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* build: add symfony/security-csrf Backs the CSRF token core that replaces the vendored csrf-magic fork. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * test: fix security-csrf package path assertion symfony/security-csrf ships CsrfTokenManager.php at the package root, not under src/. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * refactor: register the composer autoloader before the CSRF include CSRF validation ran before the autoloader existed, which blocks any class-based guard. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * feat(csrf): add CactiCsrfGuard over symfony/security-csrf Issues and validates session-scoped tokens; not yet wired into the request path. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * feat(csrf): accept pre-upgrade csrf-magic tokens during the grace window Legacy tokens carry their own expiry, so the fallback closes itself without a config flag. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * feat(csrf): port the output buffer rewriter to CactiCsrfGuard Keeps the hidden field name and JS globals that third-party plugins rely on. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): use json_encode for the JS script context in rewriteBuffer htmlspecialchars() protects the HTML attribute context but not the <script> string literal, which relied on Symfony's token generator never emitting a quote rather than being safe by construction. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * refactor(csrf): move the XHR shim to include/js as Cacti-owned code It has been maintained by the Cacti Group since 2020 and is not an upstream package. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * refactor(csrf): retire the vendored csrf-magic fork The procedural csrf_* surface stays as a deprecated shim so plugins keep working. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * feat(csrf): validate requests through CactiCsrfGuard csrf-magic self-invoked from its own file; the guard is called explicitly. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(install): stop gating the permission step on the csrf secret Retiring csrf-magic removed the directory its default path lives in, and setStep() clamps to the first errored step, so no fresh install could advance. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): key the legacy fallback on the raw secret bytes refresh_csrf.php writes PHP source with a trailing newline, and trimming that yields a different HMAC key than csrf-magic used. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): log when the guard degrades to disabled in a web context The installer is the only web path that can reach it, and failing open in silence is not something csrf-magic could do. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * docs: changelog for the CSRF library replacement Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): mint the token before the session write callback closes it csrf_startup() minted lazily from the output buffer callback, which runs after session_write_close()'s shutdown-function registration, so a token minted there on a legacy-fallback POST was silently dropped. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): make refresh_csrf.php a no-op Its default secret path no longer ships and live tokens are session-bound, not HMACs over the secret, so rotation neither worked nor did anything meaningful; running it during the upgrade grace window used to delete the legacy secret and kill validation for pre-upgrade tokens outright. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): fall back to the old default secret path when reading it csrf-magic tried its own directory as a second candidate regardless of $path_csrf_secret; the new reader only tried the configured path, so a site pointing $path_csrf_secret at a file that was never created lost the legacy-token grace window entirely. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * docs(csrf): point the JS header at its BSD license sidecar The header reduces the original BSD terms to prose and the actual text sits in an unreferenced csrf.js.LICENSE, so add a pointer to it. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * fix(csrf): restore csrf_check()'s bool return and $fatal contract The shim ignored $fatal and always returned void, so audit/audit.php's `!csrf_check(false)` evaluated `!null` (always true) and denied every request instead of getting a real pass/fail result back. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * docs: reference the pull request number in the changelog entry Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * test: resolve includes through Cacti path constants Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * test(csrf): enforce full coverage Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * Harden CSRF fallback handling Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * test(csrf): assert the component stays out of the index Committing it would leave a second copy to drift against the lock. Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * ci: align CSRF checks with PHP 8.2 Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * docs: normalize the CSRF changelog entry * Fix CHANGELOG entry ordering Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * test(csrf): support constrained test environments * fix(csrf): narrow nullable guard state * test: place CSRF coverage in security domain Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * security(test): match disabled exec exactly Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> * ci: run CSRF coverage on PHP 8.3 Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Thomas Vincent <thomasvincent@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: TheWitness <thewitness@cacti.net>
143 lines
5.5 KiB
PHP
143 lines
5.5 KiB
PHP
<?php
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/*
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+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| Copyright (C) 2004-2026 The Cacti Group |
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| This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
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| modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License |
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| as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 |
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| of the License, or (at your option) any later version. |
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+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| Cacti: The Complete RRDtool-based Graphing Solution |
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+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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*/
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require_once CACTI_PATH_LIBRARY . '/csrf.php';
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use Symfony\Component\Security\Csrf\CsrfTokenManager;
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use Symfony\Component\Security\Csrf\TokenGenerator\UriSafeTokenGenerator;
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use Symfony\Component\Security\Csrf\TokenStorage\NativeSessionTokenStorage;
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/*
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* The rewriter is the contract third-party plugins depend on: they never opt
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* in, they just get a hidden field and a patched XHR. These assertions pin
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* the field name, the JS globals and the script tag, because changing any of
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* them silently breaks every plugin that posts.
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*/
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function csrf_test_rewrite_guard() : CactiCsrfGuard {
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$_SESSION = [];
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$storage = new NativeSessionTokenStorage();
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$manager = new CsrfTokenManager(new UriSafeTokenGenerator(), $storage);
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$guard = new CactiCsrfGuard($manager, true);
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$guard->setScriptUrl('/cacti/include/js/csrf.js');
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return $guard;
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}
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test('a POST form gets the hidden token field', function () {
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$guard = csrf_test_rewrite_guard();
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$out = $guard->rewriteBuffer("<html><head></head><body><form method='post'></form></body></html>");
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expect($out)->toContain("name='__csrf_magic'");
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expect($out)->toMatch('#<form[^>]*>\s*<input#');
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});
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test('a GET form is left alone', function () {
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$guard = csrf_test_rewrite_guard();
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$out = $guard->rewriteBuffer("<html><head></head><body><form method='get'></form></body></html>");
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/*
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* The head script is injected unconditionally (it also serves pages
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* whose only POST comes from AJAX, with no <form> at all), so it
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* legitimately carries the field name. What must NOT happen is the
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* hidden field landing inside the GET form itself.
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*/
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expect($out)->not->toContain("name='__csrf_magic'");
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});
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test('the JS globals and script tag are injected into head', function () {
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$guard = csrf_test_rewrite_guard();
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$out = $guard->rewriteBuffer('<html><head></head><body></body></html>');
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expect($out)->toContain('var csrfMagicToken');
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expect($out)->toContain('var csrfMagicName');
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expect($out)->toContain('/cacti/include/js/csrf.js');
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expect($out)->toContain('CsrfMagic.end();');
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});
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/*
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* The JS globals sit inside a <script> string literal, a context
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* htmlspecialchars() does not protect. json_encode() is what makes the
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* token correct by construction there. token() re-mints a new random
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* encoding on every call (BREACH mitigation), so the embedded value is
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* pulled back out of the rendered output rather than compared against a
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* second, necessarily different call to token().
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*/
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test('the JS globals are valid JavaScript string literals carrying the right values', function () {
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$guard = csrf_test_rewrite_guard();
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$out = $guard->rewriteBuffer('<html><head></head><body></body></html>');
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preg_match('#var csrfMagicToken = "([^"]+)";#', $out, $matches);
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expect($matches)->toHaveCount(2);
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expect($guard->validate($matches[1]))->toBeTrue();
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expect($out)->toContain('var csrfMagicName = "__csrf_magic";');
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});
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test('a non-HTML buffer is returned untouched', function () {
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$guard = csrf_test_rewrite_guard();
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$buffer = '{"error":"csrf_timeout"}';
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expect($guard->rewriteBuffer($buffer))->toBe($buffer);
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});
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test('the frame breaker is not injected', function () {
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$guard = csrf_test_rewrite_guard();
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$out = $guard->rewriteBuffer('<html><head></head><body></body></html>');
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expect($out)->not->toContain('top.location.href');
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});
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test('a nonce is emitted on injected scripts when one is set', function () {
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$guard = csrf_test_rewrite_guard();
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$guard->setNonce('abc123');
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$out = $guard->rewriteBuffer('<html><head></head><body></body></html>');
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expect($out)->toContain('nonce="abc123"');
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});
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test('no nonce attribute appears when none is set', function () {
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$guard = csrf_test_rewrite_guard();
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$out = $guard->rewriteBuffer('<html><head></head><body></body></html>');
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expect($out)->not->toContain('nonce=');
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});
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test('a guard without a script URL only decorates POST forms', function () {
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$_SESSION = [];
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$manager = new CsrfTokenManager(new UriSafeTokenGenerator(), new NativeSessionTokenStorage());
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$guard = new CactiCsrfGuard($manager, true);
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$out = $guard->rewriteBuffer("<html><head></head><body><form method='post'></form></body></html>");
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expect($out)->toContain("name='__csrf_magic'")
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->and($out)->not->toContain('CsrfMagic.end()');
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});
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test('the end hook is appended when an HTML chunk has no closing body', function () {
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$guard = csrf_test_rewrite_guard();
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$out = $guard->rewriteBuffer('<html><head></head><main>content</main>');
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expect($out)->toEndWith('<script type="text/javascript">CsrfMagic.end();</script>');
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});
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test('a disabled guard does not rewrite', function () {
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$guard = new CactiCsrfGuard(null, false);
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$buffer = "<html><head></head><body><form method='post'></form></body></html>";
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expect($guard->rewriteBuffer($buffer))->toBe($buffer);
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});
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