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Juan DenisandClaude Opus 4.8
cdcfba5980
Backend: - Plugin data models (manifest `models` → ext_<slug>_ tables; upgrade hook; purge on uninstall) via extension_lifecycle.py - Declarative jobs/schedules wired into the Jobs SDK; pause on disable, resume on enable, removed on uninstall - Socket.IO extension point (plugins_sdk.sockets → status-guarded /ext/<slug>) - Permission capability gate (plugins_sdk.permissions.require_permission) - Version compat gates enforced at every install source + panel_version() SDK; app/utils/version.py - Keep-data vs purge on uninstall (lifecycle.uninstall(plugin, purge=)) - Plugin-asset serving route (delivery foundation, ADR 0001); manifest-spec documents all new fields Frontend: - Generic PluginSlot; mounted dashboard.top / service.detail.tab / domain.drawer.panel - Uninstall keep/purge dialog; permission consent list + config_schema preview on the extension detail modal Docs: ADR 0001 (frontend delivery), ADR 0002 (sandboxing note), EXTENSIONS.md updates; scripts/new-extension.mjs scaffolder (#40). Tests: test_extension_platform.py (11). Full backend suite: 1197 passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
67 lines
2.5 KiB
Python
67 lines
2.5 KiB
Python
"""Extension permission model + capability gate (#25).
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A manifest's declared ``permissions`` become enforceable capability checks. A
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plugin calls ``require(slug, capability)`` (or the SDK re-export
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``require_permission``) before doing something privileged; if the plugin did not
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declare that permission, it raises ``PermissionDenied``.
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This is **in-process, declaration-based** enforcement. Combined with install-time
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consent (the install dialog surfaces requested permissions from the manifest) and
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the curated registry, it's the accepted risk posture (decision D6). It does NOT
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sandbox a plugin that reaches for a raw host import without going through the gate
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— true out-of-process isolation is deliberately out of scope (plan #42). The gate
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makes honest plugins verifiable and gives the host a single choke point to tighten
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later.
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"""
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import logging
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Canonical host capabilities a manifest may request. Agent-command permissions
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# use the namespaced form ``agent.command:<action>`` and are matched verbatim.
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KNOWN_PERMISSIONS = {'docker', 'filesystem', 'shell', 'network', 'db'}
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class PermissionDenied(PermissionError):
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"""Raised when a plugin uses a capability it did not declare."""
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def declared_permissions(slug):
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"""The set of permissions the installed plugin `slug` declared (empty if the
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plugin is unknown)."""
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from app.models.plugin import InstalledPlugin
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p = InstalledPlugin.query.filter_by(slug=slug).first()
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if not p:
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return set()
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perms = (p.manifest or {}).get('permissions') or []
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if not isinstance(perms, list):
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return set()
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return {str(x) for x in perms}
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def has(slug, capability):
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"""True if plugin `slug` declared `capability`."""
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return capability in declared_permissions(slug)
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def require(slug, capability):
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"""Assert plugin `slug` declared `capability`, else raise PermissionDenied."""
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if not has(slug, capability):
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raise PermissionDenied(
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f"Plugin '{slug}' has not declared the '{capability}' permission. "
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f"Add it to the plugin.json \"permissions\" array."
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)
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return True
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def unknown_permissions(permissions):
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"""Return declared permissions that aren't recognized host capabilities
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(agent-command permissions are always accepted). Useful for review/consent UI."""
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out = []
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for p in permissions or []:
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p = str(p)
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if p in KNOWN_PERMISSIONS or p.startswith('agent.command:'):
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continue
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out.append(p)
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return out
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