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Commits
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8bcb709ce8 |
fix(fluxcd): refuse a flux-plunger drain deadline that leaves no time
A drain deadline of zero or less is already spent when the drain starts, so flux-plunger would exit holding every uninstall fence without listing one. The chart could produce one: its 40-second floor was a literal, so raising the manager's stop bound or the margin before SIGKILL, which the drain subtraction is already tied to, would leave the floor rendering a non-positive deadline. The binary now refuses such a flag at startup, before it reaches for a cluster, and the chart's floor and the timings the README and the values comment state are held to the same constants. A whole number of a million seconds or more printed in exponent form and was refused as a fraction; the range is now checked first, so it gets the range message. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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42a27567ce |
fix(fluxcd): keep Helm uninstall working during flux-plunger recovery
flux-plunger recovers a "has no deployed releases" HelmRelease by briefly suspending it, deleting the stale storage Secret and unsuspending. helm-controller v1.5.x skips the uninstall and drops its finalizer when it handles a delete on a suspended HelmRelease, and it wakes on the same delete event flux-plunger does, so a delete inside that window orphaned the release's DataVolume, PVCs, RBAC and storage Secret. Lifting the suspension on the delete event cannot win that race reliably. Hold the release with a flux-plunger finalizer while it is suspended. The finalizer is applied together with the suspension in one server-side apply. On a delete flux-plunger lifts its suspension and keeps the finalizer, helm-controller reconciles the unsuspended generation and runs the uninstall, and flux-plunger removes the finalizer once helm-controller's own is gone and that generation is observed. This holds whichever controller handles the delete first. A completed recovery lifts the suspension and the finalizer together, and a terminating release never begins recovery. Decide ownership of a suspension by which field manager owns spec.suspend in metadata.managedFields rather than by an annotation. The apiserver transfers the field away the moment an operator, cozyhr resume or a backup controller writes a different value to it, so a later suspension is never misread as flux-plunger's, and one set through the shared flux-client-side-apply manager (platform migrations, the tenant delete hook, a manual kubectl apply) is never claimed. A release deleted under another manager's suspension is left to that manager's decision. Acquire applies without forcing first and, on a conflict, re-fetches and forces only if spec.suspend is still false: a backup controller owns the field at false through a dynamic-client Update, which a non-forced apply can never take, while true is an active suspension to leave alone. Every apply is preconditioned on the resourceVersion and uid of the read that decided on it. Without the resourceVersion, the unforced apply of true over a foreign true is accepted as shared ownership, a window the optimistic-locked merge patch this replaces had closed, and lifting the suspension and the finalizer from a release read as live would delete it without an uninstall if helm-controller had meanwhile handled a delete. Without the uid, an apply to a release that has gone would create an empty one. The apply carries only spec.suspend and the finalizer, so it cannot leak the required spec.interval. Read the release, every re-check and the storage Secret list from the apiserver rather than the informer cache. A lagging cache would let the processed-version guard delete the revision below the one just reclaimed, and the ClusterRole grants secrets get and list but not the watch an informer needs. Emit a Warning when flux-plunger holds a suspension it failed to clear, and Normal events when it leaves an external suspension alone or defers a recovery. An external suspension on a release flux-plunger has recovered before is a Warning instead: it is most likely one an earlier flux-plunger left under the shared manager, which nothing lifts unless an operator does. A release deleted under another manager's suspension is a Normal event when that was a migration's choice, and a Warning when the release carries flux-plunger's processed-version annotation, since then the skipped uninstall is an accident. Keep a single writer with leader election. A second process able to act under the same field manager could clear a suspension the first is still recovering, and no rollout strategy prevents one: the next pod starts as soon as the old one is terminating, and an eviction or a node drain replaces a pod the same way. The old pod keeps its Lease, unreleased, through its stop and drain, and the Lease outlasts both, so the next pod acts only after the old one is done; the price is that a new pod waits for the Lease to run out. The strategy sets maxSurge 0 with maxUnavailable 1 and stays RollingUpdate because existing installs carry the apiserver-defaulted rollingUpdate block and helm-controller applies server-side, where type Recreate over it is rejected on upgrade. Give the finalizer a way out when flux-plunger itself goes. Once the manager has stopped, within a bounded time, and with it every reconcile, flux-plunger drains its finalizers under a deadline that, with the stop, fits inside the pod's termination grace period. A stop that overran its bound is drained too and still reported, and only a pod that led drains. The drain writes its events straight to the apiserver, since the manager's recorder stops with the manager. A recovery in progress is aborted, the suspension and the finalizer lifted together for the next flux-plunger to start again, and a release being deleted has the suspension lifted and keeps the finalizer until helm-controller has run the uninstall. A release helm-controller does not handle in time keeps it. The waiting lives in the controller, where the envtest suites hold it against a real apiserver's generations and finalizers, rather than in a shell script against a model of them. A pre-delete hook on the chart is the backstop for what the drain could not finish, so uninstalling the component never leaves a release that tenant teardown waits on forever. It stops flux-plunger, waits out its grace period, then lifts any remaining suspension and finalizer without waiting again, naming each release it lets go of before helm-controller uninstalled it. It lifts a suspension only where flux-plunger alone holds it, with a JSON patch preconditioned on the resourceVersion and uid it read: kubectl apply --server-side on a release last written by a client-side apply moves that apply's fields to the applying manager and strips every one the body leaves out. The Job's deadline sits under the 300s helm-controller gives a pre-delete hook by default. A Deployment that cannot be stopped or a listing that never succeeds ends the hook before any finalizer is touched, and a finalizer it cannot remove ends it after the sweep; either way it exits non-zero: a failed pre-delete hook leaves the release untouched and helm-controller retries the uninstall, hook included, from a state it can still converge from, where exiting 0 would remove the component and strand the finalizer. A flux-plunger pod still present after its grace period, typically one stuck Terminating on a NotReady node, is only reported, since failing on it would fail every retry until the node returns; because it may still be setting finalizers, they are listed again after the sweep and any found fails the hook. The Job runs once, since helm-controller's retry is the one that starts afresh, and is kept after success so that its report stays readable; helm.sh/hook-output-log-policy would make helm-controller call a nil output writer (fluxcd/helm-controller#1562). A delete still held after ten minutes raises a Warning, and the held state is re-checked on a timer instead of only on helm-controller's next status write. The chart README documents the finalizer and how to clear it. Run the envtest suites on every pull request through a new make target that fetches a kube-apiserver and etcd with a pinned setup-envtest and takes the HelmRelease CRD from the in-tree Flux manifests: the unit tests drive a fake client, and everything the finalizer rests on (apply preconditions, the finalizer set-merge, real managedFields) only holds against a real apiserver. CI caches those binaries, and the target uses them without asking the release index, so a pull request does not depend on their sources being reachable; the control plane gets a longer start timeout because it starts beside the other test goals. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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8c1a78dc9b |
feat(operator): default system namespace memory via LimitRange (#3494)
## What this PR does
System components now get a default container memory limit, so their pod
cgroups carry a `memory.max` and drop out of the Talos userspace OOM
handler's victim set. `cozystack-operator` maintains a LimitRange named
`cozystack-system-defaults` in every system namespace it reconciles.
The Talos handler (v1.12+) scores cgroups with `memory_max.hasValue() ?
0.0 : {Besteffort: 1.0, Burstable: 0.5, ...}[class] * memory_current`
and drops everything that scores zero. Only a memory limit sets
`memory.max`, so only a limit takes a pod out of the candidate set. A
request just moves a pod from BestEffort to Burstable, which under the
default `strictCgroupClassOrdering: true` still means killed second.
`PriorityClass` does nothing here, because the handler reads cgroupfs
and never talks to the apiserver. Victim selection is also unrelated to
the trigger, so a tenant workload thrashing against its own limit can
drive node memory pressure while a system component with no limit is
what gets killed.
An audit of a running cluster found around 70 workloads across ~30
packages with at least one container missing a memory limit. Per-chart
resources would not cover that set, and would not keep covering it as
packages are added. So the LimitRange is written by
`reconcileNamespaces`, which already creates these namespaces and
already tells system from tenant. It also covers init containers, which
#3495 can't reach: one of them without a limit leaves the pod cgroup
without `memory.max`, whatever the main containers declare.
Tenant namespaces are skipped. Where the tenant chart's own
`tenant-range-limits` exists (only when the operator configured
`resourceQuotas`), a second LimitRange next to it would leave the result
to the order LimitRanger iterates them. Where it doesn't exist, a tenant
namespace is not the place for the platform to impose a default.
### Why the default is 32Gi
The handler grants immunity for `memory.max` existing at all, whatever
its value. So the ceiling doesn't need to be fitted, and 32Gi is high
enough that nothing plausibly reaches it. A ceiling low enough to bind
would turn a rare pressure-driven kill into a deterministic one for any
component whose real usage nobody measured. This repo already has one
such case, recorded in the `vertical-pod-autoscaler` values, where a
110Mi limit OOM-killed the updater and failed HelmReleases with it.
Scheduling is unaffected, since pods are scheduled against requests and
the paired default request is 32Mi. An operator who wants the ceiling to
bind can lower it, per component in that component's chart or fleet-wide
with the knob, once real usage is measured.
### When the default is withheld
A default below a container's own request makes that pod impossible to
admit, so the operator checks before it applies. It scans Deployments,
StatefulSets, DaemonSets, CronJobs, Jobs and Pods in the namespace, init
containers included, for a container that requests more than the
configured limit and declares no limit of its own. If it finds one, it
withdraws the managed LimitRange and records a hold in the
`operator.cozystack.io/system-memory-state` annotation on the Namespace.
The hold does not clear by itself when the blocker disappears, because
an empty scan looks the same as a pod between deletion and recreation.
Lowering a previously applied limit also creates a hold, even with no
visible blocker, because LimitRanger writes the defaulted limit onto
admitted pods and the scan can no longer tell which containers declare
one. A cluster administrator releases the hold by copying the
`<hold>:<target>` token from the state into the
`operator.cozystack.io/system-memory-ack` annotation. The token is used
once and only for that hold and target. If a blocker is still visible,
the token is rejected and the hold stays. Package reconciles are
scheduled at least every five minutes, so an acknowledgement takes
effect on a quiet cluster too. The reason and the token also appear in
the operator log under `withholding the default container memory limit`.
### Namespace another LimitRange already governs
If a system namespace already has a LimitRange that says anything about
memory, at the Container or the Pod scope, the operator writes nothing
there and withdraws what it wrote before. A second default leaves the
effective value to iteration order. A foreign `max` below this default,
a `min` above the default request or a `maxLimitRequestRatio` rejects
pods outright, which takes out a whole namespace. At the Pod scope the
collision can't be decided in advance, because it depends on how many
containers a future pod has. A LimitRange that bounds only cpu or
storage coexists normally. A same-named LimitRange without the
operator's managed-by label is treated as foreign and left alone.
This matters most in `kube-system`, which is in scope because
`cozystack-scheduler` installs there, and where a distribution's or an
administrator's own LimitRange is likeliest to sit.
### Disabling
Setting `cozystackOperator.systemNamespaceMemoryLimit` to `0` disables
the feature. On the next reconcile the operator removes every LimitRange
it owns cluster-wide, found by the managed-by label. While the feature
is on, it also removes its LimitRange from namespaces no active Package
targets any more. The safety state on the Namespace stays in both cases.
### Docs
`docs/operations/system-memory-limits.md` landed in #3496 ahead of this
code, so main describes a `4Gi` default and installer values that do
nothing yet. The page is corrected to the 32Gi default and now describes
withholding, the acknowledgement, and the foreign LimitRange rule.
### Not in this PR
linstor policy. #3824 extends the controller's existing exemption from
limits to the satellite, and a linstor limit here would contradict it,
so linstor stays with that PR.
The scan reads six workload kinds through `APIReader`, uncached, on
every reconcile of every system namespace. That cost is tracked in
#3977, since the system namespace set isn't known when the cache is
built and the right fix depends on a reconcile-rate measurement nobody
has taken.
### Verification
`go vet` and `go test` pass for `cmd/cozystack-operator` and
`internal/operator`, and `helm unittest` passes on the installer chart
for the knobs unset, set, and the limit at `0`. The reconciler tests
cover withholding on an oversized request, the hold surviving the
blocker's removal, the hold on a lowered limit, acknowledgement and
token rejection, every memory field of a foreign LimitRange at both
scopes, ownership by label, the disabled sweep, and a deleting Package
not creating policy.
The withhold design has not been run on a live cluster yet. An earlier
design of this PR was, and that run does not carry over.
### Screenshots
Not a UI change.
### Downstream repositories
I walked the trigger map against the diff.
`packages/core/installer/values.yaml` gains two keys, but the
`ansible-cozystack` trigger is for a required key or a rename of one the
role passes, and these are new, optional and default to `""`, so the
role is unaffected. Nothing else in the map is reached by the Go
changes, the operator template or the page.
- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) -
follow-up:
### Release note
```release-note
feat(operator): system namespaces now get a default container memory limit through a LimitRange maintained by cozystack-operator, which keeps system components out of the Talos userspace OOM handler's victim set. Tune it with cozystackOperator.systemNamespaceMemoryLimit (default 32Gi) and cozystackOperator.systemNamespaceMemoryRequest (default 32Mi); set the limit to 0 to disable it. The default is far above any real working set on purpose, because the handler grants immunity for a memory.max existing at all, not for its value. A namespace with a container that requests more than the limit and declares no limit of its own gets no default, and stays without one until a cluster administrator acknowledges the hold recorded on the Namespace (see docs/operations/system-memory-limits.md); lowering a previously applied limit needs the same acknowledgement. A namespace where another LimitRange already sets anything about memory is left alone. A container that declares its own memory limit is never changed.
```
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798094e725 |
feat(release): add backport-audit, a pre-release backport triage tool (#3527)
## What this PR does
This adds `cmd/backport-audit`, a maintainer tool that checks, before a
release or an rc is cut, whether everything labelled for backport
actually landed on the release branch. It prints the URLs of the PRs
that did not and exits non-zero, so the cut can gate on it.
`docs/release.md` and `docs/agents/releasing.md` now send the patch-cut
check through it.
The docs it replaces inventoried backports with `gh pr list --search
"is:merged label:kind/backport"`. That lists every PR ever labelled, not
what reached the branch. Answering the real question by hand means
reading the branch history per PR, and that is how backports go missing
quietly.
```console
$ go build ./cmd/backport-audit
$ ./backport-audit release-1.4
=== release-1.4 === 30 candidate PRs: MISSING=5 dropped=4 backported=21
MISSING -- labelled for this line, no trace of it here (5):
https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/pull/2704
#2704 fix(info): use root-host for Keycloak OIDC issuer URL in tenant kubeconfig
label=kind/backport author=myasnikovdaniil merged=2026-05-26 -- no backport PR, nothing on branch
```
A `kind/backport` label does not name a branch. `backport.yaml` resolves
the target when the PR merges, so the same label means `release-1.5` on
a PR merged in June and `release-1.6` on one merged in August. The audit
reproduces that rule instead of trusting the label text. The rule
changed once, on 2026-08-03, when
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5b585d6eda |
fix(operator): persist holds for unsafe memory defaults
An admitted Pod loses the distinction between explicit and defaulted limits. Its disappearance cannot prove a lower default is safe for its replacement. Keep that decision on the Namespace until an administrator acknowledges the particular target, without waiving current blockers or foreign policy ownership. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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e83b4eb492 |
fix(operator): align memory policy ownership messages
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> Assisted-By: LLM |
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b3168a3824 |
test(operator): pin system memory defaults
Keep the parser inputs tied to the constants registered as flag defaults, but compare the results with literal 32Gi and 32Mi expectations. A shipped default can no longer move while the defaults case stays green. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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6a521f0c68 |
fix(operator): sweep memory defaults when disabled
List LimitRanges by the ownership label once per Package reconcile when the feature is disabled, and remove managed objects even in namespaces outside the current Package target set. Skip the per-namespace path while disabled and keep cleanup failures non-fatal to namespace reconciliation. Update the flag help, installer guidance, and operations documentation to describe the global cleanup boundary. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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f6dcb69b61 |
refactor(operator): withhold instead of raising, and drop the grace period
The raise-and-grace machinery cannot work: LimitRanger writes the raised limit onto the very container that justified the raise, so at that container's next admission it carries a limit, the scan skips containers that have one, and the raise has erased its own evidence. The ceiling then drops on schedule and the workload is rejected permanently. Any such machinery approximates admission logic ahead of admission, and that is incomplete by construction: a LimitRange default is one number for a whole namespace and cannot mean "the configured limit, or this container's request, whichever is larger". Only per-pod conditional defaulting expresses that, which is a mutating webhook and not this. The justification for the machinery had also expired. It was designed when the default was 4Gi, where withholding was self-perpetuating for VPA-managed namespaces. At 32Gi nothing in the tree approaches the ceiling -- the largest static memory request is 2Gi -- and VPA sets requests and limits together, so those containers carry their own limit and were never blockers. So a namespace holding a container that requests more than the configured limit with no limit of its own is now left with no default at all, and anything written there earlier is withdrawn. It fails in the safe direction, which is the whole argument: a namespace with no memory.max is a namespace behaving as it did in every release before this, while a default below a request is a namespace whose workload cannot be admitted. It needs no stored state and no timer, because withholding is not a decision that has to survive between reconciles -- once the oversized request is gone the default is applied again on the next pass. Gone with it: the grace period, the clear-since annotation and its clamp, the injected clock, containerMemoryDefault, raisedCeiling, and fourteen tests. The scan stays, because deciding whether to apply or withhold is what it was always for. The foreign-LimitRange ownership guard, the disable path and the 32Gi default are untouched. The residual sharp edge is stated rather than machinery: a workload whose only evidence is a live Pod, built from a custom resource with no template this scan can read, can still be missed if the scan runs while that Pod is absent, and applying the default then rejects its recreation. At 32Gi that is unreachable in this tree. It becomes reachable if an operator lowers the knob below such a workload's request, which the flag help, values.yaml and the operations page now say plainly. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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c6342bf885 |
fix(operator): bring the flag help in line with the guard and removal scope
The --help text still carried two claims that values.yaml and the operations page had already narrowed, and it is the one surface an operator reads without opening the tree. Both were wrong in the direction that costs the reader something. "A namespace where another LimitRange already defaults or caps container memory is left alone" described the guard before it was widened, so an administrator holding a container memory min, a maxLimitRequestRatio or any Pod-scoped bound would read it, expect the LimitRange to be applied there anyway, and get a namespace with no memory.max for a reason the help says does not apply. "Removes any previously created one" is the universal removal claim, and removal is scoped to namespaces an active Package still targets. Two comments corrected while here. constrainsMemory said it switched on the item's own maps "rather than a hand-picked few", which contradicts the hand-picked list immediately below it; what is actually true is that a field added upstream has to be added there too, which is the reason it has its own table test. And memoryDefaultSettledAt claimed the count of raised namespaces falls to none once the oversized requests are gone, which stopped being true when the scan started keeping Failed pods: a carcass Kubernetes never collects holds both the raise and that namespace's per-reconcile pod List open. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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81c12bc953 |
fix(operator): withhold on any foreign memory policy, not two fields
The coexistence guard treated a namespace as already-governed only when another LimitRange carried a container memory default or max, and said so in its comment. That is not the set of fields that collide with what this reconciler writes. A container min above the default request rejects the pod, and so does a maxLimitRequestRatio, since a 32Gi default against a 32Mi default request is a ratio of 1024:1 and no cap allows it. So the namespace-wide admission failure the guard exists to prevent stayed reachable through fields the guard did not read, and kube-system is where it is likeliest, this feature having deliberately brought it in scope. Enumerating the colliding fields does not fix it, because at the Pod scope the collision is not decidable here. Whether a per-container default of 32Gi breaches a pod-wide max depends on how many containers the pod has, and the pods in question do not exist yet: any arithmetic about them is a guess, and a wrong guess costs a namespace its entire pod admission. So the rule is ownership rather than arithmetic. If anything else in the namespace has an opinion about memory, at either scope and in any field, the namespace is not this reconciler's to default. Narrow still on the resource, because nothing here writes cpu or storage and a LimitRange bounding those must keep coexisting. This is the rule the tenant-namespace exclusion already rests on. The pod scan no longer skips Failed pods, only Succeeded. A pod that ran to completion is never recreated from its spec, but an eviction or a node crash leaves a Failed carcass holding the same oversized request that its controller will recreate, and that carcass is frequently the only surviving evidence the namespace needs a raised ceiling, since the shape the scan looks for cannot be admitted once the namespace has settled. Dropping it lowered the ceiling under a workload that was coming back, which is what the grace period exists to prevent. A grace stamp dated ahead of the clock is clamped to now. Unclamped it held the ceiling for the skew plus the grace period, silently, so an hour of skew bought ninety minutes instead of thirty. Clamping never shortens the wait, it only stops it being extended. The two flag defaults are named constants the flag registration and its test both read. The test previously duplicated the literal and still asserted 4Gi after the default moved to 32Gi, so it misinformed a reader about the shipped value and pinned nothing. The disable claim is narrowed to what the code guarantees. "Removes any previously created one" was universal, but the reconciler only runs for namespaces an active Package still targets, so a namespace whose Package was removed keeps its LimitRange. The flag help, values.yaml and the operations page now say that, and name the managed-by label for finding leftovers by hand. The test asserting a Pod-scoped memory max should be ignored is gone, since under the ownership rule a Pod-scoped memory bound withholds. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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e131a49514 |
feat(operator): default the system namespace memory ceiling to 32Gi
The guard in front of this default reads declared memory requests. It cannot see a container's real working set, so a system component that requests little but legitimately uses more than the ceiling, and declares no limit of its own, was handed a deterministic kernel OOM on its next recreation in exchange for leaving the Talos handler's victim set. Since the feature ships enabled, that trade fell on the whole fleet on upgrade. It is not a trade this feature has to make. The handler discards a cgroup for carrying a memory.max at all, whatever its value, so immunity does not require a fitted ceiling -- only a real one. A default far above any plausible working set buys the immunity and leaves nothing for the ceiling to bind on, which also keeps it clear of the failure mode this repository already carries a scar from, where an undersized limit converted a rare pressure-driven kill into a reliable one. Nothing about scheduling changes: only requests are scheduled against, and the paired default request stays 32Mi. An operator who wants the ceiling to bind lowers it, per component in a chart or fleet-wide with this knob, once real usage is measured -- which is the direction that needs evidence, and now the direction that needs it rather than the default. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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b6cb0def78 |
docs(operator): say that kube-system is in scope for the memory default
The scope of the default LimitRange is every namespace a Package targets whose name does not start with `tenant-`, and cozystack-scheduler installs into kube-system, so a namespace owned by the underlying Kubernetes distribution is defaulted like any other. Neither the flag help nor the installer value said so, and both are what somebody setting the knob reads. docs/operations/system-memory-limits.md already covers this, including the part that surprises: containers the kubelet builds from an on-disk manifest never pass through admission, so a Talos control-plane static pod gets no memory.max from this feature in the first place and the mirror pod is the only thing the LimitRange reaches. Both notes now carry the same statement, so neither reading of the knob leaves it out. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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9866113da0 |
test(operator): pin the system namespace memory flag parsing
parseQuantity and the request-above-limit check were closures inside main(), so no branch of either was reachable from a test: not empty, not malformed, not negative, not a request of 0 against a real limit, and not the pair check itself. That last one is the one worth having. A limit and a request that each parse but contradict each other produce a LimitRange the API server rejects, once per system namespace on every Package reconcile, and nothing in that error points back at a flag. Lift both into parseSystemNamespaceMemory, which returns an error instead of calling os.Exit, and pin all of it: the shipped defaults, empty as the off switch, an explicit 0 limit beside a set request, a 0 request against a real limit (supported on purpose), malformed and negative values on either flag, request above limit, and request equal to limit as the legal boundary. main() keeps the same exit-on-error behaviour, now in one place. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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dd36eeddbc |
docs(operator): describe the raise, not the retract, in the shipped help
The flag help and the installer values comment both still said the operator skips a namespace holding a request above the configured limit and retracts any LimitRange it applied there. It stopped doing that in 3127c0fad: it raises that namespace's ceiling to clear the request and drops back once the request is gone. An operator reading the shipped help and then finding an 8Gi LimitRange in cozy-monitoring had no way to connect the two. Both texts now describe the raise, the drop-back and the log line to grep for. The values comment also loses its VPA warning, which this branch's own comment in findRequestAboveDefaultLimit refutes — VPA rescales the limit in proportion to the request under the default controlledValues, so it cannot be what puts a namespace over — and gains a pointer to declaring a limit in the component's own chart, which is how packages/system/linstor now stays out of the default's reach. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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7eecbe9b4c |
docs(operator): document a zero default memory request
--system-namespace-memory-request=0 passes the startup check, since 0 is not greater than the limit, and produces a LimitRange with defaultRequest: 0. Whether that is a footgun to reject or a supported setting to explain was open, so I asked a real API server: envtest with kube-apiserver 1.36.0 and LimitRanger enabled, with a second namespace using 32Mi as the positive control that the plugin was actually running. It is supported. The API server accepts the LimitRange and stores defaultRequest as 0 rather than folding it back to the default -- the Default-to-DefaultRequest copy only fills keys that are absent, and this one is present. A container declaring no memory of its own is then admitted with an explicit request of 0 and a limit of 4Gi, QoS Burstable. So LimitRanger does not read zero as absent, and the container still gets memory.max on its cgroup, which is the whole reason this feature exists. What it costs is the scheduling signal: nothing is reserved for that container, which is exactly where system components stood before this feature. Say so in the flag help text, where an operator setting the knob will see it, and note at the startup check that 0 passing is deliberate so nobody hardens it into a rejection later. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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546d8e6a54 |
feat(operator): default system namespace memory via LimitRange
The Talos userspace OOM handler (v1.12+) picks its victim by ranking
cgroups with `memory_max.hasValue() ? 0.0 : {Besteffort: 1.0, Burstable:
0.5, ...}[class] * memory_current`, discarding every cgroup that scores
zero. Only a memory limit sets memory.max on the pod cgroup, so only a
limit takes a pod out of the candidate set: a request merely demotes
BestEffort to Burstable, which under the v1.13.6 default
strictCgroupClassOrdering still means "killed second". PriorityClass has
no effect at all, because the handler walks cgroupfs and never talks to
the API server.
Victim selection is decoupled from the trigger, so the cgroup that
caused the pressure and the cgroup that gets SIGKILLed are unrelated by
design. Tenant workloads generally carry limits and system components
generally did not, which inverted the intended order: a tenant workload
thrashing against its own limit drives node-wide memory PSI, and
metallb-speaker or linstor-satellite is killed for it while the workload
responsible is never touched.
An audit found roughly 70 workloads across ~30 packages with at least
one container missing a memory limit, so per-chart resources would
neither cover the current set nor keep covering it. Maintain a
LimitRange in every system namespace instead, at the single choke point
that already creates them and already distinguishes system from tenant
(reconcileNamespaces). Tenant namespaces are left alone because
packages/apps/tenant owns LimitRange policy there.
The limit is a ceiling, not a reservation: it defaults well above real
usage (4Gi against a largest observed system request of 512Mi).
defaultRequest is set explicitly and small, because Kubernetes otherwise
defaults each request to the limit and reserves that much at schedule
time. Setting the limit to 0 disables the LimitRange and removes any the
operator previously created.
Two things keep the feature from being able to hurt more than it helps.
A LimitRange default only reaches a container that declares no memory
limit of its own, and the API server then rejects a request above its
limit. So before applying, scan the namespace for a container that
requests more than the configured limit and sets none, and where one
exists skip the namespace, retract any LimitRange applied earlier, and
log the pod, container, request and limit. This is not hypothetical:
packages/system/monitoring and packages/system/monitoring-agents ship
VPAs for cozy-monitoring with maxAllowed.memory of 8Gi and 6G under
updateMode: Initial, so the VPA admission webhook -- which runs after
the in-tree LimitRanger -- can write a request past 4Gi that no chart in
the tree declares. That is why the check runs against live pods rather
than rendered templates, and why it reads through APIReader rather than
starting a cluster-wide Pod informer.
And no failure inside the feature propagates: a LimitRange error, or a
pod list that cannot be read, is logged and stepped over instead of
failing the Package reconcile. A namespace without a LimitRange is back
to the behaviour of every earlier release, while a namespace that never
reconciles leaves its components uninstalled.
Assisted-By: LLM
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
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d3df698c43 |
docs(release): gate maintenance cuts on backport delivery
Listing labelled pull requests cannot establish whether their changes landed on a maintenance branch. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> Assisted-by: LLM |
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a0b1dfb45b |
feat(release): add per-commit backport audit
Backport labels record requests, and a merged conflict draft may still lack commits. Release cuts need a check of what reached the branch. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> Assisted-by: LLM |
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520af57905 |
chore: drop private cluster, host and personal names from the tree
Private infrastructure names, a real hostname, a commented-out internal mirror block, an internal product name, and a reviewer's name in a comment do not belong in a public repository; drop them and replace what needs a stand-in with neutral placeholders. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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de570a3806 |
feat(platform): add slim installation variants (#4595)
## What this PR does This adds three minimal platform variants for small installs, such as arm64 labs, where isp-full is too heavy. They are `isp-slim` for Talos, `isp-slim-generic` for k3s, kubeadm or RKE2, and `isp-hosted-slim` for clusters where the host provides CNI and storage. A slim variant installs only the base platform: the engine, API and dashboard, tenants, ingress and Gateway API. The two non-hosted variants also get LINSTOR. objectstorage-controller stays on too, because cozystack-controller watches BucketClaim unconditionally and crash-loops without that CRD. Everything else is opt-in through `bundles.enabledPackages`, including every paas and naas application and its operator, monitoring, backups, etcd, SeaweedFS, metrics-server, VPA, Multus and MetalLB. The iaas bundle is refused, so there are no VMs and no managed Kubernetes. With the stock preset a slim variant emits 20 Packages (15 for hosted), where isp-full emits 77. On the two non-hosted slim variants, networking is Cilium alone. Without VMs nothing needs Kube-OVN, and Cilium L2 announcements take the place of MetalLB. The admin creates a `CiliumLoadBalancerIPPool` and a `CiliumL2AnnouncementPolicy`, or uses `publishing.externalIPs`. Pod ranges come from `node.spec.podCIDR`, which Talos and k3s allocate by default. `networking.encryption` only drives Kube-OVN IPsec, so the slim variants refuse it instead of silently ignoring it. The tenant application needs its own slim variant. The default one waits on the monitoring, etcd and SeaweedFS applications, so on slim cozystack-basics and tenant-root would never become ready. tenant-rd and cozystack-basics still reference the default variant's artifacts by name. Those artifacts exist anyway, because the PackageSource builds them for every variant. The full variants don't change. I rendered isp-full, isp-full-generic and isp-hosted against main and got byte-identical Packages. The only new output there is the slim variant in the tenant-application PackageSource. Things to know before using it: - An opt-in package does not pull in its dependencies. The presets and the docs list the chains. A package enabled without its chain stays `DependenciesNotReady`. - Slim is for new installs. Switching a live isp-full cluster to isp-slim moves the networking Package from `kubeovn-cilium` to `cilium`, the operator removes the Kube-OVN release, and running pods lose networking. The other Packages are kept by `helm.sh/resource-policy: keep`, so the switch doesn't make the cluster smaller either. - No e2e suite runs a slim variant yet. Helm unit tests cover the presets, opt-in, OIDC, the networking values and both refusals, and a dependency check over every emitted Package passes for all three presets. I installed isp-slim from a build of this branch on a fresh three-node Talos 1.13 cluster (amd64). All Packages and HelmReleases went Ready, with no Kube-OVN, MetalLB, monitoring, backup or KubeVirt pods. From outside, the dashboard and the API answered by name with valid certificates. A LoadBalancer Service got an address from a Cilium pool and answered through L2 announcements. Pod-to-pod traffic across nodes, cluster DNS and a replicated LINSTOR volume worked. Opting in postgres-operator and postgres-application gave a Ready Postgres. That run found the BucketClaim crash-loop above, which is fixed here. The base platform used about 215m CPU and 3.2 GiB of memory, not counting the Kubernetes control plane. ### Screenshots Not a UI change. ### Downstream repositories - [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [x] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: cozystack/website#718 - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [x] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: cozystack/ansible-cozystack#79 - [x] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: cozystack/ccp#23 - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note feat(platform): add the isp-slim, isp-slim-generic and isp-hosted-slim variants. They install only the base platform (engine, dashboard, tenants, ingress, gateway, and LINSTOR outside hosted) with Cilium-only networking and no MetalLB; applications, operators, monitoring, backups, etcd and SeaweedFS are opt-in through bundles.enabledPackages, and the iaas bundle is not available. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added the `isp-slim`, `isp-slim-generic`, and `isp-hosted-slim` platform variants, with support for PaaS and NaaS bundles. * Slim variants use Cilium networking and include a reduced set of packages by default. Additional packages and their dependencies can be enabled as needed. * **Limitations** * IaaS and the platform encryption toggle are not supported on slim variants. Cilium-native encryption is not configured. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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f6a615f693 |
fix(backups): scrub legacy plaintext passwords from CNPG Backup snapshots (#4558)
## What this PR does A CNPG `Backup` taken while the Postgres app still accepted `users[].password` copied that password into `status.underlyingResources`, where anyone with `get backups` in the namespace can read it. #4078 stopped new snapshots from carrying the field but left every existing `Backup` as it was (#4179). This adds `LegacyPasswordScrubber`, a leader-elected runnable in the backup strategy controller that, on start, lists `Backup` objects and removes `users.*.password` from every snapshot whose `kind`/`apiVersion` is the CNPG snapshot's. - **Why on every leader start and not a platform migration.** The migration hook runs pre-upgrade, while the old controller is still leader, so a `Backup` the old replica writes during the rollout would keep its password and the migration never re-runs. With `--leader-elect` on, the old replicas stop writing before the new leader's scrub runs, and a `Backup` brought back from an object-level export is cleaned on the next start too. On a clean cluster the whole pass is one List from the manager cache, which `BackupReconciler` already populates. - **Write shape.** The patch is a merge patch computed from the diff, so the request body only nulls the `password` keys and cannot overwrite status another writer changed since the List. The snapshot is handled as generic JSON (numbers kept as `json.Number`), so fields the current snapshot type does not know survive. - **Failure handling.** A `Backup` that cannot be decoded or patched is logged and skipped, and a failed List is logged too; `Start` always returns nil, because a returned error would stop the manager and take every backup down over one object. - **Restore compatibility.** Restore already ignored the key; a test decodes a scrubbed snapshot through `unmarshalCNPGBackupSnapshot` to pin that. - RBAC: `list` and `patch` on `backups.cozystack.io/backups` are already granted to the controller, so the chart is unchanged. - `docs/operations/backup-classes.md` no longer tells operators to delete pre-upgrade `Backup` objects, and says what the scrub does not reach (audit logs, etcd backups, external exports of the objects, Helm history of the init-script Secret), so a password once set through `users[].password` is still treated as exposed until rotated. The runnable carries a `TODO(#4179)` to remove it once upgrading from a release that accepted `users[].password` is no longer supported. Verification: `go test ./internal/backupcontroller/...` and `go build ./cmd/backupstrategy-controller/` are green. The new tests cover scrubbing with everything else kept (including an unknown field with a large integer), leaving non-CNPG, other-apiVersion, clean and snapshot-less Backups unpatched, and continuing past a Backup that fails to decode or patch. Disabling the delete, or returning on the first patch error, makes the tests fail. Not exercised on a live cluster yet. Fixes #4179 ### Screenshots N/A — no UI changes. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map against the diff: it touches only `internal/backupcontroller`, `cmd/backupstrategy-controller` and the in-repo `docs/operations/backup-classes.md`, with no package, values, schema, CRD, variant or asset change. The website carries no "delete pre-upgrade Backups" workaround this would make obsolete; its stale `users[name].password` rows are the #4078 follow-up already noted there. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(backups): the backup strategy controller now removes plaintext `users[].password` values left in `status.underlyingResources` of CNPG `Backup` objects taken before managed Postgres stopped accepting user passwords. It runs on every controller start and needs no action. It does not reach copies outside the cluster (audit logs, etcd backups, exported `Backup` objects), so a password once set through `users[].password` should still be treated as exposed until it is rotated. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Security** * At controller startup, plaintext user passwords are removed from matching CNPG backup snapshots. Other snapshot data is preserved. * This cleanup does not affect external copies or remove older init-script manifests from Helm history. Treat passwords previously set through `users[].password` as exposed until rotated. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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465195c671 |
feat(operator): register slim platform variants
Add isp-slim, isp-slim-generic and isp-hosted-slim to the platform PackageSource so a Package can select the minimal presets shipped by the platform chart. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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e510d49b3d |
feat(monitoring): re-render node agents when a monitoring label changes
The node fluent-bit builds its tenant routes from a lookup of namespace labels, and helm-controller upgrades a release only when its chart or values digest changes. A tenant turning monitoring on therefore got no route, and a removed one kept its route, until an unrelated change upgraded monitoring-agents. The reconciler digests the label across all namespaces and requests a forced upgrade of the release when the digest moves. It digests every labelled namespace rather than repeating the chart's selection, so it cannot drift from the chart; the cost is an occasional upgrade that renders the same config. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Mattia Eleuteri <mattia@hidora.io> |
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19764c4bba |
fix(backups): scrub legacy plaintext passwords from CNPG Backup snapshots
A CNPG Backup taken while the Postgres app still accepted users[].password copied that password into status.underlyingResources, where anyone with `get backups` in the namespace can read it. Dropping the field stopped new snapshots from carrying it but left every existing Backup exposed. The backup strategy controller now removes users.*.password from CNPG snapshots when its leader starts. It runs on every start rather than once, so a Backup written by a pre-upgrade replica during the rollout, or brought back from an object-level export, is still cleaned; on a clean cluster it is a single cached List. The patch is a diff-computed merge patch that only nulls the password keys, and a Backup that cannot be decoded or patched is logged and skipped instead of stopping the manager. Fixes #4179 Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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2c2c0301f7 |
chore(deps): roll up pending Renovate updates and move to Go 1.27.1 (#4447)
## What this PR does This replaces the open Renovate PRs with one rollup. Go modules move to their newest releases that keep the Kubernetes libraries and controller-runtime where they are, the toolchain and builder images move to Go 1.27.1, and the first-party code gets the Go 1.27 modernizers. Tests for the code the bumps touch come first, in their own commits, and pass on both the old and the new dependencies. Before the bumps: - The e2e sandbox image builds again: dl.min.io answers 410 for mc since MinIO archived it, so mc now comes from its last GitHub release with a pinned checksum. - Renovate stops offering tags of the apimachinery fork. They mirror upstream, so #2999 is a downgrade that drops our patch. - `make unit-tests` now runs the tests of the nested Go modules (kubevirt-csi-driver, token-proxy, kubeovn-webhook, api/apps/v1alpha1). They never ran in CI before. - New tests: JWT verification in the dashboard token proxy, the kube-ovn plunger metrics, cert-manager object idempotency in the tenant gateway, values-file layering in the operator, and the kubevirt CSI driver wrapper. - One real fix. The lineage webhook decoded admitted objects with encoding/json, so an int64 above 2^53 came back rounded. jsonpatch v2.5 compares numbers exactly and would emit a replace that rewrites such a field in the pod. The webhook now decodes with apimachinery's json. Held back on purpose, with the reasons in the commit messages: - Kubernetes libraries stay on v0.35. #3001 needs the apimachinery fork rebased onto release-1.37 first. - cel-go v0.29.2 and etcd v3.6.15, the lines k8s.io/apiserver v0.35 is built and tested with. - grpc v1.83.2. v1.84.0 is affected by GO-2026-6443 and no v1.84 patch release carries the fix yet. - kubevirt.io/api and the CDI API stay on what upstream csi-driver builds against. From CDI v1.60 it no longer compiles. - api/apps/v1alpha1 keeps go 1.26.4, so consumers of the published types are not forced onto Go 1.27. - go fix runs without embedlit (Go 1.27-only syntax, breaks backports to release branches on Go 1.26) and omitzero (would make metadata, spec and status required in the published OpenAPI schemas), and one errorsastype rewrite that did not compile is left out. govulncheck reports nothing reachable in any of the five modules, standard library included. Supersedes #4311, #4310, #4309, #3452, #3993, #3927, #3902, #3805, #3451, #3415, #3414, #3413, #3302, #4050 and #3363. #3001 stays open. Not checked locally: the images that build upstream projects (kube-ovn, kamaji, cilium, linstor-csi and others) with the Go 1.27 builder. The image build jobs of this PR cover them. Closes #4487. ### Screenshots No UI changes. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note chore(deps): move the toolchain and builder images to Go 1.27.1 and raise Go dependencies to their latest compatible releases, closing the published advisories; the lineage webhook no longer rewrites int64 fields above 2^53 in admitted objects. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added a restore resource policy option for Velero strategies. * Added a test target to run Go tests across tracked modules. * **Bug Fixes** * Updated the end-to-end test environment to download and verify the MinIO client from its current release location. * Added coverage for token validation, webhook patching, controller behavior, and reconciliation. * **Maintenance** * Updated the Go toolchain, dependencies, and container image versions. * Refreshed pinned workflow actions and base image digests. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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0bae19fccc |
feat(lineage-webhook): refuse a second ApplicationDefinition for a kind
A definition declaring an application kind that another definition already declares now fails when it is applied, instead of sitting next to the first one where it has no effect. An update that keeps its kind is allowed, so a duplicate that predates the check keeps upgrading, and so is a second definition from the same Helm release, since a release that renames its definition object creates the new one before it deletes the old one. The webhook is registered with failurePolicy Ignore: ApplicationDefinitions ship with the platform itself, so an outage of the webhook must never block a bootstrap or an upgrade, and a failure to read the existing definitions lets the request through with a warning rather than answering with an error, which Ignore would not cover. It is the feedback layer; which definition manages a kind is decided by the ownership rule whatever it lets through. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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0b7dd23b99 |
fix(appdef): let one ApplicationDefinition own each application kind
Nothing enforced that spec.application.kind is unique, and each consumer that maps a kind back to a definition resolved a duplicate its own way: the chartRef reconciler let every definition rewrite every release of its kind, the lineage webhook and the CA projection reconciler took whichever came first in an unordered list, and cozystack-api registered one resource per definition. A second definition declaring a kind already in use could therefore repoint that kind's tenant releases at its own artifact. Add one ownership rule, the definition created first owns the kind with ties broken by name, and route every consumer through it. A definition that arrives later with a kind already in use no longer manages that kind's releases whatever it is named: the chartRef reconciler skips it with a Warning event and re-reconciles the next owner when the current one goes, cozystack-api registers the owner only and logs the rest, its restart hash moves when ownership moves, and the lineage and CA projection lookups resolve the owner. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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7a0aab2bdc |
refactor: apply the Go 1.27 modernizers
Run go fix over every first-party module: interface{} becomes any,
hand-written loops become slices, maps, min/max and range-over-int,
errors.As becomes errors.AsType, pointer helpers become new(expr) and
are inlined at their call sites, and so on. Every rewrite keeps
behaviour.
Three rewrites stay out. embedlit flattens embedded-field literals
such as ObjectMeta, syntax only Go 1.27 accepts, which would break
backports to release branches still on Go 1.26. omitzero drops
omitempty from struct fields, and openapi-gen reads omitempty as
optional, so metadata, spec and status would turn required in the
published schemas. And errorsastype rewrote an errors.As whose
target, apierrors.APIStatus, does not implement error, which
errors.AsType rejects at compile time.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
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aa20495df3 |
feat(marketplace): register a tapped repository's apps on connect
Connecting a marketplace repository materialized its PackageSource but created no Package, so its ApplicationDefinitions never rendered and its apps never appeared in the dashboard catalog until a manual `cozypkg add` the dashboard cannot drive (the package list is computed from the ApplicationDefinitions, which do not exist yet). The tap materializer now creates a tap-managed registration Package for each materialized PackageSource, the way the platform ships a Package per built-in app, so the ApplicationDefinition registrations deploy on connect and the apps become browsable; the app components carry no install block and are still instantiated per user resource. Privileged install components of an unconfirmed tap auto-registration (a Package that still carries the marketplace-tap label) are refused on several best-effort layers: the Package reconciler skips their HelmRelease and prunes a lingering one at the install site, and the PackageSource reconciler withholds their ExternalArtifact so the helm-controller has no privileged content to deploy, re-running on confirmation via a Package watch. `cozypkg add --allow-privileged` sheds the label as an explicit ownership handover, which is the confirmation; a platform Package never carries the label. A benign component flipped to privileged in a new revision can still be materialized by source-watcher before these layers observe the flip; closing that race fully requires decoupling the catalog registration from install and is tracked in issue #4359. `cozypkg untap` and the dashboard disconnect remove the registration Package (de-registering the apps) under a UID + ResourceVersion precondition, so a concurrent `cozypkg add` handover is never clobbered; running instances are left but unmanaged. `cozypkg add` re-opens a tap auto-registration for variant selection and hands it over. The cozystack-api ClusterRole gains delete on packages for the disconnect path. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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f9ea0da3de |
feat(backups): Kafka topic-metadata backup via a dedicated strategy driver (#4000)
## What this PR does Adds a dedicated `strategy.backups.cozystack.io/Kafka` Go driver that backs up the **topic metadata** of a Cozystack-managed `Kafka` application and wires it into the platform `cozy-default` flow — the counterpart to the app-specific drivers (CNPG, MariaDB, Altinity, MongoDB). It is a typed variant of the generic Job strategy: the controller renders a one-shot batch Job that talks to the Kafka Admin API, and adds on top an applicationRef Kind gate, a `Ready` precondition on the Strimzi `Kafka` cluster, and a per-run object key via `.BackupName` so distinct runs never overwrite each other. What it captures: every non-internal topic's partition count, replication factor and non-default configs (via `kafka-topics --describe`), stored as one small object per run in the system bucket; restore recreates them with `kafka-topics --create` + `kafka-configs --alter`. Deliberately **out of scope**: message payloads (a volume-snapshot strategy's job), consumer-group offsets (a log position, only meaningful with a byte-identical data restore), ACLs, quotas, and `KafkaUser`s. No PITR. Restored topics are created directly through the Admin API, so on the target they are unmanaged (no `KafkaTopic` CR) — the accepted tradeoff of an Admin-API-only driver. Both restore flows are implemented: **in-place** recreates dropped topics into the source, and **to-copy** applies the source's topics onto a freshly-bootstrapped empty `Kafka` (the "bootstrap a cluster, then apply the metadata state" flow). Contents: - Driver: `api/backups/strategy/v1alpha1/kafka_types.go`, `internal/backupcontroller/kafkastrategy_controller.go` (+ unit tests for its pure helpers), `internal/backupcontroller/kafkatypes/` (Strimzi `Kafka` readiness gate), dispatch cases in both controllers + `supportedBackupStrategyKinds()`, scheme registration, generated CRD + deepcopy. - Chart: `strategy-kafka-default.yaml` (gated on the bucket name), a `cozy-default` binding, read RBAC on `kafka.strimzi.io/kafkas`, and the Strimzi Kafka client image value. - Docs: a Kafka section in `docs/operations/backup-classes.md`. - Example + e2e: `examples/backups/kafka-metadata/` and `hack/e2e-chainsaw/kafka-metadata/` (`kafka-3-metadata-roundtrip`), an honest round-trip that proves a per-run `retention.ms` sentinel survives both restores. The original `packages/apps/kafka` chart is left untouched (it has no legacy backup mechanism). Validated: `go build ./...`, `go vet`, `go test ./internal/backupcontroller/...` (pure helpers plus a reconcile Kind-gate test and the RestoreJob cleanup regression test), `helm unittest` on the package (which now renders `strategy-kafka-default.yaml` and asserts its kind/name/`artifactURITemplate`), the `select-install`/`select-e2e` bats suites, `helm template` of the strategy CR, `bash -n` of the rendered script, and `make generate` (clean). The end-to-end round-trip (`kafka-3-metadata-roundtrip`) is enabled and mapped like the sibling backup suites, so CI builds this branch's controller and runs it live against a fresh sandbox; it has not been merged-and-run before, so that first live run must go green before merge. ### Screenshots N/A — no UI changes. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the diff. This PR adds a new `strategy.backups.cozystack.io/Kafka` CRD, a Go driver, chart wiring, docs and examples. It does not add or rename a `packages/apps`/`packages/extra` package, does not change any `ApplicationDefinition`, `values.schema.json`, version enum, `release.prefix`, output Secret/Service, the `Package`/`Plan`/`RestoreJob` CRDs the provider types by hand, any `hack/*.mk` anchor or make-target behaviour, node prerequisites, labels/annotations, or telemetry metrics. A brand-new `strategy.backups.cozystack.io` CRD travels to the Terraform provider as opaque JSON (it types only `Plan`/`RestoreJob`/`Package`), so it keeps working untouched. None of the downstream triggers match. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note feat(backups): add a Kafka topic-metadata backup strategy bound by cozy-default — backs up topic definitions and configs (partitions, replication factor, non-default configs) via the Kafka Admin API, with in-place and to-copy restore; message data, consumer offsets, ACLs, quotas and KafkaUsers are out of scope ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit - **New Features** - Added Kafka topic-metadata backup and restore support, excluding message data. - Supports ad-hoc and scheduled backups, in-place restoration, and restoration to a separate Kafka cluster. - Recreates missing topics and restores compatible configurations while validating partition and replication-factor constraints. - Waits for Kafka readiness and cleans up backup artifacts after completion. - Backup and restore jobs now enforce configurable deadlines to prevent stalled operations. - **Documentation** - Added guidance covering Kafka metadata backups, restoration limitations, and S3 configuration. - **Tests** - Added end-to-end coverage for backup, restoration, validation, and cleanup scenarios. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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a410a3f48b |
feat(backups): Kafka topic-metadata backup via a dedicated strategy driver
Add a strategy.backups.cozystack.io/Kafka driver that backs up the topic metadata of a Cozystack-managed Kafka application — partition counts, replication factors and non-default topic configs — through the Kafka Admin API, and restores it with kafka-topics --create + kafka-configs --alter. Modelled on the Job/Rabbitmq strategies: the driver renders a one-shot batch Job, gates on the Strimzi Kafka cluster reporting Ready, and keys each backup by .BackupName so runs do not overwrite each other. Scope is deliberately narrow: message payloads, consumer-group offsets, ACLs, quotas and KafkaUsers are out of scope, and there is no PITR. Restored topics are created directly (unmanaged on the target) — the accepted tradeoff of an Admin-API-only driver. Both restore flows are implemented: in-place recreates dropped topics into the source, to-copy applies the source's topics onto a freshly-bootstrapped empty cluster. Wire it into cozy-default (strategy-kafka-default.yaml gated on the bucket name, a BackupClass binding, read RBAC on kafka.strimzi.io/kafkas for the readiness gate, and the Strimzi Kafka client image), document it in backup-classes.md, and add an honest round-trip example plus Chainsaw e2e (examples/backups/kafka-metadata, kafka-3-metadata-roundtrip) that proves a per-run retention.ms sentinel survives both restores. Unit tests cover the driver's pure helpers (application-ref validation, readiness verdict, parameter round-trip, per-run artifact-URI keying). Not yet verified on a live cluster. Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> Assisted-by: LLM |
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2bf9ae4a27 |
feat(gateway)!: serve passthrough hostnames and stop terminating them
Each tlsPassthroughListeners entry renders a mode=Passthrough listener on its own port, answering the entry's hostname by SNI and admitting TLSRoutes from the publishing tenant's namespace alone. It declares no allowedRoutes.kinds: at the pinned Cilium v1.19.5 a listener that spells its kinds out has them applied to every route on the Gateway rather than to itself, so naming TLSRoute here would reject every HTTPRoute on the Gateway. A hostname a passthrough listener answers no longer earns an HTTPS-terminate listener or a Gateway-issued certificate. That is the break, and it is keyed on service rather than on declaration: the same Cilium builds a passthrough filter chain per route out of the backends that survived resolution, so a listener no TLSRoute attaches to, and a route whose backendRefs resolve to nothing, both match no ClientHello and leave the terminate listener holding the name. Eligibility asks what v1.19.5 asks and no more, the reference allowed and the Service present, and fails closed on a read it cannot complete. Services and ReferenceGrants are watched, so a withdrawal deferred on a missing backend lands on the pass that sees it arrive, and the Service watch takes only the creates and deletes, existence being all that is read. Which hostname a route claims is answered the same way. spec.hostnames is optional on a TLSRoute, and ComputeHosts substitutes the hostname of each TLS listener the route's parentRefs select for a route that declares none, so such a route carries the SNI and takes the name over exactly as one that spells it out. A declared hostname broader than the listener's is that substitution from the other side: the route is served on the listener's name and not on the wildcard it wrote, so a claim covering a reserved name counts as a claim on it. The substitution reaches only the listeners that would admit the route. A native-port listener takes the publishing tenant's namespace alone, so Cilium never puts a route from elsewhere on it and never serves that route on its hostname; borrowing the name anyway refuses the route for a namespace, over a hostname its own object does not carry, in the same pass that sheds a terminate listener because that same route is serving a name it borrowed legitimately. A route that names the listener in its sectionName keeps the borrow, since there the refusal is the answer to what it asked for. A route the Gateway renders no listener for hears it from this controller instead of from Cilium alone: the hostname a passthrough listener took, the hostname nothing answers, the sectionName or port naming a listener that answers something else, the sectionName naming no rendered passthrough listener, and the native-port listener that admits the tenant alone, each with its own Gateway API reason and a message naming the hostnames that lost. An HTTPRoute pinning a rendered passthrough listener by sectionName is refused there too, since such a listener forwards a stream it never terminates and takes TLSRoute alone by protocol. Nothing else tells that route: the port-443 listeners name HTTPRoute in their kinds to keep every port-443 set uniform, which the Gateway reports back as InvalidRouteKinds rather than as a grant, and the pin reads a listener's kinds against every route on the Gateway, so it reports the route accepted. The field is confined to certMode http01, stated as the modes that can carry it so one added later is refused until someone rules on it. The wildcard modes cover the whole apex with one terminate listener the pinned Cilium cannot keep apart from a passthrough listener beneath it, and edge terminates TLS at the class provider and renders no TLS listener at all. An HTTPRoute claiming a wildcard is refused under http01 before the race and the overlap are read. The HTTP-01 challenge issues no wildcard certificate, so the terminate listener rendered for the claim could never carry the name, and the listener name built from the hostname's first label carried the asterisk, which the Gateway CRD admits in a hostname and refuses in a name, so the apiserver refused the whole Gateway write and every other listener on it froze where it stood. The renderer now writes that label as "wildcard", so every hostname the CRD admits yields a name it admits, and no name that was already admissible moves. That refusal is a statement about the terminate listener, so it is judged where that listener is decided rather than ahead of everything else. The port-80 listener carries no hostname and serves a wildcard claim as readily as any other, so a route that selects it, by pinning the port or by naming the listener, never needed the listener HTTP-01 cannot supply and is served rather than refused. Judged first, the refusal reached that route too and reported it unserved while Cilium was serving it in plaintext. A parentRef port on an HTTPRoute is read the way servableOn reads it for a TLSRoute. The terminate listener sits on 443, so a route pinning another port attaches to no listener the render would give it, and it used to earn a listener and an ACME certificate for a route that attached to nothing. Port 80 is the plain-HTTP listener, which admits the publishing tenant alone: a route from there pinning it is served plain and earns neither a listener nor a refusal. A route status write that fails is told apart by kind. A conflict or a route that vanished between the list and the write is a race between the two status writers this Gateway has: the reconcile requeues and retries the write without pinning Ready=False on the tenant, and the status pass runs after the http-to-https redirect, so such a race cannot withhold the one object that guard exists to provide. A write the apiserver will refuse on every pass still fails the reconcile, after every other route has been written, because the condition is the only object saying why a hostname is not served, and a pass that reported success over a lost write left the route reading Accepted=True until the resync. The retryable half is logged on the way out. Declining to pin Ready=False leaves the requeue as the only thing acting on it, and the requeue says nothing: the tenant goes on reading Ready, no event is recorded, and returning no error opts out of the backoff that would widen the interval, so a write failing on every pass retries at a fixed period indefinitely with nothing anywhere to show for it. A TLSRoute claiming a hostname broader than the listener's is pulled into the eligibility question for each name it covers, because the pinned Cilium serves it on the listener's own name. That is right only where the listener answering a name is named exactly that name. Under a wildcard entry the substitution hands such a route the wildcard, so its chain carries "*.db.<apex>" while the terminate chain carries the exact name beneath, and Envoy matches an exact server name ahead of a wildcard, so nothing collides; pulling the route in there withdrew a served endpoint and handed its name to the database behind the passthrough listener. The pull-in is now keyed on an exact listener match. Every condition this controller writes on an HTTPRoute, and the one it writes on a TLSRoute declaring no hostnames, is written under http01, and the whole-apex modes collect no claims, so a switch of certMode left those verdicts standing over listeners the new mode does not render. The whole-apex pass now drops this controller's entry from HTTPRoutes and from hostname-less TLSRoutes; the edge refusal stays confined to routes that declare hostnames, since a refusal written on a lent hostname would have no path back. Within http01 the same verdicts outlive their listeners for a second reason, and no mode change is needed to reach it. The status pass walks the routes that attached rather than the ones that claimed a hostname, and retracts its entry from the difference, because a claim set is not a route's own property once a hostname can be borrowed: a TLSRoute declaring none takes the hostname of every passthrough listener its parentRef selects, so removing that listener empties the claim set while the route stands unchanged, and an HTTPRoute reaches the same state by dropping its hostnames. Judged on claims alone such a route keeps whatever the last pass that did judge it left behind, describing a listener the Gateway no longer has. An HTTPRoute pinned by sectionName to a passthrough listener this Gateway does not render is refused with NoMatchingParent, the reading a TLSRoute in the same shape already got, instead of earning a terminate listener it could never attach to. A route served on the port-80 listener, by parentRef port or by naming it, earns no terminate listener and is refused nothing, but it publishes the name from its namespace all the same, so it stays in the hostname race. Every recount now ranks it with the field it recounts, because a recount that left it out crowned the namespace that had lost to it and dropped a loss the first count recorded: a third route refused in a third namespace, or a passthrough entry declared for the name, flipped the loser to Accepted=True. Selecting the port-80 listener by name is judged as selecting it by port: from a namespace the listener admits the route is served plain, from anywhere else the listener turns it away and the route reads NotAllowedByListeners, and a sectionName and a parentRef port that select different listeners select none and read NoMatchingParent, which is what Gateway API requires when both are given. Before this a route naming the listener from a refused namespace earned a terminate listener and a certificate it could never attach to. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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54621bc046 |
feat(migration): tenant self-service VM import from VMware vSphere
Hidora's customers are leaving VMware now, and a tenant has to be able to import their own machines without a platform administrator. The chart approach could not express that: a tenant can neither create the Secret holding vCenter credentials nor name the VDDK image, so both had to come from somewhere they cannot reach. Two CRDs in a new `forklift.cozystack.io` group, split by lifecycle. A VMImportSource is a long-lived connection -- type, endpoint, credentials, readiness -- and a VMImportTask is the one-shot operation that names machines and produces VMDisks and VMInstances. The outputs carry no owner reference back to the task, so deleting a finished import leaves the machines alone. Konveyor Forklift does the transfer underneath; the controller renders its objects, mirrors its verdicts, and hands each finished volume into a VMDisk without copying it. What a live vCenter migration forced out, and no amount of source reading would have: - A guest copied verbatim keeps the drivers it had under VMware and no virtio, so on a virtio disk it does not fail the import -- it succeeds and then does not boot. Imported disks go on SATA. - VDDK connects straight to the ESXi host at the address vCenter advertises, which is routinely unreachable, and on the first cluster collided with the Service CIDR. `spec.hosts` redirects per host. - Firmware must be carried across or a UEFI guest imports as BIOS and never boots (stacked on #3002). - Deleting a task mid-transfer orphaned its DataVolume; a finalizer now removes the engine's volumes and leaves the outputs. The console gains a Migration section: connections are editable, and the VM field is a picker built from a machine list the controller publishes, since the aggregated API cannot reach the inventory and should not hold a source's credentials to try. Two general mechanisms fall out of that -- an option source may take an argument, and one named in a CRD annotation may reference a sibling field. Design: cozystack/community#62. Docs: cozystack/website#673. Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <kvapss@gmail.com> |
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109ee1dd9e |
refactor(cozypkg): share one reserved-prefix list between init and validate
init carried the same two prefixes inline that validate declares as reservedNamePrefixes, so a third prefix added for validate would have left init letting it through. Both files are package cmd, so this is one identifier. Drive the init test off the shared list for the same reason. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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7ac9404057 |
fix(operator): do not force-overwrite a PackageSource the platform does not own
installPlatformPackageSource applied its PackageSources with Force: true and no ownership check, so a platform upgrade could silently overwrite a PackageSource a marketplace tap had materialized under a name the platform later ships. The collision check cannot cover this: it runs at tap time, the overwrite months later at upgrade. Drop Force so server-side apply surfaces a field-ownership conflict from any other manager as an error, and add an ownership pre-check that fails with a specific message when the existing object carries the marketplace-tap marker, leaving it untouched. Re-applying the platform's own object never conflicts. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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b8f8efa66d |
feat(marketplace): restore the reserved-name check as a usability hint
Per review: keep the authoring-time hint that steers away from the reserved cozystack. and community. prefixes, independent of the runtime naming model. cozypkg init rejects a reserved --name, validate reports ps-name-reserved at error severity, and --allow-reserved-names stays a caller-side escape hatch the index gate never passes. The on-cluster collision check remains the real boundary; this only lets an author learn at init rather than after publishing. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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1653da967b |
refactor(marketplace): drop artifact-prefix injection and reserved names
Without the community. rename, a tapped repository's cozyrds ApplicationDefinition references its component's artifact by the concrete <packagesource>-<variant>-<component> name again, so the operator no longer injects a cozystackArtifactPrefix value and the -rd chart renders its cozyrds asset with a plain Files.Get. cozypkg init scaffolds the concrete chartRef. Reserved name prefixes are removed: repositories choose their own PackageSource names, and a clash with a core component is caught on-cluster at tap time (the collision check) rather than by refusing prefixes offline. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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95badea1c8 |
refactor(marketplace): identify taps by marker label, drop community rename
Tapped repositories keep their own declared PackageSource names instead of being renamed under the community. prefix. Tap-ness is now marked by the marketplace-tap label (and source annotation) on the OCIRepository and every materialized PackageSource, so untap, the Flux-source cleanup, and idempotent re-tap key on the marker rather than a name prefix. A declared name that clashes with an existing core component (or another tap) is rejected: the CLI tap fails fast before applying anything, and the operator materializer refuses to overwrite the foreign object, records the reason on the source (annotation and Event), and does not stamp the revision so a corrected artifact retries. The shared check lives in internal/marketplace/collision. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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0c0609ad63 |
fix(marketplace): resolve community chartRef via injected artifact prefix
Fixes the rename-vs-chartRef break found on dev3: a community-tapped
PackageSource is renamed to community.<org>.<repo>, so the assembled artifact
name changes, but a repo's cozyrds ApplicationDefinition baked chartRef.name
under the author's original name and the ExternalArtifact it referenced no
longer existed, leaving every community-installed app permanently ArtifactFailed.
Implements @kvaps's option 2 (derive at the -rd component, keep platform charts
literal):
- naming.ArtifactPrefix exposes the per-(source,variant) artifact-name prefix.
- The Package reconciler injects it as the cozystackArtifactPrefix Helm value,
but ONLY for community.-prefixed sources, so platform HelmRelease values are
byte-for-byte unchanged (no churn, no platform chart edits).
- cozypkg init now scaffolds a community-style -rd chart: cozyrd.yaml renders the
cozyrds asset through tpl, and chartRef.name templates
'{{ .Values.cozystackArtifactPrefix }}-<app>', resolving to the real artifact
whatever the tap-time rename produces.
- validate skips the dangling-chartRef check for a templated name (it cannot be
cross-checked at authoring time; the operator resolves it at install).
Verified end-to-end: init -> validate is clean, and helm template with the
prefix value renders chartRef.name to the exact artifact the reconciler emits.
Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com>
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950268cccc |
feat(marketplace): reject reserved PackageSource name prefixes
From @kvaps's review: a repository author could name a PackageSource 'cozystack.<x>' or 'community.<x>' and claim the platform or marketplace namespace. Until now validate only rejected an empty metadata.name and the forced rename in the materializer was the sole guard. - validate now flags 'cozystack.'- and 'community.'-prefixed PackageSource names as an error. The escape hatch --allow-reserved-names lives on the caller side only: the index gate (validate-entry.sh) never passes it, so a submitter cannot hand it to themselves. - cozypkg init refuses the same prefixes early with a neutral-name hint. - Document why the ClusterIP fail-open is safe: it falls back only on address resolution, and integrity stays enforced by the fail-closed digest check, so a wrong host yields a mismatch error rather than a content substitution. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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b6f14373b5 |
fix(marketplace): scope controller OCIRepository writes and split validate YAML safely
Close the two non-blocking notes from the latest review, mirroring fixes already applied on the other side: - The tap materializer's update/patch on ocirepositories moves from the cluster-wide cozystack-controller ClusterRole to a namespaced Role in cozy-system (get/list/watch stay cluster-wide for the informer), matching the API-side scoping. The materializer only ever writes tap sources in cozy-system. - cozypkg validate now splits multi-document YAML with the apimachinery reader instead of a naive ^---$ regex, so a PackageSource whose block scalar contains a separator-looking line is not fractured — the gate's validator now decodes the same content the materializer applies. Covered by a block-scalar test. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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c9accd6086 |
fix(marketplace): address maintainer review — url collisions, fail-closed digest, centralized prefix
From @kvaps's review of the untrusted-artifact path: - Refuse to silently retarget: two repositories that share an org/repo path on different registry hosts derive the same tap name. The API and CLI now reject a connect when an existing source points at a different spec.url, instead of blindly repointing the first at the second. - Fail closed on integrity: verifyAndExtract now errors on an absent digest (not just a mismatch), and the reconciler waits for status.artifact.digest, so a tap artifact is never materialized without a verified digest. - Centralize the load-bearing community. prefix in internal/marketplace/tapconst (removing two duplicate consts and several literals across the CLI, API, materializer, and dashboard) so the disconnect guard, the community badge, and the anti-shadowing guarantee cannot drift. - Split multi-document YAML with the apimachinery reader so a PackageSource whose values contain a separator-looking line is not fractured. (The short-name version-pin drop was already fixed in an earlier commit.) Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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3ce8279019 |
fix(marketplace): prune stale taps, preserve source state, scope RBAC, pull by digest
Address the remaining review findings: - The materializer now prunes PackageSources it materialized from an earlier revision that the current artifact no longer contains (including a single/multi rename), so a removed package leaves the catalog; installed Packages stay. - A repeat connect updates the fetched OCIRepository's spec, label and name annotation instead of replacing the object, so the operator's finalizer and materialized-revision annotation survive; covered by a test. - OCIRepository write verbs move from the cluster-wide cozystack-api ClusterRole to a namespaced Role in cozy-system (get/list/watch stay cluster-wide for the watch cache), since the API only manages tap sources there. - 'cozypkg validate --require-signature' now pulls the exact manifest digest cosign verified, closing the tag-mutation window between verify and pull. - safeJoin rejects any '..' path segment outright (defense in depth and to satisfy the Zip-Slip scanner) on top of the existing containment check. - Document why the index gate's merge/label steps need a workflow_run split for fork pull requests. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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d5891f7093 |
fix(marketplace): close gate rename bypass, label CLI tap sources, reject artifact-name collisions
Address review findings: - The index gate listed only added/modified entries (--diff-filter=AM), so a renamed entry file (R) skipped validation and signature checks and could auto-merge an unreviewed ociRef. Include renames and copies (ACMR). - 'cozypkg tap' created its OCIRepository without the marketplace-tap label or tap-name annotation, so the dashboard's orphan-disconnect could not find a CLI-created source. Set both, aligned with the tap's community name. - cozypkg validate now rejects two components whose artifact names collide after dot-to-dash normalisation (e.g. v1.0/c and v1/0-c), which would otherwise make the reconciler overwrite one OutputArtifact with the other. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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7b703f2859 |
fix(cozypkg): satisfy golangci-lint and derive a valid kind for hyphenated apps
Address the linters flagged in review: check the previously-ignored writer, Close, and RemoveAll return values (errcheck), lowercase an error string (ST1005), drop the embedded-field selector (QF1008), remove an unused const, and switch the materializer's post-finalizer requeue from the deprecated Result.Requeue to RequeueAfter. Also fix 'cozypkg init': capitalize now builds an upper CamelCase kind from a hyphenated --app (foo-bar -> FooBar) so the scaffolded ApplicationDefinition is not rejected by the apiserver at install time; covered by a test. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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f88d5c13c2 |
feat(cozypkg): confirm privileged components on add unless --allow-privileged
'cozypkg add' now lists the privileged components of the selected variant and requires an explicit confirmation (defaulting to No) before installing them, unless --allow-privileged is passed. This is the install-time privileged confirmation #23 specifies; the badge and validate warning already existed. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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559c050de0 |
fix(cozypkg): pin tap short-name to the index version and harden the gate
Conformance review against the design proposals surfaced that a short-name tap ignored the index entry's recorded version: resolveTapTarget returned the bare ociRef, so 'cozypkg tap <name>' pulled :latest while the CI gate had validated and cosign-verified <ociRef>:<version>. The gate signed one tag and the cluster pulled another, breaking both the versioning model (#18) and the signature chain (#23). Resolve the short name to <ociRef>:<version> when a version is recorded. Also harden the publication gate: run 'cozypkg validate --helm-lint' (with helm installed in the workflow) so charts are linted as the design specifies, and add a CODEOWNERS so every index entry requires maintainer review. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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3643fceceb |
refactor(marketplace): fail-safe re-tap rollback and single-source artifact naming
Close the two non-blocking notes from the third review round: - objectExists now fails safe: it returns 'not existing' (eligible for rollback) only on a definite NotFound; any other Get error (RBAC, throttling, timeout) is treated as possibly-pre-existing, so an idempotent re-tap that hits a transient probe error cannot delete a pre-existing resource on rollback. Mirrors the fail-direction of sourceStillReferenced; covered by a new interceptor-based test. - The PackageSource reconciler now calls internal/marketplace/naming.ArtifactName instead of inlining the formula, so the artifact-name convention has a single definition shared by the producer, the marketplace backend, and the validator, and the parity test guards producer-vs-helper. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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1fbceee10e |
fix(marketplace): operator RBAC for tap materialization and dot-safe artifact naming
Second review round found the write-path RBAC fix was only half applied and the extracted naming helper diverged from its producer: - The tap materializer runs as the cozystack-controller ServiceAccount, whose ClusterRole granted source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/ocirepositories only get/list/watch. Its finalizer and materialized-revision writes (r.Update on the OCIRepository) were therefore Forbidden, so a dashboard-connected tap never materialized. Grant the controller update/patch on ocirepositories. - naming.ArtifactName replaced dots only in the PackageSource name, but the reconciler replaces them in the variant and component too, so a tapped repo with a dotted variant or component name dropped its packages from the catalog and tripped a false appdef-dangling warning. Replace dots in all three segments and add a direct parity test with dotted names. - Pin cosign-installer and the cosign release in the index gate so the signature verifier is reproducible. - Add a unit test for the tap rollback objectExists predicate. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |