Every NOT NULL FK from the KNOWN_DANGLING_ON_DELETE audit now declares
its parent-side relationship, so the delete-cascade policy door covers
it: AI conversations/pending actions, API keys, dashboards, event
subscriptions, login links, sent invitations, resource grants (users);
env vars + history, previews + settings, WAF policy (applications);
surveys, doctor results, proxy stack, tunnels (servers); manifests
(projects); DDNS hosts (zones); exposed services (tunnels); drills
(backup policies); rollouts (agent versions); site plugin installs
(WordPress sites); queue messages (groups). The ratchet set is now
EMPTY and stays that way.
One new deliberate exception: Workspace.projects — projects carry
environments and app groupings, so delete_workspace now refuses (409)
while any remain instead of silently destroying them (previously it
crashed with IntegrityError).
Migration 095 sweeps rows already orphaned on existing installs by
pre-fix hard-deletes — including an application's leftover env-var
secrets, which a reused SQLite row id could have attached to a future
app.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TimestampMixin (byte-identical to the hand-written pair — zero schema
migrations) adopted by 52 classes across 44 model files; the utcnow
tz-aware migration is now a one-file edit. uuid_pk() replaces the 13
pasted String(36) uuid4 lambdas across 7 files (ai.py's hex variant
stays grandfathered, documented). Deviant shapes (indexed created_at,
sanitization_profile's default-less updated_at, created-only models)
deliberately keep their own columns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Self-hosted tunneled reverse proxy: a service on a NAT'd host (e.g. a home
Jellyfin box) gets a public HTTPS hostname with no port-forwarding, by pairing
two agents over WireGuard. Implements Phases 0-3 of docs/REMOTE_ACCESS_ROADMAP.md.
Agent (Go):
- new internal/wireguard package: Manager interface + kernel backend (wg/ip)
and a userspace netstack backend (wireguard-go + gVisor) so Windows/macOS
peers need no driver/admin; in-process keygen returns only the public key
(private keys never leave the host)
- wireguard:keygen/interface/peer/status/forward/unforward + firewall
:allow_port/:deny_port commands; wireguard + firewall capability probes
- TCP forwarder (tnet.ListenTCP / net.Listen -> dial localhost) carries
traffic to the real service behind a netstack peer
Backend (Python):
- Tunnel + ExposedService models; tunnel_netutil (subnet allocator, health);
tunnel_broker_service (keygen->up->peer->verify, firewall open, reconcile-on-
reconnect); tunnel_publish_service (forward -> nginx -> DNS -> auth -> cert)
- nginx remote-upstream vhost (WebSocket + proxy_buffering off)
- /api/v1/tunnels CRUD + /<id>/services publish/unpublish
- panel-authoritative reconcile hooked into the agent gateway on reconnect
Frontend (React):
- Remote Access page (tunnels + exposed services, status, teardown) and an
"Expose a Local Service" wizard; new services/api/tunnels.js
Verified: go build (win/linux) + vet + go tests (forwarder + no-leak parsers);
py_compile + pytest (netutil, reconcile, nginx template); create_app boot;
eslint + npm run build. Live multi-host run pending.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
