The first pass left routes that hand the body straight to a service
(create_zone(data), MonitorService.create(data), ...). Those services
read it as a dict, so a body of null, [] or a bare string still
crashed them into a 500. Agent long-poll, external webhook receivers
and the routes that already type-check their body are left alone.
328 more routes used a JSON body as a dict straight from
request.get_json(), so a body of null, [] or a bare string crashed them
into a 500. Bare reads become json_object(); the
'get_json(silent=True) or {}' reads of action routes become
json_object(optional=True), which still treats a missing body as {}.
Routes that take arrays or pass the body through untouched are left
alone. The full backend suite shows no new failures.
Also carries three files' bare section citations (apps, backups,
notifications) and the extended citation guard, which needed them.
Comments, docstrings and a few strings cited plan numbers ("plan 29
#9", "plan 86 §B2") from a git-ignored folder, so they pointed at
nothing; one reached users in a bottleneck hint. Code and frontend
strings are unchanged apart from those citations (checked by AST and
token comparison). A vhost still carrying the old asset comment reads
as undrifted, and a guard test keeps new citations out.
The 1791-line security omnibus splits along tool lines and the install-gated
surfaces leave core for five standalone extensions - serverkit-clamav
(ClamAV+YARA scanning, quarantine, scan jobs), serverkit-fail2ban
(management UI; probes stay core on Fail2banJailService), serverkit-lynis,
serverkit-auto-updates, and serverkit-image-scan (headless CVE/SBOM
scanning; models stay core per the plan 52 D1 data seam). Each mounts its
routes back at the same /api/v1/security prefix when installed, so route
shapes never change; absent extensions mean plain 404s, no dead UI.
Core keeps the zero-host-package baseline: status/config, legacy integrity,
suspicious activity/events, SSH keys, IP lists, the audit (fail2ban check
now probes via the jail service; updates check was already self-contained),
scoped FIM, and the scan/alert logs + notification helpers extensions write
through. Job handlers for security.malware_scan/lynis_scan/image_scan now
come exclusively from the extensions' manifest jobs key.
Security page becomes core-tabs-only; extension tabs contribute into the
security tab group (3a groupId). Overview posture drops the hardcoded
ClamAV rows and offers the Marketplace when no security extension is
installed. Upgrade parity: run_registry_auto_install() installs each
extension from the registry once, gated on the host tool actually being
present, fail-soft until the registry entry is published.
Wizard round 2 (Ph5): a security-posture chooser (minimal/recommended/
hardened) on the Summary step, catalog-resolved so unpublished slugs never
render dead installs; persisted as onboarding_security_posture.
Moved test suites re-home to the extension repos; panel keeps
test_security_suite_extraction.py (18 proving tests: absent-shape 404s,
lean summary, jail-service probes, migration gates, posture wiring).
docs/API_SURFACE.md regenerated (34 operations moved out).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
enqueue_scan/resolve_app_path raise NotFoundError/ValidationError; the
scan routes drop their except-ValueError prose sniffs and let the global
handler map. Sniffing census 9 -> 8.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan 76 milestone B, drift/bug row 4. 43 API handlers answered HTTP 500 from
their own `except Exception`, so the global 500 handler never ran — and that
handler was the ONLY caller of error_log_service.record_error(source='backend').
Every one of those crashes was absent from /monitoring/errors, and the page read
empty precisely because someone had "handled" them.
35 of the 43 also returned str(exc) to the caller. Two returned the full
traceback (templates.py, which also print()ed it), and several logged with a
locally-minted uuid4 'ref' that correlated with nothing but a log line.
The recording side of the 500 handler moves to app/error_reporting.py, so it is
importable rather than reachable only by not-catching:
record_unexpected(exc) -> logs, rolls the session back, records, returns
the request id
unexpected_response(exc) -> the above plus the documented crash body
The 500 handler now calls the same pair, so there is one recorder rather than
one recorder and 43 routes that quietly opted out of it.
Caller-visible change on those endpoints: the body is now the documented
{'error': 'Internal server error', 'status': 500, 'code': 'internal_error',
'request_id': ...} instead of the exception text. That is the point — an
unexpected exception's text is written for whoever reads the log and routinely
carries connection strings, absolute paths, and SQL. The request id is the part
a caller can act on, and it matches the row in the error log. No frontend code
read the 'ref' or 'trace' keys this drops (checked).
Two sites keep their own wording and call record_unexpected instead: sso.py's
login failures should not read as a generic crash on the login page.
docker.py's bulk endpoint keeps its per-item `results` — the caller's half-done
work survives, only the exception text is dropped.
Ratchet: tests/unreported_crash_census.py + its test, held at **0**, not a
legacy baseline to shrink. It counts blanket handlers that answer 500 without
calling either reporter, and is scoped to app/api — a service catching an
exception and returning a value is making a domain decision, not declaring an
HTTP crash. Verified non-vacuous: an injected handler fails it, and it passes
again on revert.
Measured and deliberately still open: 56 API handlers swallow a crash and
answer 200. A failure reported as success is worse, but converging it is
milestone C's response-envelope work, not this row.
Gate: tests/test_unexpected_error_reporting.py (11, including the two that pin
why the old shape lost the crash), test_unreported_crash_ratchet.py (9), and
the 66 test files covering every touched module: 1105 passed, 7 skipped, 1
pre-existing Windows-only failure (test_fleet_doctor's socket.gaierror).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Malware scans run as jobs and can target an app's docroot; a curated
web-shell rule set (yara CLI when present, pure-Python fallback) runs
alongside ClamAV with custom .yar upload; quarantine gains restore via
original-path metadata. Note: api/security.py also carries the FIM
routes of the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add app/utils/formatting.py with format_bytes() and delegate 9 duplicated
human-readable byte formatters across services.
- Import admin_required from app.middleware.rbac in 15 API modules instead of
redefining it locally.
- Extend app/utils/slug.py with validate_app_name() and use it for template
install/validation and apps slug normalization.
Add a POST /security/clamav/start endpoint and SecurityService.start_clamav() to enable+start the ClamAV daemon (tries clamav-daemon and clamd). Add unit tests that mock ServiceControl to verify success/failure and auth. Wire a startClamAV API call into the frontend and extend the Security Overview: richer posture UI, one-click fixes (install, start service, init integrity, update defs), KPIs, icons, and accessibility improvements. Update related styles and file-manager minor styles. This improves operator workflows by allowing a one-click "Start service" posture fix and provides immediate UI feedback when fixes run.
- Add ImageVulnerabilityScan and SbomArtifact models.
- Add ImageScannerService to download/install grype and syft into
/var/lib/serverkit/scanners, run CVE scans, generate SPDX SBOMs,
and enforce a configurable deploy gate.
- Add security API endpoints for scanner install, image scans,
scan history, deploy-gate checks, and SBOM create/download/list.
- Include lightweight image_scan badge in Application.to_dict() for UI.
- Add Alembic migration 018_image_scan_sbom.
Implemented backend and frontend support for Fail2ban management, SSH key management, IP allowlist/blocklist, security audit reports, Lynis vulnerability scanning, and automatic security updates. Added new API endpoints and service methods for these features in the backend, and introduced corresponding tabs and UI components in the frontend Security page for comprehensive server security administration.
Introduces backend security API and service for malware scanning (ClamAV), file integrity monitoring, suspicious activity detection, and security event logging. Adds frontend Security page, navigation, and styles for managing scans, quarantine, integrity checks, and viewing security events. Integrates security routes and UI into the application.
Juan Denis