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* build: add symfony/security-csrf Backs the CSRF token core that replaces the vendored csrf-magic fork. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * test: fix security-csrf package path assertion symfony/security-csrf ships CsrfTokenManager.php at the package root, not under src/. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * refactor: register the composer autoloader before the CSRF include CSRF validation ran before the autoloader existed, which blocks any class-based guard. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * feat(csrf): add CactiCsrfGuard over symfony/security-csrf Issues and validates session-scoped tokens; not yet wired into the request path. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * feat(csrf): accept pre-upgrade csrf-magic tokens during the grace window Legacy tokens carry their own expiry, so the fallback closes itself without a config flag. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * feat(csrf): port the output buffer rewriter to CactiCsrfGuard Keeps the hidden field name and JS globals that third-party plugins rely on. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): use json_encode for the JS script context in rewriteBuffer htmlspecialchars() protects the HTML attribute context but not the <script> string literal, which relied on Symfony's token generator never emitting a quote rather than being safe by construction. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * refactor(csrf): move the XHR shim to include/js as Cacti-owned code It has been maintained by the Cacti Group since 2020 and is not an upstream package. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * refactor(csrf): retire the vendored csrf-magic fork The procedural csrf_* surface stays as a deprecated shim so plugins keep working. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * feat(csrf): validate requests through CactiCsrfGuard csrf-magic self-invoked from its own file; the guard is called explicitly. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(install): stop gating the permission step on the csrf secret Retiring csrf-magic removed the directory its default path lives in, and setStep() clamps to the first errored step, so no fresh install could advance. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): key the legacy fallback on the raw secret bytes refresh_csrf.php writes PHP source with a trailing newline, and trimming that yields a different HMAC key than csrf-magic used. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): log when the guard degrades to disabled in a web context The installer is the only web path that can reach it, and failing open in silence is not something csrf-magic could do. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * docs: changelog for the CSRF library replacement Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): mint the token before the session write callback closes it csrf_startup() minted lazily from the output buffer callback, which runs after session_write_close()'s shutdown-function registration, so a token minted there on a legacy-fallback POST was silently dropped. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): make refresh_csrf.php a no-op Its default secret path no longer ships and live tokens are session-bound, not HMACs over the secret, so rotation neither worked nor did anything meaningful; running it during the upgrade grace window used to delete the legacy secret and kill validation for pre-upgrade tokens outright. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): fall back to the old default secret path when reading it csrf-magic tried its own directory as a second candidate regardless of $path_csrf_secret; the new reader only tried the configured path, so a site pointing $path_csrf_secret at a file that was never created lost the legacy-token grace window entirely. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * docs(csrf): point the JS header at its BSD license sidecar The header reduces the original BSD terms to prose and the actual text sits in an unreferenced csrf.js.LICENSE, so add a pointer to it. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): restore csrf_check()'s bool return and $fatal contract The shim ignored $fatal and always returned void, so audit/audit.php's `!csrf_check(false)` evaluated `!null` (always true) and denied every request instead of getting a real pass/fail result back. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * docs: reference the pull request number in the changelog entry Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * test: resolve includes through Cacti path constants Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * test(csrf): enforce full coverage Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * Harden CSRF fallback handling Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * test(csrf): assert the component stays out of the index Committing it would leave a second copy to drift against the lock. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * ci: align CSRF checks with PHP 8.2 Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * docs: normalize the CSRF changelog entry * Fix CHANGELOG entry ordering Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * test(csrf): support constrained test environments * fix(csrf): narrow nullable guard state * test: place CSRF coverage in security domain Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * security(test): match disabled exec exactly Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * ci: run CSRF coverage on PHP 8.3 Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: TheWitness <thewitness@cacti.net>
101 lines
3.6 KiB
PHP
Executable File
101 lines
3.6 KiB
PHP
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env php
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<?php
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/*
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+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| Copyright (C) 2004-2026 The Cacti Group |
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| This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
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| modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License |
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| as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 |
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| of the License, or (at your option) any later version. |
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| This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
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| but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
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| MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
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| GNU General Public License for more details. |
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+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| Cacti: The Complete RRDtool-based Graphing Solution |
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+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| This code is designed, written, and maintained by the Cacti Group. See |
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| about.php and/or the AUTHORS file for specific developer information. |
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+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| http://www.cacti.net/ |
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+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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*/
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require(__DIR__ . '/../include/cli_check.php');
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require_once(CACTI_PATH_LIBRARY . '/poller.php');
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require_once(CACTI_PATH_LIBRARY . '/utility.php');
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// process calling arguments
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$parms = $_SERVER['argv'];
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array_shift($parms);
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if (cacti_sizeof($parms)) {
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foreach ($parms as $parameter) {
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if (str_contains($parameter, '=')) {
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[$arg, $value] = explode('=', $parameter, 2);
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} else {
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$arg = $parameter;
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$value = '';
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}
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switch ($arg) {
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case '--version':
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case '-V':
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case '-v':
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display_version();
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exit(0);
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case '--help':
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case '-H':
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case '-h':
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display_help();
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exit(0);
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default:
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print 'ERROR: Invalid Parameter ' . $parameter . PHP_EOL . PHP_EOL;
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display_help();
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exit(1);
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}
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}
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}
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// CSRF tokens are session-bound random values now, not HMACs over this
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// file, so rotating it no longer invalidates anything outstanding. Kept
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// only so scripts and cron entries that still invoke it do not break; it
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// will be removed in a future release once the pre-upgrade grace window
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// (see CactiCsrfGuard::validateLegacyHmac()) is retired.
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print 'NOTE: CSRF tokens are now session-bound and are not derived from a shared secret,' . PHP_EOL;
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print ' so rotating the secret no longer invalidates anything.' . PHP_EOL;
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print ' This file is retained only to validate tokens issued before the upgrade' . PHP_EOL;
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print ' and will be removed in a future release.' . PHP_EOL;
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exit(0);
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/**
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* display_version - displays version information
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*
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* @return void
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*/
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function display_version() : void {
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$version = get_cacti_cli_version();
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print "Cacti CSRF File Utility, Version $version, " . COPYRIGHT_YEARS . PHP_EOL;
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}
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/**
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* display_help - displays the usage of the function
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*
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* @return void
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*/
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function display_help() : void {
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display_version();
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print PHP_EOL . 'usage: refresh_csrf.php' . PHP_EOL . PHP_EOL;
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print 'Deprecated. CSRF tokens are session-bound and are not derived from a' . PHP_EOL;
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print 'shared secret, so this utility no longer rotates anything. Retained' . PHP_EOL;
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print 'only to avoid breaking scripts that still invoke it.' . PHP_EOL . PHP_EOL;
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}
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