The SSL-enable and server-overview changes put session and query
calls in the routes, tripping the controller-boundary ratchet. Move
them into SiteDomainService and WorkspaceService, raise a typed error
for bad allowed_ips, point the ACME-contact test at the new vhost
door, and regenerate the baseline and inventory (476 -> 453).
The 3,000-line file mixed core server routes with Docker, agent
install/update/fleet and remote host operations. Those sections move
verbatim into servers_docker, servers_agents and servers_remote on the
same blueprint; the registered route map (127 rules, methods and
endpoint names) is identical before and after.
The controller-boundary scan only treated files that create a
Blueprint as controllers, so an area module would have escaped it; it
now also counts files that register routes.
QueueBusError is an expected, caller-actionable failure, so it now
subclasses ApplicationError and the global handler answers it with its
own status. The 21 queue-bus routes each wrapped their whole body in
try/except only to do that by hand. Also records the two workspace
queries the previous commit moved out of the API layer.
Nine route files each loaded the live app and checked access, with
four return shapes, docstrings promising error tuples the code never
returned, and 41 dead 'if err: return err' branches. require_app()
backed by ResourceGrantService.get_app_for does it once; conceal=True
keeps the 404-for-denied answer the previews, WAF and slot routes
already gave, so no route's status changes. Nine query sites leave the
API layer.
The server access helper and the app-name clash checks queried the DB
from the API layer, which the controller-boundary scan rejects. They
now go through WorkspaceService.get_accessible_server and
Application.name_clash_error; the baseline drops by three.
Replica counts could be changed, but nginx only proxied to one port
and the auto-scale sweep was never scheduled, so neither the
Auto-scale section nor its five routes could work; the nginx
upstream builder had no UI at all. With one live copy per app they
are gone, and the scale-policy table is dropped. Running containers
are not touched. The scaling spec now says replicas are not
pursued.
Keep connection persistence behind the service boundary, use typed errors and shared JSON parsing, and refresh reviewed inventories. The new GET connection catalog accepts API keys so API clients managing connections can discover IDs without exposing credentials; existing JWT-only routes stay unchanged. Add regression coverage and release notes.
Centralize backup schedule calculations and shared request/form flows, encode query values, and move repository finalization into its service. Add browser CI coverage, repair stale test fixtures, and provide opt-in request and build measurement tools.
Controller-boundary baseline drops the three api/security.py crossings that
moved to serverkit-image-scan; API surface sheds the 18 Gitea operations;
migration inventory regenerated by preflight; test-count floor raised
4735 -> 4799 (SERVERKIT_CLEAN_COLLECT).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The recipes Phase 0 commit moved all three measured counts without
regenerating their baselines. The new api/recipes.py persistence
crossings are owned and documented in the baseline; the hand-shaped
error census is unchanged by this branch.
Two more shards were red on generated artifacts nobody regenerated:
- api_controller_boundary_baseline.json: the attachment round rewrote
_persist_user_message to build the row before adding it, so the fingerprint
moved from `db.session.add(AiMessage(...))` to `db.session.add(message)`.
Same crossing, same category, count unchanged at 509 -- one line.
- docs/MIGRATION_INVENTORY.md: three measured numbers had moved without a
regeneration -- bare @jwt_required() routes 577 -> 576, and the two frontend
rows whose totals come from maps inside check-frontend-boundaries.mjs
(setInterval pollers 10 -> 9, hex colour literals 151 -> 150). All three are
deterministic AST/constant counts, so these are CI's numbers, not this box's.
The reason nobody caught the inventory locally is the third fix here: the
generator hardcoded `node`, and under WSL the Windows nvm directory is on PATH
but exposes only `node.exe`, so test_migration_inventory.py skipped on the dev
box. Both the generator and the test now resolve $NODE / node / node.exe, and
the test runs instead of skipping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two nets, deliberately complementary, because neither alone would have caught
the advisory:
- `test_route_authz_sweep.py` fires every mutating route as a viewer and
fails on any 2xx outside a reviewed `VIEWER_WRITABLE` list. It proves
*enforcement*, but a route that 400s or 404s on a dummy request before its
gate runs is invisible to it — `POST /workspaces/` 400s on an empty body,
so the net would never have seen the bug it exists for. Hence the targeted
Part A: the fixed routes must answer a viewer and a developer with 403, and
must not block an admin.
- `test_route_authz_static.py` proves *coverage* from the source instead: every
mutating route in `url_map` either carries a `_sk_authz` decorator, reaches
an authorization primitive through its module's call graph, or sits in
SELF_SCOPED / PUBLIC_ALT_AUTH / STATELESS with a written justification.
Staleness checks keep an allowlist slot from outliving the route that
earned it, and a SELF_SCOPED entry must still resolve the caller's identity
— calling `get_current_user()` is necessary but not sufficient, which is
exactly how `create_workspace` looked self-scoped while creating a global
row.
Both nets are blind below the API layer and to public routes, so
`test_authz_round3_guards.py` covers the three fixes whose shape they cannot
express (API-key scope widening, demo-deploy job creation, nginx diff
containment), the webhook cases land beside the rest of the gateway surface,
and the shared-resource tag gate lands with its own blueprint's tests. Each
comes with its non-vacuity case: the same call succeeds for a caller the gate
admits.
`migrations/history` gets tests because it had none — which is why the
NameError in it shipped.
Ratchets: JWT-only census 605 -> 577 (the routes that moved to policy
decorators), the controller-boundary baseline loses the one persistence
crossing `complete_onboarding` no longer makes, and the collected-test floor
rises to 4431.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The full-suite run tripped four ratchets on plan-77's own additions —
exactly their job: /api/v1/runs moves onto auth_required (the JWT-only
ceiling holds at 605) and behind run_log_service.list_run_logs (no
model access in the controller); the core-blueprint snapshot records
runs_bp deliberately (108 -> 109 + sha); sso_service joins the crypto
allowlist (C2 dual-read lives there by design); the controller-boundary
baseline re-records the two pre-existing ManagedDatabase crossings under
their B5 query_active spelling (count unchanged).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan 76 milestone A, the third row. 23 handlers decided admin access inline,
all in two files, in two shapes.
18 were the mid-route gate this milestone already built a door for:
current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
user = User.query.get(current_user_id)
if user.role != 'admin':
return jsonify({'error': 'Admin access required'}), 403
which is four lines to say require_admin_user(), and carried the two-line
identity lookup with it. Migrating them closes both rows at once: the identity
census drops 87 -> 69 and the controller-boundary baseline loses 18 persistence
crossings (528 -> 510), with no new entries.
It also fixes a latent 500: where the check omitted the `not user or` guard, a
token naming a deleted user hit `None.role` instead of answering 403.
The other 5 are `not user.is_admin and app.user_id != user.id` — admin OR
owner, which is a different question. Those keep their shape and only converge
the truth source from `role != 'admin'` to `is_admin`; routing them through
can_access_app would silently widen access, since that also honours resource
grants.
The migration initially left `current_user_id` referenced but unbound in four
places. Two were caught by tests; the other two (create_manual_app,
upload_app_archive) have no coverage and were caught by an AST scan for names
used-but-never-assigned. Worth remembering that a mechanical removal needs the
scan, not just the suite.
Gate: -k "system or apps or app_ or host_snapshot or manual_app or upload",
304 passed / 13 skipped; all seven ratchets green (52 passed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
a7d5a0b9 replaced hand-shaped 500s in docker.py and notifications.py with
unexpected_response(), which rolls the session back itself, so those two routes
no longer call db.session.rollback() directly. Controller-boundary persistence
crossings 519 -> 517; no new entries.
Caught by the full per-file sweep rather than the focused gate, which did not
include this ratchet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan 76 milestone A, drift/bug row 2 — scheduled as a fix, not a refactor,
because it is a behaviour difference shipping today.
rbac.get_current_user() is the only lookup that knows about both auth
mechanisms: it returns g.api_key_user for an X-API-Key request and falls back
to the JWT. 73 call sites answered "who is calling" with
`User.query.get(get_jwt_identity())` instead, behind 19 near-identical private
helpers (12 named get_current_user(), shadowing the real door).
The audit that scheduled this row predicted those return None for API-key
callers. Measured, it is worse: auth_required() deliberately skips
verify_jwt_in_request() once the key middleware has authenticated, so there is
no JWT context and get_jwt_identity() *raises*. Nine handlers reached through
an API-key-capable policy decorator therefore returned 500 to every API-key
caller:
bandwidth.get_app_bandwidth @viewer_required
servers.set_server_workspace @developer_required
servers.create_server @developer_required
sso.get_sso_config / update_provider_config / update_general_settings
source_connections.update_{github,gitlab,bitbucket}_admin_config
source_connections.complete_github_app_manifest
databases.execute_{mysql,pg,sqlite,docker}_query (see below)
Three service helpers had the same lookup inside a blanket `except Exception`,
which converted the raise into a silent user_id=None — the write landed and
the audit trail lost the actor (shared_resource_service, cf_ops_change_service,
secrets_webhooks).
The four databases.execute_*_query sites were a second admin check *inside* an
already-@admin_required route: dead code that always passed for JWT callers and
crashed for API-key ones. They now call require_admin_user() rather than
re-deriving the answer.
Also folds in a sixth _require_admin() found in the cloudflare-ops extension
source (29 gates, the same inverted contract as jobs.py), and fixes
serverkit-gui's blueprint at its sibling-repo source rather than in this repo's
live copy.
Ratchet (second-wave rule 1 — a migration without one regrows):
tests/identity_door_census.py counts both bypass shapes by AST, direct and the
two-line `uid = get_jwt_identity(); User.query.get(uid)` variant. The ceiling is
87, all of them on @jwt_required()-only routes where reading the JWT is correct
today; the ratchet's third assertion holds the API-key-capable population at
exactly zero, so migrating one of those routes to a policy decorator without
fixing its lookup now fails. Verified non-vacuous: an injected bypass fails both
assertions and passes again on revert.
The first wave's controller-boundary baseline is regenerated — this removes 74
persistence crossings (593 -> 519), a debt reduction with no new entries.
Gate: tests/test_api_key_identity.py (7, each red before the fix),
test_identity_door_ratchet.py (10), test_api_controller_boundaries.py (4), plus
the 65 test files covering every touched module: 1024 passed, 10 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan 75 §G1, the remaining 33 files. Every raw subprocess call site in
backend/app that can go through a door now does. What is left is what
should be:
8 app/utils/system.py the doors themselves
8 database_service mysqldump|gzip, gunzip|mysql, pg_dump|gzip,
gunzip|psql — a pipe is two processes
7 build/docker/db_sync/ftp streaming output, gzip pipes
1 log_service tail -f
2 serverkit-analytics sibling repo; see below
Extensions were migrated in BOTH trees. builtin-extensions/ is the source
and backend/app/plugins/ the live copy, compared by normalised hash;
test_builtin_extension_drift stays green. serverkit-email has both sides
tracked, serverkit-ftp and serverkit-cloud-provision only the source.
serverkit-analytics (2 calls) is deliberately untouched: it has no source
in builtin-extensions/ at all, and backend/app/plugins/serverkit-analytics
is a gitignored materialised copy. Editing it would be a change that
cannot be committed and is overwritten on the next sync — that fix belongs
in the serverkit-analytics repo.
Exit-code semantics are preserved wherever they carry meaning, with a
comment at each site, because they are the thing a mechanical migration
destroys: clamscan 1 = INFECTED, grype 1 = vulnerabilities FOUND, yara
1 = matches, cron_runner 127 = never launched. Those read
result['returncode'], never result['success'].
run_checked gained two things real call sites needed: it yields when the
caller directs the streams itself (writing straight to a log file), rather
than adding capture_output on top and raising ValueError; and text/errors
pass through, so site_importers/ssh keeps decoding with errors='replace'
instead of gaining a UnicodeDecodeError on a bad byte.
A regression this migration introduced, caught by the suite and fixed:
install_profile_service._docker_usable() is deliberately TRI-STATE —
None means the probe could not run, because inside LXC the docker client
is usually present while the daemon never started, and callers "must not
treat a broken probe as proof of absence". Writing it as
run_checked(...)['success'] turned an exec failure into False, i.e. "docker
is not usable" — a fact nobody established. That is the §A violation this
plan exists to remove, reintroduced by the migration meant to prevent it.
test_probe_honesty_doctor caught it. Every other run_checked(...)['success']
caller was then audited; the rest are genuinely two-state, and their
originals also returned False on a missing binary.
Seven more slips of the same shape were caught before running by an AST
check for `x = run_checked(...)` followed by `x.stdout/.stderr/.returncode`
— a dict read as an object, which raises only on the failure path, so
happy-path tests stay green.
api_controller_boundary_baseline.json: pure deletion. Routing api/docker.py
through DockerService removed the last 6 subprocess crossings, so the
`subprocess` category is gone from the API layer entirely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Juan Denis