8 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Juan DenisandClaude Fable 5 5417c39100 perf(models): index every foreign-key column
An audit found 102 FK columns with no index — every join, per-parent
listing, and the delete cascades from _delete_cascade_policy scanned
whole tables on them (deployments.app_id, audit_logs.user_id,
dns_records.zone_id, webhook_logs.webhook_id, ...). All FK columns now
declare index=True; migration 096 creates the same indexes on existing
installs, deriving the list from the live schema at upgrade time (so
it is idempotent and cannot drift from what an install actually has).

Ratchet: test_every_fk_column_is_indexed pins the rule with no
allowlist — a new FK column is born indexed or the build fails.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 20:42:53 -04:00
Juan DenisandClaude Fable 5 f34969eaac fix(models): close all 26 dangling-on-delete FKs + orphan sweep migration
Every NOT NULL FK from the KNOWN_DANGLING_ON_DELETE audit now declares
its parent-side relationship, so the delete-cascade policy door covers
it: AI conversations/pending actions, API keys, dashboards, event
subscriptions, login links, sent invitations, resource grants (users);
env vars + history, previews + settings, WAF policy (applications);
surveys, doctor results, proxy stack, tunnels (servers); manifests
(projects); DDNS hosts (zones); exposed services (tunnels); drills
(backup policies); rollouts (agent versions); site plugin installs
(WordPress sites); queue messages (groups). The ratchet set is now
EMPTY and stays that way.

One new deliberate exception: Workspace.projects — projects carry
environments and app groupings, so delete_workspace now refuses (409)
while any remain instead of silently destroying them (previously it
crashed with IntegrityError).

Migration 095 sweeps rows already orphaned on existing installs by
pre-fix hard-deletes — including an application's leftover env-var
secrets, which a reused SQLite row id could have attached to a future
app.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 20:25:29 -04:00
Juan DenisandClaude Fable 5 7fd90a6c87 refactor(models): one door for delete cascades on NOT NULL child FKs
Replaces the 29 hand-written cascade='all, delete-orphan' declarations
from c1d4c0af/1704d60b/79a78c3c with a single mapper hook
(_delete_cascade_policy): at configure time, every one-to-many whose
child FK is NOT NULL gets the delete cascade automatically — with a
NOT NULL FK the children cannot outlive the parent, so the only choice
is cascade or crash. New models (extensions included — registering one
re-fires the hook) are covered with zero ceremony; nothing to remember.

Relationships where the parent delete should be REFUSED instead opt
out in the module's DELIBERATELY_UNCASCADED registry with their
justification (User.applications guarded by delete_user's 409,
CloudProvider.servers with no delete path). The sweep test now proves
the door works rather than policing model authors, and pins the
registry so it can only shrink.

Model files revert to their pre-fix text: delete semantics live in one
place instead of twenty.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 20:04:12 -04:00
Juan DenisandClaude Fable 5 79a78c3c38 fix(models): repo-wide delete-cascade audit for NOT NULL child FKs
Follow-up to 1704d60b, prompted by 'can this happen elsewhere?' — a
mapper-wide audit found 22 more one-to-many relationships whose child
FK is NOT NULL but which lacked a delete cascade, so hard-deleting the
parent (user/server/workspace/template/plugin delete, deployment
retention pruning, WP site teardown) raised the same IntegrityError as
the Recycle Bin purge.

20 get the cascade: plugin installs, deployment diffs, metric alerts,
template assignments (both sides), WP activities/sync/promotion jobs
(both sides), workspace members/keys, and the per-user detail rows
(passkeys, OAuth identities, notification prefs, sanitization
profiles, source connections, workflows, workspace memberships).

2 stay uncascaded on purpose, now enforced: User.applications (delete_
user refuses with 409 while the user owns apps — apps must go through
app delete + Recycle Bin purge so containers/volumes are cleaned) and
CloudProvider.servers (no delete path exists; dropping VM inventory
must stay a deliberate decision). The invariant sweep is now global
across every mapper with exactly that allowlist, which may only shrink.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 19:47:32 -04:00
Juan DenisandClaude Fable 5 e810016005 refactor(models): finish JsonColumnMixin adoption — no hand-rolled json.loads (plan 77 B4)
~60 call sites across 24 model files now ride _json_read with each
site's exact default preserved; 34 classes newly adopt the mixin
(registry contract test expanded to 36). Reverses the old 'bare sites
stay raising' ruling: a corrupt row degrades to its default instead of
500ing every serializing endpoint (docstring updated). Ratchet:
json.loads( appears only in json_column_mixin.py.

Known pre-existing: test_host_inventory enumerate_filesystems failures
on this machine (verified via clean-tree stash rerun).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 02:15:09 -04:00
Juan DenisandClaude Fable 5 4919ff1cfe refactor(models): TimestampMixin + uuid_pk() one-door shapes (plan 77 B1/B3)
TimestampMixin (byte-identical to the hand-written pair — zero schema
migrations) adopted by 52 classes across 44 model files; the utcnow
tz-aware migration is now a one-file edit. uuid_pk() replaces the 13
pasted String(36) uuid4 lambdas across 7 files (ai.py's hex variant
stays grandfathered, documented). Deviant shapes (indexed created_at,
sanitization_profile's default-less updated_at, created-only models)
deliberately keep their own columns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 01:59:10 -04:00
Juan DenisandClaude Opus 4.8 d9a5ec7e92 feat(workspaces): per-resource access grants — per-site ACL backend (#33)
An owner/admin can share a specific application (transitively its WordPress
site / DB / domains) with a specific user who doesn't own it. Access-level for
now; per-grant view/edit roles are reserved via a role column.

- New ResourceGrant model (Alembic 016, unique per user x resource) +
  ResourceGrantService (grant/revoke/list/user_has_grant/granted_ids).
- Enforcement at the cleanest seams: scope_query gained grant_resource_type so
  granted apps appear in the apps list (own OR granted, then workspace-narrowed);
  get_app and the WordPress _owner_or_admin_app helper became grant-aware, so one
  change opens every WP per-site route to a grantee.
- Grant-management API (GET/POST/DELETE /apps/<id>/grants, owner-or-admin; can't
  grant to the owner; revoke is resource-scoped so you can't revoke another app's
  grant by id). Uses user.id (int), not the stringified get_jwt_identity().

Verified: 4 new ACL tests (visibility, get_app, WP route access, management perms
+ idempotency + revoke), full suite 127 passed, end-to-end alembic upgrade to 016.

Deferred: a Sharing UI (next), and broadening grant-access to the generic app
operate endpoints (start/stop/update stay owner-or-admin; delete stays owner-only).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-01 11:59:34 -04:00
Juan DenisandClaude Opus 4.6 fcc7abaf3f Add multi-tenancy workspaces with member management and quotas
Phase 30: Workspace isolation, role-based membership (owner/admin/member/viewer),
workspace-scoped API keys, usage quotas, archive/restore, branding, and
super-admin cross-workspace view.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-23 02:14:04 -04:00