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Commits
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be55c68fbc |
docs(linstor): keep the strict-topology rationale out of the applied object
A `#` comment in a rendered template is output, not source: the eight lines explaining --strict-topology were applied to the live LinstorCluster and came back on every `kubectl get`. Moved into a template comment, which is stripped at render. The test comment beside the argument-count assertion claimed the count was "a tripwire that forces a re-check" on a piraeus-operator bump. It cannot be. The assertion reads the chart's own rendered args, and those do not move when upstream adds a flag -- the count stays 12 and the suite stays green. It catches an edit to this chart, which is the case that needs it least. Say what it does catch, and say where the upstream half actually has to be checked: the tree vendors the piraeus chart but not the operator resources carrying those defaults, so there is nothing in-tree to diff against and the re-check on a bump stays a human obligation. The list is recorded as verified against v2.10.2. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> Assisted-By: LLM |
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f34a7f5ea1 |
fix(linstor): refuse drbd.enabled=false on a non-Talos substrate
drbd.enabled=false removes the drbd-logger sidecar, and that is all it removes. The satellite DaemonSet also carries two DRBD-only initContainers that piraeus-operator contributes unconditionally -- drbd-module-loader, which cannot load a module the substrate does not have, and drbd-shutdown-guard -- and the only configuration that deletes them is satellites-talos.yaml, gated on talos.enabled. So with talos.enabled=false and drbd.enabled=false the chart rendered a satellite that can never reach Ready: exactly the state the flag exists to prevent, reached by setting the flag. Not hypothetical -- the isp-full-generic bundle sets talos.enabled=false (packages/core/platform/templates/bundles/system.yaml). Fail at render time and name both flags. The alternative, moving the two initContainer deletions and their volumes out from under talos.enabled, is the real fix for generic Linux and is a larger change than this lane needs; it is tracked in cozystack/cozystack#4092, and the message points there. Refusing is what keeps an operator from getting no signal at all in the meantime. values.yaml states the requirement beside the flag. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> Assisted-By: LLM |
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0418577f55 |
fix(kubevirt-cdi): make importer resources configurable
podResourceRequirements applies to every worker pod CDI creates -- importer, uploader and host-assisted cloner alike, not only the importer the parameter is named for -- so a value set here reaches the console's disk-upload path as well as the imports. It has to be set on the CDI CR and not on CDIConfig: the operator reconciles CDIConfig.spec from this resource, so a direct patch is silently reverted and status.defaultPodResourceRequirements stays where it was. The default restates CDI's own built-in values exactly -- limits 750m/600M, requests 100m/60M, read off a live cluster -- so an install that sets nothing behaves as it did before the parameter existed. That is deliberate. A 4Gi ceiling was measured as necessary on one hand-built stand, where the decompress+convert of a tenant worker disk was OOM-killed at 99.8-100% and CDI then retried from scratch forever, but the same 20Gi import completes at stock 600M on a QEMU-node cluster and no CI run on either lane has recorded an OOMKilled importer. What has been shown to need the headroom is that substrate, so the override lives with the substrate in hack/e2e-platform-packages.sh rather than here. The failure being answered is memory, and only memory. CDI already ships a CPU limit of its own at 750m, nothing measured has asked for more, and the default here restates that figure rather than raising it. The package had no `test` target, and hack/helm-unit-tests.sh only runs a package whose `make -n test` resolves, so a tests/ directory here was collected by nothing and skipped in silence. Added with the suite. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> Assisted-By: LLM |
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499034e960 |
fix(linstor): constrain CSI provisioning to the scheduler's chosen node
Without --strict-topology, external-provisioner passes EVERY topology segment as `requisite` and merely *prefers* the node the scheduler picked, so when that node is out of space linstor-csi may legally provision the volume somewhere else. For a node-pinned volume (allowRemoteVolumeAccess: false, the `local` class that is the cluster default) the result is a PV whose node affinity contradicts the pod's other volumes, and the pod is then unschedulable forever against pv "pvc-..." node affinity doesn't match node "srv1": no matching NodeSelectorTerms with nothing erroring anywhere. It bites hardest on CDI imports, because an importer pod mounts two volumes: the disk, and a ~21 GiB scratch volume CDI creates only AFTER the pod is scheduled. The scheduler therefore sizes the node against the disk alone, can place two importers where both disks plus both scratch volumes do not fit, and the second scratch lands elsewhere. Capacity tracking cannot help -- the scratch volume does not exist when placement is decided, and CSIStorageCapacity agreed with LINSTOR to within 5% when this was measured. Reproduced on 2026-08-25 by cordoning two of three nodes so both importers landed on one constrained to 45 GiB: enough for two 20 GiB disks, not for their scratch. With the flag the scratch PVC stays Pending and the pod reports `1 node(s) did not have enough free storage`, then binds and completes once space frees. A silent permanent deadlock becomes a legible, self-correcting wait. The full argument list is restated because `args` has no patchMergeKey, so a strategic merge replaces rather than appends. That makes the list a drift hazard on every piraeus-operator bump, and the note beside it says so -- the count assertion in the test guards this chart's own list and cannot see a flag the operator adds upstream. Verified for node-pinned volumes. For `replicated` the PV is remotely accessible so the constraint is satisfiable wherever the pod lands, and that case is reasoned rather than measured -- hence the switch. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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06ee08f636 |
feat(linstor): gate the DRBD sidecar behind drbd.enabled
On a substrate where the DRBD kernel module is unavailable the drbd-logger sidecar exits immediately, the satellite pod is therefore never Ready, and piraeus consequently registers zero nodes: LINSTOR reports none, linstor-csi-node hangs in Init polling for a node that does not exist, and every PVC stays Pending behind a cluster that looks healthy. So this flag is the difference between working storage and no storage at all there, not a cosmetic reduction in logging. The concrete case is Talos nodes running as containers. DRBD's resource registry is global per kernel, so three containers sharing one kernel cannot represent three DRBD nodes -- the second new-resource for a given name silently aliases the first instead of failing, which is worse than an error because LINSTOR then records a replica it does not have. It applies to kind equally; it is a property of one kernel, not of Talos. Omitting the sidecar from Cozystack's own pod template is not enough, because piraeus strategically merges satellite configurations and a container another configuration contributes survives the omission. So a LinstorSatelliteConfiguration deletes it from the effective DaemonSet as well. What the flag does NOT do is touch a StorageClass, and the comment says so explicitly. Cozystack does not own them -- an operator writes them by hand from the install guide -- so a class carrying layerList: "drbd storage" still exists after setting this false and volumes on it will never provision. The operator-facing half of that warning goes beside the examples they copy, in cozystack/website#675. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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7b0c35b9b3 |
feat(monitoring): add KubeVirt VM dashboard (#2198)
## Summary - Adds `dashboards/vm/virtual-machines.json` — KubeVirt VM resource metrics (CPU, memory, network, storage) with namespace and VM template variables - Adds `dashboards/vm/console-logs.json` — VM serial console log viewer via VictoriaLogs with namespace filtering - Adds `vm/virtual-machines` and `vm/console-logs` entries to `dashboards.list` ## Problem `dashboards.list` references `vm/virtual-machines` and `vm/console-logs` but the corresponding JSON files don't exist. The console-logs dashboard includes `kubernetes_namespace_name` filtering to prevent cross-tenant log exposure. Relates to #2194 ## Test plan - [ ] Verify JSON is valid for both dashboards - [ ] Import dashboards in Grafana and verify panels render with KubeVirt metrics - [ ] Verify console-logs queries include namespace filter ```release-note Add KubeVirt VM dashboards (virtual-machines and console-logs) ``` 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * **VM Console Logs dashboard**: View live console output with namespace and VM filtering, fast refresh, and improved log presentation (details, wrapping, and sorting). * **Virtual Machines dashboard**: Rich VM monitoring covering CPU, memory, network, storage I/O, latency, swap/page faults, and filesystem usage with thresholds and formatted visuals. * **Dashboard catalog updated**: Added multiple new monitoring dashboards for broader coverage and easier discovery, including the new VM dashboards. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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1b2beac3f8 |
[cilium] Set resources requests/limits on cilium-operator (#2618)
## Summary Companion to #2617 (cilium-agent). The upstream cilium chart ships with `operator.resources: {}`, which triggers a `no CPU limit` conformance warning on the `cilium-operator` Deployment. Override `packages/system/cilium/values.yaml` to set the sizing recommended by the upstream `values.yaml` comment: - `limits` : `cpu: 1000m`, `memory: 1Gi` - `requests` : `cpu: 100m`, `memory: 128Mi` ## Test plan - [ ] `helm template . --namespace kube-system` from `packages/system/cilium/` renders a `resources` block on the `cilium-operator` container of the Deployment (verified locally) - [ ] Re-run the conformance/lint tool — the `cilium-operator has no CPU limit` warning should be gone - [ ] CI passes ### Release note \`\`\`release-note Set CPU/memory requests and limits on the cilium-operator Deployment to clear the "no CPU limit" conformance warning. Values follow the upstream chart's recommended sizing (limits 1000m/1Gi, requests 100m/128Mi). \`\`\` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Chores** * Updated Cilium system component resource configuration with CPU and memory requests and limits. [](https://app.coderabbit.ai/change-stack/cozystack/cozystack/pull/2618) <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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a2cb47c961 |
feat(gateway): update the CRD bundle to Gateway API v1.6.1 and gate GRPCRoute hostnames (#3872)
## What this PR does Bumps the vendored Gateway API CRD bundle in `packages/system/gateway-api-crds` from v1.5.1 to v1.6.1. The package Makefile pins the upstream ref, so the change is that pin plus the re-rendered `templates/crds-experimental.yaml`. The bundle version is not only bookkeeping: it is a compatibility signal consumers read at runtime. Every CRD in the bundle carries a `gateway.networking.k8s.io/bundle-version` annotation, and a Gateway API controller can read it off the `gatewayclasses` CRD to decide whether the installed bundle matches the one it was built against. Controllers that do this typically accept any patch release but require an exact major and minor match, and report `SupportedVersion=False` with reason `UnsupportedVersion` on their GatewayClass when the minor differs, a status condition that surfaces the skew rather than a functional break. The Cloudflare Tunnel Gateway API controller proposed for the platform in #3858 is built against Gateway API v1.6.1 and performs exactly that comparison, so against the v1.5.1 bundle shipped today its GatewayClass reports the bundle unsupported, and with this bump it reports supported. Neither change depends on the other landing first: this PR only moves the bundle, and the check lives entirely on the consumer side. One consequence worth stating plainly, since it will outlive this PR: an exact-minor check makes the shipped bundle version a coupled pin for any such controller. A future bump to v1.7.x flips the same condition back to `UnsupportedVersion` until that controller is rebuilt against the newer bundle, so the two want to move together. The bundle still emits the same twelve CustomResourceDefinitions and the same two `safe-upgrades.gateway.networking.k8s.io` admission objects, and every CRD still carries the `helm.sh/resource-policy: keep` stamp the Makefile's post-processing step adds. One of the policy's two CEL rules is rewritten, though, and it changes what a cluster accepts. That has its own section below. Two kinds change their version surface: TCPRoute and UDPRoute gain a served `v1` that takes over as the storage version, and their `v1alpha2` stays served with a deprecation marker. Every other kind keeps exactly the versions it served at v1.5.1. That matters because the Cilium operator resolves GatewayClass, Gateway, HTTPRoute and GRPCRoute in `v1`, ReferenceGrant in `v1beta1` and TLSRoute in `v1alpha2` before it enables its Gateway API controller; all six are still served by the v1.6.1 bundle. TLSRoute in particular keeps `v1alpha2`, which the tenant gateway controller, the platform TLSRoute templates and the tenant hostname admission policy all address. Schema changes are small and land on fields nothing in this repository sets. `sessionPersistence.idleTimeout` is gone from HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute and XBackendTrafficPolicy, removed upstream under GEP-1619 because no implementation ever implemented it and HTTP cookies have no native idle-timeout mechanism, so no working behaviour is lost even though the field disappears from the schema; HTTPRoute gains a lower bound on `retry.attempts` and now rejects duplicate `retry.codes`; ReferenceGrant requires `spec` at the root. In the other direction, Gateway infrastructure annotations and frontend CA certificate references go from a limit of 8 to 16, and TLSRoute hostnames from 16 to 1024. No CRD schema loses or changes a CEL validation rule, and the six added belong exclusively to the new TCPRoute and UDPRoute `v1` schemas. ### The safe-upgrades admission policy accepts a different set of bundles The experimental kustomization ships a `ValidatingAdmissionPolicy` and its binding, both named `safe-upgrades.gateway.networking.k8s.io`, next to the twelve CRDs. The binding is `validationActions: [Deny]` with `failurePolicy: Fail`, matching CREATE and UPDATE on `apiextensions.k8s.io/v1 customresourcedefinitions` cluster-wide, and Cozystack installs it in two places: on the host through `cozystack.gateway-api-crds`, and inside every guest cluster that sets `addons.gatewayAPI.enabled`. Its second rule reads the `gateway.networking.k8s.io/bundle-version` annotation off an incoming CRD. At v1.5.1 that rule was a blacklist: reject anything matching `v1.[0-4].\d+` or containing `v0`, allow the rest. At v1.6.1 it is a whitelist: allow `v0.0.0-dev` outright, otherwise require the annotation to start with `v1.` and not match `^v1\.[0-4](\.|$)`. Evaluating both expressions over a spread of annotation values: | bundle-version | v1.5.1 policy | v1.6.1 policy | | --- | --- | --- | | `v1.6.1`, `v1.5.1`, `v1.5.0-dev`, `v1.10.0` | allow | allow | | `v1.4.0`, `v1.4.10`, `v1.0.0` | reject | reject | | `v0.0.0-dev` | reject | **allow** | | `v2.0.0` | allow | **reject** | | `1.6.1` (no leading `v`) | allow | **reject** | | `v1.4` (no patch) | allow | **reject** | | `main`, empty string | allow | **reject** | Nothing in this repository trips the new rejections: every CRD the bundle ships is stamped `v1.6.1`. What is exposed is an operator applying a Gateway API CRD set from somewhere else on a cluster that carries the policy. A fork, a vendor build or a nightly whose annotation reads `1.6.1` or `v2.0.0` used to go in and is now denied with `reason: Invalid`, naming a policy the operator may not know is installed, and whatever HelmRelease owns those CRDs then sits un-Ready. Uninstalling the policy is the escape hatch, and the denial message says so. The same hunk fixes an upstream inconsistency: at v1.5.1 the policy pair was stamped `v1.5.0-dev` while its twelve CRDs said `v1.5.1`. At v1.6.1 all fourteen documents agree. The Gateway and HTTPRoute objects the tenant gateway controller renders were serialized across all three certificate modes and checked against both the v1.5.1 and the v1.6.1 schemas; the two runs are identical, so the bump does not change what the controller can create. `go.mod` still pins `sigs.k8s.io/gateway-api` v1.4.1 and this PR deliberately leaves it there. The CRD bundle and the Go client types have been on separate versions since before this change, and nothing the controller emits depends on the gap. One thing to know before the next bump: from v1.6 on, the two things upstream calls the experimental bundle disagree. This package follows `config/crd/experimental`, the kustomization, which emits 12 CRDs at v1.6.1; the published `experimental-install.yaml` for the same tag emits 13, the extra one being `xbackends.gateway.networking.x-k8s.io`, new in v1.6 and not listed in the kustomization. At v1.5.1 the two agreed, so there was nothing to choose between. Nothing in this repository references XBackend and no vendored CRD depends on it, so following the kustomization costs nothing today, but whoever bumps next inherits the choice, and it should be made deliberately rather than by whichever command gets typed. The second commit corrects a comment this bump invalidated. It claimed TLSRoute stays at `v1alpha2` through Gateway API v1.5 and that the promotion to `v1` was still upstream-only; TLSRoute has been served at `v1` since v1.5.0, so the claim was already wrong before this bump and the version range it named is now wrong too. The third commit closes a gap that correction exposed. `cozystack-route-hostname-policy-tls` named `v1alpha2` alone while the bundle serves `tlsroutes` at `v1`, `v1alpha2` and `v1alpha3`: three served versions against one named. The gap is not new and this bump neither creates nor widens it: the v1.5.1 bundle and the v1.6.1 one serve the same three versions, with the same two marked deprecated. Coverage of the two unnamed versions rested entirely on request conversion, because `matchPolicy` is unset on both rules in that file and so defaults to `Equivalent`, which rewrites a request submitted under any served version into the one the rule names before the policy sees it. That is why there is no bypass to demonstrate, and equally why the arrangement is brittle: the conversion has nothing left to convert into once no named version is served, and a rule that selects nothing is not caught by `failurePolicy: Fail`, because nothing failed. The rule now names all three, which is the shape the HTTPRoute rule above it already used, and `hack/route-hostname-policy-version-coverage.bats` reads the served versions out of the vendored bundle and fails when a policy does not cover every one of them, so a future bundle move cannot outrun the list silently, in either direction. That guard carries negative fixtures rather than only watching a correct tree pass. Three of them drive `assert_covers` itself, with the two readers redefined in a subshell, against an omitted served version, an empty served set and an empty named set. Each requires the specific complaint text rather than merely a non-zero exit, so a helper renamed out from under it fails for the right reason instead of reading as a successful rejection. A fourth drives the comparison helper directly. The fourth commit pins the vendored bundle version in the CRD package's unit suite. Nothing outside the package Makefile named a Gateway API version, so re-running `make update` against a different ref landed green: twelve CRDs, every one stamped, document count unchanged, suite passing. The new case reads the `gateway.networking.k8s.io/bundle-version` annotation off every rendered CRD and fails when it is not the version the Makefile pins. The fifth commit extends the version-coverage guard to `cozystack-gateway-hostname-policy`, which names the `gateways` versions literally the same way the two route policies do, and whose version set lives in the vendored bundle and moves on `make update` there. It matched the served set already; the guard now says so on every run instead of leaving one of the three hostname policies unpinned. Two notes for whoever reads the release: the TCPRoute and UDPRoute storage version moves from `v1alpha2` to `v1`, and while nothing in this repository ships either kind and the CRDs declare no conversion block, an upgraded cluster accumulates both entries in `status.storedVersions` — inert today, load-bearing only if a later bundle stops serving `v1alpha2`. The sixth commit gives GRPCRoute the same hostname rule the other two route kinds have. GRPCRoute carries `spec.hostnames` and it can reach a tenant Gateway: the port-443 listeners pin `allowedRoutes.kinds` to HTTPRoute and TLSRoute, but the port-80 listener leaves `kinds` unset, and an unset list resolves to the kinds the listener protocol supports, which for HTTP includes GRPCRoute. A GRPCRoute in a tenant namespace could claim any hostname on the plaintext listener with nothing checking it. Tenants hold no `gateway.networking.k8s.io` RBAC in Cozystack, so this is the same defence-in-depth against a chart bug that the other two rules are, not a tenant-user control. The rule is the HTTPRoute rule with `grpcroutes` in place of `httproutes` and the one version the bundle serves for it, and the coverage guard pins that list to the bundle like the others. Several places in the tree enumerate which route kinds the hostname policies cover, and all of them named two: the port-443 kinds invariant in the tenant gateway controller and the test that pins it, `packages/extra/gateway/README.md`, and the threat model together with the self-assessment. They name three now. The port-443 kinds set also carries an accurate reason now. cilium#45559 governs only that every port-443 listener carries the same set, not what is in it, so the contents are a least-privilege choice: nothing the platform ships needs gRPC, TCP or UDP routing on port 443. The README had also described HTTPS and TLS-passthrough listeners as carrying different kinds, where the controller gives both the same one. One more commit makes the suite's existing assertions bite. A ValidatingAdmissionPolicyBinding whose `policyName` points at another policy renders without complaint and leaves its own policy inert, and the suite pinned `validationActions` on the bindings while never pinning `policyName` at all, so pointing the GRPCRoute binding at the HTTPRoute policy kept every case green with the GRPCRoute control doing nothing. All three bindings now pin the policy they name. In the same file, `uncovered()` assigned to the variable names its caller reads back when printing a mismatch, so a call site with the arguments swapped would have printed a diagnostic naming the wrong side. Two things are named rather than made. The version-coverage guard collects `apiVersions` from every `resourceRules` entry mentioning the resource without also matching on `apiGroups` or `operations`, so a rule in another group, or one scoped to a single verb, would donate its versions to the set coverage is measured against; the chart's own suite pins the group and the resource on the rule it checks, which closes that a layer below. And `packages/system/cozystack-api/templates/api-tlsroute.yaml` renders `gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1alpha2` while the bundle serves `v1` as storage and marks `v1alpha2` deprecated, but the identical pin sits in the kubevirt and kubevirt-cdi TLSRoute templates, and the pinned `sigs.k8s.io/gateway-api` carries no `apis/v1` TLSRoute type for the controller side to follow, so moving one of the three here would leave the tree less consistent than leaving all three. Closes #3789. ### Screenshots Not a UI change. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the diff, file by file: neither `packages/system/gateway-api-crds/Makefile` nor its rendered CRD template matches any entry. Leaving every box empty rather than ticking the "no downstream repository" line, because the docs site carries a Gateway API version statement that is already inaccurate and needs a decision that is not mine: `content/en/docs/next/networking/gateway-api.md` and its v1.5 and v1.6 copies say Gateway API v1.5 ships TLSRoute at `v1alpha2` and that the graduation to `v1` is still upstream-only, when v1.5.0 already shipped TLSRoute `v1` as the storage version. ### Release note ```release-note chore(gateway-api-crds): update the vendored Gateway API CRD bundle to v1.6.1. TCPRoute and UDPRoute gain a served v1 that becomes their storage version, with v1alpha2 still served and now deprecated; every other kind keeps the versions it served at v1.5.1. Upstream removed `sessionPersistence.idleTimeout` from HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute and XBackendTrafficPolicy; the field is not set by anything Cozystack renders, but a hand-written route that carries it loses it silently on its next write, with no admission error. The bundle's `safe-upgrades.gateway.networking.k8s.io` ValidatingAdmissionPolicy changes which CRDs it accepts. Cozystack installs it cluster-wide on the host and in every guest cluster with `addons.gatewayAPI.enabled`. Its `gateway.networking.k8s.io/bundle-version` rule was a blacklist on two patterns and is now a whitelist on the `v1.` prefix with a `v0.0.0-dev` escape hatch. A bundle annotated `v0.0.0-dev` is now accepted where it was denied. A bundle annotated `v2.0.0`, `1.6.1` without the leading `v`, `main`, `v1.4` without a patch, or carrying an empty annotation is now denied where it was accepted. Nothing Cozystack ships is affected, since every CRD in the bundle is stamped `v1.6.1`, but applying a Gateway API CRD set from a fork, a vendor build or a nightly on such a cluster can now fail admission with `reason: Invalid`. Uninstalling the policy remains the documented escape hatch. fix(cozystack-basics): the tenant TLSRoute hostname admission policy now names every served TLSRoute version (`v1`, `v1alpha2`, `v1alpha3`) instead of `v1alpha2` alone. Coverage of the other two rested on request conversion, which holds only while a named version stays served, and a rule left selecting nothing is not caught by `failurePolicy: Fail`. feat(cozystack-basics): GRPCRoute hostnames in `tenant-*` namespaces are now gated by the same admission policy that gates HTTPRoute and TLSRoute. A tenant Gateway's port-80 listener leaves `allowedRoutes.kinds` unset, which admits GRPCRoute by protocol default, so a GRPCRoute could claim any hostname on the plaintext listener unchecked. Tenants hold no `gateway.networking.k8s.io` RBAC, so this is defence-in-depth against a chart bug rather than a tenant-user control. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit - **New Features** - Added hostname admission validation for `GRPCRoute` resources. - Expanded `TLSRoute` hostname validation to support all served Gateway API versions. - Ensured route hostname policies consistently cover HTTP, TLS, and gRPC routes. - **Security** - Updated listener policies to restrict port-443 routes to supported HTTP and TLS route types. - Clarified fail-closed hostname validation behavior across Gateway, Route, and Ingress resources. - **Documentation** - Updated security and threat-model documentation to include GRPCRoute handling and validation coverage. - **Maintenance** - Updated the bundled Gateway API CRDs to version 1.6.1. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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b7e5100e73 |
fix(monitoring): strip infrastructure metadata from tenant logs (#2196)
## Summary - Adds a `modify` filter in fluent-bit that removes `kubernetes_node_name` and `kubernetes_host` from all container logs - Prevents infrastructure topology (node names, hosts) from leaking to tenant users ## Problem `kubernetes_node_name` is exposed in log metadata, leaking node topology to end-users. Other sensitive fields like `kubernetes_host` are also visible. Relates to #2194 ## Test plan - [ ] `helm template` monitoring-agents and verify `Remove kubernetes_node_name` filter is present - [ ] Deploy and verify `kubernetes_node_name` is absent from logs in tenant Grafana ```release-note Strip infrastructure metadata (node name, host) from tenant logs ``` 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Chores** * Improved Kubernetes monitoring log processing by filtering out most `kubernetes_*` fields for `kube.*` events, while preserving the key Kubernetes identity fields (such as pod, namespace, and container-related names) for clearer, more consistent log output. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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7786f72b9f |
feat(etcd-operator): bump to v0.5.5 and vendor EtcdDefragPolicy CRDs (#3968)
## What this PR does Bumps the vendored `etcd-operator` from **v0.5.4** to **[v0.5.5](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/releases/tag/v0.5.5)** and adopts the new defrag API. v0.5.5 ships the `EtcdDefrag` and `EtcdDefragPolicy` types — a controller that runs a one-shot defrag against a target etcd cluster, plus a cron-style policy that stamps scheduled `EtcdDefrag` runs (`schedule`/`suspend`/`concurrencyPolicy`/`historyLimit`). - **`etcd-operator-crds`**: vendor the two new CRDs (`etcddefragpolicies`, `etcddefrags`) alongside the existing three; bump `ETCD_OPERATOR_REF`. Re-vendoring also refreshed `etcdmembers.yaml` (a doc-string change from the version-matched-`etcdutl` restore work in v0.5.5). All five carry `helm.sh/resource-policy: keep`; the existing resource-policy suite covers the new CRDs via its wildcard template scope. - **`etcd-operator`**: bump `appVersion`/image tag to v0.5.5 and re-vendor the manager `ClusterRole` from the operator's `charts/etcd-operator/files/manager-role-rules.yaml`. New grants match what the defrag controllers need: full CRUD on `etcddefrags`, read/patch/watch on `etcddefragpolicies`, the two new `/status` subresources, and cluster-scoped `events` create/patch. Fixed the stale `config/rbac/role.yaml` path in the Makefile/test comments (upstream moved the role rules). ### Screenshots n/a — no UI changes. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map against the diff. The change is confined to `packages/system/etcd-operator{,-crds}`: etcd-operator is a system component (not a `packages/apps`/`packages/extra` package the website and TF provider track), the new CRDs are in group `etcd-operator.cozystack.io` (not `cozystack.io`/`backups.cozystack.io`, the only CRD groups the TF provider types), and nothing under `hack/`, the installer values, or the platform values changed. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change ### Release note ```release-note feat(etcd-operator): bump to v0.5.5, adding the EtcdDefrag and EtcdDefragPolicy APIs for on-demand and scheduled etcd defragmentation ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added APIs for configuring recurring and one-time etcd defragmentation tasks. * Added status reporting for defragmentation progress, results, and conditions. * Added validation and lifecycle controls for defragmentation policies and runs. * **Enhancements** * Updated the etcd operator to version 0.5.5. * Expanded permissions to manage defragmentation resources and report events. * Improved restore documentation for etcd members. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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19eaff6a30 |
test(cozystack-basics): pin which policy each route binding names
A ValidatingAdmissionPolicyBinding whose policyName points at another policy renders without complaint and leaves its own policy inert. The suite pinned validationActions on the bindings but never policyName, so pointing the GRPCRoute binding at the HTTPRoute policy kept all 56 cases green while the GRPCRoute control did nothing. uncovered() assigned to the same variable names its caller reads back when printing the mismatch, so a future call site with the arguments swapped would print a diagnostic naming the wrong side. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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70a675fd6b |
feat(cozystack-basics): gate GRPCRoute hostnames in tenant namespaces
The route hostname policy covered HTTPRoute and TLSRoute. GRPCRoute carries spec.hostnames too, and it can reach a tenant Gateway: the port-443 listeners pin allowedRoutes.kinds to HTTPRoute and TLSRoute, but the port-80 listener leaves kinds unset, and an unset list resolves to the kinds the listener protocol supports, which for HTTP includes GRPCRoute. A GRPCRoute in a tenant namespace could therefore claim any hostname on the plaintext listener with nothing checking it. Tenants hold no gateway.networking.k8s.io RBAC, so this is the same defence-in-depth against a chart bug that the other two rules are, not a tenant-user control. The new rule is the HTTPRoute rule with grpcroutes in place of httproutes and the single served version the bundle provides; the coverage guard pins that list to the bundle like the others. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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72437d127f |
test(gateway-api-crds): pin the vendored bundle version in the suite
Nothing outside the package Makefile named the Gateway API version, so re-running `make update` against a different ref landed with the whole suite still green: twelve CRDs, every one stamped, document count unchanged. The new case reads the bundle-version annotation off every rendered CustomResourceDefinition and fails when it is not the version the Makefile pins. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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9311a48f6a |
test(cozystack-basics): make the version-coverage guard prove it still compares
The guard added alongside the TLSRoute version fix only ever ran against a tree that already satisfied it. A passing check that is checking nothing looks exactly like a passing check that is checking something, so a later refactor could empty out the comparison and the suite would stay green forever. That is the same shape as the negated assertions that cannot fail elsewhere in this repository: the assertion survives, the guarantee does not. Drive the checker with synthetic input instead of only with the live tree, the way hack/bats-no-exit-trap.bats and hack/md-no-hardwrap.bats feed their checkers a broken sample and require a complaint. Two layers need it separately. The comparison itself moves into uncovered() so a fixture can call it with a served set the named set does not cover. Above that, assert_covers runs in a subshell with both readers replaced, so the wiring, the empty-set guards and the exit status are exercised too -- covering only the inner function leaves the outer one free to become a no-op while every other case in the file stays green, because the live-tree cases are its only callers and the tree they read is correct. Each fixture requires the complaint it expects rather than any non-zero exit. A renamed helper exits 127 and an unbound variable under set -u exits 1, and either would read as a successful rejection if only the status were checked; a rejection for the wrong reason is the same false comfort as no fixture, and harder to notice because the red looks earned. Each way of breaking the guard now fails at its own case. Emptying uncovered(), reducing assert_covers to a no-op, and deleting the empty-set guards each turn a different fixture red while the live-tree cases stay green, and changing only the wording of assert_covers' complaint -- which still rejects, just for an unstated reason -- turns the omission fixture red on the message rather than passing on the exit status. Select a resourceRules entry by comparing each resource name for equality, and match versions as fixed strings rather than patterns. yq's contains() compares array elements by substring, so a rule scoped to a subresource would have satisfied a search for the parent: a rule naming tlsroutes/status answers a query for tlsroutes and donates its apiVersions to the set the guard checks coverage against. That direction is the wrong one for a fail-closed check -- it makes coverage succeed where the real rule falls short. No rule in this policy is scoped that way today. Also pin apiGroups on the TLSRoute document in the chart suite. The HTTPRoute document has always had that assertion; the asymmetry meant the case named after both kinds only checked the group for one of them. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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7ba22369d4 |
fix(cozystack-basics): match every served TLSRoute version in the hostname policy
The tenant route hostname policy names v1alpha2 alone while the vendored Gateway API bundle serves tlsroutes at v1, v1alpha2 and v1alpha3: three served versions against one named. The gap is not new. The v1.5.1 bundle this package shipped before and the v1.6.1 one it ships now serve the same three versions, with the same two marked deprecated, so nothing in this change created or widened it -- a bundle bump is simply when someone last opened the file. Coverage of the two unnamed versions rested entirely on request conversion. matchConstraints.matchPolicy is unset on both rules in this file and so defaults to Equivalent, which rewrites a request submitted under any served version into the one the rule names before the policy sees it. That is why there is no bypass to demonstrate, and equally why the arrangement is brittle: the conversion has nothing left to convert into once no named version is served, and a rule that selects nothing is not caught by failurePolicy: Fail, because nothing failed -- there was simply no match. Name all three served versions, which is the shape the HTTPRoute rule directly above already uses. The defect is a version list drifting from the bundle it must track, so a longer list on its own would not catch the next drift: add a check that reads the served versions out of the vendored bundle and fails when a policy does not cover every one of them, in either direction. Both rules get an exact-value assertion in the chart's own suite, so the coverage check and the pinned value fail for different reasons and neither stands alone. The header comment being replaced claimed TLSRoute stays at v1alpha2 through Gateway API v1.4-v1.5 and that its promotion to v1 was still upstream-only. TLSRoute has been served at v1 since v1.5.0, so that was already false, and false in the direction that hid this gap: a reader who believed it had no reason to look at the version list at all. Widening the rule then falsified every remaining place that restated which versions it matches -- the template's own header, the security-model layer list in packages/extra/gateway/README.md, and the name of the test case that asserts the value. Rather than resync three copies of a list that will move again, they now say which kinds are gated and point at the rule and its guard for the versions. A comment in the same test file now states only the behaviour it guards: an earlier form of the CEL used `... ? true : (...)`, which allowed routes in any tenant-* namespace whose host label was missing or scrubbed. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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eb175aa5a9 |
chore(gateway-api-crds): vendor the Gateway API v1.6.1 CRD bundle
Re-renders the experimental kustomization at v1.6.1. The bundle still carries the same twelve CRDs plus the safe-upgrades admission policy pair, and every CRD keeps its helm.sh/resource-policy: keep stamp. TCPRoute and UDPRoute gain a served v1 that takes over as their storage version; their v1alpha2 stays served, now marked deprecated. No other kind changes its served versions, so the group/version pairs the Cilium operator and the tenant gateway controller resolve -- GatewayClass, Gateway, HTTPRoute and GRPCRoute in v1, ReferenceGrant in v1beta1, TLSRoute in v1alpha2 -- are all still served. Schema changes land on fields this repository does not set: sessionPersistence.idleTimeout is dropped from HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute and XBackendTrafficPolicy, HTTPRoute gains a lower bound on retry.attempts and rejects duplicate retry.codes, and ReferenceGrant now requires spec. Gateway infrastructure annotations, frontend CA certificate refs and TLSRoute hostnames all get larger upper bounds. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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e94fcf8219 |
feat(backups): RabbitMQ definitions backup via a dedicated strategy driver (#3990)
## What this PR does Adds backup/restore support for the managed `RabbitMQ` application. RabbitMQ's cluster operator ships no backup CRD and RabbitMQ has no consistent online export of message payloads, so this backs up broker **definitions** (vhosts, users, permissions, queues, exchanges, bindings, policies, parameters) over the management HTTP API (`GET`/`POST /api/definitions`) and stores them in the system bucket. Message payloads and point-in-time recovery are intentionally out of scope; a full-data backup would be a Velero volume snapshot, which is a separate strategy. It is delivered as a **first-class `strategy.backups.cozystack.io/Rabbitmq` driver**, following the Altinity pattern (a dedicated driver that renders a one-shot Job for an HTTP-API engine): - `reconcileRabbitmq` / `reconcileRabbitmqRestore` render the strategy's `PodTemplateSpec` — `curl` `GET`/`POST /api/definitions`, pushing/pulling the JSON to S3 with `curl --aws-sigv4` — as a `batch/v1.Job`, covering both restore flows: in-place (into the source broker) and to-copy (into a separate, differently-named RabbitMQ in the same namespace, authenticating with the target's own default-user credentials and reading the source's object key). - A **Go-read precondition** gates each run on the `RabbitmqCluster` reporting `AllReplicasReady` (read through a small `rabbitmqtypes` partial type), so a not-yet-ready broker surfaces a precise `Ready=False` wait on the BackupJob/RestoreJob rather than a Job that starts and fails against an unreachable management API. - The produced `Backup` records the stored object's location on `status.artifact.uri`, rendered from the strategy's `spec.artifactURITemplate`. The `Backup` CRD has no status subresource, so this persists on Create, mirroring the Etcd driver. Dispatch is wired in both controllers (plus `supportedBackupStrategyKinds`), `rabbitmqtypes` is registered in the scheme, and RBAC grants read on `rabbitmqclusters.rabbitmq.com` (the Job itself is already covered by the existing `batch/jobs` grant). It ships `cozy-default-rabbitmq` (a `$bucketName`-gated `Rabbitmq` strategy) and routes `apps.cozystack.io/RabbitMQ` to it in the `cozy-default` BackupClass, which also enrols it in the `DefaultObjectsGate`. The RabbitMQ application chart is left untouched — it had no prior backup wiring, and the strategy carries the S3 coordinates itself. Unit tests cover the driver's pure helpers (applicationRef validation, cluster-name derivation, the readiness-message builder, artifact-URI rendering, parameter round-trip) and the reconcile precondition gate (defers with `Ready=False` and no Job until the cluster is ready, then proceeds). A runnable example under `examples/backups/rabbitmq/` and an honest-roundtrip Chainsaw e2e under `hack/e2e-chainsaw/rabbitmq/` seed a sentinel vhost, back it up, drop it, and assert it round-trips through object storage on both restore flows. The Job pod reuses the existing `platform-migrations` image (curl + ca-certificates) under a new `backupStrategyController.rabbitmqBackupClientImage` key, stamped in lockstep with `chBackupClientImage` in `packages/core/platform/Makefile` so the repository stays pinned at a single digest (`hack/image-pin-consistency.bats`). A dedicated slim image built by this package is a follow-up. **Validation:** `go build`/`go vet`/`gofmt`/`go test ./internal/backupcontroller/... ./internal/template/...`, deepcopy + Rabbitmq CRD generation, `helm template` proving the CRD-ordering gate both on and off, `helm lint`, and `helm unittest` (18/18). The backup + in-place + to-copy roundtrip was verified end-to-end on a dev cluster (a real management-API export and a real S3 `--aws-sigv4` upload/download against SeaweedFS), so the driver's core contract is exercised on a real cluster; the in-CI Chainsaw run is the remaining automated evidence. The object-cleanup, terminating-namespace teardown and readiness-deadline paths added during review are unit-tested (including `Reconcile`-level finalizer retention and the terminating-namespace release) but not yet cluster-exercised. (Note found while testing: RabbitMQ 4.2 is OOMKilled on the `nano` preset, so the example/e2e use `c1.small`.) ### Screenshots Not applicable — no UI changes. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map against the diff. This is an additive backup strategy plus a new strategy CRD; no downstream repository is mechanically forced by the change. A documentation page for RabbitMQ backup on [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) would be a reasonable follow-up, but it is not required by this diff — leaving the boxes unticked for a human to decide rather than ticking "no downstream" to clear the checklist. ### Release note ```release-note feat(backups): add RabbitMQ definitions backup/restore via a dedicated strategy.backups.cozystack.io/Rabbitmq driver; it gates each run on the RabbitmqCluster being ready and records the stored object on Backup.status.artifact.uri. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added RabbitMQ backup and restore support for definitions, including vhosts, users, queues, exchanges, bindings, policies, and related settings. * Added in-place and restore-to-copy workflows with readiness checks. * Added scheduled and on-demand backup examples. * Integrated RabbitMQ backups with the default backup configuration. * Backups store definitions only; message payloads and point-in-time recovery are not included. * **Documentation** * Added a complete RabbitMQ backup and restore demonstration guide. * **Tests** * Added end-to-end coverage for readiness and backup/restore round trips. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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5896484c4a |
docs(etcd-operator): fix stale role-rules vendoring path in rbac.yaml comment
The manager ClusterRole header still pointed at the upstream config/rbac/role.yaml path, which 404s at v0.5.5; the rules now live in charts/etcd-operator/files/manager-role-rules.yaml (already corrected in the Makefile and rbac_test.yaml). Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <andrey.kolkov@aenix.io> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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85cbb3d7cb |
feat(etcd-operator): bump to v0.5.5 and vendor EtcdDefragPolicy CRDs
v0.5.5 ships the EtcdDefrag and EtcdDefragPolicy API types (a controller plus a cron that stamps scheduled defrag runs). Vendor both CRDs into the etcd-operator-crds package and grant the manager ClusterRole the verbs the new controllers need: defragpolicies read/patch, defrags full CRUD, the two new /status subresources, and cluster-scoped event emission. Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <andrey.kolkov@aenix.io> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2b99853e6d |
fix(networking): prevent webhook admission outages during namespace churn (#3997)
## What this PR does Moves ingress-nginx and kubeovn-webhook pod deny rules to source-side cilium policies, and keeps a target-side `ingressDeny` on the webhook pods beside them, so enforcement does not depend on which component performs the service DNAT. Pod access to both webhooks stays denied, ingress-nginx keeps exception for konnectivity agent (now keyed on its ServiceAccount instead of `k8s-app` label that any pod can set on itself), and external `world` deny stays as static target rule. Source-side rules deny only backend port. That covers ClusterIP traffic too, because cilium translates service to its backends before it enforces egress policy, and that ordering exists because `packages/system/cilium/values.yaml` sets `kubeProxyReplacement: true` against upstream default of `"false"`. The value is operator-reachable, so the target-side rule is what keeps the deny working if it is ever flipped, and two render-time beacons make a flip visible instead of silent. Naming the frontend with `toServices` is not possible, and templates now say why, because the construct looks correct and fails silently: cilium resolves `toServices` only in allow rules (`pkg/policy/k8s/service.go` walks `spec.Egress`, never `spec.EgressDeny`), so such `egressDeny` gets non-nil empty L3 selector from `pkg/policy/utils/parserules.go`, and `pkg/policy/types/policyentry.go` treats that as wildcard when rule carries `toPorts`. This does not remove the namespace-churn map writes. The target-side rule carries a cluster-spanning peer, so those writes come back. What changes is that they stop being load-bearing, because whichever end is degraded the other still denies. Cost is policy-map cardinality on the two webhook endpoints, and residual risk is an endpoint near `MaxEntries` getting the inverted add-before-delete order (`pkg/endpoint/bpf.go:1168-1177`). Both policies also change kind and name: namespaced `CiliumNetworkPolicy/ingress-nginx-admission-webhook` and `CiliumNetworkPolicy/kube-ovn-webhook` become cluster-scoped `CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy/ingress-nginx-admission-webhook-c5d94713a379` and `kube-ovn-webhook-c2bdbc146112`. Anything keyed on the old namespaced objects goes quiet with no error. ## Tests Package suites pin the deny shape per package, one rule per spec with a destination selector cilium can actually resolve, and pin the peer shape of the target-side rule against the two substitutions that would deny the API server (`fromEntities: [all]`, and dropping the peer). Checked by mutation, all of those go red. `matchRegexRaw` and `notMatchRegexRaw` are not used, helm-unittest 1.0.3 ignores both. `packages/system/kubeovn-webhook` had no `test` target in Makefile, and `hack/helm-unit-tests.sh` finds suites by probing `make -n test` per package, so all three of its suites never ran in CI, including port agreement guard that exists to catch a drift failing open. Added the target, plus `.PHONY: test` to it and to cilium. E2e churn case proves webhooks stay available. Second case proves they are still unreachable from pods, and that deny is confined to webhook port. Both now gate every verdict on the admission endpoints having ready addresses before, during and after, on controller pod identity and restart count being equal across the window, and on a positive control where the same pods' own 443 must stay reachable. So a dead or flapping backend fails as setup failure instead of reporting a deny that was never enforced. First run of these cases reported a false verdict for exactly that reason. ## Not verified Original outage in #3983 was not reproduced in isolation, and its symptom argues against the mechanism this PR was written around. `connect: no route to host` is `EHOSTUNREACH`, and a policy denial cannot produce it, since a deny drops after `connect()` has already returned and the caller sees a timeout. On a ClusterIP that errno is what cilium's socket LB returns with no usable backend, and socket LB is active in host netns because `pkg/kpr/kpr.go:47-49` forces it whenever kube-proxy replacement is set. Namespace deletion churns EndpointSlices and service backend maps as well as identities, which is directly on that path. So this change is justified as removing a structural weakness and adding a topology-independent deny, not as a confirmed root cause fix. What would settle it: `cilium-dbg monitor --type drop` on the controller's node during the window, agent log checked for the map-overflow warning, and the admission Service's ready backend count across those seconds. `world` deny that issue named as its first suspect is kept, on `cilium monitor` evidence recorded when kubeovn-webhook policy was written - api server arrives with identity `host` on same node and `kube-apiserver` from another, never as `world`. That is one topology, a kube-ovn-chained management cluster, and it is not re-derivable on cilium-primary variants or on a Kamaji guest cluster without a run. Whether cilium without kube-proxy replacement is a supported configuration is a maintainer decision and is open. If it is not supported, a `fail()` in the cilium chart is the right shape and should follow this PR. Refs #3983. ### Screenshots Not applicable. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(networking): enforce the Ingress and Pod admission webhook deny on both the caller and the webhook endpoint, so it no longer depends on Cilium performing service load-balancing. Both policies become cluster-scoped: CiliumNetworkPolicy/ingress-nginx-admission-webhook and CiliumNetworkPolicy/kube-ovn-webhook are replaced by CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy/ingress-nginx-admission-webhook-c5d94713a379 and kube-ovn-webhook-c2bdbc146112. ``` ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Bug Fixes** * Improved admission webhook reliability during namespace deletion and churn. * Preserved webhook protection while allowing unrelated secure traffic to continue. * Corrected webhook access controls for both ingress-nginx and kube-ovn. * **New Features** * Added cluster-wide policy support with safer backend-port enforcement and automatic capability detection. * Added safeguards for policy naming and configuration overrides. * **Tests** * Expanded automated coverage for webhook availability, access restrictions, policy rendering, and end-to-end suite selection. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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686a81a491 |
docs(networking): stop claiming the churn coupling is removed
Restoring the target-side pod deny put a cluster-spanning peer selector back on the webhook endpoint, which is the exact thing the source-side rules were added to take off it. The comments still said the coupling was "structural and removed", and the release note still said deleting a namespace no longer rewrites that endpoint's policy map. Both were true of the previous revision and are not true of this one. What ships now is two denies that fail in different directions: the source-side one keeps enforcing while the webhook endpoint's policy is being recomputed or has overflowed its map, the target-side one keeps enforcing where Cilium is not the service load balancer, and neither subsumes the other. So the coupling is not eliminated, it is made non-load-bearing -- whichever end is degraded the other still denies, and the map writes are writes rather than an outage. Eliminating it outright would mean dropping the target-side rule and accepting a silent fail-open, which is the worse trade. The chainsaw case's header claimed the deletion "briefly made fail-closed admission webhooks unreachable". That is the unconfirmed hypothesis, and the errno in the report contradicts it: EHOSTUNREACH cannot come from a policy denial, which drops after connect() has returned. It now says what the case actually asserts -- both webhooks still admit across a namespace deletion -- rather than claiming to reproduce a cause. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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b78405cede |
fix(networking): keep a target-side pod deny beside the source-side rules
Restores the deny that does not care who performs the service DNAT, which is what the source-side rules on their own gave up. Both policies now carry it on their webhook endpoint for the backend port, alongside the retained world deny, so losing cilium.kubeProxyReplacement degrades enforcement rather than removing it. I argued against this and was wrong. The argument was that a target-side rule needs a peer covering pods, that such a peer either reattaches namespace churn to a fail-closed endpoint or, as a wildcard, denies the API server. The second half does not hold: a CRD-sourced fromEndpoints is never a true wildcard, because for a clusterwide policy Cilium rewrites every selector to also require k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace to Exist plus the cluster label (Cilium v1.19.5, pkg/k8s/apis/cilium.io/utils/utils.go:120-154 getEndpointSelector, whose own comment at :141 says a wildcard must not become a truly empty allow-all selector), and no reserved identity carries either label. So this rule denies pods and leaves host, remote-node and kube-apiserver allowed. `fromEntities: [all]` and an omitted peer are the shapes that would reach them. The first half was a cost dressed up as a correctness problem. A cluster- spanning peer is enumerated per identity, so the rule does add policy-map entries on the webhook endpoints in proportion to pod-identity count and a map write per namespace event. It does not add a drop window: pkg/endpoint/bpf.go:1168-1177 adds entries before deleting them expressly to avoid transient drops, and inverts that order only when the addition would overflow the map, warning when it does. The residual risk is therefore cardinality, not churn -- an endpoint near MaxEntries gets the inverted order, and cozystack leaves endpointLockdownOnMapOverflow false (charts/cilium/values.yaml:1250) so an overflow degrades rather than locking the endpoint down. Both templates now say that where the rule is, rather than leaving the cost unstated. The peer is the load-bearing part and both ways of losing it render as a plausible ingressDeny, so each suite pins it: rule count, the exact peer selectors, no fromEntities on the pod rule, no fromEndpoints on the world rule. Mutation-proved by making exactly the two substitutions that would deny the API server -- fromEntities: [all], and dropping the peer -- in both packages; all four render cleanly and all four go red. The ingress-nginx rule carries the konnectivity-agent ServiceAccount exemption for the same reason the source-side rules do: a Kamaji-hosted tenant cluster reaches this webhook through that pod, so without it guest-cluster Ingress admission breaks. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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3daa83f4b5 |
feat(cilium): surface a kube-proxy-replacement override instead of nothing
The pin added earlier guards a cozystack developer changing the default. It cannot observe an operator override in the field, and neither can the e2e, which only ever runs the default configuration -- so the path Ivan's review actually names, addons.cilium.valuesOverride on a tenant cluster and the cozystack.networking Package's cilium component on the host, produced no signal at all. Both webhook deny policies name their webhook's backend port only, which covers a pod dialling the ClusterIP solely because Cilium performs the service DNAT ahead of its own egress hook, so an override degrades that half silently. A status-beacon ConfigMap rather than a fail(), following the -awaiting-etcd beacon in packages/apps/kubernetes/templates/cluster.yaml. Whether Cilium without kube-proxy replacement is a supported cozystack configuration is a platform decision, and refusing to render the CNI over a weakened defence-in-depth control is not a call these charts should make. The host beacon fires on a bool false, on the string "false", and on the umbrella key being deleted, because the subchart's own "false" default coalesces into the parent. The tenant beacon fires on an explicit non-true override only, since absence means the chart default applies, and it renders on the management cluster next to the HelmRelease carrying the override -- which is why the mismatch is detectable there at all rather than inside the guest cluster. Also withdraws the argument the suite header used to carry, that a target-side ingressDeny could not be re-added as a fallback. It was wrong, and the next commit adds that rule. The header now records what the two halves each buy. Makefile gets .PHONY: test for the reason this branch already argued for kubeovn-webhook, which applies with more force here now that the suite is load-bearing for two other packages: hack/package.mk's .PHONY list deliberately carries only the targets that file defines, so a path named `test` would otherwise make the target up to date and skip the recipe. Proven both ways. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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3a70f91423 |
fix(vm-disk): fail on storageClass/source edit of existing disk (#3969)
## What this PR does Fixes #2985. Editing a `VMDisk`'s `storageClass` or `source` after its DataVolume already exists was silently ignored: `packages/apps/vm-disk/templates/dv.yaml` looks up the existing DataVolume and, when found, reused its `spec` verbatim (because `DataVolume.spec` is immutable in CDI). The edit therefore rendered as a no-op — the typed CR accepted it and the HelmRelease reported success, while the DataVolume/PVC kept the original spec and the source of truth silently diverged from the cluster. The template now builds the desired `source` into a shared `$desiredSource` variable (used both for rendering and comparison) and, when a DataVolume already exists, calls `fail()` with an explicit message if the requested `storageClass` or `source` differs from the immutable existing spec — mirroring the explicit size handling already done in `pvc-resize-hook.yaml`. Storage growth is unaffected and still flows through the resize hook. `source` is also marked `@immutable` in `values.yaml`, so the generated schema now carries the same `x-kubernetes-validations` transition rule (`self == oldSelf`) that `storageClass` already had; `types.go`, `values.schema.json` and the generated `vm-disk-rd` CRD are regenerated to match. ### Verification - `helm unittest` covers both the immutability guard (via a mocked existing DataVolume through `kubernetesProvider`, since `lookup` needs a cluster) and initial-creation source rendering for every source type — 12/12 pass. - Verified live on a dev cluster with `helm install --dry-run=server` against a real DataVolume: an unchanged edit renders, a `storageClass` change fails, a `source` change fails, and a storage grow still renders the resize hook without tripping the guard. ### Scope note This PR only makes the drift visible and marks `source` immutable. Two deeper platform findings sit outside its scope: (1) #2657 (pre-existing) — the `apps.cozystack.io` aggregated apiserver does not evaluate the `x-kubernetes-validations` CEL rules on update, so `@immutable` is a no-op at admission for every Application kind, which is exactly why the chart-level `fail()` — not the CEL rule — is the substantive guard here; (2) #3971 — that same apiserver does not honour `--dry-run=server` and persists the change (surfaced while testing this fix). ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the diff file by file. The diff touches only `packages/apps/vm-disk/` (template, `values.yaml`, regenerated `values.schema.json`, tests), the regenerated `packages/system/vm-disk-rd/cozyrds/vm-disk.yaml`, and `api/apps/v1alpha1/vmdisk/types.go`. No package was added, renamed or removed; no `values.schema.json` field was added, renamed or removed (only a validation rule on the existing `source` field); no default changed; `README.md` is unchanged; the `cozyrds` file was regenerated, not renamed. The terraform provider models fields, defaults and enums but not CEL immutability, so it is unaffected. No downstream repository is reached by this change. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(vm-disk): editing storageClass or source on an existing VMDisk now fails with a clear message instead of being silently ignored; delete and recreate the disk to change these immutable fields. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added support for blank, HTTP, image, disk, and upload VM disk sources. * VM disk sources and storage classes are now protected from unintended changes, while storage expansion remains supported. * Existing disks preserve their configured source and storage settings. * **Bug Fixes** * Invalid or conflicting source configurations are rejected. * Prevented silent no-op updates and incorrect immutability errors for existing disks. * **Documentation** * Documented source and storage class immutability, including the need to recreate disks when changing either setting. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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86fe8e5a7e |
feat(valkey): add managed Valkey service (#3380)
## What this PR does Adds a **managed Valkey** service to the catalog, alongside managed Redis. > **Stacked on #3406** (redis-operator migration to freshworks-oss). This PR targets that branch and depends on it; review/merge #3406 first. ### Why Redis relicensed at 8.x to a source-available family (AGPLv3 / SSPL / RSALv2), and the managed Redis app currently ships `v8: 8.4.0` with no BSD-licensed option ≤ 7.2. That is a licensing risk for CNCF Incubation. [Valkey](https://valkey.io) is the BSD-3-Clause fork of Redis 7.2.4, governed by the Linux Foundation, and a drop-in replacement for Redis. This is the same move Argo CD made — [`cncf/foundation#750`](https://github.com/cncf/foundation/issues/750) was closed with "no need for exception" after they migrated to Valkey. ### How it works Valkey runs on the same operator as managed Redis. #3406 migrates that operator from the archived `spotahome/redis-operator` to the actively-maintained **freshworks-oss/redis-operator** fork, which adds a native `spec.engine: Valkey` switch. With it, the operator runs `valkey-server` / `valkey-cli` natively (in the launch command and in its liveness / readiness / shutdown probes), so the chart uses the official `valkey/valkey` image directly — **no Redis-compatibility shim image**. The app mirrors managed Redis: same shape/values (`replicas`, `resources`/`resourcesPreset`, `size`, `storageClass`, `external`, `version`, `authEnabled`), Sentinel-based HA, metrics exporter, `WorkloadMonitor`s, dashboard resource map, and `ApplicationDefinition` (`kind: Valkey`). Versions offered: `v8 → 8.1.8` (default) and `v7 → 7.2.13` (the BSD-3-Clause Redis 7.2 line, most conservative drop-in). ### How it was verified - `helm template` renders cleanly for `v8`, `v7`, and `external: true`; the `RedisFailover` carries `spec.engine: Valkey` and `image: valkey/valkey:<version>`. `helm lint` shows only the pre-existing icon-URL / `cozy-lib` warnings that managed Redis emits too. - `helm template` of `valkey-rd` renders a valid `ApplicationDefinition` (`kind: Valkey`, `plural: valkeys`, `category: PaaS`). - Generated artifacts (`values.schema.json`, `README.md`, `types.go`, `zz_generated.deepcopy.go`, the ApplicationDefinition `openAPISchema`) reproduce with the pinned `cozyvalues-gen` v1.6.0 and `controller-gen` v0.16.4 — root `make generate` and per-app generate both produce no drift; `go build ./valkey/...` passes. - A live-cluster e2e was not run from this environment; the Chainsaw suite `hack/e2e-chainsaw/valkey/` (mirroring the redis suite) is included and `hack/select-e2e.sh` maps the `valkey-application` source to it, so it runs in CI once the freshworks operator image is built. ### Notes - The Valkey logo (`packages/apps/valkey/logos/valkey.svg`) is a placeholder in Valkey's brand colors, pending the official brand asset. - A Grafana `db/valkey` dashboard was intentionally left out of this initial PoC; it can follow. ### Screenshots N/A — no UI changes. ### Downstream repositories This adds a new managed-app kind, which likely warrants follow-ups in `cozystack/website` (user-facing docs for the new service) and possibly `cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack`. No follow-up PRs are opened yet — leaving these for a maintainer to decide, per the template guidance. - [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note feat(valkey): add managed Valkey service — a BSD-3-Clause, Linux Foundation-governed alternative to managed Redis, running on the freshworks-oss redis-operator via native spec.engine: Valkey (versions 8.1.8 and 7.2.13) ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added managed Valkey service support with high availability and configurable replicas. * Supports Valkey versions 7 and 8, persistent storage, resource presets, authentication, and optional external access. * Added monitoring metrics and dashboard integration. * Added platform package integration and tenant administrator access. * **Documentation** * Added Valkey configuration guidance and storage-class immutability documentation. * **Tests** * Added end-to-end coverage for deployment readiness, storage, and replicas. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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6a289cf6d0 |
test(cilium): pin the service-LB assumption both webhook denies rest on
Both admission-webhook deny policies name only their webhook's backend port. That covers a pod dialling the ClusterIP because Cilium translates a service to its backends before it enforces egress policy -- in v1.19.5, bpf/bpf_lxc.c runs __per_packet_lb_svc_xlate_4 and lb4_local() and only then tail-calls into handle_ipv4_from_lxc where policy_can_egress4 evaluates the rule. That ordering exists only while Cilium performs the DNAT, and the only reason it does is cilium's kubeProxyReplacement: true, set against an upstream chart default of "false". Set it false and the DNAT moves downstream of Cilium's egress hook: the packet arrives with dst = ClusterIP, matches no endpoint identity, and with default-deny off it is allowed. Both webhooks regain a pod -reachable ClusterIP path while the backend deny keeps working, so nothing fails and nothing is logged. Same shape as the port disagreement namespace-annotation-webhook.port already exists to prevent, and it had no pin. The suite asserts the rendered cilium-config key rather than .Values, so an upstream bump that renames it or stops honouring the override is caught too, and it spells out each of the five variant valuesFiles combinations from sources/networking.yaml so a future variant file that overrides the value reds here. Proven both ways: flipping values.yaml reds all six cases, and adding the override to values-kilo.yaml alone reds exactly the cilium-kilo case. The suite also records why a target-side ingressDeny is not available as a belt-and-braces fallback. A target-side rule needs a peer selector covering pods, and the peer selector is what carries namespace churn -- the failure being removed here. pkg/policy/selectorcache.go UpdateIdentities notifies a selector only when the churned identities were in its own cached selections, and pkg/policy/l4.go IdentitySelectionUpdated then writes the policy map of every endpoint the rule's endpointSelector selects, which for a target-side rule is the fail-closed webhook pods. The one churn-free peer is the wildcard, which Cilium collapses to a single ANY-identity entry and skips identity updates for -- but ANY covers reserved:host, remote-node and kube-apiserver, so it would deny the API server. There is no third shape. Refs #3983. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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042ac2715b |
test(kubeovn-webhook): declare the test target phony, fix the port comment
hack/package.mk's .PHONY line does not carry `test`, so a path named `test` next to the Makefile makes the target up to date and make skips the recipe. Proven both ways: with the declaration the three suites run with such a file present, without it make reports "'test' is up to date" and asserts nothing. That is the same fail-open shape the port agreement guard exists for, and hack/helm-unit-tests.sh only catches it after the fact. The port comment named a ValidatingWebhookConfiguration. This package ships a MutatingWebhookConfiguration, whose clientConfig.service omits `port` so the API server defaults it to 443. The assertion was right; the sentence explaining it was not, and it is the only place a reader learns why 443 is pinned. Assisted-By: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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9f485a18ad |
docs(ingress-nginx): keep the policy rationale out of the render
The rationale above the CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy was a `#` block, which
Helm copies verbatim into the manifest: 53 comment lines shipped with every
render. The sibling policy added alongside it already uses `{{/* */}}`. Convert
this one to match; the text is unchanged.
Also state in the values description what `enabled: true` actually promises.
The template renders only while cilium.io/v2/CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy is
discoverable, so on a cluster without it the default emits no policy at all and
leaves no Event or render-time message behind. `enabled: false` is what
distinguishes an opt-out from an absent API.
Assisted-By: LLM
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
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bdc172a648 |
test(networking): pin the deny shape and run the kubeovn-webhook suites
The suites asserted the toServices rule that produced the cluster-wide 443 deny, so they pinned the defect: every rendered-YAML assertion passed on the broken policy, and removing the rule would have read as the regression. Replace those cases with the invariant that was actually missing -- one deny rule per spec, and its destination must be a selector Cilium can resolve (toEndpoints present, toServices absent, spec count fixed). Verified by mutation: reintroducing the toServices rule fails these assertions in both packages. Not used: matchRegexRaw / notMatchRegexRaw. helm-unittest 1.0.3 silently ignores both -- a notMatchRegexRaw against a pattern guaranteed to be present still reports pass -- so a document-wide regex guard would have asserted nothing. packages/system/kubeovn-webhook had no Makefile test target, and hack/helm-unit-tests.sh discovers suites by probing `make -n test` per package and skips any package without one. All three of its suites -- including the port agreement guard, whose whole purpose is to catch a drift that fails open -- had therefore never run in CI. Add the target; the sweep now reports "Running tests in packages/system/kubeovn-webhook". Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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6b2b68a685 |
fix(networking): drop unresolvable toServices deny from webhook policies
Cilium resolves toServices only inside ALLOW rules: pkg/policy/k8s/service.go
walks spec.Egress in processRule, hasMatchingToServices and specHasToServices,
and never spec.EgressDeny. An egressDeny whose only destination is a
toServices therefore never gains a ToEndpoints/ToCIDRSet, and the
EgressDeny -> PolicyEntry conversion in pkg/policy/utils/parserules.go does not
pass ToServices to mergeEndpointSelectors at all. Its nil-guard only fires for
a non-nil empty slice, so with every other destination field absent it returns
make(types.Selectors, 0, 0) -- non-nil and empty, which
pkg/policy/types/policyentry.go documents as an implicit WILDCARD whenever the
rule carries toPorts.
The rule therefore did not deny the webhook Service on 443; it denied every
destination on TCP/443 for every endpoint its spec selected -- all pods outside
kube-system for ingress-nginx, and with endpointSelector {} every pod in the
cluster for kubeovn-webhook. Cilium deny beats allow, so the tenant
allow-external-communication policy could not offset it. Validation accepts
the construct (l3DependentL4Support marks ToServices supported), which is why
it failed silently.
Deny the backend port only. That already covers ClusterIP-addressed traffic,
because Cilium translates a service to its backends before enforcing egress
policy -- the same reason its own toServices support resolves to backend
selectors rather than the frontend. The kubeovn-webhook servicePort helper
existed only to feed the removed rule, so the Service goes back to a literal
443.
Also correct the four comments that documented the frontend deny as working,
record why the world deny is kept (cilium monitor showed the API server
arriving as host / kube-apiserver, never world), and state plainly that the
namespace-churn coupling is structural rather than a reproduced root cause for
issue 3983.
Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
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f224baae46 |
docs(networking): document webhook policy scope
Explain which callers the source-side Cilium policies select and how the Service and backend ports are kept in agreement. Assisted-By: GPT-5 <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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fc5dc66c61 |
fix(networking): isolate webhook policies from namespace churn
Move pod denials to source-side Cilium policies so namespace churn cannot regenerate fail-closed webhook endpoints. Keep the external world deny as a static target rule. Assisted-By: GPT-5 <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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ba32df69c0 |
feat(backups): add RabbitMQ definitions backup via a dedicated strategy driver
RabbitMQ's cluster operator ships no backup CRD and RabbitMQ has no
consistent online export of message payloads, so back up broker
DEFINITIONS (vhosts, users, permissions, queues, exchanges, bindings,
policies, parameters) over the management HTTP API and store them in the
system bucket. Message payloads and PITR are out of scope - a full-data
backup is a Velero volume snapshot, a separate strategy.
Add a first-class strategy.backups.cozystack.io/Rabbitmq driver, following
the Altinity pattern (a dedicated driver that renders a one-shot Job for an
HTTP-API engine):
- reconcileRabbitmq / reconcileRabbitmqRestore render the strategy's
PodTemplateSpec (curl GET/POST /api/definitions, push/pull to S3 with
--aws-sigv4) as a batch/v1.Job, for both in-place and to-copy restore.
- A Go-read precondition gates each run on the RabbitmqCluster reporting
AllReplicasReady (via the rabbitmqtypes partial type), surfacing a
precise Ready=False wait instead of a Job that starts and fails.
- The produced Backup records the object location on status.artifact.uri
(rendered from spec.artifactURITemplate; the Backup CRD has no status
subresource, so it persists on Create, as in the Etcd driver).
Wire dispatch in both controllers + supportedBackupStrategyKinds, register
rabbitmqtypes in the scheme, and grant read on rabbitmqclusters. Ship
cozy-default-rabbitmq (a $bucketName-gated Rabbitmq strategy) and route
apps.cozystack.io/RabbitMQ to it in the cozy-default BackupClass. The
application chart is untouched.
Add unit tests for the driver's pure helpers and the precondition gate, a
runnable example, and an honest-roundtrip Chainsaw e2e that seeds a
sentinel vhost, backs it up, drops it, and asserts it round-trips through
object storage on both restore flows.
The Job pod reuses the platform-migrations image (curl + ca-certificates)
under a new rabbitmqBackupClientImage key, stamped in lockstep with
chBackupClientImage so the repository stays pinned at one digest; a
dedicated slim image is a follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com>
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127cc2ce9a |
fix(ingress-nginx): re-pin to the segfault-free v1.11.5 rebuild
The v1.11.5 tag in cozystack/ingress-nginx-with-protobuf-exporter now points at the merge of its #7, which builds lua-protobuf with -fno-strict-aliasing. The digest pinned here was the build before that, whose pb.so makes nginx's cache manager and cache loader children segfault continuously: tens per second, indefinitely. The workers are unaffected, so the pod stays Ready with no restarts and nothing surfaces until the master itself segfaults, which is how this reached main unnoticed. Verified against the published image rather than a local build. The one-line repro, luajit -e 'require "protoc"', exits 0 where it exited 139, and a 25 second nginx run on a generated ingress-nginx config produces no signal 11 where the pinned build produced 105. The exporter is re-pinned alongside it because one tag builds both images, so the rebuild published a new exporter digest too. Its source did not change. release-1.5 and release-1.6 pin v1.11.2 and were never affected. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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dc2e427262 |
docs(etcd): note that affinity is not applied to existing members (#3964)
## What this PR does Documentation follow-up to #3962. Both reviewers (CodeRabbit and @androndo/@IvanHunters) noted that the new `affinity` value is not applied retroactively: the etcd-operator sets `spec.affinity` only when it creates or replaces a member Pod and never reschedules running members. On a cluster that already has co-located members (the exact failure #3962 targets) the default soft rule — or a newly set hard rule — takes effect only as each member is replaced. This adds that caveat to the `affinity` parameter documentation in `values.yaml` and regenerates `values.schema.json`, `README.md`, and the embedded `openAPISchema` in `etcd-rd`. No template or behaviour change; `make test` passes (20/20). The other inline note (the soft podAntiAffinity default overlaps the soft `topologySpreadConstraints`) was explicitly flagged as "fine to keep as-is", so no code change is made for it. > Note: this PR is stacked on `fix/etcd-soft-antiaffinity` (#3962) and will retarget to `main` once that merges. ### Screenshots n/a — no UI changes. ### Downstream repositories Doc-only change to an app chart (regenerated artifacts). No package added/renamed/removed, `kind`/`plural` unchanged, no installer values/assets/variants touched. No downstream follow-up required. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change ### Release note ```release-note NONE ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Documentation** * Clarified that etcd affinity rules apply when member Pods are created or replaced. * Noted that running members are not rescheduled retroactively; the rule takes effect as each member is replaced. * Updated the guidance consistently across configuration documentation and schema descriptions. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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ec0785fe2a |
fix(redis-operator): use REDISCLI_AUTH for valkey-cli auth in generated scripts
The freshworks-oss operator authenticates the CLI in its generated readiness and shutdown scripts by exporting the engine's auth env var before invoking it. For the Valkey engine it used VALKEYCLI_AUTH, but valkey-cli honours only REDISCLI_AUTH (its --help documents that name and no VALKEYCLI_AUTH). With auth enabled the readiness probe's valkey-cli call therefore returned NOAUTH, the role never resolved, and the data pods never became Ready. Patch valkeyEngine.CLIAuthEnvName to REDISCLI_AUTH so auth-enabled Valkey instances pass readiness. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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c94a1da5bb |
feat(mongodb): add TLS support via PSMDB operator-managed certificates (#2692)
## What this PR does Enables operator-managed TLS for MongoDB and stops handing tenants any Secret that carries private key material. - Percona Server for MongoDB serves TLS unconditionally (`mode: preferTLS`), so this PR drops the misleading `tls.enabled` toggle rather than pretending the chart controls it. - The tenant no longer receives the operator's CA Secret (`<release>-ca-cert`, which holds `ca.key`) or the leaf (`<release>-ssl`). Both were previously reachable, and either one is a private key in tenant hands, the CA one is a full trust-chain compromise. - The chart declares a `TenantProjection` sentinel naming its CA source Secret (`<release>-ssl`, the operator-managed leaf, which carries `ca.crt`), and the ResourceDefinition selects the resulting key-free `<release>.tenant-ca` projection by the engine-agnostic `internal.cozystack.io/tenant-ca` label. The CA-extraction controller reads the sentinel and publishes the projection holding only `ca.crt`. The tenant gets what it needs to verify the server and nothing else. ### Why the include also carries an exclude list The trust-anchor selector matches by label with no name constraint, so any Secret in the namespace that acquired that label would be promoted with its data copied verbatim. The enumerable dangerous set is therefore excluded explicitly: the CA, both leaves, the rotation snapshots (`-ssl-old`, `-ssl-internal-old`, same server keys as the leaves, and unlike them they carry no owner reference, so an interrupted rotation can leave them behind after the release is gone), the system-user passwords, the at-rest encryption key, the keyfile, the object-storage credentials, and both forms of the operator's internal Secret. That backstop is bounded, and the comment says so: matching is by exact name with no globs, so a Secret a future operator version introduces, or a transient object an issuer creates mid-renewal, stays in scope of the label-only include. The per-user Secrets cannot be enumerated at all, since their names carry the username. The primary defence remains that the controller stamps only its own projection; this closes the enumerable set, not the whole surface. ### Release note ```release-note feat(mongodb): stop exposing TLS private key material to tenants and publish the CA as a key-free trust anchor ``` |
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6fdb5e0840 |
docs(etcd): note that affinity is not applied to existing members
The operator applies spec.affinity only when it creates or replaces a member Pod; it does not reschedule running members. Document that on the `affinity` value so operators do not expect the default (or a newly set rule) to redistribute already co-located members until each is replaced. Addresses the non-blocking review notes on #3962. Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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edd767ea0f |
feat(nats): publish ca.crt-only trust anchor to tenants (#3340)
## What this PR does Converges nats onto the key-free CA trust-anchor contract. A TLS-enabled nats release renders a `TenantProjection` sentinel naming the chart's cert-manager CA Secret as its source, and the nats ResourceDefinition selects the resulting `<release>.tenant-ca` object by label. The projection is built by the CA extraction controller in `internal/controller/cacert`, which parses the source certificate and re-encodes it into a single `ca.crt` key, so a tenant that enables TLS gets something to verify the server against without ever getting a private key. No key-bearing Secret is granted to a tenant, by name or by label. `packages/apps/nats/templates/certmanager.yaml` is not touched. An earlier draft of this change stamped publish labels onto the CA `Certificate`'s `secretTemplate`; the controller that shipped consumes a sentinel object instead, so the chart now declares its source rather than marking it. The functional change is one new template and one `matchLabels` entry in the ResourceDefinition. The sentinel is gated on the chart's effective TLS state, which is tri-state: left unset it follows `external`. That gate is the single divergence from the postgres implementation of the same contract, and it exists because the nats CA is only issued while TLS resolves true. An ungated sentinel would sit `Ready=False/SourceNotFound` forever on every plaintext release. The CA extraction controller is already on main, so this is live on merge rather than dormant until a follow-up lands. The `do-not-merge/hold` label predates that and no longer guards anything. ## Verified against a running cluster The premise this rests on is that cert-manager populates `ca.crt` on the Secret of a `selfSigned`, `isCA: true` Certificate. Nothing in this repository witnesses it: `hack/e2e-chainsaw/` has no nats suite, and nats appears in no e2e workflow, so every unit test here encodes the same assumption the chart encodes and the two cannot catch each other being wrong. I closed it against a live cluster instead, running cert-manager v1.20.2, the version this repo ships, on two independent nats releases: - `nats-<name>-ca`, the chart's CA Secret, holds `ca.crt`, `tls.crt` and `tls.key`. The declared source key exists. - `nats-<name>.tenant-ca`, the projection, holds exactly one key, `ca.crt`. - The projection's SHA-256 certificate fingerprint equals the source's, so it carries that CA and not some other certificate. - The projection carries `internal.cozystack.io/tenant-ca: "true"` and `internal.cozystack.io/tenantresource: "true"`. The second is stamped by the lineage webhook, computed from the ResourceDefinition selector this PR adds, so its presence means the whole chain held. - `kubectl get tenantsecret nats-<name>-ca` returns NotFound. The key-bearing Secret is not served through the tenant API. What is still missing is an automated regression witness for that premise. Adding one means a new chainsaw suite for nats, which has no e2e coverage of any kind today, and that is a larger change than this one. ## What the tests pin 61 helm-unittest cases and 3 bats cases. The sentinel's absence of `ownerReferences` (an owner would short-circuit the lineage walk before it reaches the Flux label the attribution depends on), the length of `spec.projections` as well as its single entry (the controller refuses a multi-entry sentinel, so a second entry is a silent loss of the anchor rather than a leak), both implied legs of the tri-state TLS gate, and `notExists` on either visibility label for both key-bearing Certificates. The bats guard covers the two grant surfaces nothing else asserts on. The ResourceDefinition is rendered, by the `nats-rd` chart inlining `cozyrds/*`, but that chart has neither a tests directory nor the `test` target `hack/helm-unit-tests.sh` looks for, and no `packages/system/*-rd` package does. The dashboard Role is rendered by a chart that has both, and no suite under `packages/apps/nats/tests/` asserts on it. Both are compared whole rather than filtered down to the entries that mention a Secret, because every such filter admits the spelling it did not anticipate. A name whitelist passes an added label selector, and `controller.cert-manager.io/fao` is stamped on both key-bearing Secrets, so a selector on it is a one-line grant of the CA private key. On the Role side, a rule with no `resourceNames` names no Secret, a rule with `resources: ["*"]` names no resource, and a ClusterRole is not a Role, while all three grant read access to the CA key. Comparing the rendered output whole needs no filter and leaves no spelling to find. ## Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the diff, file by file. No trigger fires, and no follow-up PR is owed. `packages/apps/nats/templates/tenant-projection.yaml` is a new template and `packages/apps/nats/tests/` holds chart tests. No package is added, renamed or removed; `values.yaml` and `values.schema.json` are untouched, so neither the hand-written Terraform schema, its version enums, nor its restated defaults have anything to track. `kind`, `plural` and `release.prefix` are unchanged, and no output Secret or Service is renamed, so the provider's concatenated name lookups still resolve. `packages/system/nats-rd/cozyrds/nats.yaml` is edited in place rather than renamed, so the ccp external-app skill's dependency-contract anchor still resolves. The provider offers no typed access to the new projection, which is the position it already holds for every Secret it does not model, and not a break. `packages/apps/nats/README.md` is covered by the one automated path that does exist: `nats` is present in the website `Makefile` `APPS` list, so the docs bot regenerates the managed-apps reference page from this `README.md` on the next stable tag. This is the silent-skip failure mode the trigger map warns about, so I checked the list rather than assuming; an app missing from it gets no page at all, which is what happened to `opensearch`. `hack/check-nats-rd-secrets.bats` is a new file, not a move or a rename, and it changes no make target's contract: `Makefile` globs `hack/*.bats` into `BATS_UNIT_FILES` automatically. The ccp skills anchor on `hack/package.mk` and `hack/common-envs.mk`, neither of which is touched. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: Part of #2814. ### Release note ```release-note feat(nats): expose the CA certificate to tenants as a key-free `<release>.tenant-ca` Secret ``` |
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65e700486b |
feat(qdrant): publish ca.crt-only trust anchor to tenants (#3341)
## What this PR does Converges qdrant onto the key-free CA trust-anchor contract (#2814), the same way #3340 does it for nats. The chart declares a `TenantProjection` sentinel naming its cert-manager CA Secret. The CA-extraction controller reads that declaration and publishes a key-free copy, `ca.crt` and nothing else, as `<release>.tenant-ca`. The qdrant ResourceDefinition selects that projection by label so it shows up in the tenant's secret list. No key-bearing Secret gains a tenant-visible label. The sentinel is gated on the chart's TLS condition. Engines whose operator mints a CA unconditionally do not need that, but qdrant only has a CA while TLS is on, and an ungated sentinel would sit `Ready=False`/`SourceNotFound` on every plaintext release. This was held while the CA-extraction controller was still open. That controller landed in #3407, so the sentinel is honoured as soon as this merges and the hold is gone. Tests pin the invariants that otherwise fail silently. The sentinel carries no `ownerReferences`, so the lineage walk falls through to the Flux release label. Neither key-bearing Certificate stamps a tenant-visible label on its Secret. The two objects that decide which Secrets a tenant may actually read, the dashboard Role with its binding and the ResourceDefinition, are pinned whole rather than checked for known-bad names: a rule granting secrets with no `resourceNames` is unrestricted rather than narrow, and a label selector can reach a key-bearing Secret while every name in the file stays correct, so neither adds a name for a probe to notice. Part of #2814. ### Follow-ups What this PR does not do, and where each belongs instead. - nats converges the same contract in #3340 and has no `dashboard-resourcemap_test.yaml`, so the dashboard Role pin belongs there too. Tracked in #3701 along with postgres, which already carries the label selector with no guard behind it. - The qdrant e2e fixture runs plaintext (`hack/e2e-chainsaw/qdrant/qdrant.yaml` sets `external: false`), so nothing in CI walks the path from the sentinel to `tenantsecrets`. postgres has a `verify-tenant-ca-projection` step to copy. - `hack/check-qdrant-rd-secrets.bats` is engine-agnostic apart from two literals, the chart path and the expected Secret set. The third copy of it is the point to parameterise over `packages/system/*-rd/cozyrds/` instead of copying again. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the diff, file by file. Nothing needs a manual follow-up, but not for the reason a values-only walk would give: the website reference page for an app is regenerated from that package's `README.md`, and this PR does change it. `qdrant` is in the app list hardcoded in the website `Makefile`, so the docs bot picks the new section up on the next stable tag and there is nothing to open by hand. The Terraform provider's schema is hand-written against `values.schema.json`, which is untouched, and the provider offers no typed access to the new projection, the same position it holds for every other Secret it does not model. No package is added, renamed or removed, and the `cozyrds` file is edited in place rather than renamed, so the ccp dependency-contract anchor still resolves. User-facing documentation for consuming the trust anchor ships with the chart README, matching #3340. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note feat(qdrant): expose the CA certificate to tenants as a key-free `<release>.tenant-ca` Secret ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Tenant environments can securely access the Qdrant TLS CA certificate without receiving the private key. * TLS CA access is automatically enabled when TLS or external access is configured. * **Documentation** * Expanded TLS guidance explains certificate validation and provides commands for retrieving the tenant CA certificate. * **Tests** * Added coverage for TLS projections, secret visibility, dashboard resources, and secure fail-closed secret exposure. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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29d2955241 |
fix(mongodb): declare the trust anchor with a TenantProjection
A tenant verifying a MongoDB endpoint needs the CA certificate, and every Secret that holds one also holds a private key: the operator's <release>-ca-cert carries the CA key, the leaf <release>-ssl the server key. Granting either would hand over the key along with the anchor. Render a TenantProjection naming the source, so the CA-extraction controller can publish the key-free <release>.tenant-ca, and select that projection by label from the managed-service definition. The sentinel carries no ownerReferences: it is resolved back to its release through the label Flux stamps, and an owner reference short-circuits that walk and silently costs the tenant its anchor. The sentinel is ungated. The operator issues the certificate chain whatever the chart asks for, so the source exists for every release and there is no plaintext leg to skip. The source is <release>-ssl rather than <release>-ca-cert. It is the name this chart itself sets in spec.secrets.ssl, so the reference cannot drift from the CR; the operator writes it on both its cert-manager path and the self-signed fallback it uses when cert-manager is absent, where no <release>-ca-cert exists at all; and it holds the merged old and new CA through a rotation, where <release>-ca-cert holds only the new one and would stop verifying pods still serving the previous leaf. Withhold the key-bearing Secrets from the tenant explicitly as well. The label selector matches on no name, so a single mis-stamp would promote a private key; the exclude list is evaluated first and closes the enumerable set. Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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27f71bfbe9 |
fix(mongodb): deliver the TLS trust anchor without private key material
The tenant-facing paths handed over both Secrets the PSMDB operator creates for TLS. <release>-ca-cert holds the CA private key, so read access is a full trust-chain compromise; <release>-ssl holds the server private key, so read access allows impersonation. A client verifying the endpoint needs ca.crt and nothing else, so neither object belongs on a tenant-facing path. Declare the trust anchor by name instead. The operator creates its CA Secret itself and offers no way to label it, so the ApplicationDefinition names it and the CA-extraction controller lifts ca.crt alone into the key-free projection. The include selector matches that projection by label, and the dashboard Role drops both key-bearing names without gaining the projection by name: a name grant conveys whatever occupies the name, while the label path conveys only what the platform vouched for. Witness both delivery paths against a running cluster, since the two that matter are separate. The Role is asserted as an exact grant with bounded rule counts, because a rule with no resourceNames — or one granting every resource — would otherwise pass an absence check while conveying every Secret in the namespace. The label path is asserted as a negative on all three key-bearing Secrets. A bats check pins the declaration's names and keys, which nothing else covers: the field is pruned at admission until the controller ships, so drift there would surface as an empty trust anchor with nothing red. Drop the mongodb-rd unit test. That package has no test target, so the file never ran, and what it asserted was the leak. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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7f8f32b1ba |
fix(mongodb): always enable operator-managed TLS, drop tls.enabled field
Address review feedback from lexfrei (B3): the tri-state tls.enabled field could not actually disable TLS. The PSMDB operator defaults spec.tls to preferTLS whenever it is unset, so tls.enabled: false rendered no spec.tls while the operator still served TLS — a misleading no-op. Remove the field and unconditionally render spec.secrets.ssl and spec.tls.mode: preferTLS to match operator behaviour. splitHorizons SAN injection now keys off external alone. Also drop the Makefile jq patch that re-injected the tls schema property. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com> |
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e9f276195f |
test(mongodb): cover TLS modes, splitHorizons, and RBAC
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com> Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f6816e1f44 |
feat(mongodb): add operator-managed TLS with external hostname SANs
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com> Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4e6313b608 |
feat(valkey): register Valkey application in the platform
Wire the managed Valkey app into the platform: add the valkey-rd package carrying the Valkey ApplicationDefinition, the valkey-application PackageSource (reusing the existing redis-operator), enable it in the paas bundle, and grant tenant roles access to the valkeys resource. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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06624bacd0 |
fix(vm-disk): fail on storageClass/source edit of existing disk
Editing a VMDisk's storageClass or source after its DataVolume already
exists was silently ignored: dv.yaml reused the existing DataVolume.spec
verbatim (DataVolume.spec is immutable in CDI), so the edit rendered as a
no-op while the HelmRelease reported success and the CR diverged from the
cluster.
When a DataVolume already exists, fail with a clear message if the
requested storageClass or source differs from what the disk was created
with. Both compare the operator's input recorded in an annotation at
creation (vm-disk.cozystack.io/storage-class and .../source), written only
at creation and preserved verbatim afterwards — never overwritten with an
unapplied edit. Recording the input rather than reading the live object
matters on both axes: the image-clone PVC name carries a chart-version
prefix (vm-image- was renamed to vm-default-images-, commit
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6d9444056d |
chore(keycloak): bump KMS proxy to 0.2.2
Pin the released image by digest so package rendering is reproducible. Assisted-By: GPT-5 <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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b9a95a0c4a |
fix(postgres): let in-place restore re-bootstrap instead of wedging (#3959)
## What this PR does An in-place `RestoreJob` (one whose `targetApplicationRef` is omitted, so the app is restored back into itself) re-bootstraps the Postgres app under its own name. On stock v1.6.2 it never comes back up — the cluster is deleted and then hangs in `Setting up primary` with `*-full-recovery-*` pods crash-looping, or the HelmRelease upgrade fails outright. There are two independent causes, both in the same restore patch, and both surface only in place because a to-copy restore targets a different app. **1. Archive-vs-recovery `serverName` collision.** The driver set the restored cluster's WAL-archive `serverName` equal to the recovery source (`bootstrap.serverName = bootstrap.oldName = sourceServerName`), while the chart pinned the archiver `serverName` to the release name. In place those coincide, so the cluster archived onto the source's own WAL prefix and `barman-cloud-check-wal-archive` refused to start with `Expected empty archive`. Fixed by giving the restored cluster a fresh `bootstrap.newServerName`, keyed by the `RestoreJob` UID (unique per restore, stable across reconciles); the chart archives there while `externalClusters` still recovers from `bootstrap.serverName`. This is what manual `CNPG` strategies hit (their `serverName` defaults to the cluster name, including the shipped `examples/backups/postgres/10-cnpg-strategy.yaml`); the `cozy-default` flow dodged it because its `serverName` is `<namespace>-<app>`. **2. `useSystemBucket` guard.** The restore populates explicit S3 coordinates (`destinationPath` / `s3CredentialsSecret` / `endpointCA`) but left `backup.useSystemBucket=true`, so the chart's `bootstrap.enabled is incompatible with useSystemBucket` guard failed the HelmRelease upgrade and the cluster never re-rendered. This is what the default `cozy-default` (system-bucket) flow hits on an in-place restore. Fixed by clearing `useSystemBucket` in the restore patch, since the app is now on the explicit-creds path. Verified live on a v1.6.2 cluster: with `useSystemBucket` cleared, the same in-place restore re-bootstraps to a healthy cluster and the sentinel row survives. Both are exercised only by an in-place restore; the postgres backup e2e drove only to-copy, so neither surfaced in CI. A step 50 in-place restore now guards cause 1 (manual-strategy flow); cause 2 is covered by a Go unit assertion (a system-bucket in-place e2e needs the platform bucket wired in CI and is left as a follow-up). This is a bug in released v1.6.2 (chart and driver are byte-identical on `main`), so it is a backport candidate. ### Screenshots Not applicable (no UI changes). ### Downstream repositories The only externally visible schema surface is one new field, `spec.bootstrap.newServerName`, in the postgres `values.schema.json` / CRD; it is set by the CNPG backup driver on restore and never authored by tenants, exactly like the existing `bootstrap.serverName` / `bootstrap.oldName`. (The `useSystemBucket` clearing is internal to the Go driver — `backup.useSystemBucket` already exists in the schema.) The chart `README.md` is regenerated from `values.yaml` automatically by the website docs bot on release, and `terraform-provider-cozystack` models user-authored spec (its guard tracks top-level fields, not driver-set nested ones), so neither needs a change in practice. Leaving every box unticked per the trigger-map guidance so a maintainer confirms rather than acting on a speculative follow-up. - [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(postgres): in-place restore no longer wedges — the restored cluster archives WAL under a fresh serverName distinct from the recovery source, and a system-bucket app is switched to explicit credentials so the bootstrap/useSystemBucket guard no longer fails its HelmRelease. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit - **New Features** - Added support for specifying a distinct WAL archive destination when restoring PostgreSQL clusters. - In-place restores now automatically use a fresh archive location while continuing to recover from the original source. - Added configuration and schema support for the optional `bootstrap.newServerName` setting. - **Bug Fixes** - Prevented archive conflicts that could cause in-place restores to fail. - **Documentation** - Documented the new restore archive configuration and behavior. - **Tests** - Added coverage for unique restore destinations and in-place restore validation. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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c8e4d97df9 |
feat(ingress-nginx): bump to 1.11.5 and restrict the admission webhook (#3798)
## What this PR does Bumps ingress-nginx to chart 4.11.5 / controller v1.11.5, and closes the admission webhook to everything except the API server. ### Version bump The shipped `v1.11.2` controller is a cozystack rebuild that **already carries a backport** of the CVE-2025-1974 fix (v0.28.2, March 2025), so this is not a fix for a live vulnerability. The problem is that it reports itself as a plain `v1.11.2 build git-d3bb2b4`: the binary is built from the upstream 1.11.2 tag with the patch applied on top, which does not change the version ldflags, and the image labels are inherited from the `registry.k8s.io` base layer. A patched build is therefore indistinguishable from an unpatched one by anything except its digest, and anything scanning by version string flags it. This bump removes that ambiguity. `packages/system/ingress-nginx` feeds three consumers — the platform ingress, tenant Ingress applications (`extra/ingress`), and the ingress addon of tenant Kubernetes clusters — so one bump covers all three. The protobuf-exporter sidecar moves in lockstep, since its tag tracks the upstream controller version. `CHART_VERSION` is now pinned in the package Makefile. `helm pull` carried no `--version`, so `make update` would have fetched whatever is latest upstream (4.13.9 today) against a controller image that only exists for selected versions. ### Admission webhook policy The webhook is only ever called by the API server, but it was reachable from every pod in the cluster, in any namespace — avoidable attack surface independent of any specific CVE. The new `CiliumNetworkPolicy` is deny-only and disables default-deny. A Cilium rule carrying an ingress section otherwise puts the selected endpoints behind a default-deny, which here would mean enumerating every port the controller serves (80, 443, metrics, the exporter, tcp/udp services) and breaking traffic on the first one missed. Subtracting one port is the safer construction. Two callers are deliberately not denied: * **host-network sources**, which are not Cilium endpoints — this covers a management cluster, where the API server runs on the host network; * **the konnectivity agent**, which is not optional. On a Kamaji-hosted tenant cluster the API server lives outside the cluster and reaches in-cluster webhooks through the konnectivity tunnel (Kamaji defines only the `cluster` egress selection), so the call arrives from the agent pod in `kube-system`, not from the API server address. A `fromEntities: [kube-apiserver]` allow would not match it, and every Ingress create/update in every tenant cluster would start failing. The policy is namespaced rather than clusterwide on purpose: the same package is installed into several namespaces of one cluster, so a cluster-scoped object with a fixed name would collide between releases. It can be disabled with `admissionWebhookPolicy.enabled`. ### Verification Tested on a live Kamaji tenant cluster (k8s 1.35.6, Cilium 1.19), with the addon enabled for the test and disabled afterwards: | | probe from a pod in `default` | Ingress create | |---|---|---| | without policy | `open` | works | | with policy | `Connection timed out` | works | Also confirmed on the management cluster that `kube-apiserver` runs as static pods on the host network, so the host-network carve-out holds there. The package previously ran no unit tests at all; a `test` target is added with 7 assertions covering the policy. It is scoped with `--with-subchart=false` because the vendored chart carries upstream's own suites, which assert upstream defaults and fail under our values. The full `hack/helm-unit-tests.sh` sweep is green. The controller and exporter images are rebuilt by cozystack/ingress-nginx-with-protobuf-exporter#5, which vendors the `11843.diff` patch instead of fetching it from a still-open upstream PR at build time. ### Screenshots Not applicable — no UI changes. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the diff, which touches `packages/system/ingress-nginx/` and one comment line in `hack/promote-retag.sh`: * **website** — no package added, renamed or removed under `apps/`/`extra/`; no platform component added or removed; no change to `packages/core/platform/values.yaml`, variants, bundles or release assets. The `package Makefiles` trigger was considered because of `CHART_VERSION` and the new `test` target: `CHART_VERSION` does not change the documented contract of `make update`, and `test: helm unittest` is an existing pattern in the repo (`packages/system/cilium-networkpolicy/Makefile`), not new tooling. * **terraform-provider-cozystack** — every trigger is about `packages/apps/`, `values.schema.json`, version enums or `ApplicationDefinition`; none apply to a system package. * **ansible-cozystack** — no change to installer values, platform keys the role sets, variants, waited-on objects or node prerequisites. * **ccp** — `hack/package.mk` and `hack/common-envs.mk` untouched; nothing under `hack/` moved or renamed, and the edit to `hack/promote-retag.sh` is a comment with no behaviour change; layout and namespaces unchanged. * **external-apps-example**, **talm**, **cozyhr**, **cozy-proxy**, **cozystack-telemetry-server**, **examples** — no trigger matches. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note feat(ingress-nginx): update to chart 4.11.5 with controller v1.11.5, and restrict the admission webhook so it is reachable only by the API server. The previously shipped v1.11.2 image already contained a backport of the CVE-2025-1974 fix; it reported itself as a stock v1.11.2 build, which this update makes unambiguous. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added optional network protection for the admission webhook with restricted access rules. * Added PrometheusRule support and improved ServiceMonitor configuration. * Webhook service ports are now configurable. * **Updates** * Upgraded ingress-nginx and controller images to version 4.11.5. * Improved default-backend availability and topology-spread settings. * Added Pod Security Admission guidance and refreshed configuration documentation. * **Bug Fixes** * Corrected webhook service rendering and default-backend disruption budget behavior. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |