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2568db67b1 |
Merge branch 'main' into fix/kubernetes-nodes-surge-before-drain
Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Mattia Eleuteri <mattia@hidora.io> |
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f61cfdf0b8 |
feat(bucket)!: add publicRead to serve a bucket without credentials (#5252)
<!-- Thank you for making a contribution! Here are some tips for you: - Use Conventional Commits for the PR title: `type(scope): description` - Types: feat, fix, security (a fix that comes through a security advisory), docs, style, refactor, perf, test, build, ci, chore - Scopes are not an exhaustive list — pick the most specific scope for the change and extend the list when a genuinely new area appears. Examples: - System components: dashboard, platform, operator, cilium, kube-ovn, linstor, fluxcd, cluster-api - Managed apps: postgres, mariadb, redis, kafka, clickhouse, virtual-machine, kubernetes - Development and maintenance: api, hack, tests, ci, docs, maintenance - Breaking changes: append `!` after type/scope (`feat(api)!: ...`) or add a `BREAKING CHANGE:` footer - If it's a work in progress, consider creating this PR as a draft. - Don't hesistate to ask for opinion and review in the community chats, even if it's still a draft. - Fixes merged to `main` reach the release lines the backport batch runs for automatically, so do not open backport PRs by hand: https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/blob/main/docs/release/backports.md --> ## What this PR does Adds `publicRead` to the Bucket application. A bucket cannot serve its objects without a signature today: every BucketAccess issues a key, and those keys grant neither `WriteAcp` nor `PutBucketPolicy`, so `aws s3api put-bucket-acl --acl public-read` is refused and a tenant has no way to serve static assets (images, downloads) straight from a bucket. The only workaround is an operator running `weed shell` `s3.anonymous.set` by hand, which nothing reconciles and which outlives the bucket. With `publicRead: true` the chart renders one more BucketAccess, `<bucket>-public-read`, on a new `-public` BucketAccessClass whose `accessPolicy` is `public-read`. The class is added in the three places that define access classes: the Client topology, the per-storage-pool classes, and the vendored chart (through its existing `cosi-bucket-class-lock-readonly.patch`). The COSI driver handles the policy by adding `Read:<bucket>` to the gateway's `anonymous` identity and, on revoke, removing only that action, so turning the flag off or deleting the bucket closes it again without touching other public buckets. Anonymous callers can `GET`/`HEAD` objects at `<endpoint>/<bucket>/<key>`; listing and writes stay refused. A user named `public-read` would own the same BucketAccess name, so that combination fails to render with an explicit message rather than having two owners fight over one object. The seaweedfs pool name check now also reserves `public` and the `-public` suffix, next to the existing `-lock` and `-readonly`: a pool `<x>-public` would render a readwrite BucketAccessClass with the same name as pool `<x>`'s public-read class, and a pool `public` would take the instance's own `-public` class. This is a breaking change for an instance that already defines a pool with such a name: its seaweedfs release stops rendering with the pool name error. Pool keys are part of the volume server and PVC names, so renaming such a pool moves its data to new volumes; that migration is the operator's to plan before upgrading. **Known limitation until the next driver release.** On v0.5.0, revoking public read (turning `publicRead` off or deleting the bucket) can leave the bucket readable anonymously if an S3 gateway migrates `identity.json` while the revoke is in flight: the migrated `identities/anonymous.json` keeps `Read:<bucket>`, and SeaweedFS loads it over `identity.json` without ever repairing it. The fix is seaweedfs/seaweedfs-cosi-driver#22 (the revoke always writes `anonymous.json`, after the legacy file). The driver release carrying it will be pinned here if it lands before this PR merges, otherwise in a follow-up. Until then, an operator can check `s3.anonymous.list` in `weed shell` after a revoke and clear a leftover with `s3.anonymous.set -bucket <bucket> -access none`. **Driver: pins the upstream seaweedfs-cosi-driver v0.5.0.** The `public-read` policy merged upstream in seaweedfs/seaweedfs-cosi-driver#21 and v0.5.0 is tagged on that merge, so this PR moves the image pin from v0.4.0 (#5284) to v0.5.0 in `packages/system/seaweedfs/values.yaml`, the client-mode `.tag` file and `cosi_image_test.yaml`. An earlier revision of this branch built the driver in-tree while no release carried the policy; that build is gone, and the intermediate commits that added it are undone by the merge of `main`, so squashing leaves only the feature and the pin. v0.5.0 differs from v0.4.0 only by the `public-read` policy (seaweedfs/seaweedfs-cosi-driver#21) and its README note. Upstream documents one `public-read` BucketAccess per bucket as the supported shape, which is what the chart renders. Tested: new helm-unittest suites for the bucket app (default off, class name with and without storage pool, locked bucket, coexistence with users, the name collision), the seaweedfs extra chart (Client and storage-pool classes) and the vendored chart; they fail when the class suffix or the policy is removed. `helm unittest` passes on `packages/apps/bucket`, `packages/extra/seaweedfs`, `packages/system/seaweedfs` and `packages/system/bucket`, as do `test-guard-fail-closed` and `test-image-version`; `cosi_image_test.yaml` pins `ghcr.io/seaweedfs/seaweedfs-cosi-driver:v0.5.0`, which is published for amd64 and arm64. The anonymous-read mechanism itself was checked by hand on SeaweedFS 4.45 (`weed shell` `s3.anonymous.set -access Read`): anonymous `GET` returns 200 on both gateways, `ListObjects`/`ListObjectsV2` and `PUT` return 403, and the identity survives grants and revokes of regular BucketAccesses. The end-to-end path through the new driver has not run on a cluster yet. ### Screenshots No UI change. ### Downstream repositories <!-- Cozystack is upstream for repositories that are NOT kept in sync with it automatically, and nothing in CI compares the two sides, so a change here can break them silently. Which change forces what, and which file to touch, is the trigger map in docs/agents/contributing.md under "Downstream Repositories". Walk it before you tick anything. IF YOU ARE AN AI AGENT OR AN LLM, THIS IS PART OF THE TASK, NOT A FORM TO FILL IN: 1. Walk the trigger map against the actual diff of this PR, file by file. Do not decide from the PR title or from your memory of what you changed. 2. For every repository you tick, open the follow-up PR there and link it on the same line. A ticked box with no link claims work that does not exist, which is worse than an empty box. Search that repository for an open PR or issue covering it first, and link that instead of filing a duplicate. 3. When the follow-up is out of scope, or needs a decision that is not yours to make, open an issue in that repository instead, link that, and say so in the PR body. Do not push a speculative PR into another repository just to fill a line here. 4. Do not tick "No downstream repository is affected" to make the checklist go away. If you are unsure, leave every box empty and say so in the PR body, so a human decides. --> - [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [x] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack#80 - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: Walked the trigger map against the diff: the only hit is the new field in `packages/apps/bucket/values.schema.json` (and `api/apps/v1alpha1/bucket/types.go`), which the Terraform provider models by hand. Follow-up filed as cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack#80. The website's bucket page is hand-written and could mention the flag, but no listed trigger covers an added field, so it is left unticked. ### Release note <!-- Write a release note: - Explain what has changed internally and for users. - Start with the same `type(scope):` prefix as in the PR title - Follow the guidelines at https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/guide/release-notes.md. --> ```release-note feat(bucket): add `publicRead` to serve a bucket's objects without credentials at `<endpoint>/<bucket>/<key>`. Anonymous callers can read objects but cannot list the bucket or write to it. The COSI driver is bumped to seaweedfs-cosi-driver v0.5.0, which adds the `public-read` access policy. The seaweedfs pool names `public` and `*-public` are now reserved: an instance that already defines such a pool fails to render until the pool is renamed, which moves its data to new volumes. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Bucket configurations can enable anonymous reads of objects through the bucket endpoint. Anonymous access does not allow listing buckets or writing objects. * SeaweedFS provides public-read access classes across supported bucket configurations, alongside read-only and read-write access. * Added a retained bucket class with object locking and a 365-day compliance retention period. * **Documentation** * Added guidance for the `publicRead` setting, which is disabled by default. * **Updates** * Updated the SeaweedFS COSI driver to v0.5.0. Pool names `public` and names ending in `-public` are reserved. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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df42104b13 |
fix(seaweedfs, cozy-lib): cap the Go heap so components survive their memory limit (#4234)
<!-- Thank you for making a contribution! Here are some tips for you: - Use Conventional Commits for the PR title: `type(scope): description` - Types: feat, fix, docs, style, refactor, perf, test, build, ci, chore - Scopes are not an exhaustive list — pick the most specific scope for the change and extend the list when a genuinely new area appears. Examples: - System components: dashboard, platform, operator, cilium, kube-ovn, linstor, fluxcd, cluster-api - Managed apps: postgres, mariadb, redis, kafka, clickhouse, virtual-machine, kubernetes - Development and maintenance: api, hack, tests, ci, docs, maintenance - Breaking changes: append `!` after type/scope (`feat(api)!: ...`) or add a `BREAKING CHANGE:` footer - If it's a work in progress, consider creating this PR as a draft. - Don't hesistate to ask for opinion and review in the community chats, even if it's still a draft. - Add the label `kind/backport` if it's a bugfix that needs to be backported to a previous version. --> ## What this PR does Every SeaweedFS component is a Go binary running under a cgroup memory limit, and none of them set `GOMEMLIMIT`. The collector then works from `GOGC` alone, which is a target relative to the live heap with no absolute ceiling, so a burst of allocation grows the heap past the limit and the kernel kills the container. This is not a leak. On the cluster where it showed up, the S3 gateway held 6.4 GiB of `heap_sys` against an 8 GiB limit while `heap_inuse` was 389 MiB: the container was killed over memory the runtime was holding and not using. Ten kills in seven days, each one an interruption of the object store every tenant writes its backups to. Raising the limit does not help, because nothing bounds the growth; it only moves the ceiling the heap climbs to. This PR adds a `cozy-lib.resources.goMemLimit` helper next to the existing `javaHeap` one and wires it into the master, volume, filer and s3 components and into every volume pool and zone, each sized from the memory limit already computed for it. Pools need their own value because the subchart merges `volume` into every entry of `volumes`: without one, a `t1.nano` pool would inherit the value sized for the default volume's 512Mi limit, above its own 128Mi. The value is 75% of the limit, the same fraction `javaHeap` uses for the JVM; the remaining quarter covers what `GOMEMLIMIT` does not account for, goroutine stacks and mmap'd regions among them. The lifecycle admin and worker run the same binary under limits the parent chart does not set (256Mi and 512Mi in `packages/system/seaweedfs/values.yaml`), so their value is pinned next to those limits at the same 75%: 192MiB and 384MiB. A limit under 4/3 Mi (1398102 bytes) floors to `0MiB`, which Go accepts and then collects almost continuously, so the helper fails the render instead. The upstream chart already supports `extraEnvironmentVars` on every one of these components, so nothing had to change there. No values key is added, so this needs no configuration and changes no public schema. Tested with `helm unittest`: a suite on the seaweedfs package asserts the value tracks the memory limit rather than a fixed string, for the default volume, Simple pools, MultiZone zones and zone pools; the system seaweedfs suite asserts the admin and worker env; and a helper suite in `cozy-lib-tests` pins the unit grammar and the rejection of a zero value. Reverting each fix makes its suite fail. ### Screenshots <!-- REQUIRED for UI changes: attach screenshots or screen recordings demonstrating the visual impact of your changes. PRs with UI changes without screenshots will not be merged. --> ### Downstream repositories <!-- Cozystack is upstream for repositories that are NOT kept in sync with it automatically, and nothing in CI compares the two sides, so a change here can break them silently. Which change forces what, and which file to touch, is the trigger map in docs/agents/contributing.md under "Downstream Repositories". Walk it before you tick anything. IF YOU ARE AN AI AGENT OR AN LLM, THIS IS PART OF THE TASK, NOT A FORM TO FILL IN: 1. Walk the trigger map against the actual diff of this PR, file by file. Do not decide from the PR title or from your memory of what you changed. 2. For every repository you tick, open the follow-up PR there and link it on the same line. A ticked box with no link claims work that does not exist, which is worse than an empty box. Search that repository for an open PR or issue covering it first, and link that instead of filing a duplicate. 3. When the follow-up is out of scope, or needs a decision that is not yours to make, open an issue in that repository instead, link that, and say so in the PR body. Do not push a speculative PR into another repository just to fill a line here. 4. Do not tick "No downstream repository is affected" to make the checklist go away. If you are unsure, leave every box empty and say so in the PR body, so a human decides. --> - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note <!-- Write a release note: - Explain what has changed internally and for users. - Start with the same `type(scope):` prefix as in the PR title - Follow the guidelines at https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/guide/release-notes.md. --> ```release-note fix(seaweedfs): set GOMEMLIMIT on master, volume (and each pool and zone), filer, s3 and the lifecycle admin and worker so the Go runtime collects before the container hits its memory limit instead of being OOM-killed ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * SeaweedFS master, volume, pool, zonal volume, filer, and S3 workloads now receive a Go memory limit set to 75% of their configured memory limit. * Pool workloads use their own resource settings when provided, falling back to the default volume preset when needed. * SeaweedFS admin and worker components now have Go memory limits aligned with their configured memory limits. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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e4d059cedd |
fix(etcd): require an even spread of members over nodes by default (#4986)
## What this PR does The tenant etcd chart spreads members with `maxSkew: 1` on `kubernetes.io/hostname` and `whenUnsatisfiable: ScheduleAnyway`, the default since #119. `ScheduleAnyway` only adds to the score of a node and other scores can outweigh it, so two members of one etcd can still start on the same node, where a node-local volume then keeps them. This PR makes the default `DoNotSchedule` with `nodeTaintsPolicy: Ignore`. The branch for `_cluster.scheduling.globalAppTopologySpreadConstraints` is untouched, so a platform that sets its own policy renders exactly as before, and the soft pod anti-affinity from #3962 stays. Seen on a three-node cluster running v1.6.4, whose `etcd-cluster.yaml` and etcd-operator v0.5.5 are the same as in v1.6.5. A new tenant etcd got the Pods of its first two members on one node, created 26 seconds apart, and the third on another node 18 seconds later. The Pods carry the `ScheduleAnyway` constraint and were scheduled by `linstor-scheduler`, whose profile adds the LINSTOR extender's prioritize score to the same sum with weight 5. The data volumes are on a node-local StorageClass with `WaitForFirstConsumer` and `allowRemoteVolumeAccess: "false"`, so the two members cannot leave that node, and losing it takes the quorum. A second tenant etcd created there the next day came up the same way. On a test cluster four tenant etcds created within one week each had two members on one node, and we moved one member of each by hand. `DoNotSchedule` does not stop an etcd with more members than nodes from starting when every node can run its Pods, unlike a required anti-affinity, because the skew is counted between the nodes that exist. kube-scheduler rejects a node only when the matching Pods on it plus the new one exceed the node with the fewest by more than `maxSkew` ([filtering.go](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/v1.34.1/pkg/scheduler/framework/plugins/podtopologyspread/filtering.go#L334-L352)). One node takes all three members, two nodes take two and one, and three or more nodes take one each. A member whose only allowed node cannot take it, for example because the storage pool there is full, now waits Pending instead of joining another member. `nodeTaintsPolicy: Ignore` is the Kubernetes default and is written out on purpose. A cordoned node carries `node.kubernetes.io/unschedulable`, and `Honor` would take it out of the count ([common.go](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/v1.34.1/pkg/scheduler/framework/plugins/podtopologyspread/common.go#L50-L54)), so a member created during a drain would start next to another member and stay there on a node-local volume. With `Ignore` it waits Pending until the node is back, while the other two keep quorum. The cost is that a node no member can run on, such as a tainted control plane, counts as an empty node too, so on a cluster with such a node each schedulable node takes at most one member and the members beyond that do not start. #4947 makes the same choice for the SeaweedFS masters and checked both policies in kwok. A platform that wants the old behaviour can set `scheduling.globalAppTopologySpreadConstraints` to `ScheduleAnyway`, which the other charts that read it pick up as well, and a new test case pins that the chart renders such a policy as written. On upgrade nothing is recreated. The etcd-operator adopts a changed `spec.topologySpreadConstraints` into `status.observed` once the cluster has reached its current target, or its progress deadline has passed ([etcdcluster_controller.go#L203-L214](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.6/controllers/etcdcluster_controller.go#L203-L214)). It copies the value from there into the spec of an `EtcdMember` only when it creates one, at bootstrap ([#L446](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.6/controllers/etcdcluster_controller.go#L446)) and on scale-up ([#L851](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.6/controllers/etcdcluster_controller.go#L851)), and nothing in the operator writes it into an existing `EtcdMember`. The member controller creates a Pod only when it is missing and builds it from that member's own copy ([etcdmember_controller.go#L499-L512](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.6/controllers/etcdmember_controller.go#L499-L512), [#L545-L549](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.6/controllers/etcdmember_controller.go#L545-L549), [#L860](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.6/controllers/etcdmember_controller.go#L860)). So running members keep `ScheduleAnyway`, and so does a member whose Pod is evicted, deleted or replaced after a terminal phase ([#L164-L186](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.6/controllers/etcdmember_controller.go#L164-L186)), since the new Pod is built from the same copy. Only members created after the upgrade get `DoNotSchedule`, which means a scale-up, a crash-loop replacement or a member whose `EtcdMember` was deleted. No member is rolled, neither one at a time nor all at once. This matches the field docs ([etcdcluster_types.go#L542-L549](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.6/api/v1alpha2/etcdcluster_types.go#L542-L549), [etcdmember_types.go#L112-L116](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.6/api/v1alpha2/etcdmember_types.go#L112-L116)). The code paths are the same in v0.5.8, and in v0.5.5, which v1.6.4 and v1.6.5 ship, except that v0.5.5 does not yet replace a Pod left in a terminal phase. Members that already share a node therefore stay there. One of them moves only when a new `EtcdMember` takes its place, and the constraint then sends the replacement to the node without a member. That is how we moved the members on the test cluster, with `DoNotSchedule` set on the `EtcdCluster` by hand. The operator's docs say a scheduling change can be applied by deleting one Pod at a time ([concepts.md#L272](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.6/docs/concepts.md#L272)), but the recreated Pod gets the member's old copy, so that does not move it. The release note now declares two cases from review. In the first, an etcd created while the cluster had fewer nodes than members has two or three members on one node, and once a node is added a recreated Pod of one of them stays Pending, since `maxSkew` rejects its own node and its node-local volume rules out the others. Deleting that member's `EtcdMember` while the other members keep quorum replaces it on a node without a member. In v0.5.5 the member finalizer removes the member from etcd through the remaining members before the object goes ([`handleDeletion`](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/controllers/etcdmember_controller.go#L195-L231), [`removeMemberFromEtcd`](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/controllers/etcdmember_controller.go#L243-L310)), its Pod and its `data-<member>` PVC are owned by it and deleted with it ([#L403](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/controllers/etcdmember_controller.go#L403), [#L490](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/controllers/etcdmember_controller.go#L490)), and the cluster controller waits for the deletion, then adds a member under a new name with the constraints from `status.observed` ([etcdcluster_controller.go#L254-L312](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/controllers/etcdcluster_controller.go#L254-L312), [`scaleUp`](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/controllers/etcdcluster_controller.go#L820-L851)). Its new PVC binds where its Pod lands, and under `DoNotSchedule` only a node without a member passes. The operator documents the same steps for a broken member, along with the limit that `MemberRemove` cannot run without quorum ([operations.md#L208-L231](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/docs/operations.md#L208-L231)), and v0.5.6, which main and `release-1.6` ship now, has the same path. The upstream chart of the operator installs a policy that denies `EtcdMember` deletion without the `etcd-operator.cozystack.io/allow-deletion=true` annotation ([member-deletion-policy.yaml](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/charts/etcd-operator/templates/member-deletion-policy.yaml)), and the `etcd-operator` package here does not install it. On a three-node cluster running v0.5.5 a tenant etcd had two members on one node with `DoNotSchedule` in effect. We deleted the `EtcdMember` of one of the two while the other members kept quorum. The replacement's Pod and its new node-local PVC were scheduled on the node without a member, the member joined, and the `EtcdCluster` stayed `Available` with quorum the whole time, polled every 5 seconds. In the second case `nodeTaintsPolicy: Ignore` counts a node the Pods cannot tolerate as one with zero members, so on a cluster with such a node and fewer schedulable nodes than members the members beyond the schedulable nodes do not start. The way out is the soft global policy in the platform `Package`, set before the upgrade. ```yaml apiVersion: cozystack.io/v1alpha1 kind: Package metadata: name: cozystack.cozystack-platform spec: components: platform: values: scheduling: globalAppTopologySpreadConstraints: | topologySpreadConstraints: - maxSkew: 1 topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname whenUnsatisfiable: ScheduleAnyway ``` The platform chart writes `scheduling` into `_cluster` of the `cozystack-values` Secret ([apps.yaml#L292-L295](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/blob/55aad6f91456cb545601a83aaecf39118e943b04/packages/core/platform/templates/apps.yaml#L292-L295)), the tenant chart copies `_cluster` into the Secret of each tenant namespace ([namespace.yaml#L109-L120](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/blob/55aad6f91456cb545601a83aaecf39118e943b04/packages/apps/tenant/templates/namespace.yaml#L109-L120)), and this chart renders the value as written, which the new test case pins. Rendering the platform and tenant charts with the value above, on main and on `release-1.6`, gives the same string in both Secrets. The operator adopts a changed spec into `status.observed` only once all members are Ready or the progress deadline has passed ([etcdcluster_controller.go#L196-L213](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/controllers/etcdcluster_controller.go#L196-L213)), and it clears the deadline when the cluster converges ([#L1448-L1456](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/controllers/etcdcluster_controller.go#L1448-L1456)). A new etcd stuck short of its members adopts the policy once its first deadline passes, and deleting the `EtcdMember` of the Pending member then brings a replacement that starts. An etcd that had converged before one of its replacements went Pending adopts the policy only after the deadline is forced as the operator docs describe ([operations.md#L197-L206](https://github.com/cozystack/etcd-operator/blob/v0.5.5/docs/operations.md#L197-L206)), which is why the release note says to set it before the upgrade. #4817 moves this block into `_etcd.tpl` in cozy-lib without changing it, so whichever of the two lands second has to carry the two lines over. `tests/topology-spread_test.yaml` now pins the whole default constraint, and a new case pins that a `ScheduleAnyway` policy from `globalAppTopologySpreadConstraints` renders as written, without `nodeTaintsPolicy`. The existing zone override case is unchanged. Against the template on main the suite fails only the default case, 1 failed and 25 passed. Switching the default to `Honor`, to `ScheduleAnyway` or to `maxSkew: 2` fails the default case, and adding `nodeTaintsPolicy` to the override branch fails the new case. ```console $ docker run --rm -v "$PWD":/apps -w /apps/packages/extra/etcd helmunittest/helm-unittest:4.2.3-1.1.2 . Charts: 1 passed, 1 total Test Suites: 9 passed, 9 total Tests: 26 passed, 26 total ``` On main the same command gives 25 tests in 9 suites, with helm-unittest 1.1.2 as CI pins it. With default values `helm template` differs from main in the two lines and in the comment above the affinity block, and with a global policy set only in that comment. The docs commit changes the `affinity` description, from which `make generate` rewrites the README, `values.schema.json` and the `ApplicationDefinition` with nothing but that text, and the suite stays at 26 tests. I have not rolled this chart change out on a cluster. The spread block and the test file are the same on release-1.6 and release-1.7. On release-1.6 the template has no affinity block yet, so the fix commit cherry-picks without conflicts and the docs commit has nothing to change there. That backport is a separate PR. ### Screenshots Not a UI change. ### Downstream repositories One changed and one added line in `packages/extra/etcd/templates/etcd-cluster.yaml` and its test suite, and new text for the `affinity` description and the comment above the affinity block. The description reaches `values.schema.json`, the README and the `ApplicationDefinition` as text only, with no key, type or default change, and the website rebuilds the etcd reference page from the README on release. The website mentions `globalAppTopologySpreadConstraints` only as a platform setting, which stays as it is, so no trigger map entry applies. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(etcd): tenant etcd members now spread over nodes with whenUnsatisfiable DoNotSchedule by default, so two members of one etcd no longer start on the same node while another node has none. Members that exist are not moved, only members created after the upgrade get the new constraint. An etcd created while the cluster had fewer nodes than members puts two or three members on one node. Once a node is added, such a member whose Pod is recreated (drain, eviction, graceful node shutdown) stays Pending, because maxSkew rejects its own node and its node-local volume rules out the others. With two nodes grown to three the etcd runs two of three members and its PodDisruptionBudget blocks draining the other nodes. With one node grown to three a reboot of that node brings back one member of three and quorum is lost. A stranded member is replaced by deleting its EtcdMember while the other members keep quorum. Its Pod and PVC go with it, and the replacement gets a new Pod and PVC on the node without a member. Right after adding nodes, doing this for one co-located member at a time while all members are Ready avoids the case. With nodeTaintsPolicy Ignore a node the etcd Pods cannot tolerate, such as a tainted control plane, counts as a node with zero members, so no node can take a second member. On a cluster with such a node and fewer schedulable nodes than members, a new etcd starts only as many members as there are schedulable nodes, one of three on a single schedulable node. An existing etcd there keeps its members, but a member it replaces stays Pending the same way. Either case is avoided by setting scheduling.globalAppTopologySpreadConstraints in spec.components.platform.values of the cozystack.cozystack-platform Package to a topologySpreadConstraints entry with maxSkew 1, topologyKey kubernetes.io/hostname and whenUnsatisfiable ScheduleAnyway before the upgrade. Every app chart that reads this value applies it, two members of a new etcd can share a node again, and the operator gives it only to members created after it adopts the changed EtcdCluster spec into status.observed. Once status.observed.topologySpreadConstraints of an EtcdCluster shows ScheduleAnyway, a member of it that stays Pending is replaced by deleting its EtcdMember. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit - **Bug Fixes** - Default etcd placement now requires even spreading across hosts and ignores node taints when evaluating placement. - Configurable cluster-wide spreading continues to use a flexible scheduling policy when selected. - **Documentation** - Clarified how affinity and topology spreading work together, when required anti-affinity or node-local storage can leave members pending, and that affinity changes take effect as members are replaced. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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3fce040268 |
Merge branch 'main' into fix/etcd-strict-member-spread
Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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d1f95e3212 |
Merge branch 'main' into fix/etcd-defrag-small-requests
Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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e3e2018075 |
fix(seaweedfs, cozy-lib): cap the Go heap so components survive their memory limit
Every SeaweedFS component is a Go binary running under a cgroup memory limit, and none of them set GOMEMLIMIT. The collector then works from GOGC alone, a target relative to the live heap with no absolute ceiling, so a burst of allocation grows the heap past the limit and the kernel kills the container. Seen on an S3 gateway holding 6.4 GiB of heap_sys against an 8 GiB limit while only 389 MiB was actually in use: ten kills in seven days, each one an interruption of the object store every tenant writes its backups to. Raising the limit does not help, since nothing bounds the growth; it only moves the ceiling the heap climbs to. Derive the value from the limit already computed for each component, at the same 75% the javaHeap helper uses for the JVM. The remaining quarter covers what GOMEMLIMIT does not account for, goroutine stacks and mmap'd regions among them. Volume pools and zones carry their own value: the subchart merges volume into every entry of volumes, so a pool would otherwise inherit the value sized for the default volume's limit, above its own. The lifecycle admin and worker run the same binary under limits the parent chart does not set, so their value is pinned next to those limits. A limit under 2Mi floors to 0MiB, which Go accepts and then collects almost continuously; the render fails instead. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Mattia Eleuteri <mattia@hidora.io> |
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fa1cf77670 |
fix(seaweedfs): reserve the -public suffix in pool names
A pool's classes take its name as a prefix, so a pool named <x>-public renders a readwrite BucketAccessClass <ns>-<x>-public with the same name as pool <x>'s public-read class, and whichever object wins gives one of the two pools the wrong policy. A pool named public takes <ns>-public, the instance's own public-read class. The pool name check already reserves -lock and -readonly for the same reason. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Mattia Eleuteri <mattia@hidora.io> |
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c2d370e95c |
fix(seaweedfs): pin the COSI driver release with public-read access
The public BucketAccessClass relies on the public-read accessPolicy, which the driver supports from v0.5.0; v0.4.0 would hand out keys instead of anonymous read access. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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21fd2b7b69 |
feat(bucket): add publicRead to serve a bucket without credentials
A bucket cannot serve its objects without a signature: every BucketAccess issues a key, and the keys grant neither WriteAcp nor PutBucketPolicy, so a tenant cannot open the bucket themselves with put-bucket-acl. Static assets then need a proxy, presigned URLs or an operator running weed shell by hand, which no reconcile tracks and which outlives the bucket. publicRead renders one more BucketAccess on a new -public access class whose accessPolicy is public-read. The COSI driver handles that policy by adding Read:<bucket> to the gateway's anonymous identity and removing only that action on revoke, so deleting the bucket or turning the flag off closes it again without touching other public buckets. Anonymous callers can read objects but cannot list the bucket or write to it. The access is named <bucket>-public-read, the name a user called public-read would take, so that combination fails to render instead of fighting over one BucketAccess. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Mattia Eleuteri <mattia@hidora.io> |
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b6f5a4fa35 |
feat(monitoring): stamp application identity on scraped series (#5216)
## What this PR does
Adds a default scrape class `application-identity` to both VMAgents: the
cluster-wide one in `monitoring-agents` and the per-tenant one in
`monitoring`. Every series scraped from a pod that carries the lineage
labels `apps.cozystack.io/application.{group,kind,name}` gets them as
`apps_cozystack_io_application_{group,kind,name}`.
Why: the per-application metrics scope in the design proposal [Tenant
resource-consumption
metrics](https://github.com/cozystack/community/pull/94) (Design 4a)
needs to tell which application an exporter series belongs to. Today
that is only possible indirectly, through pod names.
How the labels are protected against forgery by an exporter:
- At the target stage, the class always sets all three labels: to the
pod's real lineage value, or to a placeholder `-` when the pod has none
(`-` is not a valid Kubernetes label value). With `honorLabels: false`,
any copy the exporter publishes therefore collides with the target label
and is renamed to `exported_*`.
- At the metric stage, the class drops every `exported_*` copy.
- The placeholder is removed by the VMAgent's global remote-write
relabeling (`inlineRelabelConfig`), not at the metric stage: vmagent
adds `up` and `scrape_*` with the target labels after metric relabeling,
so only the remote-write stage sees those series. Targets without
lineage therefore keep exactly the label set they have today on every
series, including `up` and `scrape_*`.
- With `honorLabels: true` the exporter's value wins and no relabel rule
can tell it apart. ingress-nginx scrapes with `honorLabels: true`, and
its series describe Ingress objects in any namespace, so the
controller's identity would misattribute traffic; its scrape now drops
the identity labels explicitly, from the target (so `up` and `scrape_*`
stay unchanged) and from the scraped samples (so an exporter's copy
cannot survive). Switching it to `honorLabels: false` was not done,
because that renames `namespace` and breaks the existing ingress
dashboards.
#### How it was tested
- helm-unittest for `monitoring-agents`, `monitoring` and `ingress`.
These tests check the rendered config only; the relabeling behaviour was
verified offline by running vmagent v1.136.0, built from source, against
the rendered rules: `up` and `scrape_*` carry no identity for targets
without lineage, and the placeholder appears on no series.
- The rendered `scrapeClasses` validate against the vendored VMAgent CRD
schema.
- The rendered rules were exercised on a locally built vmagent v1.136.0
(the version the bundled operator deploys) writing to a local
VictoriaMetrics: with and without lineage, with and without a forging
exporter, `honorLabels` true and false, and the ingress-nginx endpoint
rules. Checked on exporter samples and on `up`, `scrape_samples_scraped`
and `scrape_series_added`; the previous rules reproduce the `-`
placeholder on the generated series of targets without lineage, the new
ones leave no placeholder on any series.
- Verified on a test cluster with the earlier revision that removed the
placeholder at the metric stage (the move to remote-write relabeling is
not yet verified on a cluster): series carry the application labels;
metrics read for a Redis instance through the per-application proxy root
contained only that instance's pods; vmagent logs show no errors.
#### Known limitations
- Scrapes with `honorLabels: true` other than ingress-nginx are not
protected against an exporter that publishes the identity labels itself.
Today these are the vendored qdrant and harbor ServiceMonitors; their
exporters are platform images with fixed label names, and their series
describe the application's own pods.
- A tenant's raw `vmagent.inlineScrapeConfig` bypasses scrape classes
entirely, and so do `additionalScrapeConfigs`. VMProbe takes only auth
settings from a scrape class (operator v0.68.4); no VMProbe exists in
the platform today.
- A scrape object's own relabel rules run after the class and can
overwrite the labels; tenants cannot create VictoriaMetrics operator
objects, so this is platform-controlled.
### Screenshots
No UI changes.
### Downstream repositories
- [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) -
follow-up:
Downstream: no trigger matched. Candidate: none affected, because the
diff changes templates and tests in `packages/system/monitoring-agents`,
`packages/system/monitoring` and `packages/extra/ingress` without
adding, renaming or removing a package and without touching any
`values.yaml` or schema. The telemetry metrics the telemetry server
reads (`cozy_cluster_info`, `cozy_application_count`) are produced by
the operator, not by these scrapes. The proposal text in
`cozystack/community` (#94, Design 4a) should be corrected to name
qdrant and harbor as further `honorLabels: true` scrapes; that is not a
trigger-map item.
### Release note
```release-note
feat(monitoring): VMAgent now adds `apps_cozystack_io_application_{group,kind,name}` labels to every series scraped from a pod that carries application lineage labels. Because the label set of those series changes, each of them becomes a new series after the upgrade: graphs and dashboards show a break at the rollout, queries over a range that spans it see two series per pod, and alert `for:` timers on those series restart. Series of targets without lineage labels, including node-level series (cAdvisor, kubelet) and kube-state-metrics, and all ingress-nginx series keep their current label set; this includes their `up` and `scrape_*` series.
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
<!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 -->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **Improvements**
* Monitoring metrics now use application identity labels derived from
Kubernetes pod metadata for covered scrape targets. Exporter-supplied
duplicates and placeholder values are removed, including from `up` and
`scrape_*` metrics.
* Ingress metrics no longer retain application identity labels at either
target or metric relabeling stages.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
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238b3ee491 |
fix(seaweedfs): enforce S3 bucket lifecycle rules (#5228)
<!-- Thank you for making a contribution! Here are some tips for you: - Use Conventional Commits for the PR title: `type(scope): description` - Types: feat, fix, docs, style, refactor, perf, test, build, ci, chore - Scopes are not an exhaustive list — pick the most specific scope for the change and extend the list when a genuinely new area appears. Examples: - System components: dashboard, platform, operator, cilium, kube-ovn, linstor, fluxcd, cluster-api - Managed apps: postgres, mariadb, redis, kafka, clickhouse, virtual-machine, kubernetes - Development and maintenance: api, hack, tests, ci, docs, maintenance - Breaking changes: append `!` after type/scope (`feat(api)!: ...`) or add a `BREAKING CHANGE:` footer - If it's a work in progress, consider creating this PR as a draft. - Don't hesistate to ask for opinion and review in the community chats, even if it's still a draft. - Add the label `kind/backport` if it's a bugfix that needs to be backported to a previous version. --> ## What this PR does SeaweedFS accepts and stores an S3 bucket lifecycle configuration, but only the `s3_lifecycle` job of its plugin worker applies it, and that job is scheduled by the admin server. Cozystack deployed neither, so a lifecycle rule returned 200 and no object ever expired, on the platform backup bucket and on tenant buckets alike. That also made the documented way to bound backup storage a no-op. This PR adds the admin server and a worker to Simple and MultiZone SeaweedFS instances, behind a new `lifecycle.enabled` value that is **off by default**. A Client instance is unchanged, because its rules are enforced where the instance it connects to runs. The worker registers for `s3_lifecycle` only, so vacuum, balancing and erasure coding are not started as a side effect. The admin keeps its job state on a 1Gi volume on `lifecycle.storageClass`, or on the cluster default when that is empty; `volume.storageClass` is not reused, because in MultiZone it can name a class local to one zone or node. The admin UI is protected by a generated password, because a tenant namespace admits traffic from the whole cluster. The dashboard Role lists the two new WorkloadMonitors. Enabling the worker alone was not enough on SeaweedFS 4.45. Its chart renders no `[grpc.s3]` section, so the s3 gateway served its internal gRPC in plaintext while the worker dials it with mTLS, and every lifecycle delete failed the TLS handshake. The section is backported from upstream (seaweedfs/seaweedfs#11157, released in 4.46) as a chart patch, applied with `--forward` so the next `make update` stops at the point where the patch must be dropped instead of silently reversing it. The s3 pods are restarted once so they load the section. This also repairs IAM cache propagation between s3 replicas, which failed in the same way, and it applies whether or not lifecycle is enabled. The data-plane release now retries a failed install or upgrade in place (`RetryOnFailure`) instead of rolling it back. With the previous default remediation and unlimited retries, an upgrade that waited out its timeout, for example on a tenant quota with no room for the admin volume, rolled back and retried forever, restarting the s3 pods twice per cycle. The worker's hostname anti-affinity is relaxed to a preference so a rollout finishes on a single-node cluster. #### Why lifecycle is off by default The daily walk that SeaweedFS uses to expire objects sends its deletes without an object identity, and the s3 server skips its compare-and-swap when no identity is given; it does not re-check the object's age either. A key overwritten between the walk's listing and the delete loses its new content. This path is unchanged from 4.45 through 4.52 and on upstream master (`weed/s3api/s3lifecycle/dailyrun/walker_dispatcher.go`, `identityMatches` in `weed/s3api/s3api_internal_lifecycle.go`). Backup buckets write unique keys and are barely exposed; a tenant bucket that rewrites a fixed key is. On top of that, turning enforcement on would start applying, on upgrade, every rule that was stored and ignored until now. Both are retention changes an operator should choose, so nothing changes for existing instances until `lifecycle.enabled` is set. Making it the default again is left to a separate PR that carries object identity on the walk path; upstream report: https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/issues/12451. #### Turning lifecycle on and off When `lifecycle.enabled` is set, rules that have been stored but ignored start applying within minutes, and objects they have already expired are deleted on that first pass, so review existing bucket lifecycle rules first. Set `lifecycle.storageClass` before enabling, and prefer a replicated class: the class is part of the admin StatefulSet's volume claim template, which cannot change, so changing it while lifecycle is on makes every upgrade of the instance fail until it is reverted. Moving the volume means disabling lifecycle, deleting the `admin-data-seaweedfs-admin-0` PVC, changing the class and enabling lifecycle again. Each instance gains two small pods and a 1Gi PVC; when the tenant quota has no room for them, the data-plane release keeps retrying in place until it has. When `lifecycle.enabled` is turned off again, the parent release removes the admin credentials Secret while the data-plane release removes the admin StatefulSet only on its own reconcile, shortly after. An admin pod that restarts in that window fails to start on the missing Secret until the StatefulSet is gone; nothing is lost, and the order is left as is. The admin PVC stays until the instance is deleted, and a later re-enable starts the admin with a new password. Verified on a test cluster with the 4.45 chart: without the backport, the worker found the expired objects and every delete failed with `tls: first record does not look like a TLS handshake`; with this branch and lifecycle enabled, a rule with a past expiration date removed the matching objects and left the others, both on a manual run and on the first scheduled pass. ### Screenshots <!-- REQUIRED for UI changes: attach screenshots or screen recordings demonstrating the visual impact of your changes. PRs with UI changes without screenshots will not be merged. --> ### Downstream repositories <!-- Cozystack is upstream for repositories that are NOT kept in sync with it automatically, and nothing in CI compares the two sides, so a change here can break them silently. Which change forces what, and which file to touch, is the trigger map in docs/agents/contributing.md under "Downstream Repositories". Walk it before you tick anything. IF YOU ARE AN AI AGENT OR AN LLM, THIS IS PART OF THE TASK, NOT A FORM TO FILL IN: 1. Walk the trigger map against the actual diff of this PR, file by file. Do not decide from the PR title or from your memory of what you changed. 2. For every repository you tick, open the follow-up PR there and link it on the same line. A ticked box with no link claims work that does not exist, which is worse than an empty box. Search that repository for an open PR or issue covering it first, and link that instead of filing a duplicate. 3. When the follow-up is out of scope, or needs a decision that is not yours to make, open an issue in that repository instead, link that, and say so in the PR body. Do not push a speculative PR into another repository just to fill a line here. 4. Do not tick "No downstream repository is affected" to make the checklist go away. If you are unsure, leave every box empty and say so in the PR body, so a human decides. --> - [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up needed, not opened yet: `operations/services/backup-classes.md` (v1.7 and next) advises an S3 lifecycle policy, which the bundled SeaweedFS applies only once `lifecycle.enabled` is set; the SeaweedFS reference page gains `lifecycle.enabled` and `lifecycle.storageClass` from the regenerated README on the next release - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: The terraform provider does not model the SeaweedFS application, so the new values do not reach it. ### Release note <!-- Write a release note: - Explain what has changed internally and for users. - Start with the same `type(scope):` prefix as in the PR title - Follow the guidelines at https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/guide/release-notes.md. --> ```release-note fix(seaweedfs): S3 bucket lifecycle rules can now be enforced. Simple and MultiZone SeaweedFS instances run the SeaweedFS admin server and a lifecycle worker when the new `lifecycle.enabled` value is set; it is off by default, so existing instances keep their current behaviour. It stays off by default because the upstream daily expiry walk deletes without checking that the object it listed is still the one stored, so an object overwritten in that window can be deleted although it is new. When enabled, rules that were stored but ignored start applying within minutes and objects they have already expired are deleted on that first pass; review existing rules first. Each enabled instance gains two small pods and a 1Gi volume, placed on `lifecycle.storageClass` or the cluster default. Independently of the switch, the s3 gateway now serves its internal gRPC over mTLS, which repairs IAM cache propagation between s3 replicas and restarts the s3 pods once on upgrade. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added optional, daily S3 bucket lifecycle-rule processing for supported SeaweedFS configurations. It is disabled by default; Client instances rely on lifecycle rules configured on the connected SeaweedFS. * Added configurable storage for lifecycle job state and dashboard visibility for lifecycle components. * Enabled the S3 gRPC server to use its internal TLS identity when security is configured. * **Bug Fixes** * Improved storage-class handling so numeric-looking names remain strings and unset classes are omitted where appropriate. * Clarified backup cleanup guidance, including when lifecycle rules apply and how to reclaim storage. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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aa97451bc2 |
fix(platform): leave tenant-root's ingress empty when the root tenant has none (#5226)
## What this PR does Enabling SeaweedFS on the root tenant without ingress no longer hangs. `cozystack-basics` wrote `_namespace.ingress: tenant-root` for the root tenant whatever its `spec.ingress` said, so `seaweedfs-system` depended on an `ingress-nginx-system` release that nothing creates, and the platform backup bucket waited with it. Every other tenant already derives the key in `packages/apps/tenant/templates/namespace.yaml` and leaves it empty without ingress. `cozystack-basics` cannot read the root Tenant, so the platform now carries its ingress state the same way it carries monitoring: the new platform value `ingress.rootEnabled` reaches the `cozystack-values` Secret as `_cluster.ingress-enabled`, and `_namespace.ingress` is written only when it is true. The default is `true`, which keeps the value every existing cluster renders today, and a Secret written before the key existed keeps it as well. An operator running the root tenant without ingress sets `ingress.rootEnabled: false`, kept in sync with `Tenant/root spec.ingress` by hand, as with `monitoring.rootEnabled`. With the key empty, `seaweedfs-system` drops the dependency through the check it already had (`eq $ingress .Release.Namespace`), and nothing reads live cluster state for it. An empty `_namespace.ingress` now reaches tenant-root and every tenant inheriting from it, so the consumers that would break on it are adjusted in the same PR. The API rejects `ingressClassName: ""` (checked with a server-side dry run), and two consumers quote the value: - `kubernetes`: the proxied ingress-nginx addon Ingress is not rendered without an ingress; its Service still is. - `monitoring`: Grafana's `spec.ingress` is left out, since grafana-operator copies it into the Ingress verbatim. - `seaweedfs`: the S3 Ingress is disabled instead of rendering with no controller to serve it. The `KamajiControlPlane` `network.ingress` block is unchanged on purpose: its `hostname` is what the Kamaji provider uses as the control plane endpoint, and Kamaji itself skips an empty class name. Harbor, bucket, bootbox and alerta write the class unquoted, so an empty value renders as an unset class, which the API accepts. Tests: `packages/core/platform/tests/apps_ingress_enabled_wiring_test.yaml` pins the flag reaching `_cluster` both ways and with `ingress` set to null; `packages/system/cozystack-basics/tests/cozystack-values-secret_test.yaml` pins `_namespace.ingress` for a missing, string, bool and `"false"` flag, and that the other keys stay when ingress is off; `packages/extra/seaweedfs/tests/ingress_dependency_test.yaml` pins the dependency and the S3 Ingress for an own, empty and inherited ingress; the kubernetes and monitoring suites pin the gated Ingress. Reverting any of the gates, or flipping the missing-key default, fails the suites. Not covered here: - `_namespace.etcd` has the same hardcoded shape (#4783) and is left for its own change. - Toggling `Tenant/root spec.ingress` without changing `ingress.rootEnabled` leaves the value stale, as `monitoring.rootEnabled` does today. ### Screenshots Not a UI change. ### Downstream repositories The diff adds a key to `packages/core/platform/values.yaml`, which the website documents by hand. - [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [x] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: cozystack/website#800 documents `ingress.rootEnabled` in the platform Package reference - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(platform): a root tenant without ingress no longer leaves seaweedfs-system waiting for an ingress-nginx-system release that is never created. Set the new platform value ingress.rootEnabled to false to match Tenant/root spec.ingress: false. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added a root-tenant ingress setting, enabled by default, that can be turned off. * **Bug Fixes** * Kubernetes and Grafana ingress resources are now rendered only when ingress is configured. * SeaweedFS S3 ingress is enabled only when ingress is configured. * Ingress-dependent components now respect the root-tenant setting, while other platform services remain available when root ingress is off. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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6a93765351 |
fix(seaweedfs): bump the COSI driver to v0.4.0 for the lost-grant fix
seaweedfs-cosi-driver v0.3.1 grants access by rewriting the legacy /etc/iam/identity.json. Each S3 gateway migrates that file to per-identity files and renames it away whenever it changes, so a grant written while a gateway is migrating is lost: the BucketAccess reports accessGranted and its Secret is written, but every gateway rejects the key with InvalidAccessKeyId and never recovers. Users added to a Bucket in one change lose a key regularly. v0.4.0 also writes the per-identity file on grant. The rest of v0.4.0 does not reach the platform. The readwrite-governance-bypass access policy is opt-in and no BucketAccessClass uses it. The refusal to delete a bucket that still holds locked objects applies only to object-lock buckets, and their classes are Retain, so the sidecar never calls DriverDeleteBucket for them. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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67fcadf689 |
fix(seaweedfs): disable the S3 Ingress in a tenant without ingress
The S3 Ingress kept rendering with no ingress-nginx to serve it. Now that seaweedfs-system no longer waits on ingress-nginx-system there, the release completes and the unserved Ingress would stay behind. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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b26001b6f9 |
test(seaweedfs): pin the ingress-nginx dependency to the namespace's ingress
seaweedfs-system waits on ingress-nginx-system only when _namespace.ingress names its own namespace. With tenant-root's key now empty when the root Tenant runs no ingress, an empty value has to drop the dependency, and a value inherited from a parent must not add it. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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f5114ae04c |
fix(seaweedfs): keep the metadata database storage class a string
db.storageClass went unquoted into the values of the database release and again into its CNPG Cluster. A class name made only of digits, which Kubernetes allows, became a number that the Cluster rejects, and a line break in the value could add keys to the database release values. It is quoted at both steps. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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e6eb3345c6 |
fix(seaweedfs): escape pool and zone storage classes in the release values
Pool and zone storage classes were wrapped in quotes by hand, which does not escape a quote or a backslash in the value: a quote closes the string early and the data-plane release values stop parsing, with a YAML error that does not name the field. They are now quoted like the volume and admin classes. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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7c9aa2fe10 |
fix(seaweedfs): hand storage class names to the data plane as strings
The volume and admin storage classes were written unquoted into the values of the data-plane release. A class name made only of digits, which Kubernetes allows, arrived there as a number, and a value with a line break could add keys next to the field, past the schema that is the tenant's input gate. Both are now quoted. lifecycle.storageClass, new in this release, also carries the StorageClass name rules in its schema, so a value that cannot name a class is refused when the application is written instead of leaving the admin claim pending. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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f2ee3ec8ad |
test(computeplane): pin the maxUnavailable bounds and zero through the API
A zero dropped anywhere between the ComputePlane API and the pool chart would let a GPU pool fall back to the chart default of 1, and the render tests never cross the aggregated API. A negative value let through by the ComputePlane schema would only be refused by the pool chart, after the parent release had already been upgraded. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Mattia Eleuteri <mattia@hidora.io> |
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28b66bbc63 |
test(computeplane): forward an explicit zero and the int32 maximum of maxUnavailable
An explicit 0 is what overrides the pool chart's default of 1 for GPU pools, so it must reach the pool unchanged rather than be dropped as an empty value. The int32 maximum is the largest value the schema accepts and must be forwarded as is. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Mattia Eleuteri <mattia@hidora.io> |
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525e416134 |
fix(kubernetes-nodes): let ComputePlane pools set maxUnavailable and bound it to int32
The ComputePlane wrapper forwards only the pool fields it names, and maxUnavailable was not one of them. A ComputePlane pool without room for one extra VM therefore had no way back to the drain-first rollout, and its rollouts stalled. CAPI decodes maxUnavailable as an int32, so a value above 2147483647 passed the chart schema and was then refused by the MachineDeployment decoder. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Mattia Eleuteri <mattia@hidora.io> |
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5cbb3a633e |
fix(seaweedfs): give the lifecycle admin volume its own storage class
volume.storageClass is picked for volume server data, and in a MultiZone instance it can name a class whose volumes exist in one zone or on one node. Reusing it for the admin volume would tie the admin to that zone or node, so losing it would stop lifecycle enforcement for the whole instance, a placement nobody chose for the admin. The admin volume now takes lifecycle.storageClass, and the cluster default when that is empty. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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62b4213784 |
fix(seaweedfs): keep bucket lifecycle enforcement off unless enabled
The daily walk that expires objects sends its deletes without an object identity, and the s3 server skips its compare-and-swap when none is given (walker_dispatcher.go and identityMatches, unchanged from 4.45 through 4.52). It does not re-check the object's age either, so a key overwritten between the walk's listing and the delete loses its new content. Backup buckets write unique keys and barely meet that window; a tenant bucket that rewrites a fixed key does. Turning enforcement on by default would also start applying, on upgrade, every rule that was stored and ignored until now. Both are retention changes an operator should choose, so the admin server and the worker now run only where lifecycle.enabled is set. On by default can return once the walk carries identity. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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a6f4f557f3 |
fix(seaweedfs): let the dashboard read the lifecycle monitors
The dashboard reads an application's WorkloadMonitors by name through its resource-map Role, so the admin and worker monitors the lifecycle switch adds were invisible to the tenant: the components ran, but the application page never listed them. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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a70a1cf83b |
fix(seaweedfs): retry the data-plane release instead of rolling it back
The admin volume and the two lifecycle pods are new demands on tenant quota, so an upgrade into a namespace with no headroom can wait out its timeout. Flux's default remediation then rolls the release back, and with unlimited retries it does so on every attempt: each rollback drops the [grpc.s3] section and the s3 restart annotation, each retry brings them back, and the s3 pods restart twice per cycle until quota frees up. RetryOnFailure keeps what was applied and retries it, as the parent release that the apiserver builds for the application already does. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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699b5ce78e |
test(ingress): pin the position of the target-stage identity drop
A containment check passes even if a rule added after the drop sets the identity labels again. Asserting both endpoints' full target relabel lists fixes the drop as the last rule, so such a change fails the test. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: ZverGuy <maximbel2003@gmail.com> |
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1018eaa3b6 |
docs(ingress): name the controller series that lose application identity
The comment said every ingress-nginx series describes served Ingress objects. The metrics port also serves the controller's own series (nginx process, reload status, go_*, up, scrape_*), and dropping the identity on the whole endpoint removes it from those as well. Say so, so the lost attribution reads as a decision rather than an oversight. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: ZverGuy <maximbel2003@gmail.com> |
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dab6035a97 |
fix(ingress): keep application identity off ingress-nginx scrape-health series
Dropping the identity in metricRelabelConfigs reaches only the scraped samples. vmagent adds up and scrape_* with the target labels after metric relabeling (VictoriaMetrics v1.136.0 lib/promscrape addAutoMetrics, addRows with needRelabel=false), so those series still carried the controller pod's identity. Dropping it from the target as well leaves every ingress-nginx series with the label set it had before the scrape class. The metric-stage drop stays: with honorLabels true an exporter-supplied identity is not renamed and would otherwise survive. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: ZverGuy <maximbel2003@gmail.com> |
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f36d864e99 |
fix(seaweedfs): run the worker that enforces bucket lifecycle rules
SeaweedFS accepts and stores a bucket lifecycle configuration, but only the s3_lifecycle job of its plugin worker acts on it, and that job is scheduled by the admin server. Neither ran here, so a rule returned 200 and no object ever expired, on the platform backup bucket and on tenant buckets alike, and the documented way to bound backup storage did nothing. Both now run in Simple and MultiZone instances, behind lifecycle.enabled (on by default). A Client instance has no data plane of its own; its rules are enforced where the master it connects to runs. The worker registers for s3_lifecycle alone, so enabling lifecycle does not also start vacuum, balancing or erasure coding. The admin keeps its job state on a small volume (on volume.storageClass when set), and its UI gets a generated password, because a tenant namespace admits traffic from the whole cluster and the server is unauthenticated without one. The data-plane chart keeps both off unless its parent turns them on, so it never starts an admin without that password. Existing rules start applying minutes after the upgrade: the admin's scheduler runs the first pass within one idle cycle of its lifecycle lane, then once a day, and objects the rules have already expired are deleted on that first pass. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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5a6086c7a1 |
test(monitoring): pin the endpoint count the ingress identity test relies on
The ingress assertion reads only the first endpoint of each scrape, so a second endpoint added without the label drop would go unnoticed. Pinning the count makes such an addition fail the suite. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: ZverGuy <maximbel2003@gmail.com> |
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0e5557d0ba |
fix(ingress): keep application identity off ingress-nginx series
The vmagent scrape class stamps the scraped pod's application identity on its series. ingress-nginx series describe the Ingress objects the controller serves, in whatever namespace they live, so the controller's own identity would attribute another tenant's traffic to the Ingress application. And because these scrapes honor exporter labels, an exporter-supplied identity would win over the class. Dropping the labels leaves these series to the pod and namespace scopes. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: ZverGuy <maximbel2003@gmail.com> |
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4087218a02 |
docs: move the repo-only guides onto the website (#5034)
## What this PR does Seven guides under `docs/` were operator facing and written alongside the code, and left in the source tree where no user looks. They are on the website now, so this deletes them here and repoints every reference. ``` docs/operations/backup-classes.md -> operations/services/backup-classes docs/operations/resource-presets.md -> guides/resource-management docs/storage-immutability.md -> operations/storage-class-immutability docs/operations/system-memory-limits.md -> operations/configuration/system-memory-limits docs/gateway-classes.md -> networking/gateway-classes docs/observability/distributed-tracing.md -> operations/services/monitoring/distributed-tracing docs/operations/seaweedfs-capacity-for-backups.md -> operations/services/object-storage/capacity-for-backups ``` `docs/release.md`, `docs/deprecating-applications.md` and the two SeaweedFS runbooks in `docs/operations/` stay. A workflow, `AGENTS.md`, a migration and a bats suite read them by path, which is the test from #3777. References point at `https://cozystack.io/docs/v1/...`. The site rewrites that short prefix to the latest version in `layouts/404.html`, so the links follow releases and pin none. Backup Classes, resource management and `storageClass` immutability exist in the latest version already. The other four pages are only in `next/` until 1.7.0 is promoted, and their links start to resolve then. The generated mongodb files come from `values.yaml` through `make generate` with cozyvalues-gen v1.7.0, the version pinned in `.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml`. Tests: helm unit tests for mongodb (151), postgres (209), vm-disk (114) and kubernetes-nodes (223), go tests for backupcontroller, presets and the operator, rd-presets-check, the migration-50 bats suite. ### Downstream repositories - [x] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: cozystack/website#763 Walked the rest of the trigger map against the diff. No provider follow-up: the mongodb `values.schema.json` diff is one `description` string, with no field added, removed or renamed, no enum, no default, and no `kind`, `plural` or `release.prefix` change. `packages/core/platform/values.yaml` changed in comments only and no key, so the hand written platform-package table on the site is unaffected. Please merge after cozystack/website#763, the links in the code only resolve once those pages deploy. ### Release note ```release-note docs: seven guides move from the docs/ directory of this repository to cozystack.io (Backup Classes, resource presets, storageClass immutability, system component memory limits, GatewayClass selection, distributed tracing, SeaweedFS capacity for backups), and in-repo references point there. ``` |
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61289c7210 |
fix(etcd): size the defrag job for the client it runs
The hourly defrag pod runs the etcd-defrag client, which only sends defragment calls to the members, yet it requested 200m CPU and 256Mi from the tenant quota. On a sandbox tenant whose quota was mostly taken by its own etcd and SeaweedFS, the job could not create a pod and the defrag never ran. The client peaked at 5.1 MiB working set over a day on a v1.6.5 cluster. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Yan Bondarenko <202671653+yankawai@users.noreply.github.com> |
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9f6fdd77c6 |
docs(etcd): update the affinity notes for the hard member spread
The affinity description and the comment above the affinity block explained the soft default by a member that would stay Pending on its node-local volume. Now that the spread is DoNotSchedule by default, the spread keeps such a member Pending as well, once its node holds another member and some other node holds none. Both texts now explain the soft default by what is left, that a required rule forbids two members on one node even when every node has one, and state the node-local case for both rules. The description also says that the operator copies affinity into each EtcdMember when it creates it, so a recreated Pod keeps the rule its member was created with. README, values.schema.json and the ApplicationDefinition are regenerated from it. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Yan Bondarenko <202671653+yankawai@users.noreply.github.com> |
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432d02e20c |
fix(etcd): stop counting canceled watch streams as failed gRPC requests (#4985)
## What this PR does
The tenant etcd chart has its own copy of
`etcdHighNumberOfFailedGRPCRequests`, and both of its rules count every
`grpc_code` other than `OK` as a failure. `grpc_server_handled_total`
counts a Watch stream once, when it ends, and the streams of a
kube-apiserver that goes away end with `Canceled`. So whenever an API
server on a tenant etcd stops, the Watch method of every member reads as
100 percent failed and the critical rule fires on all of them.
Both rules now count only
`Unknown|FailedPrecondition|ResourceExhausted|Internal|Unavailable|DataLoss|DeadlineExceeded`,
the list the etcd mixin has used since etcd-io/etcd#13127 and the one
the platform copy in
`packages/system/monitoring-agents/alerts/etcd.yaml` already uses. The
grouping `BY (job, instance, grpc_service, grpc_method)`, the
thresholds, `for` and the annotations stay as they are, so the alerts
keep their labels.
Seen on a v1.6.5 cluster while a Kubernetes cluster on a tenant etcd was
created and deleted a few minutes later. vmalert had the critical alert
firing for `grpc_method="Watch"` on all three members with the value
100. At that point
`rate(grpc_server_handled_total{grpc_code!="OK"}[10m])` was 0.63 for
Watch with `Canceled`, and the only other non-OK codes were
`FailedPrecondition` on `RoleGet` and `UserGet` at 0.0017 each, which is
one call each. The same query an hour earlier returned nothing. The
platform copy runs in the same vmalert over the same series, and none of
the firing alerts came from it. Each alert also showed up seven times
there, once per tenant copy of these rules, because the root tenant's
vmalert loads the rules of every tenant namespace. This PR does not
change that.
`hack/etcd-grpc-alerts.bats` renders the chart's PrometheusRule with
`helm template` and replays it through `vmalert-tool` v1.136.0 pinned by
digest, the same image #4963 uses.
`hack/testdata/etcd-grpc-alerts/unittest.yaml` has three cases with
seven checks. Watch streams that end only with `Canceled` must not fire
at 6, 12 and 30 minutes. `Range` calls failing with `Unavailable` at 25
percent must fire the critical rule at 7 minutes and both rules at 12,
with the labels and the summary pinned. Both together must fire only for
`Range`. Against the rules on main the suite fails 4 of the 7 checks,
all of them on Watch alerts with the value 100. Dropping `Unavailable`
from the list, or grouping by `job` and `instance` only, fails 3 checks
each.
```console
$ bats hack/etcd-grpc-alerts.bats
1..1
ok 1 tenant etcd failed gRPC request alerts pass their vmalert-tool cases
```
The same run on the rules from main prints `not ok 1` and the four
failing checks. With Bats 1.14.0 at the commit CI pins, the suite passes
together with `bats-strict-setup`, `bats-no-negated-assert`,
`bats-no-exit-trap`, `bats-runner-coverage`, `bats-runner-contract`,
`alert-severity-contract` and `image-pin-consistency`, 81 of 81. Like
the migration suites it needs docker, and only the image pull touches
the network. Helm 3.17.3 and 4.2.4 render the same rules. I have not run
the new rules in vmalert on a live cluster.
The rules file is the same on release-1.6 and release-1.7. The commit
cherry-picks onto release-1.6 without conflicts, and that backport is a
separate PR with one more commit that drops the `load test_helper` line,
because release-1.6 runs `hack/*.bats` through `hack/cozytest.sh`.
### Screenshots
Not a UI change.
### Downstream repositories
A rule template in `packages/extra/etcd`, a Bats suite under `hack/` and
its test data. No values, schema, README, image or
`ApplicationDefinition` change, and the website does not mention these
rules, so no trigger map entry applies.
- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) -
follow-up:
### Release note
```release-note
fix(etcd): the tenant etcd alert etcdHighNumberOfFailedGRPCRequests now counts only the gRPC codes that the etcd mixin and the platform copy of the alert count, so the Canceled watch streams of a Kubernetes API server that stops no longer fire it on every etcd member.
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
- **Bug Fixes**
- Refined etcd gRPC failure alerts to target specific failure status
codes, reducing alerts for non-failure responses while preserving
existing thresholds and timing.
- Added coverage for canceled watch streams, unavailable range requests,
and combined failure scenarios, including warning and critical alert
evaluations.
- **Tests**
- Added integration validation for rendering etcd alert rules and
running them through the alert-testing tool, including failure handling
when prerequisites are unavailable.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
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b83cc087cc |
docs: move the repo-only guides onto the website
Seven guides in docs/ were written next to the code and left in the source tree, where no operator looks. The website carries them now, so a second copy here only lets the two drift again: the Backup Classes page had already fallen behind its original. docs/release.md, docs/deprecating-applications.md and the two SeaweedFS runbooks in docs/operations stay. A migration, a bats suite, a workflow or AGENTS.md reads each of them by path, which is the test for keeping a document in this repository. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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f1f30b3071 |
fix(etcd): require an even spread of members over nodes by default
The default spread of the etcd members was ScheduleAnyway, which only adds to the score of a node, and other scores can outweigh it. A new etcd on a three-node cluster got its first two members on one node. On a node-local StorageClass a member cannot leave its node, so losing that node takes two of the three members and the quorum. DoNotSchedule with maxSkew 1 still lets an etcd with more members than nodes start, because the skew is counted between the nodes that exist. One node takes all three members and two nodes take two and one. nodeTaintsPolicy is Ignore, so a cordoned node still counts and a member waits for it instead of landing next to another member. The operator copies the constraints into an EtcdMember when it creates it and builds the Pod from that copy, so members that exist keep the old setting and only members created later get the new one. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Yan Bondarenko <202671653+yankawai@users.noreply.github.com> |
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1ca7c0d891 |
fix(etcd): stop counting canceled watch streams as failed gRPC requests
The tenant etcd copy of etcdHighNumberOfFailedGRPCRequests counted every code other than OK. A Watch stream is counted once, when it ends, and the streams of a kube-apiserver that stops end with Canceled. So whenever an API server on that etcd goes away, the Watch method of every member reads as 100 percent failed and the critical rule fires on all of them. The rules now count the codes the etcd mixin counts since etcd-io/etcd#13127, the same list the platform copy in monitoring-agents already uses. The grouping by method stays, so the alert labels do not change. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Yan Bondarenko <202671653+yankawai@users.noreply.github.com> |
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f3486f4e3a |
docs: move the operator guides out of docs/ to where readers find them
Five guides in docs/ were written next to the feature code that needed them and left in the source tree, where no operator looks. They are on the website, so a second copy here only drifts: edits kept landing in docs/ after the website copy was made. docs/vm-external-vlan.md is split rather than moved. Its section on staging the reference CNI plugins is a contract that hack/cni-plugins-staging-contract.bats asserts against the multus Dockerfile, the daemonset manifest and the platform values, so that half is package documentation and goes to packages/system/multus/README.md, which the suite now reads. The operator half goes to the website. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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fe59a6bf91 |
fix(etcd): leave compaction to etcd and pass the real quota to defrag
The hourly defrag CronJob runs etcd-defrag with its defaults, which compact to the latest revision before defragmenting. Every cluster already compacts itself with a periodic five-minute retention, so the second compaction either fails with "required revision has been compacted" when nothing was written since, or drops the history that retention keeps for watchers to resume from. The same defaults evaluate dbQuotaUsage in the defrag rule against 2 GiB rather than the quotaBackendBytes the cluster runs with, so the 80 percent threshold fires at a different database size than intended. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Yan Bondarenko <202671653+yankawai@users.noreply.github.com> |
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d9689bd6e7 |
fix(gateway): stop describing Cilium 1.19.5 as the shipped release
With Cilium at 1.20.2 the tenant gateway comments, README and one status message still explained behaviour as that of "the pin" at 1.19.5. Several of those claims no longer hold: a Gateway with two routed passthrough ports now gets an Envoy listener per port, Cilium judges a route's kinds against the listener the route names, and the shipped operator accepts an HTTPS and a passthrough listener on one port when the passthrough hostname is strictly narrower. Behaviour that is unchanged is re-anchored on the 1.20.2 source, behaviour that is gone is stated as history, and the refusal of one hostname on two passthrough ports no longer blames a Cilium limitation the shipped release does not have. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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ad3f15d4f3 |
feat(gateway)!: reserve a passthrough listener's name by the spec alone
The TenantGateway controller withheld the HTTPS-terminate listener for a name a passthrough listener answers only once a TLSRoute was attached there and resolved a backend, mirroring how Cilium builds its filter chains. That kept a served endpoint up on Cilium 1.19.5, but it tied every route's status to one implementation's translator and needed Service and ReferenceGrant watches to land the deferred decision. The shipped operator accepts a wildcard terminate listener beside a narrower passthrough listener on 443 and keeps conflicting every other overlap. A terminate listener for the passthrough name itself is not narrower, so on 443 the rule now protects the dataplane outright; on a native port Gateway API would serve the pair, and the rule holds as a policy that keeps a platform name with its passthrough listener. Reading it off the spec makes the outcome the same on every implementation. Under http01 an HTTPRoute claiming such a name gets no listener and no certificate whether or not a TLSRoute is attached. A route whose every hostname is reserved reads Accepted=False with NoMatchingListenerHostname; one that also claims a free hostname stays Accepted and is served there, as Gateway API accepts a route whose hostnames intersect at least one listener. dns01 and existingSecret are unchanged: their wildcard listener still covers such a name, and the passthrough listener answers it by its exact server name. The chart writes the passthrough services on the publishing tenant alone, so the names reserved by default are the ones the platform publishes there through its own TLSRoutes. The shape an upgrade changes is an HTTPRoute on such a name whose platform TLSRoute forwards nowhere, because it never attached (the package owning the service is not installed) or because none of its backends resolve: that route kept a terminate listener and now gets none. The backend resolution, its watches and the RBAC rules that served them go away. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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52f09d1aed |
fix(gateway)!: render passthrough services only where platform routes attach
The chart wrote the tlsPassthroughServices default onto every non-edge tenant's TenantGateway, so every tenant Gateway carried tls-api, tls-vm-exportproxy and tls-cdi-uploadproxy. The TLSRoutes that serve those names are platform routes: the packages owning the services render one per name in publishing.exposedServices while gateway.enabled is on, parented to the publishing tenant's Gateway alone. Everywhere else no shipped route attached to the listeners, and a passthrough listener holds its name whether or not anything is routed through it. The chart now writes the field only on the publishing tenant, with the same gateway.enabled switch and the same exposedServices filter those routes use, so a listener exists exactly where a platform route can attach. A TLSRoute attached by hand to one of those listeners on another tenant loses its parent. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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d624049a3a |
feat(gateway): allow tlsPassthroughListeners under dns01 and existingSecret
The refusal existed because Cilium 1.19.5 served every Gateway port from one Envoy listener matched by SNI alone, so the "*.<apex>" terminate listener of the wildcard modes and a passthrough listener under the apex could reach each other's backend. The shipped Cilium 1.20.2 gives each port its own Envoy listener when SNI overlaps across ports, and Gateway API treats listeners on different ports as compatible, so the pair is served as declared. edge still refuses the field: it renders no TLS listener for an entry to bind to. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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e63b9e439c |
fix(monitoring): count a central request as the receiver admitted it
The limiter refuses for good any request it counts above burst, and burst was the receiver's 4 MiB cap. A request grows on its way to the limiter: the sampler adds a tracestate to every span it keeps, and the limiter counts a request as the collector re-encodes it, which writes the empty value of every attribute the wire may omit, so a valid request of spans with empty-valued attributes is counted 1.4x. A request the receiver admitted near its cap was therefore refused on every retry. The limiter now runs right after memory_limiter, so it counts the request before sampling. The receiver caps a request at 3 MiB and burst stays at 5 MiB, which holds 1.4x the cap; a larger burst would also be what each pod start lets through above the rate. The rate is counted before sampling, so the store keeps only the sampled share of it. The texts say that a request above the cap gets a 400, which senders do not retry, and that each collector rollout a tenant causes lets that burst through again on every pod. The replica bound that keeps that allowance small now applies only to a central tenant's collector, whose render fails above ten replicas: a collector writing to the tenant's own store has no rate, and the replica counts it shipped with stay valid. Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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65f0caae2b |
fix(monitoring): keep a central tenant's write login out of its Grafana
A tenant's Grafana pod may reach the shared traces store's vmauth, and
the Secret a tenant names in oidc.customConfig.secretRef was mounted
into it whole. The apps API does not prune keys the Monitoring schema
leaves out, so a tenant could also set grafana.image: an image of its
choosing, with the collector's Secret mounted, writes past the rate
limit the collector enforces.
Grafana's image is the platform's, like the collector's, and for a
central tenant only the auth.ini key Grafana reads is mounted from the
named Secret. Other tenants have no collector login to keep out and
keep the whole Secret, which an auth.ini reading a sibling key with
$__file{} relies on.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io>
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cc51cac63d |
fix(monitoring): give a central tenant's Grafana a login that cannot write
The collector holds a central tenant to its write rate, but the one login it writes with was also the login of the tenant's Grafana datasource, and it could both read and write. vmauth cleans the request path before it picks a route, so any user the tenant admits to its Grafana, a Viewer included, could POST through the datasource proxy to ../insert and write into the shared store past the limiter. Each central tenant now has two VMUsers on its one account: the collector's, which may only write, and Grafana's, which may only read, each with its own chart-owned Secret and password. A namespace name holds no dot, so the reader's username never matches another tenant's. On upgrade the datasource moves to the new login in the same release that creates it, so reads may fail until vmauth loads the new user. Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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fc0db49187 |
fix(monitoring): bound what a central tenant writes above its rate
Each collector pod starts with a full token bucket, and burst was at least 64 MiB, the largest request vtinsert accepts. A tenant controls when its collector pods start, through any Monitoring change or by deleting them, and how many there are, so it could write tens of mebibytes above its rate per pod start and gigabytes per rollout of many replicas, which the two-day bound does not survive. The limiter only sees requests the receiver admits, so in central mode the receiver now caps them at 4 MiB, decompressed for HTTP, and burst drops to that floor; a pod start lets at most 4 MiB through above the rate. The replica count is capped at 10. The texts now say what the default rate guarantees: one tenant writes at most a default store's disk cap over two days counted uncompressed, rather than that it cannot fill it, and they name the per-pod-start allowance and that a sender pinned to one replica gets that replica's share. Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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177b207a27 |
feat(monitoring): hold each shared-central tenant to a write rate
The design has the per-tenant collector rate-limit its tenant, so that a noisy or hostile tenant cannot exhaust a shared backend. The disk cap alone does not do that: VictoriaTraces always keeps the last two days, so a tenant writing faster than the cap allows over two days fills the disk for every tenant on the store. The platform sets the rate with monitoring.tracingCentralTenantBytesPerSecond, and it reaches every tenant in _cluster through the cozystack-values Secret. A change there is a change in the values each monitoring HelmRelease reads, so Flux upgrades them all; a rate read with lookup at render time would never reach a tenant whose release is already in sync. The platform writes the key only when it is set, since every release in every tenant reads that Secret. Without it the collector holds the tenant to the rate of a default 10Gi store. Each central tenant's collector splits the rate across its replicas and refuses data above it before the batch processor, so the sender sees the refusal. An OTLP/HTTP sender gets a 429 and retries; the limiter answers gRPC with RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED and no RetryInfo, which the OTLP specification makes final, so central tenants should export over HTTP. Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |