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Juan DenisandClaude Opus 5
5f8a3ef204
Plan 70. Domain went through this and TEN read paths were wrong, four with
effects outside the panel. Application has 211 call sites across 68 files and
drives more -- container lifecycles, nginx, backups, registry pulls, the OS
crontab -- so it was audited in full first (docs/plans/70_...md). 180 sites are
now query_active(); the 35 left unfiltered are each commented in place.
**The delete / purge split is what makes the tombstone honest.** delete_app used
to run compose_down(volumes=True) and rmtree(). Keeping a tombstone AND doing
that would put a Restore button next to a row whose data the delete had already
destroyed -- the one promise a recycle bin cannot break. So:
DELETE containers down (VOLUMES KEPT), vhost removed, firewall closed,
cron suspended, row tombstoned. All reversible.
RESTORE vhost rewritten, firewall reopened, cron resumed. Containers left
STOPPED -- "put it back" must not silently start processes or open
ports, the same reasoning that stops domain restore re-issuing certs.
PURGE volumes removed, uploaded source deleted, cron detached.
register() gained on_purge for that, wired into BOTH purge paths. And
purge_expired had NO scheduler -- fine when a tombstone was just a row, not fine
when it holds data volumes and a source tree, so a daily builtin job now runs
it. Without that, "kept until purge" would have meant kept forever and delete
would have quietly stopped reclaiming disk.
A side effect worth naming: the old _remove_data_flag protection for database
engines is now the DEFAULT for every app, and the flag is carried into
?purge=true so an explicit skip-the-bin delete still honours it.
**Cron was the blocker with no mechanical answer.** before_delete never fires on
a soft delete, and clear_application is LOSSY -- it nulls the association
without recording it, so nothing could put it back. suspend_for_application
instead disables only the jobs that were CURRENTLY ENABLED and stamps each
suspended_by_app; resume re-enables exactly those. That flag is the whole point:
without it a restore switches back on jobs the user deliberately turned off.
clear_application survives as purge-only, where lossiness is correct.
**The indirect reach (audit 3.1) is the class that grep cannot find.**
ContainerSleepPolicy, BackupPolicy, DeploymentJob and WafPolicy are enumerated
on a SCHEDULE and resolve application_id afterwards, so they never appear in a
search for Application.query. Left alone, a tombstoned app's sleep policy is
swept forever and wake_app restarts the containers the delete tore down. Those
loops test Application.deleted_ids().
Deliberately NOT scoped: reservation checks (port, name, directory) -- a
tombstone must keep holding those or a new app takes them and the restore is
refused; api/git.py's webhook VISIBILITY gate, which falls through to
"panel-wide visible" so hiding a tombstone would WIDEN access; and cron
attribution, which only labels a row.
Verified: 15 new tests, the migration replayed on a fresh DB (a tombstone frees
its private_slug, two live rows still collide), and a full delete -> restore
round trip. The 20 remaining full-suite failures are the known
serverkit-wordpress-not-installed class and are identical on a clean tree.
Two traps caught by testing, both recorded in the plan: a bad import made the
ENTIRE purge cleanup silently no-op while purge() still reported success
(_run_purge_hook swallows by design, so assert on the warning, not just ok), and
private_slug had to lose unique=True at the MODEL level or a models-built
database burns the slug regardless of the migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
65 lines
2.5 KiB
Python
65 lines
2.5 KiB
Python
# Bucket: PER-APP read (plan 29 #9). Per-app bandwidth is scoped to callers who
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# can access the app (can_access_app); the cross-app overview stays panel-wide.
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"""REST surface for per-domain bandwidth accounting.
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Mounted at /api/v1/bandwidth (registered in app/__init__.py).
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"""
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from flask import Blueprint, jsonify, request
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from flask_jwt_extended import get_jwt_identity
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from ..middleware.rbac import admin_required, viewer_required
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from ..models import User, Application
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from ..services.bandwidth_service import BandwidthService
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from ..services.resource_grant_service import ResourceGrantService
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bandwidth_bp = Blueprint('bandwidth', __name__)
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@bandwidth_bp.route('/apps', methods=['GET'])
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@viewer_required
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def get_apps_bandwidth():
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"""Month totals + 30-day sparkline series for every app with traffic —
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one call for the Services list."""
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try:
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data = BandwidthService.overview(days=30)
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# JSON object keys must be strings.
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return jsonify({'apps': {str(k): v for k, v in data.items()}})
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — surface as a clean JSON error
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return jsonify({'error': str(exc)}), 500
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@bandwidth_bp.route('/apps/<int:app_id>', methods=['GET'])
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@viewer_required
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def get_app_bandwidth(app_id):
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"""Full daily series (default 90 days) + current-month total for one app,
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scoped to the app's workspace visibility (plan 29 #9 — foreign caller 404)."""
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app = Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()
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user = User.query.get(get_jwt_identity())
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if app is None or not ResourceGrantService.can_access_app(user, app):
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return jsonify({'error': 'Not found'}), 404
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try:
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days = request.args.get('days', 90, type=int)
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series = BandwidthService.series(app_id=app_id, days=days)
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return jsonify({
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'app_id': app_id,
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'days': len(series),
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'series': series,
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'month_bytes': BandwidthService.monthly_total(app_id),
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})
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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return jsonify({'error': str(exc)}), 500
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@bandwidth_bp.route('/aggregate', methods=['POST'])
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@admin_required
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def run_aggregate():
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"""Run the daily aggregation now (optionally for a specific day)."""
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try:
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payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
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result = BandwidthService.aggregate(day=payload.get('day'))
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return jsonify(result)
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except ValueError:
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return jsonify({'error': 'day must be YYYY-MM-DD'}), 400
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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return jsonify({'error': str(exc)}), 500
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