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Juan DenisandClaude Opus 5
031142111d
GHSA-r4q7-x795-vr4j was one forgotten check, but the audit behind it found the same shape across the surface: `@jwt_required()` authenticates, it does not authorize, and ServerKit has no default-deny to catch the difference. This closes the routes that audit left open — fleet-monitor alert acknowledge/resolve, recycle-bin restore, nginx test/diff, registrar sync/test, server-template drift checks, uptime tracking on/off, server ping and remote compose ps/logs, refresh-capabilities, template test-db-connection, deploy branches, buildpack detect — plus three inline gaps: a viewer could widen their own API key's scopes, the demo-deploy flag was doing double duty as an authorization one, and tagging a shared resource had no write check at all while attaching one did. `_ensure_group_mutable` only ever blocked *system* queue groups, so every queue_bus mutation now also calls `_ensure_group_accessible` (owner-or-admin) — renaming, draining or deleting another user's group was open to any authenticated caller. The rbac policy decorators authenticate through `auth_required()`, so they replace `@jwt_required()` rather than stack under it; stacking rejects API-key callers before the policy can authorize them (tests/test_auth_decorator_boundaries.py enforces this). Where a route then needed the caller it reads `get_current_user()` — `get_jwt_identity()` raises for an API-key request. The decorators also carry a `_sk_authz` marker so a static test can see the decision from the source. `migrations.get_migration_history` moves to `require_admin_user()` for the same reason its siblings did: the inline `User.ROLE_ADMIN` check it kept was already reading two names this module no longer imports, so the route raised NameError for every caller, admin included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>