to the one marked default.
- New SiteBaseDomain model + migration 040 (own dns_provider_config_id + cert
state per base; exactly one is_default).
- SiteBaseDomainService: add/remove/set_default/update, and ensure_seeded which
materialises the legacy single sites_base_domain setting into the default row
the first time a second domain is registered — so old and new never disagree.
- SiteDomainService is now base-aware and back-compatible: subdomain_for(name,
base), https_enabled(base), dns_mode(base), wildcard_cert_paths(base) and
give_subdomain(app, base) take an optional base; covering_base(host) picks the
base (longest match) whose wildcard cert covers a host so vhosts get the right
per-base cert; base_domain() returns the default and still falls back to the
legacy setting / SITES_BASE_DOMAIN config for un-migrated & dev installs.
Existing single-base installs are untouched (zero rows -> setting fallback);
45 existing site-domain tests still green. New coverage in
test_site_base_domains.py: seeding, default promotion/demotion, per-base
https/dns-mode/cert, longest-match cover, and give_subdomain under a chosen base.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Project / Environment hierarchy (C2): Workspace -> Project -> Environment
org model. New Project/Environment models + CRUD APIs, nullable
applications.project_id/environment_id (opt-in, no destructive backfill),
ProjectService.ensure_default, a Projects list + ProjectDetail (env tabs),
a project/environment selector in the create wizard, and sidebar nav.
- Polymorphic shared resources facade (C9): ResourceTag + SharedVariableGroup
/SharedVariable/attachment models keyed by (resource_type, resource_id),
reusing the env-var Fernet encryption; SharedResourceService resolves merged
variables (most-recent attachment wins) with secrets masked. /api/v1/shared
endpoints + reusable TagsPanel/EnvironmentVariablesPanel + a Shared Variables
management page. Existing per-resource tables untouched (facade first).
- PR preview environments (C3): ApplicationPreview + settings models, a
PreviewService with pure domain-templating + reconcile (open PRs vs active
previews) cores and best-effort provisioning (incl. guarded WordPress
file+DB clone), a pull_request webhook endpoint, preview.* jobs, and a
Previews tab on the app detail page.
- Per-server managed proxy stack (C6): opt-in Dockerized Traefik/Caddy as a
Compose stack (host Nginx stays default and superior for PHP/WordPress).
ProxyStack model + ProxyStackService with pure compose/config generators and
versioned config backups, /api/v1/servers/<id>/proxy endpoints, and a Proxy
tab on the server detail page.
Migrations 031-034 add the new tables/columns; the full chain applies cleanly
from an empty DB. Full backend suite: 871 passed, 14 skipped; frontend builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Build packs / zero-Dockerfile deploys (C1): new BuildpackService detects the
stack from a cloned repo (Node/Python/Go/PHP/Ruby/Rust/static), produces a
transparent build plan and a generated Dockerfile, and persists the plan +
overrides on the Application. POST /api/v1/buildpacks/{detect,generate}; a
BuildpackPreview shows the detected plan + editable overrides + Dockerfile in
the create wizard and the app Build tab. Builds on the existing build_method
plumbing instead of duplicating it.
- Deployment config snapshots + diff engine (C4): ConfigurationService captures
an immutable, hashed snapshot of resolved config (env keys + masked values,
domains, image/tag, build method, volumes) at every deploy and rollback; new
DeploymentSnapshot model + /api/v1/apps/<id>/snapshots[/diff|/restore]. A
DeploymentTimeline + ConfigDiffModal surface "what changed" and one-click
restore in the app Deploy tab. Secret values are never serialized.
- Template catalog certification (C5 cont.): a whole-catalog validation test
proves all 105 declarative templates conform to the documented schema; fixed
the stale index.json (was 63/105 entries) to list every bundled template.
Migration 030 adds the buildpack columns + deployment_snapshots table. Full
backend suite: 820 passed, 14 skipped; frontend builds clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four foundational enhancements toward the deploy-code developer experience:
- Container status aggregator (C7): new ContainerStatusService applies a
deterministic priority hierarchy (degraded > restarting > running:unhealthy >
starting > running:healthy > exited > unknown) over an app's containers,
cached with a short TTL. Exposed at /api/v1/status and pushed over a new
container_status Socket.IO channel; Applications page now renders an
aggregated ContainerStatusPill with sub-status tooltip.
- API token scopes + sensitive data masking (C10): require_scope() decorator
enforces fine-grained scopes for API-key requests (pass-through for JWT),
a canonical SCOPES catalog at /api/v1/api-keys/scopes, and a reusable
sensitive_data_filter (mask_sensitive) honoring secrets:read. Frontend gains
a grouped ApiKeyScopesModal picker and per-key scope pills.
- Server onboarding state machine (C8): new onboarding lifecycle
(pending -> validating -> installing_prerequisites -> installing_docker ->
pairing_agent -> ready/failed) with ServerOnboardingService, a
server_onboarding_logs table, servers.onboarding_* columns, REST endpoints,
and an OnboardingWizard surfaced on the server detail overview.
- Declarative template catalog (C5): documented catalog schema and
magic-variable resolution (SERVICE_PASSWORD_/USER_/FQDN_/URL_/BASE64_*)
layered onto the existing YAML template loader without changing behavior for
templates that don't use them; GET /api/v1/templates/catalog/schema.
Migration 029 adds the onboarding table + columns. 60 new tests pass; frontend
builds clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- /domains is one table: app-linked domains + live zones from connected DNS
providers (Cloudflare, ...) with provider badges. New GET /dns/portfolio
(aggregates provider zones, marks which are adopted) and idempotent
POST /dns/adopt (lazy-materialize a managed zone on demand).
- Every row opens one drawer = the unified DNS records surface
(components/domains/DomainDnsPanel): live Cloudflare records via
GET /dns/provider-records (no adopt needed), type badges, proxied=>HTTPS hint,
inline Add record, deep-links to Cloudflare ops / full DNS page. Fixed-layout
table (no horizontal scroll); actions moved into the drawer header.
- Registration expiry/registrar from Cloudflare Registrar + lazy RDAP fallback
(GET /dns/registration), persisted/cached in the new domain_registrations
table and merged into the portfolio so it survives a refresh. New
frontend/src/utils/expiry.js formatExpiry() date util.
- Connections moved to admin-only (Settings Admin group + isAdmin gate;
@admin_required on /api/v1/connections); CF connection card links to Domains.
- Cloudflare client: expose each zone's account_id; add list_registrar_domains.
- Tests: backend/tests/test_dns_portfolio.py.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a Tunnels tab for creating and managing Cloudflare Tunnels (cloudflared) —
exposing a local/private service through Cloudflare's edge with no public IP.
Clearly distinct from ServerKit's WireGuard remote-access tunnels (always
labelled "Cloudflare Tunnel" in the UI). Account-scoped; account resolved from
the zone.
- CloudflareTunnel model: records the connector token (encrypted at rest) and
owning connection per (account, tunnel_id).
- CloudflareClient: cfd_tunnel create (config_src=cloudflare) / list
(is_deleted=false) / delete / token / connections / configurations get+put.
- CloudflareService: create (returns + stores the one-time token, yields the
cloudflared install command), list (managed-flagged), delete, fetch install,
and public-hostname routing — sets the ingress config (always re-appends the
required http_status:404 catch-all) and best-effort upserts the proxied CNAME
hostname→<id>.cfargotunnel.com via the shared ownership-guarded DNS path.
- /api/v1/cloudflare/zones/:id/tunnels* routes (read any user; writes admin).
- TunnelsPanel (create form + one-time install box w/ copy, tunnel list with
per-tunnel install reveal and public-hostname add/remove); api methods; SCSS.
Tests: list is_deleted param, create config_src, name required, token stored
encrypted + install string, managed-flagging, delete prunes local row, ingress
built with catch-all last (7).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a Workers tab to the Cloudflare Zone Settings page for deploying edge
scripts and managing Worker routes. Workers are account-scoped, so the owning
account is resolved from the zone — the whole feature reuses the existing
Cloudflare DNS connection (no new credential).
- CloudflareWorker model: records the source ServerKit uploaded per (account,
name) so a worker can be tracked and re-deployed (created via create_all).
- CloudflareClient: zone→account lookup, list/delete scripts, and a stable
multipart PUT /scripts/{name} module upload (the still-beta resource-oriented
Workers API is deliberately avoided per the roadmap's fallback note), plus
zone Worker routes list/add/delete.
- CloudflareService: list (live scripts flagged when ServerKit-managed + routes),
deploy (validated lowercase name, records source, optional route attach),
delete, route add/delete.
- /api/v1/cloudflare/zones/:id/workers* routes (read any user; writes admin).
- WorkersPanel component (deploy form with a starter script, worker list, routes
list); api methods; SCSS.
Tests: multipart upload shape, name validation, deploy records source, list
managed-flagging, delete prunes the local row (5).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#6 dns_changes audit log (migration 027) — every record write ServerKit sends to a
connected provider is recorded at the write choke point (guarded_upsert /
guarded_delete): create/update/delete, source, result (ok|error|conflict|skipped),
and the value set. Powers the "Changes to your Cloudflare" activity feed.
GET /api/v1/dns/changes lists it (filter by config_id / zone / result).
#8 A real write failure now surfaces an admin notice via the Notification Bus
(dns.sync_failed) instead of being swallowed to the log. Best-effort — surfacing
never breaks the write it describes.
Tests: test_dns_change_log.py. The frontend activity/mirror UI lands separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#3 managed_dns_records ledger (migration 026) — the single source of truth for
records ServerKit created in a connected provider zone, written by every write
path (zones page, DDNS, WordPress auto-DNS, email).
#4 DnsOwnershipService.guarded_upsert/guarded_delete: automatic paths refuse to
overwrite or delete a record ServerKit didn't create (the user's own records),
while the explicit Zones page adopts a matching record and takes ownership.
Wired into both CF paths (DNSZoneService._cloudflare_sync and
DNSProviderService._cloudflare_set_record/_delete_record). ensure_a_record now
surfaces a 'foreign_record' reason instead of clobbering.
#5 Live zone mirror: CloudflareClient.list_records +
DNSZoneService.list_provider_records classify every live record as serverkit vs
external; GET /api/v1/dns/<id>/mirror.
Tests: test_dns_ownership.py. Existing set_record mocks updated for the new
source kwarg.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add SystemEvent model, TelemetryService, /api/v1 telemetry endpoints, and
a /telemetry UI page. Instrument audit, notification, webhook, backup,
deployment, and monitoring paths. Add correlation_id to Notification,
EventDelivery, and DeploymentJob so related events can be grouped.
- 18 backend tests added and passing
- Frontend production build clean
Reusable, non-blocking notification layer on top of the Queue Bus:
notify.send(event, to, data) records a Notification + per-channel
NotificationDelivery, queues them, and a daemon consumer delivers via
pluggable channel adapters (in-app, email, chat) inheriting retry,
backoff and dead-letter.
- Jinja2 email system: branded, dark-mode, Outlook-safe base layout +
per-event templates (security/backup/monitoring/welcome/invitation).
The legacy inline f-string email was removed and now renders here.
- In-app center API (inbox/unread-count/mark-read) + per-user Socket.IO push.
- Admin delivery log (stats/filter/retry).
- Email providers (SMTP/SendGrid/Postmark/SES/Mailgun) with encrypted
credentials + test; the email adapter prefers the default provider and
falls back to the legacy SMTP config; surfaced in ConnectionRegistry.
- NotificationService.send_all() is now a non-blocking shim that routes
system alerts through the bus. Migrations 023 + 024.
Tests: backend/tests/test_notification_bus.py (20). Full suite: 391 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add pluggable queue bus with SQLAlchemy backend (Redis-ready interface)
- Models: QueueGroup, Queue, QueueMessage with retries, visibility timeout,
delayed delivery, priority ordering, and dead-letter handling
- REST API at /api/v1/queue for groups, queues, messages, and stats
- Plugin SDK: from app.plugins_sdk import queue
- Operations UI page with group/queue/message management and send-message form
- Migrate webhook deliveries from raw threading.Thread to the queue bus
- Add webhook consumer with retry/dead-letter support
- Migration 022_queue_bus and backend tests
- Add webauthn dependency.
- Add PasskeyCredential model and Alembic migration 019_passkey_credentials.
- Add PasskeyService for registration/authentication challenge flow.
- Add auth API endpoints:
- POST /auth/passkeys/options/register
- POST /auth/passkeys/register
- GET /auth/passkeys
- DELETE /auth/passkeys/<id>
- POST /auth/passkeys/options/authenticate
- POST /auth/passkeys/authenticate
- Expose passkey_enabled flag in User.to_dict().
- Add ImageVulnerabilityScan and SbomArtifact models.
- Add ImageScannerService to download/install grype and syft into
/var/lib/serverkit/scanners, run CVE scans, generate SPDX SBOMs,
and enforce a configurable deploy gate.
- Add security API endpoints for scanner install, image scans,
scan history, deploy-gate checks, and SBOM create/download/list.
- Include lightweight image_scan badge in Application.to_dict() for UI.
- Add Alembic migration 018_image_scan_sbom.
Self-hosted tunneled reverse proxy: a service on a NAT'd host (e.g. a home
Jellyfin box) gets a public HTTPS hostname with no port-forwarding, by pairing
two agents over WireGuard. Implements Phases 0-3 of docs/REMOTE_ACCESS_ROADMAP.md.
Agent (Go):
- new internal/wireguard package: Manager interface + kernel backend (wg/ip)
and a userspace netstack backend (wireguard-go + gVisor) so Windows/macOS
peers need no driver/admin; in-process keygen returns only the public key
(private keys never leave the host)
- wireguard:keygen/interface/peer/status/forward/unforward + firewall
:allow_port/:deny_port commands; wireguard + firewall capability probes
- TCP forwarder (tnet.ListenTCP / net.Listen -> dial localhost) carries
traffic to the real service behind a netstack peer
Backend (Python):
- Tunnel + ExposedService models; tunnel_netutil (subnet allocator, health);
tunnel_broker_service (keygen->up->peer->verify, firewall open, reconcile-on-
reconnect); tunnel_publish_service (forward -> nginx -> DNS -> auth -> cert)
- nginx remote-upstream vhost (WebSocket + proxy_buffering off)
- /api/v1/tunnels CRUD + /<id>/services publish/unpublish
- panel-authoritative reconcile hooked into the agent gateway on reconnect
Frontend (React):
- Remote Access page (tunnels + exposed services, status, teardown) and an
"Expose a Local Service" wizard; new services/api/tunnels.js
Verified: go build (win/linux) + vet + go tests (forwarder + no-leak parsers);
py_compile + pytest (netutil, reconcile, nginx template); create_app boot;
eslint + npm run build. Live multi-host run pending.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce a broad Connections expansion: add RegistrarConnection model, RegistrarService and /api/v1/registrars endpoints to surface domain portfolios and expiry. Add EmailRelayService and API routes plus Postfix relay wiring to configure/test/disable outbound SMTP. Extend DNSProviderService with DigitalOcean and GoDaddy implementations and helpers. Add GitLab support to source connection service and routes. Frontend: expand Connections hub, provider catalog, modal bodies, provider icons, RegistrarPortfolio component, API client methods and styles. Add docs/CONNECTIONS_ROADMAP.md describing roadmap and intent.
An owner/admin can share a specific application (transitively its WordPress
site / DB / domains) with a specific user who doesn't own it. Access-level for
now; per-grant view/edit roles are reserved via a role column.
- New ResourceGrant model (Alembic 016, unique per user x resource) +
ResourceGrantService (grant/revoke/list/user_has_grant/granted_ids).
- Enforcement at the cleanest seams: scope_query gained grant_resource_type so
granted apps appear in the apps list (own OR granted, then workspace-narrowed);
get_app and the WordPress _owner_or_admin_app helper became grant-aware, so one
change opens every WP per-site route to a grantee.
- Grant-management API (GET/POST/DELETE /apps/<id>/grants, owner-or-admin; can't
grant to the owner; revoke is resource-scoped so you can't revoke another app's
grant by id). Uses user.id (int), not the stringified get_jwt_identity().
Verified: 4 new ACL tests (visibility, get_app, WP route access, management perms
+ idempotency + revoke), full suite 127 passed, end-to-end alembic upgrade to 016.
Deferred: a Sharing UI (next), and broadening grant-access to the generic app
operate endpoints (start/stop/update stay owner-or-admin; delete stays owner-only).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
AI is a core ServerKit primitive (not a plugin): an Intercom-style bubble + slide-in drawer on every dashboard page, with a tools+page-context assistant mode and a plain simple chat mode, SSE streaming, conversation persistence, and guarded write actions (the model proposes; the user approves).
Plugins EXTEND the assistant rather than rebuilding it: backend via app.plugins_sdk.ai (reg.tool + register_context_provider, discovered from a plugin.json ai block with install/enable/disable hooks); frontend via useServerkitAI() and a contributions.ai category (suggested_prompts, tool_renderers). The marketplace gains an ai category for discovery.
Backend: ai_service (Prompture Conversation + ProviderEnvironment + guardrails), ai_tool_registry singleton, ai_tools_builtin (core.* tools), the /api/v1/ai blueprint (SSE via a worker-thread + queue bridge, single-gevent-worker safe; in-thread confirmation gate), AiConversation/AiMessage/AiPendingAction models + migration 013, encrypted ai_* settings. Frontend: AIContext + components/ai/*, AI settings tab. Powered by Prompture (installed editable; requirements pinned).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cross-reference a site's installed plugin/theme/core slug+version against the
keyless community WPVulnerability API and surface findings per site.
WpVulnerabilityService reads installed versions via the Docker-aware WP-CLI
bridge (wp core version + get_plugins/get_themes directly — not the
host-filesystem-gated get_wordpress_info, which fails for volume-backed Docker
sites), queries https://www.wpvulnerability.net/{plugin,theme,core}/ (no key,
1h in-memory cache, descriptive UA, 8s timeout), matches the installed version
against each advisory operator bounds (core advisories all apply — the feed is
version-scoped), and extracts CVE id / severity (cvss3 -> cvss short-code ->
score) / fixed-in / reference.
Persisted as a new WordPressVulnerability child model (FK -> wordpress_sites.id)
+ a last_vuln_scan_at column (Alembic 011, idempotent). The scan runs in a
background thread (Lynis-style) so the single worker never blocks; a new
Vulnerabilities tab polls for status and renders findings with severity badges,
CVE links, and a summary. On-demand only.
Security (3-lens review): reference_url restricted to http(s) (blocks
javascript: hrefs); feed slug percent-encoded; unrecognized version operator
skips rather than over-flags; the major Docker volume-backed core-read gating
was fixed so normal sites scan. Verified: backend py_compile, frontend lint +
build. Not runtime-exercised on a real host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four files were stored with CRLF in git while .gitattributes mandates
`* text=auto eol=lf`, so git reported them as perpetually "modified":
- ROADMAP.md
- backend/app/__init__.py
- backend/app/models/__init__.py
- frontend/src/App.jsx
One-time `git add --renormalize` rewriting the stored blobs to LF. Pure
line-ending change — `git diff --ignore-cr-at-eol` is empty, i.e. zero
content was altered. Windows scripts (*.ps1/*.bat/*.cmd) are untouched;
.gitattributes pins them to CRLF and they were correctly skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Without this import, SQLAlchemy's db.metadata doesn't know about the
installed_plugins table, so MigrationService.check_and_prepare's
db.create_all() never creates it on fresh installs. The plugin loader
then fails on cold start with "no such table: installed_plugins".
Pairs with the previous fix that moved the plugin loader to run after
the migration step. Both are required; this one is what Copilot's PR
review meant by "export the model from app/models/__init__.py".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce source provider connections to allow OAuth-backed GitHub repository selection and authenticated cloning. Backend: add SourceConnection model, SettingsService keys for GitHub OAuth, and a SourceConnectionService that handles OAuth flow, token storage (encrypted), repo/branch listing, and authenticated clone URL generation. Expose new API blueprint under /api/v1/source-connections with endpoints for status, authorize, callback, repos, branches, disconnect, and admin config. Update app creation flow to accept source_connection_id and repository_full_name, use authenticated clone URLs for cloning/deploy, and sanitize clone errors to show public repo URLs. Frontend: add SourceConnectionsTab UI, source connection callback route/component, extend App routes, and revamp New Service page to support connecting GitHub, picking repositories/branches, or using a manual git remote; update API client and styles accordingly. Note: database migration will be required to create the source_connections table and admins must configure GitHub client ID/secret.
Juan Denis