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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Aleksei Sviridkin
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f629280944 |
fix(tests): raise the mongodb, rabbitmq and clickhouse HR waits
Those walkthroughs gave their database HelmReleases 300s, under the 600s install timeout the generated releases carry, so a failed install surfaced as a bare timeout rather than its own reason. None of these charts sets a startup probe, so 660s clears both floors, as it does for mariadb. Each Chainsaw op that runs one of the scripts grows by exactly what the waits it reaches gained, so it keeps the margin it had. The clickhouse op still sits above the sum of every inner ceiling. The rabbitmq one covers a failed install at the source wait, while the ceilings up to its target wait add up to more than the op, as they did before. The mongodb round-trip runs with SKIP_RESTORE, so only its source wait counts there. postgres keeps its 360s: whether a suite pays the extra minutes on every red run is a per-suite call, and this one is not made here. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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Aleksei Sviridkin
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289acb2ed6 |
fix(tests): let the mariadb backup example cover a first boot
The walkthrough gave each MariaDB HelmRelease 300s, less than the release can legitimately take, so a slow first boot failed the harness and a failed install surfaced as a bare timeout with no reason. A wait here has two floors and must beat the larger. The chart grants a 310s startup budget, and the install can span it: helm-controller defaults to the poller strategy, and kstatus reads the operator CR's Ready=False as InProgress. The generated release also carries a 600s install timeout, and a wait equal to it expires first, because its clock starts at the apply and the install's only once the chart is fetched. The install timeout is the binding floor, hence 660s. On timeout and on Stalled, wait_hr_ready now dumps every condition and the release history: a scheduled retry can overwrite the Ready message before anyone reads it. It also stops folding different answers into one "(none recorded)" line. An absent release, a release deleted during the wait, a lookup kubectl could not answer, an empty history and a failed history read each say so, with kubectl's own stderr kept, because that message is usually the cause. A release seen earlier still gets its dump when only the last lookup failed. Every backup example whose wait_hr_ready carries this body takes the same change, so the copies stay byte-identical. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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Myasnikov Daniil
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186547d835 |
test(e2e): run the merge-gating lanes on Talos containers
The srv1-srv3 nodes of both lanes that gate a merge -- the same-repo one in pull-requests.yaml and the fork one in e2e-fork.yaml -- run as Talos containers instead of QEMU guests, so a tenant worker sits at L2 rather than L3. Measured in CI on commits where both substrates ran the same tree: whole-job wall clock down 24-49 minutes, essentially all of it in Chainsaw, while the two tenant-Kubernetes suites go from 1143-2040s to 466-809s and stop depending on the runner's vgif flag. The node-join soft-red gate goes with the substrate, which is what it was for. It existed because nested virtualisation on the shared runners degraded far enough that a worker registering in minutes elsewhere could miss any deadline this test could afford; #3513 established that the discriminator was the host's kvm_amd vgif flag, and removing a nesting level removes what it acted on. So hack/e2e-node-join-soft-red.sh, the SOFT-RED-node-join.txt marker and the soft_red job outputs are gone from all four workflows, and a missed deadline is an ordinary red again. The ::warning annotation survives, because the reason a run went red should be legible without opening the log, and so does the 124-versus-everything -else test, because "the workers were slow" and "the wait never ran" send a reader to different places. Done by swapping the substrate inside the existing e2e jobs rather than by promoting a separate container job. Those jobs carry more than a substrate -- the GitHub App token, the report-overrun guard, the images list, the SSH breakpoint -- and promoting a job that never had them would have dropped four features without saying so. Three properties of container mode drive the design, and each fails quietly rather than loudly. machine.kernel.modules is a silent no-op -- kernel_module_spec.go returns early on ModeContainer with no error and no event -- so the host loads openvswitch and zfs before the nodes start and the workflow step asserts both rather than trusting them; a missing module surfaces an hour later looking like a CNI or a storage regression. Docker gives a privileged container its own tmpfs /dev seeded once at creation, so /dev/kvm works but ZFS zvols created later never appear and linstor-csi fails ControllerPublishVolume; the compose file binds the host devtmpfs, which is also why talosctl cluster create docker can never carry LINSTOR. And there is no ARP VIP, so 192.168.123.11 stands in for the QEMU lane's .10. The QEMU machinery stays in the tree and keeps running: nightly.yaml and e2e-tag.yaml still call `make prepare-env`, so DRBD, the replicated StorageClass, its Immediate binding mode, the tenant StorageClass propagation that only applies to remotely-accessible classes, and the Cozystack Talos node image with its extensions all keep nightly and release-candidate coverage. None of them is exercised per pull request any more. That is the trade. Nothing on the PR path builds or downloads a nocloud disk now, so build-talos drops the talos-nocloud step and the talos-image artifact. build-talos itself stays: finalize consumes its digest fragment. One property this does not fix, recorded beside the runner class because it will be read off a red run eventually: a container node reports the HOST's CPU and memory as capacity, and hack/e2e-container-up.sh counters that with kubelet systemReserved. That corrects the scheduler and not what a pod reads from /proc, so a workload sizing itself from /proc/cpuinfo or /proc/meminfo is configured for the whole runner. Also carried here because the same files carry them: the ghcr.io pull-through mirror removal (see #4007 -- whichever lands first makes the other a no-op), the authoritative HelmRelease readiness gate, the backup-credential preflight, the prepull guard against an image-less container fragment, and folding the two standalone OIDC suites into the latest-version tenant cluster. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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Aleksei Sviridkin
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e441edc2aa |
test(e2e): stop the mongodb backup suite before the restore leg
A to-copy restore replays the source cluster's system users into the target, so the target's own generated credentials stop authenticating and the harness cannot read the sentinel back out of the restored copy. The suite has never passed for that reason, holding the in-tree e2e run red on every branch that selects it. Drive run-all.sh with SKIP_RESTORE=1 so the suite still proves the backup half end to end, and pin the skip by asserting the skip branch's own log line: exit zero alone is also what a completed round-trip returns, so without that assertion the step could not tell a skipped flow from a full one, nor notice SKIP_RESTORE failing to reach the harness. The to-copy manifest and the example README both stated that CI covers the restore, which stops being true here, so both now say where coverage ends. The asserted log line is annotated at its source, since rewording it would red the suite with a bare match failure. Coverage returns by dropping SKIP_RESTORE together with the assertion on that line, once the credential handling behind the restore is fixed. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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Andrey Kolkov
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b97c443a16 |
fix(backups): harden MongoDB restore auth + PITR option handling from review
Address the two blocking findings in PR #3562: - Restore into a differently-named target now authenticates with the TARGET cluster's own S3 credentials instead of the source's. The backupSource carried the source release's -s3-creds Secret, which is deleted together with the source app — the disaster-recovery case backups exist for — leaving a to-copy restore unable to reach S3. The restore replays into the target (gated on backup.enabled just above), whose own -s3-creds Secret is present and grants access to the same bucket; only the credential reference is swapped, bucket/prefix/endpoint still come from the source archive. Falls back to the source reference when the target declares no discoverable s3 credentials (in-place restore resolves to the same Secret, so it is a no-op there). - A non-string recoveryTime (spec.options is free-form runtime.RawExtension, so {"recoveryTime": 20260805} passes admission) no longer silently degrades a PITR request to a plain snapshot restore reported Succeeded. When the typed decode fails and the blob carries a recoveryTime key, the RestoreJob now fails terminally — the same guarantee pitrSpec already makes for a malformed RFC3339 string. Minor findings also addressed: - BackupJob tolerates a not-yet-present MongoDB app CR with the same bounded grace the psmdb-CR existence gate uses, instead of failing terminally on a GitOps single-commit ordering race. - examples: the to-copy target writes into its OWN S3 prefix (mongodb-target/) rather than the source's, so the two clusters' oplog and backup metadata no longer interleave under shared keys (both run replset rs0). - examples: wait_psmdb_ready no longer treats a transient state=error as terminal — the cluster state is recomputed each reconcile and can blip through error during replset init before converging to ready. Unit tests cover the target-credential selector (preferred/default/sole storage) and the load-bearing recoveryTime-key detection. Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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Andrey KolkovandClaude Opus 4.8
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0d4a3e3134 |
refactor(backups): make MongoDB PITR option uniform with CNPG + warn on unknown restore options
PITR: replace the bespoke spec.options.pitr{type,date} blob with a single
spec.options.recoveryTime RFC3339 string, matching the CNPG strategy's option
exactly (CNPGRestoreOptions.RecoveryTime). The driver converts recoveryTime to
the psmdb Restore's pitr{type:date,date} in the operator's "YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS"
UTC format. An empty recoveryTime restores the snapshot as-taken (documented
difference from CNPG, whose empty value means latest WAL — a psmdb logical
backup is already consistent). A non-RFC3339 recoveryTime fails terminally.
Unknown options: parseMongoDBRestoreOptions now also returns the set of
spec.options keys the driver does not recognise; reconcileMongoDBRestore emits a
UnknownRestoreOption Warning event per unknown key (and logs it) instead of
silently ignoring it — so a "recoverytime" typo no longer silently degrades a
PITR restore to a snapshot restore. (BackupJob carries no spec.options blob, so
there is no backup-path equivalent; the only backup-time input is the free-form
BackupClass parameters used as template vars.)
Docs + examples updated to recoveryTime; tests cover the RFC3339→UTC mapping,
empty/invalid recoveryTime, and unknown-key reporting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com>
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Andrey KolkovandClaude Opus 4.8
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dff56aa998 |
feat(backups): add a native MongoDB (psmdb) backup-strategy driver
Adds a MongoDB (Percona Server for MongoDB / psmdb) backup-strategy driver so `apps.cozystack.io/MongoDB` reaches feature parity with the CNPG, MariaDB and ClickHouse native drivers — logical backups, restore-to-differently-named instances, and point-in-time recovery through the unified BackupJob/RestoreJob/BackupClass/Plan interface (closes #3545). The driver orchestrates the operator's PerconaServerMongoDBBackup / PerconaServerMongoDBRestore CRDs: - BackupJob: creates a one-shot PerconaServerMongoDBBackup, polls status.state, and persists the S3 destination + storage descriptor (by-reference, no credentials) onto the Cozystack Backup artifact. - RestoreJob: drives PerconaServerMongoDBRestore via backupSource (read back from the source backup status, snapshot fallback) so the same artifact restores in-place or into a differently-named instance; PITR via spec.options.pitr (date/latest). Because psmdb resolves the backup storage by name against the cluster's spec.backup.storages, the driver names the chart's storage (s3-storage) via the cozy-default-mongodb Strategy rather than injecting it, and surfaces a clear Ready=False precondition when a target has backups disabled. Wiring: - api/backups/strategy/v1alpha1: MongoDB strategy type + generated CRD/deepcopy. - internal/backupcontroller: psmdbstrategy_controller + psmdbtypes/mongodbapp partial-schema mirrors; dispatch, supported-kinds and scheme registration. - backupstrategy-controller: cozy-default MongoDB route, cozy-default-mongodb Strategy CR, and psmdb.percona.com RBAC. - apps/mongodb: backup.insecureSkipTLSVerify knob (psmdb s3 storage has no CA-bundle field) so backups can target Cozystack's self-signed seaweedfs. Tests + e2e: - unit tests for the driver (validation, ensure-idempotency, precondition, backupSource resolution, snapshot round-trip, PITR option parsing). - examples/backups/mongodb + a mongodb-2-backup-roundtrip Chainsaw suite that drives run-all.sh end-to-end (sentinel document round-trips through S3 into a restored copy while the source stays untouched), per docs/agents/e2e-testing.md. - docs/operations/backup-classes.md updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |