The certificate covered the client and headless Services in all four
resolvable forms but gave the pod wildcard only three: bare
*.<release>-nodes was absent. A client in the broker's own namespace
dialling <pod>.<release>-nodes resolves through the DNS search path,
connects, and fails only at hostname verification — which reads as a
certificate bug rather than a missing name, the exact failure the
four-form rule exists to prevent.
The suite asserted the headless forms with contains, so it stayed
green for the form nobody listed; it now pins the whole list.
Also drops key encipherment from the leaf usages: it authorises RSA
key transport and the key is ECDSA, so it requested a capability the
key type cannot supply.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The refusal message and the README told the reader to manage users and
vhosts outside the chart. That reads as an instruction to move them
into hand-written User/Vhost/Permission objects, which fails the same
way: the topology operator derives its connection from the
RabbitmqCluster, not from who created the CR, so those objects break
identically and without the chart's refusal to warn anyone.
Say what the flag actually costs — the cluster leaves that operator's
reach entirely — and point at rabbitmqctl or a definitions import.
Also narrows the claim that no option closes plaintext: a variant
through spec.rabbitmq.additionalConfig looks reachable but is not
wired or validated here, so it is named as an open question rather
than left implicitly denied.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Every existing assertion on rabbitmq.com/operator-connection-uri ran on
the default domain, so a hardcoded cozy.local would have satisfied all
of them. On a cluster with its own cluster-domain that URI does not
resolve and messaging-topology-operator loses the broker outright, so
the case that distinguishes the two is worth having.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The TLS scope section described an upgrade that turns TLS on by itself
and told the reader to set tls.enabled: false to avoid it. Neither is
true now that the field defaults to false: the rolled pods, the
cert-manager dependency, the metrics port swap and the rewritten
binding port are all consequences of an explicit edit, so they are
described that way.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
tls.enabled inherited the value of external when unset, so enabling
external access also enabled TLS. That is not free on an existing
instance: setting spec.tls.secretName makes the operator rewrite the
port key of the <release>-default-user Secret from 5672 to 5671, and
that Secret is the Service Binding handed to the tenant. Every client
resolving its endpoint from the binding — the documented way — would
move onto TLS on upgrade and have to verify a per-release CA it has no
key-free way to obtain.
Resolve unset, null and false to false instead, so TLS is only ever on
because someone asked for it. enabled becomes a plain bool now that
there is no third state to express.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The template had grown to roughly 60% comment prose, most of it restating the
README verbatim — the strategic-merge-patch reasoning, the topology-operator TLS
derivation and the disableNonTLSListeners scope each existed in two places that
can drift apart, and the README is the copy users read. Several also carried
review-thread voice ("both directions are deliberate", "refuse the contradiction
rather than drop it") rather than describing the artifact.
Keep at each callsite only the facts an editor needs before touching that line —
why the override exists in neither direction, why the connection URI is pinned to
plaintext, what the flag does not cover — and let the README own the rest.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Two things this change got wrong about its own behaviour.
tls.disableNonTLSListeners was silently discarded whenever TLS resolved to off,
because the value was folded into the TLS condition before anything read it.
Asking to close the plaintext listeners with TLS off leaves nothing listening,
and the operator rejects the combination itself, returning "TLS must be enabled
if disableNonTLSListeners is set to true" and setting ReconcileSuccess=False.
Swallowing it in the chart was worse than what the operator does: the operator
at least records a TLSError event, while a dropped flag rendered a
healthy-looking cluster with every plaintext listener open and no trace of the
request. The likeliest way in is an operator hardening an internal broker who
sets only the flag, since tls.enabled follows external and so resolves to false
there. Fail with a message naming tls.enabled instead.
The README also claimed messaging clients are unaffected by enabling TLS. That
holds only for a client with a hardcoded port. <release>-default-user is the
Service Binding object the chart grants to the tenant, and the operator rewrites
its port key from 5672 to 5671 as soon as spec.tls.secretName is set — gated on
TLS alone, not on whether the plaintext listener stayed open — along with the
per-plugin port keys. A binding-driven client, which is the documented way to
consume it, follows that change and must speak TLS from then on, without being
able to verify the certificate until the trust anchor is obtainable. Say so.
Also record that the connection-uri annotation fans out: the operator's
annotation filter strips only kubernetes.io and k8s.io keys, so it lands on every
child object including the Secret the tenant reads.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
TLS so far only added encrypted endpoints; nothing closed the unencrypted ones,
and the chart had no way to express the intent. tls.disableNonTLSListeners gives
the operator that switch, defaulting to false so an upgrade never closes a
listener a client is already using — the choice to break plaintext has to be
made deliberately.
Its reach is worth stating plainly, because the natural reading is wrong in both
directions. It writes `listeners.tcp = none` into rabbitmq.conf, which is broker
level: the socket is not opened on any interface, so in-cluster clients lose
plaintext at the same instant external ones do, and there is no configuration
that closes it outside while keeping it inside. In the other direction it is not
"TLS everywhere" either — Erlang distribution on 25672 and epmd on 4369 ride the
headless Service, which the flag never touches, so inter-node traffic stays in
the clear regardless.
The flag also cannot coexist with chart-managed users. messaging-topology-operator
derives its connection as TLSEnabled() && (!connectUsingHTTP ||
DisableNonTLSListeners()), so the flag forces TLS on that side whatever the
operator's own configuration says, and it verifies the broker against
x509.SystemCertPool(), which cannot hold a per-release CA. The connection-uri
annotation is no escape, since it would point at the port the flag just closed —
so that annotation is now omitted when the flag is set, rather than advertising a
closed port. Every User, Vhost and Permission would silently stop reconciling.
Rendering fails instead, naming the conflict, and the flag stays usable for an
instance whose users and vhosts are managed outside the chart.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The SAN list covered every Service name in all resolvable forms but applied the
rule only to the non-wildcard entries, leaving the per-pod wildcard with .svc and
.svc.<domain> and no two-segment form. That is the form the operator itself uses:
RABBITMQ_NODENAME is rabbit@$(MY_POD_NAME).$(K8S_SERVICE_NAME).$(MY_POD_NAMESPACE)
and K8S_HOSTNAME_SUFFIX matches, so <pod>.<name>-nodes.<namespace> is the
canonical pod address rather than an incidental alias, and it is the form the
upstream API documentation shows to users.
A client dialling a pod by that name resolves it through the DNS search path,
connects, and fails only at hostname verification — which presents as a
certificate bug rather than a missing name. It would also break outright the
moment inter-node mTLS is wired through caSecretName.
Move the clusterDomain helper above the tri-state doc block while here, so each
comment sits next to the definition it describes.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Setting spec.tls.secretName makes RabbitmqCluster.TLSEnabled() true, and
messaging-topology-operator derives its own connection from that:
useTLSForConnection = TLSEnabled() && (!connectUsingHTTP || DisableNonTLSListeners())
connectUsingHTTP comes from CONNECT_USING_PLAIN_HTTP, which the shipped
Deployment does not set, so the expression collapses to TLSEnabled(). The
operator would dial https://<release>:15671 and verify it against
x509.SystemCertPool() — a process-wide pool that cannot contain a per-release
self-signed CA. Every User, Vhost and Permission this chart renders from users
and vhosts would fail with "certificate signed by unknown authority".
The failure is quiet, which is what makes it worth guarding: users already
applied to the broker keep working, so nothing looks wrong, while password
rotation, new users, new vhosts and permission changes all stop taking effect.
Annotate the cluster with rabbitmq.com/operator-connection-uri on the plaintext
management port when TLS is on. extractURIandScheme reports tlsEnabled=false for
an http:// scheme, so the operator keeps using the listener the chart
deliberately leaves open — that listener is load-bearing, not merely tolerated,
and the README now says so. Only the operator's management connection is
affected; broker traffic is untouched.
Also add the two-segment <name>.<namespace> SANs for both the client and headless
Services. That form resolves through the DNS search path, so a client connecting
to amqps://<name>.<namespace>:5671 reached the broker and failed only at hostname
verification — which presents as a certificate bug rather than a missing name.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Enabling TLS swaps the published metrics port: the operator exposes either
prometheus:15692 or prometheus-tls:15691 and never both, deliberately, so a
scrape config selecting every port does not count each node twice. That choice
keys off TLS alone rather than off disableNonTLSListeners, so a ServiceMonitor
selecting the port by the name prometheus stops matching once TLS is on, even
though the broker keeps listening on 15692. Since tls.enabled inherits external,
this reaches existing instances on upgrade with no user action.
Re-adding 15692 through spec.override.service looks like the fix and is not.
updatePorts keeps only port NAMES the operator owns and carries their NodePort
across, so every reconcile drops the re-added entry; the override then reinstates
it with nodePort unset, which the apiserver reads as "allocate" on a
LoadBalancer. The resulting write retriggers the operator's own Service watch and
the NodePort is reallocated each round. ClusterIP escapes it only because Update
zeroes every NodePort there, leaving the patched spec equal to the live one — and
external:true, the configuration that turns TLS on by default, is precisely the
one that would loop. Trading a renamed metrics port for continuous LoadBalancer
and kube-proxy reprogramming is not a trade worth making.
So the chart renders no service override at all. The README says what changed and
how to retarget a scrape config, including that 15691 is HTTPS under the release
CA and so needs the trust anchor to verify, and the template comment records why
neither direction of override is used.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Several comments described a shape the chart does not render. A test comment
claimed the chart carries a management cacertfile while the assertion directly
below it pins that no additionalConfig exists at all; the suite title and two
section headers advertised a management HTTPS block that is never rendered; and
a scope note named interNodeTLS, which is not a field on RabbitmqCluster — the
CRD exposes exactly secretName, caSecretName and disableNonTLSListeners.
Two tests were named for something they did not assert. The inter-node scope
test checked disableNonTLSListeners, which by this chart's own reasoning has no
bearing on port 25672; it now checks caSecretName, which is the field that would
actually configure inter-node mTLS.
State the ResourceDefinition backstop's real standing. The exclude list is
defence in depth, not the first line: promotion runs on the tenantresource label
that the lineage webhook stamps only when it resolves an ancestor, and a
cert-manager Secret has no ownerReference or Helm metadata, so it fails closed
before include or exclude is consulted. The list covers the case where that
stops holding.
Pin the dashboard Role's complete grant rather than only the absence of
known-bad names — every existing assertion there was a notContains, so a Role
that gained an unrelated Secret satisfied all of them.
Record what upgrading an existing external instance does: tls.enabled inherits
external, so the broker pods roll once when the operator mounts the new Secret,
and the instance gains a cert-manager dependency. No client breaks, but a
stateful broker restarting is not something to discover from a diff.
Drop four tests that duplicated earlier ones verbatim.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Requiring _namespace.host under external:true turned a working configuration
into a render error. The value derives from _cluster.root-host, which the
platform treats as optional — the ingress hostname policy skips rendering when
it is unset and the platform chart passes it through default so it can be empty
— and an external RabbitMQ is a bare LoadBalancer Service with no Ingress and no
hostname involvement. Releases in that state predate the tls field, so they
carry no tls.enabled: false to fall back on and would have failed on upgrade
with no way out. Append the SAN when a host is supplied and skip it otherwise.
Say plainly what the external SAN is worth: the chart creates no DNS record for
that name, so verifying by hostname means pointing it at the LoadBalancer
address yourself, and a client dialling the IP fails hostname verification.
Guarding the render was protecting a guarantee the chart does not deliver.
Document the one manual step when disabling TLS, which until now existed only in
a template comment nobody performing the downgrade would read: cert-manager
keeps the Secrets after Helm removes the Certificates, so the CA keeps its
publication label and a stale anchor keeps being projected until it is deleted.
Correct the tri-state helper's own comment while here. It claimed to guard a
class of input it does not need to: values.schema.json types tls as an object,
so non-map scalars are rejected by Helm before any template renders. Null is the
only shape that reaches the template, and that is what the dig form covers.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The tri-state resolution was copy-pasted into three templates. It had already
drifted: the copy in the dashboard Role outlived the grant it used to gate and
was removed with nothing to catch that the remaining two could diverge in the
same way. Extract rabbitmq.tls.enabled and have both callers use it.
Reading .Values.tls.enabled directly also panicked with "nil pointer evaluating
interface {}.enabled" under `tls: null`. The app CR cannot produce that shape,
since structural-schema pruning replaces null with the {} default, but a
HelmRelease values override reaches the chart without pruning. Resolve through
dig on a defaulted dict so the value falls back to external instead.
Cover both with a suite that renders the cluster and the certificate chain
together across every external x tls.enabled combination and asserts they agree,
so a future divergence fails a test rather than issuing certificates nobody uses.
Drop the management ssl cacertfile line while here. It was set on the management
listener but not on AMQPS, and on neither does a CA alone verify client
certificates without verify_peer and fail_if_no_peer_cert. It bought nothing and
left the two listeners inconsistent; the operator supplies everything else once
spec.tls.secretName is set, so no additionalConfig remains.
Pin the ResourceDefinition invariants that decide whether a private key can
reach a tenant. The chart's helm-unittest suite cannot see that file, so the
label-based include, the non-empty selector and the exclude backstop are
asserted in hack/check-rabbitmq-rd-secrets.bats instead.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
values.schema.json carried additionalProperties:false on the tls object,
post-processed onto a generated file by a jq patch plus a drift guard, and a
test asserted that an unknown tls key is rejected. It is not rejected on the
path tenants use: the aggregated apiserver removes every boolean-form
additionalProperties before publishing, and its own comment states the schema
is consumed for documentation and type-checking rather than enforcement. The
constraint therefore held only for a direct helm install, while the test
documented it as a general guarantee. rabbitmq was also the only chart in the
catalog carrying it. Remove the patch, the guard and the test rather than keep
a check that does not check on the path that matters.
Also in the same area, three fixes for things that claimed more than they did:
The management ssl port, certfile and keyfile lines in additionalConfig
duplicated the operator's defaultTLSConf verbatim, which it writes as soon as
spec.tls.secretName is set. Only cacertfile adds anything outside mutual TLS.
Keep that one and record what it does not do — supplying a CA does not enable
client-certificate verification without verify_peer and fail_if_no_peer_cert,
so clients still authenticate by password inside the TLS session.
The dashboard Role computed the tri-state TLS flag and never read it, left over
from removing the Secret grant it used to gate.
A missing _namespace.host under external:true rendered as `nil pointer
evaluating interface {}.host`. Fail closed with a message naming the key: the
external DNS name is a certificate SAN, so omitting it silently produces a
certificate that fails verification at connect time instead of at render time.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The override listed only the TLS ports, which reads as "plaintext is not
published on the LoadBalancer". It never did that. The operator rebuilds its
default port set from generateServicePortsMap() on every reconcile and only
then applies spec.override.service as a strategic merge patch keyed on `port`
(corev1.ServiceSpec tags Ports with patchMergeKey:"port"), so a partial list
can add or mutate entries but never remove them. With TLS on, the two ports it
listed are byte-identical to what the operator already generates, making the
whole block a no-op that credited itself with a guarantee it did not provide.
Remove it and say plainly what holds: amqp:5672 and management:15672 stay
published, on the LoadBalancer too when external is true. Closing them requires
spec.tls.disableNonTLSListeners, which writes `listeners.tcp = none` into
rabbitmq.conf — a broker-level switch that closes the socket on every interface
at once and drops in-cluster plaintext clients along with external ones. It
stays unset, so enabling TLS adds encrypted endpoints without breaking a
working connection; treat an external RabbitMQ as plaintext-reachable and
restrict it at the network layer if that is not acceptable.
Erlang distribution on 25672 is unaffected either way: the operator never
applies the flag to the headless Service that carries it.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Both objects holding ca.crt also hold a private key: the leaf <release>-tls
carries the server key and the CA <release>-ca carries the CA key. RBAC has no
key-level filter, so granting either one to deliver a trust anchor delivers a
key with it — read access to the CA key is enough to issue a certificate for
anything and MITM the endpoint undetected.
Publish the CA instead: label the isCA Certificate so the CA-extraction
controller projects ca.crt alone into the key-free <release>.tenant-ca, which
tenants read through core.cozystack.io/tenantsecrets. The labels go on the CA
Certificate rather than the leaf, since projecting from the leaf would read a
Secret whose tls.key is the server key. The release label is required because
cert-manager issues the Secret, leaving no OwnerReference or Helm metadata to
attribute it by.
Back the label-only include with a name-based exclude covering the cert-manager
chain and the operator's erlang-cookie, so a mis-stamp of the trust-anchor label
cannot promote a private key. The erlang cookie is worth the entry on its own:
it grants peer-node code execution over port 25672, which disableNonTLSListeners
does not close.
Document the retrieval path and state the limits it comes with — the projection
depends on a controller that ships separately, and the CA rotates, so a bundle
copied once eventually stops verifying.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Replace implicit RSA key generation with explicit ECDSA P-256 for both the
CA and leaf Certificates. ECDSA P-256 provides equivalent security with
smaller keys and faster TLS handshakes.
CA privateKey: algorithm ECDSA, size 256, rotationPolicy Never (unchanged).
Leaf privateKey: algorithm ECDSA, size 256, rotationPolicy Always.
Also migrate tri-state detection in certmanager.yaml from
hasKey+ne nil to the canonical kindIs "invalid" pattern.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
cozyvalues-gen v1.5.0 with {*bool} annotation emits "type": "boolean" (not
["boolean", "null"]), making the manual jq patch unnecessary. Remove the
nullable patch and its precondition check from the Makefile.
Update tri-state detection in certmanager.yaml and rabbitmq.yaml to use the
canonical kindIs "invalid" pattern, which correctly handles both the
missing-key and explicit-null cases without hasKey+ne nil.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
When both external and TLS are active, the public LoadBalancer was exposing
plaintext amqp (5672) and management (15672) alongside the TLS equivalents.
Restrict the LB override to amqps (5671) and management-tls (15671) only.
In-cluster ClusterIP plain listeners are intentionally left open to support
client migration without disruption. spec.tls.disableNonTLSListeners is not
set to avoid closing plain ports at the broker level.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Add the <release>-tls Secret to the dashboard Role resourceNames when TLS
is active, allowing tenants to retrieve the CA certificate via kubectl.
The tri-state logic in dashboard-resourcemap.yaml mirrors the same pattern
used in certmanager.yaml and rabbitmq.yaml.
Also include rabbitmq-{{ .name }}-tls in cozyrds secrets.include so the
dashboard surfaces the TLS Secret alongside the default-user credential.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Adds wildcard and base SANs for the <release>-nodes headless service
required by RabbitMQ Cluster Operator for inter-node TLS handshake
(Erlang distribution between pods). Without these entries, hostname
verification fails during cluster formation.
Also quotes all dnsNames entries to handle the wildcard (*) prefix,
which is otherwise rejected as an invalid YAML anchor character.
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Update certmanager_test.yaml SAN assertions to match the new default
cluster domain (cozy.local) and add a test that verifies a custom
_cluster.cluster-domain propagates into the FQDN SAN.
Add a tri-state LoadBalancer port override test (tls.enabled unset +
external=true) to cover the case that was untested in the existing matrix.
Replace documentIndex: 0 in the baseline RabbitmqCluster test with
a documentSelector so the test is stable regardless of render order.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The previous hasKey-only check treated an explicit null tls.enabled as a
real value (false), skipping the external fallback. Add a nil guard so
null is handled the same as absent — TLS inherits from .Values.external.
Replace the hardcoded cluster.local suffix in cert SANs with the
platform-injected _cluster.cluster-domain value (defaulting to cozy.local),
consistent with how clickhouse, foundationdb, mongodb, and opensearch resolve
the cluster DNS domain.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Add Helm unittest cases for cert-manager resource generation and RabbitMQ TLS configuration, with a fixture file for default TLS values.
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Add cert-manager Certificate and Issuer resources for RabbitMQ TLS, and wire TLS secret references into the RabbitMQ cluster manifest.
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Extend RabbitMQ values schema with TLS configuration options, update Go API types, regenerate CRD artifacts, and add TLS fields to the rabbitmq-rd operator config.
Signed-off-by: Arsolitt <arsolitt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
## What this PR does
Fixes#2985. Editing a `VMDisk`'s `storageClass` or `source` after its
DataVolume already exists was silently ignored:
`packages/apps/vm-disk/templates/dv.yaml` looks up the existing
DataVolume and, when found, reused its `spec` verbatim (because
`DataVolume.spec` is immutable in CDI). The edit therefore rendered as a
no-op — the typed CR accepted it and the HelmRelease reported success,
while the DataVolume/PVC kept the original spec and the source of truth
silently diverged from the cluster.
The template now builds the desired `source` into a shared
`$desiredSource` variable (used both for rendering and comparison) and,
when a DataVolume already exists, calls `fail()` with an explicit
message if the requested `storageClass` or `source` differs from the
immutable existing spec — mirroring the explicit size handling already
done in `pvc-resize-hook.yaml`. Storage growth is unaffected and still
flows through the resize hook.
`source` is also marked `@immutable` in `values.yaml`, so the generated
schema now carries the same `x-kubernetes-validations` transition rule
(`self == oldSelf`) that `storageClass` already had; `types.go`,
`values.schema.json` and the generated `vm-disk-rd` CRD are regenerated
to match.
### Verification
- `helm unittest` covers both the immutability guard (via a mocked
existing DataVolume through `kubernetesProvider`, since `lookup` needs a
cluster) and initial-creation source rendering for every source type —
12/12 pass.
- Verified live on a dev cluster with `helm install --dry-run=server`
against a real DataVolume: an unchanged edit renders, a `storageClass`
change fails, a `source` change fails, and a storage grow still renders
the resize hook without tripping the guard.
### Scope note
This PR only makes the drift visible and marks `source` immutable. Two
deeper platform findings sit outside its scope: (1) #2657 (pre-existing)
— the `apps.cozystack.io` aggregated apiserver does not evaluate the
`x-kubernetes-validations` CEL rules on update, so `@immutable` is a
no-op at admission for every Application kind, which is exactly why the
chart-level `fail()` — not the CEL rule — is the substantive guard here;
(2) #3971 — that same apiserver does not honour `--dry-run=server` and
persists the change (surfaced while testing this fix).
### Downstream repositories
Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the diff
file by file. The diff touches only `packages/apps/vm-disk/` (template,
`values.yaml`, regenerated `values.schema.json`, tests), the regenerated
`packages/system/vm-disk-rd/cozyrds/vm-disk.yaml`, and
`api/apps/v1alpha1/vmdisk/types.go`. No package was added, renamed or
removed; no `values.schema.json` field was added, renamed or removed
(only a validation rule on the existing `source` field); no default
changed; `README.md` is unchanged; the `cozyrds` file was regenerated,
not renamed. The terraform provider models fields, defaults and enums
but not CEL immutability, so it is unaffected. No downstream repository
is reached by this change.
- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:
### Release note
```release-note
fix(vm-disk): editing storageClass or source on an existing VMDisk now fails with a clear message instead of being silently ignored; delete and recreate the disk to change these immutable fields.
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **New Features**
* Added support for blank, HTTP, image, disk, and upload VM disk
sources.
* VM disk sources and storage classes are now protected from unintended
changes, while storage expansion remains supported.
* Existing disks preserve their configured source and storage settings.
* **Bug Fixes**
* Invalid or conflicting source configurations are rejected.
* Prevented silent no-op updates and incorrect immutability errors for
existing disks.
* **Documentation**
* Documented source and storage class immutability, including the need
to recreate disks when changing either setting.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
## What this PR does
Adds a **managed Valkey** service to the catalog, alongside managed
Redis.
> **Stacked on #3406** (redis-operator migration to freshworks-oss).
This PR targets that branch and depends on it; review/merge #3406 first.
### Why
Redis relicensed at 8.x to a source-available family (AGPLv3 / SSPL /
RSALv2), and the managed Redis app currently ships `v8: 8.4.0` with no
BSD-licensed option ≤ 7.2. That is a licensing risk for CNCF Incubation.
[Valkey](https://valkey.io) is the BSD-3-Clause fork of Redis 7.2.4,
governed by the Linux Foundation, and a drop-in replacement for Redis.
This is the same move Argo CD made —
[`cncf/foundation#750`](https://github.com/cncf/foundation/issues/750)
was closed with "no need for exception" after they migrated to Valkey.
### How it works
Valkey runs on the same operator as managed Redis. #3406 migrates that
operator from the archived `spotahome/redis-operator` to the
actively-maintained **freshworks-oss/redis-operator** fork, which adds a
native `spec.engine: Valkey` switch. With it, the operator runs
`valkey-server` / `valkey-cli` natively (in the launch command and in
its liveness / readiness / shutdown probes), so the chart uses the
official `valkey/valkey` image directly — **no Redis-compatibility shim
image**.
The app mirrors managed Redis: same shape/values (`replicas`,
`resources`/`resourcesPreset`, `size`, `storageClass`, `external`,
`version`, `authEnabled`), Sentinel-based HA, metrics exporter,
`WorkloadMonitor`s, dashboard resource map, and `ApplicationDefinition`
(`kind: Valkey`).
Versions offered: `v8 → 8.1.8` (default) and `v7 → 7.2.13` (the
BSD-3-Clause Redis 7.2 line, most conservative drop-in).
### How it was verified
- `helm template` renders cleanly for `v8`, `v7`, and `external: true`;
the `RedisFailover` carries `spec.engine: Valkey` and `image:
valkey/valkey:<version>`. `helm lint` shows only the pre-existing
icon-URL / `cozy-lib` warnings that managed Redis emits too.
- `helm template` of `valkey-rd` renders a valid `ApplicationDefinition`
(`kind: Valkey`, `plural: valkeys`, `category: PaaS`).
- Generated artifacts (`values.schema.json`, `README.md`, `types.go`,
`zz_generated.deepcopy.go`, the ApplicationDefinition `openAPISchema`)
reproduce with the pinned `cozyvalues-gen` v1.6.0 and `controller-gen`
v0.16.4 — root `make generate` and per-app generate both produce no
drift; `go build ./valkey/...` passes.
- A live-cluster e2e was not run from this environment; the Chainsaw
suite `hack/e2e-chainsaw/valkey/` (mirroring the redis suite) is
included and `hack/select-e2e.sh` maps the `valkey-application` source
to it, so it runs in CI once the freshworks operator image is built.
### Notes
- The Valkey logo (`packages/apps/valkey/logos/valkey.svg`) is a
placeholder in Valkey's brand colors, pending the official brand asset.
- A Grafana `db/valkey` dashboard was intentionally left out of this
initial PoC; it can follow.
### Screenshots
N/A — no UI changes.
### Downstream repositories
This adds a new managed-app kind, which likely warrants follow-ups in
`cozystack/website` (user-facing docs for the new service) and possibly
`cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack`. No follow-up PRs are opened
yet — leaving these for a maintainer to decide, per the template
guidance.
- [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:
### Release note
```release-note
feat(valkey): add managed Valkey service — a BSD-3-Clause, Linux Foundation-governed alternative to managed Redis, running on the freshworks-oss redis-operator via native spec.engine: Valkey (versions 8.1.8 and 7.2.13)
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **New Features**
* Added managed Valkey service support with high availability and
configurable replicas.
* Supports Valkey versions 7 and 8, persistent storage, resource
presets, authentication, and optional external access.
* Added monitoring metrics and dashboard integration.
* Added platform package integration and tenant administrator access.
* **Documentation**
* Added Valkey configuration guidance and storage-class immutability
documentation.
* **Tests**
* Added end-to-end coverage for deployment readiness, storage, and
replicas.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
The v1.11.5 tag in cozystack/ingress-nginx-with-protobuf-exporter now points
at the merge of its #7, which builds lua-protobuf with -fno-strict-aliasing.
The digest pinned here was the build before that, whose pb.so makes nginx's
cache manager and cache loader children segfault continuously: tens per
second, indefinitely. The workers are unaffected, so the pod stays Ready with
no restarts and nothing surfaces until the master itself segfaults, which is
how this reached main unnoticed.
Verified against the published image rather than a local build. The one-line
repro, luajit -e 'require "protoc"', exits 0 where it exited 139, and a 25
second nginx run on a generated ingress-nginx config produces no signal 11
where the pinned build produced 105.
The exporter is re-pinned alongside it because one tag builds both images, so
the rebuild published a new exporter digest too. Its source did not change.
release-1.5 and release-1.6 pin v1.11.2 and were never affected.
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
## What this PR does
Documentation follow-up to #3962. Both reviewers (CodeRabbit and
@androndo/@IvanHunters) noted that the new `affinity` value is not
applied retroactively: the etcd-operator sets `spec.affinity` only when
it creates or replaces a member Pod and never reschedules running
members. On a cluster that already has co-located members (the exact
failure #3962 targets) the default soft rule — or a newly set hard rule
— takes effect only as each member is replaced.
This adds that caveat to the `affinity` parameter documentation in
`values.yaml` and regenerates `values.schema.json`, `README.md`, and the
embedded `openAPISchema` in `etcd-rd`. No template or behaviour change;
`make test` passes (20/20).
The other inline note (the soft podAntiAffinity default overlaps the
soft `topologySpreadConstraints`) was explicitly flagged as "fine to
keep as-is", so no code change is made for it.
> Note: this PR is stacked on `fix/etcd-soft-antiaffinity` (#3962) and
will retarget to `main` once that merges.
### Screenshots
n/a — no UI changes.
### Downstream repositories
Doc-only change to an app chart (regenerated artifacts). No package
added/renamed/removed, `kind`/`plural` unchanged, no installer
values/assets/variants touched. No downstream follow-up required.
- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change
### Release note
```release-note
NONE
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **Documentation**
* Clarified that etcd affinity rules apply when member Pods are created
or replaced.
* Noted that running members are not rescheduled retroactively; the rule
takes effect as each member is replaced.
* Updated the guidance consistently across configuration documentation
and schema descriptions.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
The freshworks-oss operator authenticates the CLI in its generated
readiness and shutdown scripts by exporting the engine's auth env var
before invoking it. For the Valkey engine it used VALKEYCLI_AUTH, but
valkey-cli honours only REDISCLI_AUTH (its --help documents that name and
no VALKEYCLI_AUTH). With auth enabled the readiness probe's valkey-cli
call therefore returned NOAUTH, the role never resolved, and the data
pods never became Ready.
Patch valkeyEngine.CLIAuthEnvName to REDISCLI_AUTH so auth-enabled Valkey
instances pass readiness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com>
## What this PR does
Enables operator-managed TLS for MongoDB and stops handing tenants any
Secret that carries private key material.
- Percona Server for MongoDB serves TLS unconditionally (`mode:
preferTLS`), so this PR drops the misleading `tls.enabled` toggle rather
than pretending the chart controls it.
- The tenant no longer receives the operator's CA Secret
(`<release>-ca-cert`, which holds `ca.key`) or the leaf
(`<release>-ssl`). Both were previously reachable, and either one is a
private key in tenant hands, the CA one is a full trust-chain
compromise.
- The chart declares a `TenantProjection` sentinel naming its CA source
Secret (`<release>-ssl`, the operator-managed leaf, which carries
`ca.crt`), and the ResourceDefinition selects the resulting key-free
`<release>.tenant-ca` projection by the engine-agnostic
`internal.cozystack.io/tenant-ca` label. The CA-extraction controller
reads the sentinel and publishes the projection holding only `ca.crt`.
The tenant gets what it needs to verify the server and nothing else.
### Why the include also carries an exclude list
The trust-anchor selector matches by label with no name constraint, so
any Secret in the namespace that acquired that label would be promoted
with its data copied verbatim. The enumerable dangerous set is therefore
excluded explicitly: the CA, both leaves, the rotation snapshots
(`-ssl-old`, `-ssl-internal-old`, same server keys as the leaves, and
unlike them they carry no owner reference, so an interrupted rotation
can leave them behind after the release is gone), the system-user
passwords, the at-rest encryption key, the keyfile, the object-storage
credentials, and both forms of the operator's internal Secret.
That backstop is bounded, and the comment says so: matching is by exact
name with no globs, so a Secret a future operator version introduces, or
a transient object an issuer creates mid-renewal, stays in scope of the
label-only include. The per-user Secrets cannot be enumerated at all,
since their names carry the username. The primary defence remains that
the controller stamps only its own projection; this closes the
enumerable set, not the whole surface.
### Release note
```release-note
feat(mongodb): stop exposing TLS private key material to tenants and publish the CA as a key-free trust anchor
```
The operator applies spec.affinity only when it creates or replaces a member
Pod; it does not reschedule running members. Document that on the `affinity`
value so operators do not expect the default (or a newly set rule) to
redistribute already co-located members until each is replaced.
Addresses the non-blocking review notes on #3962.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io>
The freshworks-oss redis-operator filters its RedisFailover List and
Watch with a server-side selector on OPERATOR_GROUP_ID (cozystack). A
RedisFailover without the matching operator-group label is never seen by
the operator, so no data pods, sentinels, PVCs or services are created.
Match the redis app chart, which already sets the label.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com>
## What this PR does
Converges nats onto the key-free CA trust-anchor contract. A TLS-enabled
nats release renders a `TenantProjection` sentinel naming the chart's
cert-manager CA Secret as its source, and the nats ResourceDefinition
selects the resulting `<release>.tenant-ca` object by label. The
projection is built by the CA extraction controller in
`internal/controller/cacert`, which parses the source certificate and
re-encodes it into a single `ca.crt` key, so a tenant that enables TLS
gets something to verify the server against without ever getting a
private key. No key-bearing Secret is granted to a tenant, by name or by
label.
`packages/apps/nats/templates/certmanager.yaml` is not touched. An
earlier draft of this change stamped publish labels onto the CA
`Certificate`'s `secretTemplate`; the controller that shipped consumes a
sentinel object instead, so the chart now declares its source rather
than marking it. The functional change is one new template and one
`matchLabels` entry in the ResourceDefinition.
The sentinel is gated on the chart's effective TLS state, which is
tri-state: left unset it follows `external`. That gate is the single
divergence from the postgres implementation of the same contract, and it
exists because the nats CA is only issued while TLS resolves true. An
ungated sentinel would sit `Ready=False/SourceNotFound` forever on every
plaintext release.
The CA extraction controller is already on main, so this is live on
merge rather than dormant until a follow-up lands. The
`do-not-merge/hold` label predates that and no longer guards anything.
## Verified against a running cluster
The premise this rests on is that cert-manager populates `ca.crt` on the
Secret of a `selfSigned`, `isCA: true` Certificate. Nothing in this
repository witnesses it: `hack/e2e-chainsaw/` has no nats suite, and
nats appears in no e2e workflow, so every unit test here encodes the
same assumption the chart encodes and the two cannot catch each other
being wrong. I closed it against a live cluster instead, running
cert-manager v1.20.2, the version this repo ships, on two independent
nats releases:
- `nats-<name>-ca`, the chart's CA Secret, holds `ca.crt`, `tls.crt` and
`tls.key`. The declared source key exists.
- `nats-<name>.tenant-ca`, the projection, holds exactly one key,
`ca.crt`.
- The projection's SHA-256 certificate fingerprint equals the source's,
so it carries that CA and not some other certificate.
- The projection carries `internal.cozystack.io/tenant-ca: "true"` and
`internal.cozystack.io/tenantresource: "true"`. The second is stamped by
the lineage webhook, computed from the ResourceDefinition selector this
PR adds, so its presence means the whole chain held.
- `kubectl get tenantsecret nats-<name>-ca` returns NotFound. The
key-bearing Secret is not served through the tenant API.
What is still missing is an automated regression witness for that
premise. Adding one means a new chainsaw suite for nats, which has no
e2e coverage of any kind today, and that is a larger change than this
one.
## What the tests pin
61 helm-unittest cases and 3 bats cases. The sentinel's absence of
`ownerReferences` (an owner would short-circuit the lineage walk before
it reaches the Flux label the attribution depends on), the length of
`spec.projections` as well as its single entry (the controller refuses a
multi-entry sentinel, so a second entry is a silent loss of the anchor
rather than a leak), both implied legs of the tri-state TLS gate, and
`notExists` on either visibility label for both key-bearing
Certificates.
The bats guard covers the two grant surfaces nothing else asserts on.
The ResourceDefinition is rendered, by the `nats-rd` chart inlining
`cozyrds/*`, but that chart has neither a tests directory nor the `test`
target `hack/helm-unit-tests.sh` looks for, and no
`packages/system/*-rd` package does. The dashboard Role is rendered by a
chart that has both, and no suite under `packages/apps/nats/tests/`
asserts on it.
Both are compared whole rather than filtered down to the entries that
mention a Secret, because every such filter admits the spelling it did
not anticipate. A name whitelist passes an added label selector, and
`controller.cert-manager.io/fao` is stamped on both key-bearing Secrets,
so a selector on it is a one-line grant of the CA private key. On the
Role side, a rule with no `resourceNames` names no Secret, a rule with
`resources: ["*"]` names no resource, and a ClusterRole is not a Role,
while all three grant read access to the CA key. Comparing the rendered
output whole needs no filter and leaves no spelling to find.
## Downstream repositories
Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the
diff, file by file. No trigger fires, and no follow-up PR is owed.
`packages/apps/nats/templates/tenant-projection.yaml` is a new template
and `packages/apps/nats/tests/` holds chart tests. No package is added,
renamed or removed; `values.yaml` and `values.schema.json` are
untouched, so neither the hand-written Terraform schema, its version
enums, nor its restated defaults have anything to track. `kind`,
`plural` and `release.prefix` are unchanged, and no output Secret or
Service is renamed, so the provider's concatenated name lookups still
resolve.
`packages/system/nats-rd/cozyrds/nats.yaml` is edited in place rather
than renamed, so the ccp external-app skill's dependency-contract anchor
still resolves. The provider offers no typed access to the new
projection, which is the position it already holds for every Secret it
does not model, and not a break.
`packages/apps/nats/README.md` is covered by the one automated path that
does exist: `nats` is present in the website `Makefile` `APPS` list, so
the docs bot regenerates the managed-apps reference page from this
`README.md` on the next stable tag. This is the silent-skip failure mode
the trigger map warns about, so I checked the list rather than assuming;
an app missing from it gets no page at all, which is what happened to
`opensearch`.
`hack/check-nats-rd-secrets.bats` is a new file, not a move or a rename,
and it changes no make target's contract: `Makefile` globs `hack/*.bats`
into `BATS_UNIT_FILES` automatically. The ccp skills anchor on
`hack/package.mk` and `hack/common-envs.mk`, neither of which is
touched.
- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:
Part of #2814.
### Release note
```release-note
feat(nats): expose the CA certificate to tenants as a key-free `<release>.tenant-ca` Secret
```
## What this PR does
Converges qdrant onto the key-free CA trust-anchor contract (#2814), the
same way #3340 does it for nats. The chart declares a `TenantProjection`
sentinel naming its cert-manager CA Secret. The CA-extraction controller
reads that declaration and publishes a key-free copy, `ca.crt` and
nothing else, as `<release>.tenant-ca`. The qdrant ResourceDefinition
selects that projection by label so it shows up in the tenant's secret
list. No key-bearing Secret gains a tenant-visible label.
The sentinel is gated on the chart's TLS condition. Engines whose
operator mints a CA unconditionally do not need that, but qdrant only
has a CA while TLS is on, and an ungated sentinel would sit
`Ready=False`/`SourceNotFound` on every plaintext release.
This was held while the CA-extraction controller was still open. That
controller landed in #3407, so the sentinel is honoured as soon as this
merges and the hold is gone.
Tests pin the invariants that otherwise fail silently. The sentinel
carries no `ownerReferences`, so the lineage walk falls through to the
Flux release label. Neither key-bearing Certificate stamps a
tenant-visible label on its Secret. The two objects that decide which
Secrets a tenant may actually read, the dashboard Role with its binding
and the ResourceDefinition, are pinned whole rather than checked for
known-bad names: a rule granting secrets with no `resourceNames` is
unrestricted rather than narrow, and a label selector can reach a
key-bearing Secret while every name in the file stays correct, so
neither adds a name for a probe to notice.
Part of #2814.
### Follow-ups
What this PR does not do, and where each belongs instead.
- nats converges the same contract in #3340 and has no
`dashboard-resourcemap_test.yaml`, so the dashboard Role pin belongs
there too. Tracked in #3701 along with postgres, which already carries
the label selector with no guard behind it.
- The qdrant e2e fixture runs plaintext
(`hack/e2e-chainsaw/qdrant/qdrant.yaml` sets `external: false`), so
nothing in CI walks the path from the sentinel to `tenantsecrets`.
postgres has a `verify-tenant-ca-projection` step to copy.
- `hack/check-qdrant-rd-secrets.bats` is engine-agnostic apart from two
literals, the chart path and the expected Secret set. The third copy of
it is the point to parameterise over `packages/system/*-rd/cozyrds/`
instead of copying again.
### Downstream repositories
Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the
diff, file by file. Nothing needs a manual follow-up, but not for the
reason a values-only walk would give: the website reference page for an
app is regenerated from that package's `README.md`, and this PR does
change it. `qdrant` is in the app list hardcoded in the website
`Makefile`, so the docs bot picks the new section up on the next stable
tag and there is nothing to open by hand. The Terraform provider's
schema is hand-written against `values.schema.json`, which is untouched,
and the provider offers no typed access to the new projection, the same
position it holds for every other Secret it does not model. No package
is added, renamed or removed, and the `cozyrds` file is edited in place
rather than renamed, so the ccp dependency-contract anchor still
resolves.
User-facing documentation for consuming the trust anchor ships with the
chart README, matching #3340.
- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:
### Release note
```release-note
feat(qdrant): expose the CA certificate to tenants as a key-free `<release>.tenant-ca` Secret
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **New Features**
* Tenant environments can securely access the Qdrant TLS CA certificate
without receiving the private key.
* TLS CA access is automatically enabled when TLS or external access is
configured.
* **Documentation**
* Expanded TLS guidance explains certificate validation and provides
commands for retrieving the tenant CA certificate.
* **Tests**
* Added coverage for TLS projections, secret visibility, dashboard
resources, and secure fail-closed secret exposure.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
Every object this chart creates is named after the Helm release, not
after the MongoDB resource, so a MongoDB named catest yields
mongodb-catest.tenant-ca. The retrieval commands used a bare <release>
placeholder, which reads as the resource name and produces a command
that returns nothing. Spell the prefix out in the two commands meant to
be copied, and define the placeholder once for the prose.
Split the sentinel's shape test in two. The absence of ownerReferences
is the invariant — it breaks the walk from the projection back to the
release, and the tenant stops receiving the anchor. An explicit
namespace or a chart-added label breaks nothing by itself; grouping all
three under one name presented them as equally load-bearing.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The assertions withholding the key-bearing TLS Secrets from the tenant
Role addressed it as document 0 and, in two cases, asserted only with
notContains. Neither survives a rearrangement.
notContains passes when its path does not resolve, so a test built from
it alone goes green against the wrong document. Reversing the order of
the two documents in the template moved the RoleBinding into position 0,
and "does not grant the key-bearing TLS secrets when external is
enabled" and "does not grant the tenant-ca projection by name" both
stayed green while the Role granted <release>-ca-cert by name — the
Secret holding the CA private key.
Select the Role by kind, and pair every notContains with a positive
assertion on the same path so a rule reordering that moves rules[1]
reddens too. Indexing survives neither rearrangement; selecting survives
the first; the positive anchor catches the second.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The name-clash note claimed the shared TLS helper documents
<release>-ca-cert as the conventional key-free anchor. It documents the
opposite: the canonical name is <release>.tenant-ca, and it names this
engine as the reason, because MongoDB already claims <release>-ca-cert
with a key-bearing Secret. There is no clash to warn about and the chart
follows the convention rather than deviating from it. The paragraph
above already says <release>-ca-cert holds the CA private key, so drop
the note instead of inverting it.
Guard the ownerReference assertions against an absent list. length() of
null is a type error rather than a failed comparison, and the harness
returns it as an error, which aborts the poll instead of retrying — so
the timeout never applies while the operator is still patching the
reference on.
Restore the two-variable form of the fingerprint comparison. Inlining
both command substitutions into the test swallows a non-zero exit: with
no openssl on PATH both sides are empty, they compare equal, and the
check passes having compared nothing.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The README said the sentinel would sit inert with nothing else
affected. The CRD is a template of the controller's own chart, so a
cluster without the controller has no TenantProjection kind and the
release fails to render at all. The caveat also guarded a state that
cannot occur, since the controller is a mandatory platform component —
drop it rather than restate it, matching the postgres chart, and keep
the paragraph explaining the choice of source Secret.
Enumerate all three key-bearing Secrets in the registry negative. Two of
the three were listed, which leaves the third free to acquire the label
and leak a key, the exact reasoning the step above it already spells
out.
Collect TenantProjection status on failure. The controller reports
SourceNotFound and its siblings there, and without it a failed
projection surfaces only as an absent Secret with no reason given.
Rename the source-shape step, which no longer looks at the CA Secret,
and cross-reference the two halves of the leaf Secret's name.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The cert-manager exclusion suite justified its `any: true` requirement
with a specific number of rendered documents. The argument only needs
"more than one"; the number was already tied to one value set and the
sentinel adds another document.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
A tenant verifying a MongoDB endpoint needs the CA certificate, and
every Secret that holds one also holds a private key: the operator's
<release>-ca-cert carries the CA key, the leaf <release>-ssl the server
key. Granting either would hand over the key along with the anchor.
Render a TenantProjection naming the source, so the CA-extraction
controller can publish the key-free <release>.tenant-ca, and select that
projection by label from the managed-service definition. The sentinel
carries no ownerReferences: it is resolved back to its release through
the label Flux stamps, and an owner reference short-circuits that walk
and silently costs the tenant its anchor.
The sentinel is ungated. The operator issues the certificate chain
whatever the chart asks for, so the source exists for every release and
there is no plaintext leg to skip.
The source is <release>-ssl rather than <release>-ca-cert. It is the
name this chart itself sets in spec.secrets.ssl, so the reference cannot
drift from the CR; the operator writes it on both its cert-manager path
and the self-signed fallback it uses when cert-manager is absent, where
no <release>-ca-cert exists at all; and it holds the merged old and new
CA through a rotation, where <release>-ca-cert holds only the new one
and would stop verifying pods still serving the previous leaf.
Withhold the key-bearing Secrets from the tenant explicitly as well. The
label selector matches on no name, so a single mis-stamp would promote a
private key; the exclude list is evaluated first and closes the
enumerable set.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The upgrade-restart note said the replica set stays available through the
rollout. That holds at three members and fails below them, and the chart
permits both smaller sizes: replicas 1 and 2 render unsafeFlags.replsetSize
and are not excluded from the SAN change, so they gain horizons and roll on
upgrade exactly as a three-member release does. At one replica the rollout
takes the only mongod down; at two the write majority is still two, so
restarting either member stalls writes until it returns. An operator running
a single-replica external release would have read the old text and declined
to book a window.
Cover the two replicas case, which was untested, and assert horizons and the
sub-quorum marker together at both sizes, so gating horizons to sizes that
can absorb a restart turns the tests red and sends someone back to this
paragraph. The default-size case carries the pair as a positive control: the
marker proves nothing unless it is absent where a restart is survivable.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The CA retrieval command was documented without the other half: what to do
with the bundle once it is in hand. A tenant reading only the retrieval step
has the certificate and no worked example of a verified connection.
Pass the two TLS inputs as mongosh flags rather than folding tls=true into
the connection string, because the correct separator differs by topology --
the replica-set URI already carries a ?replicaSet=rs0 query and the sharded
one carries none, so a single copyable form would be wrong for one of them.
Call out that omitting the flags is silent. Under preferTLS the server
accepts the plaintext connection and nothing reports the downgrade, so a
working connection is not evidence that TLS was negotiated.
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The external-hostname note claimed the operator and the CR version were "both
shipped by this chart". Only crVersion is: the PSMDB operator is a separate
platform component with its own lifecycle, and the SAN fold is gated on both.
On a platform carrying an older operator nothing reports the unmet gate — the
chart still renders splitHorizons, the CR is still accepted and the cluster
still comes up healthy, while the external hostnames never enter the SAN list
and a verifying client fails the handshake. State which half the chart owns and
point at the operator version as the thing to check.
The leaf certificate lifetime was stated as a flat 90 days. It is an operator
default this chart deliberately does not pin: nothing in the tenant contract
keys off it, the operator reissues without client action, and pinning would
freeze the chart against upstream shortening it. Attribute the number to the
operator version and pin the field's absence, so "inherited rather than chosen"
stays falsifiable — the same treatment allowInvalidCertificates already gets.
Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
Every assertion in the suite passed while checking nothing. containsDocument
without `any: true` asserts that EVERY rendered document matches, so negating
it asks whether "not every document is a Certificate" — true of any chart
rendering more than one object, and this one renders eight. A cert-manager
Certificate appended to templates/mongodb.yaml, the most plausible place for
one to appear, left the suite fully green.
Add `any: true` to each containsDocument so the negation means "no document
anywhere is of this kind". Unscoped assertions are ANDed across template
files, which is what makes the negatives correct: they go red if any file
renders the forbidden kind.
Add a positive control asserting the chart does render the PerconaServerMongoDB
CR through the same matcher shape, scoped to the one template that emits it.
The four negatives are all satisfied by a matcher that never matches, which is
exactly how this suite failed; the control fails if that returns.
Verified by injecting a Certificate into the chart: the suite now fails and
previously passed.
Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The uninstall section promised that no manual cleanup of the TLS Secrets is
needed, reversing the instruction it replaced. That promise rests on an
ownerReference the operator patches on at reconcile time rather than sets at
creation, and two paths skip the patch: a dry-run reconcile returns before it,
and a Secret already present under the same name with a mismatched
cert-manager.io/certificate-name annotation is counted toward success and
returned on unpatched. The deletion finalizer does not cover the gap — it
enumerates only the users, internal-<release>, internal-<release>-users and
encryption-key Secrets. So a Secret predating the release at one of these names
can stay unowned and survive uninstall, and for <release>-ca-cert that orphans
the CA private key.
State the reconcile-time mechanism and tell operators to confirm the CA Secret
is gone. Pin the outcome with a chainsaw step asserting the CR owns all three
TLS Secrets on a normal install, so the claim goes red if the operator stops
patching instead of rotting as prose.
The external-hostname note described a permanently empty _namespace.host as a
bootstrap window that self-heals. A tenant with no host of its own and no
ancestor supplying one resolves to an empty host for good, leaving external
TLS hostname verification silently unavailable. Name that case alongside the
transient one, and say why the render is not failed closed: it would break
existing hostless tenants already running external access over IP.
Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The TLS notes made several claims the operator's own behaviour contradicts.
The CA is issued for a year and renewed about a month early, not for a decade
with rotation disabled — so a bundle copied once stops verifying, and the
retrieval steps now say to re-read it. Sharded mongos SANs are complete,
because the operator emits them for every topology; the real gap is that no SAN
covers the single external LoadBalancer fronting mongos, so external hostname
verification is unsupported there. preferTLS is the operator's own default
rather than a posture adopted to accommodate backups, which run under the same
certificates. External access in replica set mode is one LoadBalancer per
member with driver-side primary discovery, not a single load-balanced
endpoint — the old description contradicted the external SAN note. And the
posture section named only one of its two inherited weaknesses: unverified
clients are accepted as well as plaintext ones.
The lifecycle section was wrong in both directions. The operator owns its TLS
Secrets and its cert-manager objects through the CR, so they are collected on
uninstall rather than left behind. The rotation snapshots are the opposite of
what was written: the operator deletes them itself once the merged CA has
landed, and reads the previous CA back out of them while a rotation is in
flight — so the advice to delete them by hand could destroy the only copy of
the old CA. Only an interrupted rotation strands them.
Document what an upgrade actually does to a release already running with
external access: the new hostnames become certificate SANs, the leaf is
reissued, and the replica set rolls. Gate the retrieval steps on the component
that publishes the trust anchor and on cert-manager, without which the declared
source does not exist and the command returns nothing.
Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
The unit-test runner discovers charts by probing for a test target, and this
chart had none — so its suites had never run in CI.
Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>