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docs/api-stability-policy
9
Commits
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cc942fed68 |
test(tests): run unit suites with Bats and retain POSIX coverage
The shell translator rewrites test bodies and loses Bats reporting. The unit lane needs complete TAP results and JUnit reports without changing how live-cluster suites run. Sourced production helpers still need a dash pass, and unit test bodies need nounset without exporting shell options into subprocesses. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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7bf6906a80 |
fix(platform): keep the legacy etcd-operator stopped after etcd adoption (#4738)
## What this PR does Migration 50 scales the legacy etcd-operator to 0, adopts every legacy `etcd.aenix.io` cluster with `etcd-migrate`, and then scales the operator back to 1. At that point the Deployment still runs the legacy operator, and after a successful adoption it has nothing left to manage. Bringing it back undoes part of the adoption. Observed on a production cluster upgraded from 1.4.3 to 1.6.4. The API audit log and the Helm history of a tenant's `etcd` release show this sequence, in UTC on the same day. - 13:21:12 migration 50 scales `cozy-etcd-operator/etcd-operator-controller-manager` to 0. - 13:22:59 `etcd-migrate` updates `etcd-headless`, pointing its owner references at the adopted EtcdMembers, and orphan-deletes the legacy EtcdCluster and StatefulSet. - 13:23:04 migration 50 scales the operator back to 1. It is still the legacy operator, the v1alpha2 one replaced it only at 13:40. - 13:23:42 Flux upgrades the tenant's `etcd` release with the old chart (Helm revision 87), because the new chart artifact appeared only at 13:24:40. The old chart re-creates the legacy EtcdCluster at 13:23:43. - 13:23:43 to 13:23:45 the legacy operator reconciles it, updates `etcd-headless` twice and re-creates the legacy StatefulSet `etcd`. - 13:36:49 Flux upgrades the release to the new chart (revision 88), which prunes the legacy EtcdCluster. - 13:36:50 the garbage collector deletes `etcd-headless` and the re-created StatefulSet. The same happened in all five tenants that run an etcd. The pods survived because EtcdMembers own them, but they keep `spec.subdomain: etcd-headless`, so their `etcd-<i>.etcd-headless.<ns>.svc` names stopped resolving. From then on every member logged `no such host` for its peers, the v1alpha2 EtcdCluster had no status conditions, and the `etcd-defrag` CronJob failed every hour with `context deadline exceeded`. The transitional `etcd-headless` Service the etcd chart ships for this window (#3270) does not cover it. Helm patched the existing Service 202 ms before the garbage collector removed it, and did not create it again because it was already part of the release. With this change the operator stays at 0 after a successful adoption. The etcd-operator HelmRelease replaces the Deployment with the v1alpha2 operator later in the same upgrade, and no later migration waits for the operator. A failed or interrupted adoption still restores it to 1 through the existing EXIT trap, so a failed run does not leave the tenant etcds without an operator. If that HelmRelease cannot reconcile, the adopted clusters wait for it with or without this change, because the legacy operator does not reconcile v1alpha2 EtcdClusters. Clusters already upgraded with this bug can be repaired without restarting anything. Creating the Service from the tenant's own `etcd` release is enough. ``` helm -n <ns> get manifest etcd | awk 'BEGIN{RS="\n---\n"} /\nkind: Service\n/ && /\n name: etcd-headless\n/' | kubectl -n <ns> create -f - ``` On the cluster above the v1alpha2 EtcdCluster reported `Available` with reason `QuorumHealthy` within 11 seconds of the Service being created, in every tenant, and the members stopped logging `no such host`. ### Validation - `hack/cozytest.sh hack/migration-50-etcd-adopt.bats` passes all 29 tests. A new test asserts that a successful adoption scales the operator to 0 and never back to 1. Against the current script it fails with `FAIL: the legacy operator was scaled back up after a successful adoption`. - The existing test for a failed adoption still passes, so the EXIT trap still restores the operator to 1. - The new test checks the absence with `if grep ...; then echo "FAIL: ..."; false; fi`, the form the other suites use. A bare `! grep` assertion cannot fail a test under `hack/cozytest.sh`, so it could not have caught this. The other negated assertions in this file had the same weakness, and #3790 has rewritten them on main. With all of them made able to fail in a scratch copy, the suite still passes against this change. ### Screenshots Not a UI change. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the diff. It changes a migration script and its bats test. No package, values, schema, CRD, make target or `hack/` layout changes, so no entry matches. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(platform): keep the legacy etcd-operator stopped after migration 50 adopts the legacy etcd clusters. Scaling it back up let it reconcile the legacy EtcdCluster that Flux re-created from a not yet upgraded etcd chart, re-create the legacy StatefulSet and take the legacy etcd-headless Service away from the adopted members, which the garbage collector then deleted. The adopted members lost their DNS names, the EtcdCluster never reported a status and etcd defrag failed every hour. Clusters already upgraded can recreate the Service from the etcd release manifest. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Migration Updates** * After successful etcd adoption, the legacy operator remains scaled to zero replicas for replacement by the etcd operator; it is no longer scaled back up before the migration is stamped. * If adoption fails or exits before completion, the legacy operator is restored to one replica. * The dry-run message now describes the zero-replica outcome of successful adoption. * Successful adoption continues to record the migration version stamp. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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6248d458ad |
fix(platform): keep the legacy etcd-operator stopped after etcd adoption
Migration 50 scales the legacy etcd-operator to 0, adopts every legacy etcd.aenix.io cluster with etcd-migrate and then scales the operator back to 1. At that point it is still the legacy operator, and it has nothing left to manage. Until a tenant's etcd HelmRelease reconciles the new chart, Flux can upgrade it with the old one, which re-creates the legacy EtcdCluster that etcd-migrate just orphan-deleted. The legacy operator then reconciles it, re-creates the legacy StatefulSet and rewrites the legacy etcd-headless Service, dropping the owner references etcd-migrate pointed at the adopted EtcdMembers. When the new chart prunes the legacy EtcdCluster, the garbage collector deletes the Service with it, and the adopted members' etcd-<i>.etcd-headless names stop resolving. After a successful adoption the operator now stays at 0 until the etcd-operator HelmRelease replaces the Deployment with the v1alpha2 operator later in the same upgrade. A failed or interrupted adoption still restores it through the EXIT trap. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Yan Bondarenko <202671653+yankawai@users.noreply.github.com> |
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40dac09aaa |
test(bats): spell absences so they can fail
An assertion written `! cmd` cannot fail a test. POSIX exempts a command whose return value is inverted with `!` from errexit, so the status is dropped where it is produced. hack/cozytest.sh then closes each test function with `return 0`, and the bats binary's ERR trap carries the same exemption -- it reports only a negated assertion standing last in the body, where the inverted status happens to be what the function returns. Every absence these suites assert was written that way: a command that must not reach the log, an image that must not be copied, a flag that must not be passed, an object that must not exist. On that half of each suite's contract the tests held for any input. Rewrite each as `if cmd; then echo "FAIL: ..."; false; fi`, the form already used where the trap had been noticed one file at a time, and give every one a message naming what must not have happened. The message states the property, not the pattern: where the forbidden string is a substring of a required value -- an https endpoint the test requires in its http form -- naming the string would describe the opposite of what is asserted. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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efa85a4f61 |
feat(platform): make the etcd-adoption skip-backup hatch reachable
Migration 50 has honoured ETCD_ADOPT_SKIP_BACKUP since it was written, and its failure paths tell operators to "re-run with ETCD_ADOPT_SKIP_BACKUP=1". But migration-hook.yaml passes only NAMESPACE/CURRENT_VERSION/ TARGET_VERSION, and the Job is a Helm hook the chart re-renders, so there has never been a way to set it. The script advertised an escape the platform made impossible. The endpoint-classification work landing alongside this makes that worse: it adds refuse-rather-than-guess paths, so more clusters can now legitimately stop here. Plumb it through migrations.etcdAdoptSkipBackup, default false. Skipping the pre-adoption snapshot rewires ownership of LIVE etcd storage with no way back, so it stays opt-in and deliberate — the flag is the last resort for a cluster that has nothing to fix, not the first response to a refusal. Render "1"/"0" rather than the bare bool. The script matches the literal string "1", so a bool would render "true", sail through the Job spec looking correct, and be ignored — a safety valve that is set but silently disregarded is worse than one that was never offered, because the operator believes they opted in. The value is normalised through a string, so a bool, a quoted "true" out of the Package CR's Values JSON, or a numeric 1 all land on the same answer, while nil or garbage resolves to "0": taking this hatch must require an affirmative spelling, never a typo. Resolved with `dig` so a Platform Package predating the key renders "0" instead of failing the render of the entire platform chart and bricking every upgrade. Widen the script's own check to accept 1/true/yes as well. The template guarantees the GitOps path, but an operator running this image by hand will reasonably type "true", and that is exactly the moment they are already stuck. The two layers cover independent failure modes. Emit the var unconditionally, including the "0" default, so the rendered Job states the cluster's safety posture outright rather than leaving an operator to diff values to find out whether a snapshot was skipped. Point the failure messages at the values path that actually exists, and describe it honestly: editing the Platform Package and letting Flux re-render is a real operation, not a one-liner, and the flag has to be reverted afterwards or the next etcd migration skips its snapshot too. Fixing the condition the migration names remains the recommended path — the migration is idempotent, so re-running after a fix is safe. templates/migration-hook.yaml had no coverage at all, because the Job only renders when a lookup of the cozystack-version ConfigMap reports a version below targetVersion, and lookup is nil under helm template. The new suite mocks that ConfigMap and asserts the RENDERED VALUE — enabled, disabled, key absent, stringified true, garbage, and the pre-existing three env vars — rather than merely that the variable exists, which is what let the trap above go unnoticed in the first place. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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0ba5337526 |
fix(migrations): key the etcd-adoption endpoint scheme off the claimed bucket
Deriving the safety-snapshot target from the projected cozy-backups-creds Secret is right, but detecting the admin-managed external-S3 case (provisionBucket: false) by "the projected endpoint is absent" is not: that state does not exist. The projector substitutes BACKUP_STORAGE_ENDPOINT and fails ReasonSourceMalformed when both sources are empty, so a projected Secret always carries a non-empty, scheme-stripped endpoint. So for provisionBucket: false against a plaintext external S3 the projected endpoint is a bare host, the script saw it non-empty, forced https:// and never consulted the Strategy CR — a regression against main, which read the CR verbatim and passed http:// through. Being a pre-upgrade hook with no ETCD_ADOPT_SKIP_BACKUP plumbed through migration-hook.yaml, that is a total upgrade block with no operator escape. Classify on data instead: match the projected bucketName against the .status.bucketName of any BucketClaim. The COSI driver assigns that name and the projector republishes exactly it (packages/system/bucket user-credentials.yaml reads BucketInfo spec.bucketName), so a match means the creds describe a COSI bucket => the host is the always-TLS S3 ingress => force https, as the 1.6 chart helper does. No match means external S3. Keying on data rather than on the claim's name and namespace matters twice. backupStorage.namespace/.bucketName are supported Package-CR overrides that this hook cannot see, so a name lookup would miss a renamed bucket and fall back to the v1.5.x plaintext CR — the original P0. And a BucketClaim wedged Terminating (its cosi bucketclaim-protection finalizer outlives an uninstalled COSI controller) keeps answering a name lookup while its status names some other bucket. Split the two paths by which source is authoritative. On COSI the projected coordinates win: the bucket is the COSI-assigned name the CR can only reproduce through a live lookup that may never have run. On external S3 the Strategy CR wins WHOLESALE, not just for the endpoint — the CR renders backupStorage.* and points at this same cozy-backups-creds, so CR coordinates plus these credentials is exactly what the cluster's own BackupJobs already use, and the bucket an operator will look in. Keeping the Secret's bucket while taking the CR's endpoint assembled a pairing nothing else produces: the projector copies bucketName straight from the admin-managed source Secret and never from backupStorage.bucketName, so the two can disagree outright and the snapshot could land in a bucket the platform never writes. Relying on the CR is safe on this path alone, because bucketName short-circuits to values before the BucketClaim lookup that races on the COSI path, so the CR is guaranteed present. Match with a single jq `any`, never `jq -r | grep -q`: grep exits on the first match and SIGPIPEs jq, and pipefail reports jq's 141 rather than grep's 0, so a MATCH returns as a failure and the cluster is misclassified external. It is a race on the list outgrowing one stdio write (~8KB) with only a last-line match safe, so it strikes exactly the big multi-tenant clusters that can least afford it, and backoffLimit 3 can decide differently on each retry. Measured with the match first, 20 runs each: 300 claims went 0/20 correct (rc=141 every time) and 2000 likewise, while `any` is 20/20 at 3, 300 and 2000. Refuse rather than guess when the answer is not knowable. Three states qualify: the BucketClaim API is unreadable; the list is not interpretable (no producer emits that, but without a shape gate it reads as "no claim" = external = the plaintext P0, silently); or the bucket is claimed ONLY by a Terminating claim. That last one is ambiguous — an admin who moved COSI -> external S3 reusing the bucket name, versus a still-COSI cluster whose claim is mid-recreate — and both readings fail as the same confusing handshake error when wrong, so a guess buys no reliability while reading it as "external" specifically resurrects the plaintext-:8333 P0. A live claim still wins over an unrelated Terminating one, so healthy clusters are unaffected. Each refusal names the condition and the operator action; the migration is idempotent, so re-running after resolving it is the remedy. Behaviour change worth noting: a cluster on external S3 that still has COSI installed now refuses on a sustained BucketClaim-API failure where main would have proceeded off the Strategy CR. That is the intended trade — main proceeded only because it never had to tell the two apart — but it does mean an apiserver outage can now block this hook where it previously did not. ETCD_ADOPT_SKIP_BACKUP is still not plumbed through migration-hook.yaml, so the messages deliberately point at resolving the condition rather than at an escape hatch the operator cannot reach. Force the scheme only onto a non-empty host: an absent endpoint must degrade to the CR as main did, not to a literal "https://" that would pass the final non-empty guard and reach etcd-migrate as a destination. The old test modelled external S3 by dropping the projected endpoint entirely — a state the projector cannot produce — so it green-lit the regression. It now models what the projector really writes, and the suite pins the stale-claim, overridden-coordinates, empty-endpoint, 300-claim-multi-tenant, Terminating-match, hybrid-coordinate and unreadable/uninterpretable API cases. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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9ceccd2b07 |
fix(migrations): derive the etcd-adoption snapshot target from the projected bucket creds
Migration 50 is a pre-upgrade hook, so every chart-rendered resource it reads still belongs to the version being upgraded FROM. It read the snapshot target from the live cozy-default-etcd Strategy CR, which on a v1.5.x cluster is broken in one of two ways — and the platform upgrade is gated behind this snapshot, so neither can self-heal first: 1. Absent. strategy-etcd-default.yaml is guarded by `if $bucketName`, whose helper looks up the BucketClaim status. That BucketClaim is created by the same chart, so on first render the lookup is empty and the Strategy is silently skipped. Helm lookup only runs at install/upgrade time, so a cluster that reached 1.5.x in one hop never grows the CR on reconcile. 2. Present, carrying the static v1.5.x default http://seaweedfs-s3.tenant-root.svc.cozy.local:8333. Cozystack ships SeaweedFS with enableSecurity=true, so :8333 is a TLS listener and plaintext against it fails the handshake. Fixing the scheme alone is not enough: the Etcd Strategy's S3 schema has no caCert/insecureSkipVerify, so the self-signed in-cluster endpoint is unusable at any scheme and a trusted-cert endpoint is required. Either way migration 50 hard-fails and blocks the upgrade, and the documented ETCD_ADOPT_SKIP_BACKUP escape hatch cannot be reached — migration-hook.yaml passes only NAMESPACE/CURRENT_VERSION/TARGET_VERSION. Take the coordinates from cozy-backups-creds instead. The projector writes it from the COSI-provisioned bucket's system credentials — bucket provisioning, not chart values — so it describes the live bucket regardless of which version rendered the charts, and it carries endpoint, bucketName, region and forcePathStyle alongside the AWS keys. resolve_platform_backup_args already read this Secret to validate those keys, so preferring it adds no new dependency. The endpoint is a bare host fronted by the always-TLS S3 ingress, so force https://, exactly as the 1.6 chart helper backupstrategy-controller.endpoint does. The Strategy CR remains the fallback for the admin-managed external-S3 case (provisionBucket: false), where .Values.backupStorage.endpoint is authoritative and may legitimately be plaintext against a private store; that path is detected by the absence of a projected endpoint and its scheme is preserved verbatim. The bats fixture modelled cozy-backups-creds as carrying only the AWS keys, and test 1 asserted the broken plaintext endpoint as expected output — the test was written against the implementation rather than the requirement, which is why the defect shipped green. The fixture now carries the coordinates the real projected Secret has, test 1 asserts the derived https endpoint, and two cases are added: an absent Strategy CR still resolving, and external S3 keeping the CR endpoint verbatim. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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47d239c519 |
fix(platform): address review on migration 50 (exact SAN match, Secret-gated wait, IPv6 kubeconfig)
Review feedback on #3261 (gemini-code-assist, coderabbitai, myasnikovdaniil): - Exact SAN match. _san_present read the Certificate SANs as {.spec.dnsNames} (a bracketed JSON blob that `tr ','` cannot split) and matched with a substring `grep -qF`, so a wildcard that is a substring of a longer SAN (e.g. *.etcd.<ns>.svc inside *.etcd.<ns>.svc.cluster.local) could false-positive and skip the re-issue. Read {.spec.dnsNames[*]} (space separated) and match exactly with `grep -qxF`, matching the Secret-annotation branch. - Wait on the re-issued Secret, not the patched spec. The post-patch wait loop called _san_present, which returns as soon as the Certificate spec.dnsNames contains the wildcard -- but the patch just added it there, so the loop broke on the first iteration before cert-manager re-issued the Secret, and the "re-issued" log printed unconfirmed. Add _secret_has_san (Secret alt-names annotation only, same empty-read retry + exact match) and gate the wait on it. - IPv6-safe kubeconfig server. The synthesized kubeconfig used https://$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST:$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT, which is an invalid URL on an IPv6-only cluster (a bare IPv6 host must be bracketed). Use https://kubernetes.default.svc -- IP-family-agnostic, validated by the mounted SA CA, and the same server URL kubectl synthesizes in-cluster. Tests (the review blocker): extend the bats suite (and its fake kubectl) with two cases pinning these contracts -- a superstring dnsName must NOT skip the re-issue patch, and etcd-migrate must be invoked with a synthesized in-cluster kubeconfig whose server is kubernetes.default.svc (not the bare IPv6 host), authenticating via the SA token file + CA. Both the kubeconfig path and the SA directory are now env-overridable (ETCD_MIGRATE_KUBECONFIG, ETCD_ADOPT_SA_DIR) so the synthesis is exercisable off-cluster; production defaults are unchanged. Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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d0740ed8c7 |
test(etcd): gate S3 backup round-trip behind ETCD_E2E_S3_ROUNDTRIP
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |