Files
cacti/lib/csp_report_endpoint.php
TheWitnessandTheWitness 3ab4c69fb7 PHPStan Level 8 - Phase 1 Conversion (#8135)
* PHPStan Level 8 - Phase 1 Conversion

Reduces the real (no-baseline) PHPStan level 8 error count from ~2,724 to 425
and regenerates phpstan-baseline.neon accordingly (8,941 -> 1,921 lines).

Core type-safety changes
- lib/database.php: narrow db_fetch_row()/db_fetch_row_prepared() to return
  array (was bool|array) and db_fetch_assoc()/db_fetch_assoc_prepared() to
  return array (was mixed); the _prepared workers coerce the connection-failure
  path to an empty array so the declared type is honest. empty()/cacti_sizeof()
  checks are unaffected.
- lib/database.php: narrow $db_conn guards from is_object() to instanceof PDO in
  the transaction/quote/insert-id helpers so the PDO calls resolve.
- lib/mib_cache.php: the fluent MibCache methods mib()/object()/table()/row()
  now return self instead of a bare object so chained calls type-check.

Type-safety casts and guards (mechanical, behaviour-preserving)
- Cast string|false/|null builtin results feeding string parameters
  (json_decode, base64_encode, trim, htmle, preg_replace, explode, etc.).
- Cast int|string / int|false values feeding int id/pid parameters.
- Guard resource|false fopen()/popen() handles before fwrite/fclose/fread, and
  wrap foreach over array|false/list|false results with `?: []`.

Genuine bugs found and fixed
- cli/add_tree.php / lib/api_tree.php: site tree nodes could not be created via
  the CLI - the --site-id option was never parsed, $nodeTypes had no 'site'
  entry (passing null to api_tree_item_save(int $type) -> TypeError), and
  api_tree_item_save() never persisted site_id. All three fixed.
- tree.php: leaves_exist() is typed : int but returned db_fetch_assoc_prepared()
  (an array of rows) for a SELECT COUNT(*); now uses db_fetch_cell_prepared()
  and returns the scalar count.
- lib/mib_cache.php: $entries_per_object was a float (division / ceil) used as
  an array key (PHP 8.1 implicit float-to-int key deprecation); now cast to int.

Config
- .phpstan.neon: add notIdentical.alwaysTrue and booleanAnd.alwaysFalse to the
  existing always-true/false ignore family (same "PHPStan gets confused"
  dynamic-constant cause already covered by identical.alwaysTrue,
  notEqual.alwaysTrue, booleanAnd.leftAlwaysTrue, etc.).
- phpstan-baseline.neon: regenerated; the remaining 425 entries are the
  untouched long tail for Phase 2.

* Remove redundant @phpstan-ignore comments

Follow-up cleanup for the level 8 Phase 1 work. Removes 14 inline
@phpstan-ignore comments that no longer suppress any reported error:

- cli/repair_database.php: `@phpstan-ignore booleanAnd.alwaysFalse` is now
  covered by the global booleanAnd.alwaysFalse ignore added to .phpstan.neon.
- 13 others (host.php, include/global.php, include/session.php,
  lib/api_automation.php x2, lib/functions.php x2, lib/html_utility.php x2,
  lib/installer.php, lib/package.php, lib/reports.php, lib/rrd.php) no longer
  match any reported error after the type-safety fixes (e.g. the
  db_fetch_row_prepared() return-type narrowing removed the offset-assign
  errors the api_automation ignores were suppressing).

Verified with reportUnmatchedIgnoredErrors enabled: 0 unmatched ignores
remain and the full level 8 run still reports 0 errors.

* ci: satisfy validator ratchet and refresh security sink baselines

- lib/api_tree.php: give the new tree-item site_id a real numeric
  constraint ('^[-0-9]+$', matching html_reports.php) instead of an
  empty regex, so the validator constraint ratchet passes without
  bumping its baseline.
- tests/security/baselines: refresh the three sink/hotspot signatures
  whose code text changed from the (string) casts added in this branch
  (lib/poller.php setsid, cli/rrdresize.php json_encode, lib/import.php
  simplexml_load_string).

* ci(js): allow DOMPurify 3.4.16 and update sync_js pin test

The dependabot bump (#8134) moved package.json/package-lock.json to
DOMPurify 3.4.16 on develop but left tests/js/sync_js.test.mjs pinned to
3.4.15, so the PR merge commit fails the 'DOMPurify is pinned' contract.
Bring package.json/package-lock.json to 3.4.16 (matching develop) and
update the pin test to expect 3.4.16.

* test: update sql.php null-handling assertion for the (string) cast

This branch changed scripts/sql.php from trim(\ ?? '') to
trim((string) \) (the phpstan-safe form that coerces both null and
false from shell_exec()). Update SqlScriptsTest's null-return assertion
to match the new cast instead of the removed '?? ''.

* fix: address Copilot review - ownership IDs, fopen guards, mib_cache bound

- chown()/chgrp(): pass integer UID/GID from fileowner()/filegroup()
  (guarding the false lookup) instead of string-casting them, which made
  them resolve account/group names like '1001' and fail. Covers
  lib/api_device.php, lib/boost.php and poller_maintenance.php (x2).
- fopen() failure now short-circuits instead of reporting success:
  lib/package.php returns false, lib/clog_webapi.php and utilities.php
  render an error, and snmpagent_mibcachechild.php skips the cache write
  and sentinel unlink so a concurrent writer's lock is preserved.
- lib/mib_cache.php: keep the float quotient as the loop bound and cast
  only the array offset, so a non-even entries/columns split no longer
  truncates the loop and drops a cached row.

* revert: keep db_fetch_* returning false on error; baseline Level 8 instead

Per review, restoring the intentional fail-safe: db_fetch_row[_prepared]()
return bool|array and db_fetch_assoc[_prepared]() return mixed again, so a
genuine SQL error (not just a missing connection) is signalled as false and
the === false checks in cdef_is_in_use(), boost_process_* and aggregate.php
work as before. Dropped the is_array() ? : [] coercion.

Level 8 stays green by regenerating phpstan-baseline.neon to capture the
re-introduced bool|array/mixed call-site errors (the ~1,850 the narrowing
had eliminated). Tightening those callers to drop them from the baseline is
Phase 2 work.

---------

Co-authored-by: TheWitness <copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-02 10:08:56 -04:00

190 lines
7.7 KiB
PHP

<?php
/*
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Copyright (C) 2004-2026 The Cacti Group |
| |
| This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
| modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License |
| as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 |
| of the License, or (at your option) any later version. |
| |
| This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
| but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
| GNU General Public License for more details. |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Cacti: The Complete RRDtool-based Graphing Solution |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| This code is designed, written, and maintained by the Cacti Group. See |
| about.php and/or the AUTHORS file for specific developer information. |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| http://www.cacti.net/ |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
*/
/* This endpoint is unauthenticated and reachable pre-bootstrap, so it
* deliberately avoids loading lib/functions.php or include/global.php.
* Loading functions.php alone surfaced undefined-$config warnings in
* targeted PHP checks. csp_report_log() below writes to PHP's default
* error log, falling through to cacti_log() only if a parent caller
* already set up $config and that function is available. */
/**
* Self-contained logger for the CSP report endpoint. Prefers cacti_log()
* when a parent caller has already bootstrapped $config; otherwise writes
* to PHP's default error log. Either way the report lands somewhere an
* operator can read it without depending on the Cacti DB.
*
* @param mixed $message
*/
function csp_report_log($message): void {
$message = preg_replace('/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/', ' ', (string) $message);
if (function_exists('cacti_log') && isset($GLOBALS['config']['base_path'])) {
@cacti_log($message, false, 'CSP-REPORT');
return;
}
error_log('CACTI CSP-REPORT: ' . $message);
}
/**
* Strip log-injection characters from a CSP report field before interpolation.
* A crafted report body with embedded CR/LF would forge extra log lines.
*
* @param mixed $v
*/
function csp_report_sanitize_field($v): string {
if (!is_string($v)) {
return '(unknown)';
}
// Strip CR/LF and other C0 controls; truncate to 256 chars for log sanity.
$v = preg_replace('/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/', ' ', $v);
if (strlen((string) $v) > 256) {
$v = substr((string) $v, 0, 253) . '...';
}
return $v;
}
/**
* Validate and normalise a raw CSP report POST.
*
* Kept as a pure function so it can be exercised in unit tests without
* an actual HTTP request context. Returns a result array rather than
* throwing so the caller controls the HTTP response code.
*
* @param array $headers Associative array of request headers (CONTENT_TYPE key).
* @param string $body Raw POST body.
* @param int $maxBytes Upper bound enforced before JSON parse; 16 KB is
* large enough for any real report but small enough
* to prevent the process from buffering an attacker-
* supplied multi-megabyte payload into memory.
* @return array ['ok' => bool, 'reason' => string, 'summary' => string]
*/
function csp_report_validate_payload(array $headers, $body, $maxBytes) {
$ct = isset($headers['CONTENT_TYPE']) ? strtolower(trim($headers['CONTENT_TYPE'])) : '';
if (strpos($ct, 'application/csp-report') !== 0 && strpos($ct, 'application/json') !== 0) {
return ['ok' => false, 'reason' => 'Unsupported Content-Type', 'summary' => ''];
}
$len = strlen($body);
if ($len === 0) {
return ['ok' => false, 'reason' => 'Empty body', 'summary' => ''];
}
if ($len > $maxBytes) {
return ['ok' => false, 'reason' => 'Body exceeds size limit', 'summary' => ''];
}
$decoded = json_decode($body, true);
if (json_last_error() !== JSON_ERROR_NONE) {
return ['ok' => false, 'reason' => 'Invalid JSON', 'summary' => ''];
}
if (!is_array($decoded)) {
return ['ok' => false, 'reason' => 'JSON root must be an object', 'summary' => ''];
}
/* Browsers send either the legacy format:
* {"csp-report": {"violated-directive": ..., ...}}
* or the Reporting API (report-to) format:
* {"type": "csp-violation", "body": {"effectiveDirective": ..., ...}}
* Normalise both into a flat map of the violation fields. */
if (isset($decoded['csp-report']) && is_array($decoded['csp-report'])) {
$report = $decoded['csp-report'];
// Sanitize before interpolation: a crafted report can embed CR/LF to forge log lines.
$directive = csp_report_sanitize_field(isset($report['violated-directive']) ? $report['violated-directive'] : '(unknown)');
$blockedUri = csp_report_sanitize_field(isset($report['blocked-uri']) ? $report['blocked-uri'] : '(unknown)');
$docUri = csp_report_sanitize_field(isset($report['document-uri']) ? $report['document-uri'] : '(unknown)');
} elseif (isset($decoded['body']) && is_array($decoded['body'])) {
$report = $decoded['body'];
// report-to uses camelCase keys; same log-injection risk applies.
$directive = csp_report_sanitize_field(isset($report['effectiveDirective']) ? $report['effectiveDirective'] : '(unknown)');
$blockedUri = csp_report_sanitize_field(isset($report['blockedURL']) ? $report['blockedURL'] : '(unknown)');
$docUri = csp_report_sanitize_field(isset($report['documentURL']) ? $report['documentURL'] : '(unknown)');
} else {
return ['ok' => false, 'reason' => 'Missing csp-report or body field', 'summary' => ''];
}
$summary = 'CSP violation: ' . $directive . ' blocked ' . $blockedUri . ' on ' . $docUri;
return ['ok' => true, 'reason' => '', 'summary' => $summary];
}
// --- Entry point ----------------------------------------------------------
if (defined('CACTI_CSP_REPORT_TEST_MODE')) {
return;
}
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] !== 'POST') {
http_response_code(405);
header('Allow: POST');
exit;
}
/* $_SERVER['CONTENT_TYPE'] is set by most SAPI implementations; the
* HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE fallback covers CGI setups that omit the prefix. */
$contentType = '';
if (isset($_SERVER['CONTENT_TYPE'])) {
$contentType = $_SERVER['CONTENT_TYPE'];
} elseif (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE'])) {
$contentType = $_SERVER['HTTP_CONTENT_TYPE'];
}
/* Hard-cap the read at the stream level so a large body from this unauthenticated
* endpoint is never buffered whole. stream_get_contents() with a maxlength stops
* reading after 16 KB regardless of SAPI quirks around php://input. */
$rawBody = '';
$inputStream = fopen('php://input', 'rb');
if ($inputStream !== false) {
$rawBody = (string) stream_get_contents($inputStream, 16384);
fclose($inputStream);
}
$result = csp_report_validate_payload(
['CONTENT_TYPE' => $contentType],
$rawBody,
16384
);
if ($result['ok']) {
csp_report_log($result['summary']);
http_response_code(204);
} else {
http_response_code(400);
header('Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8');
/* Emit the rejection reason as plain text. No HTML output here because
* this endpoint is called by the browser's report mechanism, not rendered
* in a page, and we don't want to introduce XSS surface. */
print $result['reason'];
}