Files
ServerKit/backend/app/api/deploy.py
T
Juan DenisandClaude Opus 5 5f8a3ef204 feat(recycle-bin): applications are soft-deletable, and a delete stops keeping data hostage
Plan 70. Domain went through this and TEN read paths were wrong, four with
effects outside the panel. Application has 211 call sites across 68 files and
drives more -- container lifecycles, nginx, backups, registry pulls, the OS
crontab -- so it was audited in full first (docs/plans/70_...md). 180 sites are
now query_active(); the 35 left unfiltered are each commented in place.

**The delete / purge split is what makes the tombstone honest.** delete_app used
to run compose_down(volumes=True) and rmtree(). Keeping a tombstone AND doing
that would put a Restore button next to a row whose data the delete had already
destroyed -- the one promise a recycle bin cannot break. So:

  DELETE   containers down (VOLUMES KEPT), vhost removed, firewall closed,
           cron suspended, row tombstoned. All reversible.
  RESTORE  vhost rewritten, firewall reopened, cron resumed. Containers left
           STOPPED -- "put it back" must not silently start processes or open
           ports, the same reasoning that stops domain restore re-issuing certs.
  PURGE    volumes removed, uploaded source deleted, cron detached.

register() gained on_purge for that, wired into BOTH purge paths. And
purge_expired had NO scheduler -- fine when a tombstone was just a row, not fine
when it holds data volumes and a source tree, so a daily builtin job now runs
it. Without that, "kept until purge" would have meant kept forever and delete
would have quietly stopped reclaiming disk.

A side effect worth naming: the old _remove_data_flag protection for database
engines is now the DEFAULT for every app, and the flag is carried into
?purge=true so an explicit skip-the-bin delete still honours it.

**Cron was the blocker with no mechanical answer.** before_delete never fires on
a soft delete, and clear_application is LOSSY -- it nulls the association
without recording it, so nothing could put it back. suspend_for_application
instead disables only the jobs that were CURRENTLY ENABLED and stamps each
suspended_by_app; resume re-enables exactly those. That flag is the whole point:
without it a restore switches back on jobs the user deliberately turned off.
clear_application survives as purge-only, where lossiness is correct.

**The indirect reach (audit 3.1) is the class that grep cannot find.**
ContainerSleepPolicy, BackupPolicy, DeploymentJob and WafPolicy are enumerated
on a SCHEDULE and resolve application_id afterwards, so they never appear in a
search for Application.query. Left alone, a tombstoned app's sleep policy is
swept forever and wake_app restarts the containers the delete tore down. Those
loops test Application.deleted_ids().

Deliberately NOT scoped: reservation checks (port, name, directory) -- a
tombstone must keep holding those or a new app takes them and the restore is
refused; api/git.py's webhook VISIBILITY gate, which falls through to
"panel-wide visible" so hiding a tombstone would WIDEN access; and cron
attribution, which only labels a row.

Verified: 15 new tests, the migration replayed on a fresh DB (a tombstone frees
its private_slug, two live rows still collide), and a full delete -> restore
round trip. The 20 remaining full-suite failures are the known
serverkit-wordpress-not-installed class and are identical on a clean tree.

Two traps caught by testing, both recorded in the plan: a bad import made the
ENTIRE purge cleanup silently no-op while purge() still reported success
(_run_purge_hook swallows by design, so assert on the warning, not just ok), and
private_slug had to lose unique=True at the MODEL level or a models-built
database burns the slug regardless of the migration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 20:26:04 -04:00

305 lines
11 KiB
Python

# Bucket: PER-APP (plan 29 #9). Deploy config reads/writes gate on the shared
# app-access seam (can_access_app / can_edit_app); the public inbound webhook is
# token/signature-verified (ALLOWLISTed — no per-app user session).
import os
from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required, get_jwt_identity
from app import paths
from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required, app_access_tier
from app.models import User, Application
from app.services.git_service import GitService
from app.services.resource_grant_service import ResourceGrantService
deploy_bp = Blueprint('deploy', __name__)
@deploy_bp.route('/apps/<int:app_id>/config', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
def get_deploy_config(app_id):
"""Get deployment configuration for an app."""
current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
user = User.query.get(current_user_id)
app = Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()
if not app:
return jsonify({'error': 'Application not found'}), 404
if not ResourceGrantService.can_access_app(user, app):
return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
config = GitService.get_app_config(app_id)
if not config:
return jsonify({'configured': False}), 200
return jsonify({
'configured': True,
'config': config
}), 200
@deploy_bp.route('/apps/<int:app_id>/config', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
@admin_required
def configure_deployment(app_id):
"""Configure Git deployment for an app."""
app = Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()
if not app:
return jsonify({'error': 'Application not found'}), 404
data = request.get_json()
if not data:
return jsonify({'error': 'No data provided'}), 400
if 'repo_url' not in data:
return jsonify({'error': 'repo_url is required'}), 400
result = GitService.configure_deployment(
app_id=app_id,
app_path=app.root_path,
repo_url=data['repo_url'],
branch=data.get('branch', 'main'),
auto_deploy=data.get('auto_deploy', True),
pre_deploy_script=data.get('pre_deploy_script'),
post_deploy_script=data.get('post_deploy_script')
)
return jsonify(result), 201 if result['success'] else 400
@deploy_bp.route('/apps/<int:app_id>/config', methods=['DELETE'])
@jwt_required()
@admin_required
def remove_deployment(app_id):
"""Remove deployment configuration."""
result = GitService.remove_deployment(app_id)
return jsonify(result), 200 if result['success'] else 400
@deploy_bp.route('/apps/<int:app_id>/deploy', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
def trigger_deploy(app_id):
"""Trigger a deployment."""
current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
user = User.query.get(current_user_id)
app = Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()
if not app:
return jsonify({'error': 'Application not found'}), 404
if not ResourceGrantService.can_edit_app(user, app):
return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
data = request.get_json() or {}
result = GitService.deploy(app_id, force=data.get('force', False))
return jsonify(result), 200 if result['success'] else 400
@deploy_bp.route('/apps/<int:app_id>/pull', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
def pull_changes(app_id):
"""Pull latest changes without running deploy scripts."""
current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
user = User.query.get(current_user_id)
app = Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()
if not app:
return jsonify({'error': 'Application not found'}), 404
if not ResourceGrantService.can_edit_app(user, app):
return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
data = request.get_json() or {}
result = GitService.pull_changes(app.root_path, data.get('branch'))
return jsonify(result), 200 if result['success'] else 400
@deploy_bp.route('/apps/<int:app_id>/git-status', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
def get_git_status(app_id):
"""Get Git status for an app."""
current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
user = User.query.get(current_user_id)
app = Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()
if not app:
return jsonify({'error': 'Application not found'}), 404
if not ResourceGrantService.can_access_app(user, app):
return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
status = GitService.get_git_status(app.root_path)
return jsonify(status), 200
@deploy_bp.route('/apps/<int:app_id>/commit', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
def get_commit_info(app_id):
"""Get current commit info for an app."""
current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
user = User.query.get(current_user_id)
app = Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()
if not app:
return jsonify({'error': 'Application not found'}), 404
if not ResourceGrantService.can_access_app(user, app):
return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
commit_info = GitService.get_commit_info(app.root_path)
if commit_info:
return jsonify({'commit': commit_info}), 200
return jsonify({'error': 'Not a Git repository'}), 404
@deploy_bp.route('/history', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
def get_deployment_history():
"""Get deployment history. App-scoped queries require access to that app;
global queries (no app_id) are restricted to panel admins."""
current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
user = User.query.get(current_user_id)
app_id = request.args.get('app_id', type=int)
limit = request.args.get('limit', 50, type=int)
if app_id:
app = Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()
if not app:
return jsonify({'error': 'Application not found'}), 404
if not user or app_access_tier(user, app) is None:
return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
elif not user or not user.is_admin:
return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
history = GitService.get_deployment_history(app_id, limit)
return jsonify({'deployments': history}), 200
@deploy_bp.route('/clone', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
@admin_required
def clone_repository():
"""Clone a Git repository to a new location."""
data = request.get_json()
if not data:
return jsonify({'error': 'No data provided'}), 400
required = ['repo_url', 'app_path']
missing = [f for f in required if f not in data]
if missing:
return jsonify({'error': f'Missing required fields: {", ".join(missing)}'}), 400
# GHSA-8vx6-432p-h62q: app_path is attacker-controlled here (unlike
# /apps/from-repository, which derives it server-side). Confine clones to
# the managed apps root, mirroring _assert_managed_app_path.
base_dir = os.path.abspath(paths.APPS_DIR)
app_path = os.path.abspath(data['app_path'])
if app_path == base_dir or not app_path.startswith(base_dir + os.sep):
return jsonify({'error': 'app_path must be inside the managed apps directory'}), 400
result = GitService.clone_repository(
app_path=app_path,
repo_url=data['repo_url'],
branch=data.get('branch', 'main')
)
return jsonify(result), 201 if result['success'] else 400
@deploy_bp.route('/apps/<int:app_id>/branches', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
def get_branches(app_id):
"""Get list of remote branches for an app's repository."""
current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
user = User.query.get(current_user_id)
app = Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()
if not app:
return jsonify({'error': 'Application not found'}), 404
if not ResourceGrantService.can_access_app(user, app):
return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
result = GitService.get_remote_branches(app.root_path)
return jsonify(result), 200 if result.get('success') else 400
@deploy_bp.route('/branches', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
def get_branches_from_url():
"""Get list of branches from a repository URL (before cloning)."""
data = request.get_json()
if not data or 'repo_url' not in data:
return jsonify({'error': 'repo_url is required'}), 400
result = GitService.get_remote_branches_from_url(data['repo_url'])
return jsonify(result), 200 if result.get('success') else 400
@deploy_bp.route('/webhook-logs', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
def get_webhook_logs():
"""Get webhook logs for debugging. App-scoped queries require access to that
app; global queries (no app_id) are restricted to panel admins."""
current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
user = User.query.get(current_user_id)
app_id = request.args.get('app_id', type=int)
limit = request.args.get('limit', 50, type=int)
if app_id:
app = Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()
if not app:
return jsonify({'error': 'Application not found'}), 404
if not user or app_access_tier(user, app) is None:
return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
elif not user or not user.is_admin:
return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
logs = GitService.get_webhook_logs(app_id, limit)
return jsonify({'logs': logs}), 200
# Webhook endpoint (no auth required)
@deploy_bp.route('/webhook/<int:app_id>/<token>', methods=['POST'])
def webhook(app_id, token):
"""Handle incoming webhook from Git provider."""
# Detect provider based on headers
provider = 'github' # default
signature = None
if request.headers.get('X-Gitlab-Token'):
provider = 'gitlab'
signature = request.headers.get('X-Gitlab-Token')
elif request.headers.get('X-Hub-Signature-256'):
# Could be GitHub or Bitbucket
if request.headers.get('X-Bitbucket-Type'):
provider = 'bitbucket'
else:
provider = 'github'
signature = request.headers.get('X-Hub-Signature-256')
elif request.headers.get('X-Hub-Signature'):
# Bitbucket uses X-Hub-Signature
provider = 'bitbucket'
signature = request.headers.get('X-Hub-Signature')
# Log webhook for debugging
GitService.log_webhook(app_id, provider, request.headers.to_wsgi_list(), request.data)
# Verify webhook
if not GitService.verify_webhook(app_id, token, signature, request.data, provider):
return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid webhook'}), 403
# Parse payload
try:
payload = request.get_json()
except Exception:
return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid payload'}), 400
# Handle webhook
result = GitService.handle_webhook(app_id, payload)
return jsonify(result), 200 if result.get('success') else 400