Commit Graph
14 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexey Artamonov e63b9e439c fix(monitoring): count a central request as the receiver admitted it
The limiter refuses for good any request it counts above burst, and
burst was the receiver's 4 MiB cap. A request grows on its way to the
limiter: the sampler adds a tracestate to every span it keeps, and the
limiter counts a request as the collector re-encodes it, which writes
the empty value of every attribute the wire may omit, so a valid
request of spans with empty-valued attributes is counted 1.4x. A
request the receiver admitted near its cap was therefore refused on
every retry.

The limiter now runs right after memory_limiter, so it counts the
request before sampling. The receiver caps a request at 3 MiB and
burst stays at 5 MiB, which holds 1.4x the cap; a larger burst would
also be what each pod start lets through above the rate. The rate is
counted before sampling, so the store keeps only the sampled share of
it. The texts say that a request above the cap gets a 400, which
senders do not retry, and that each collector rollout a tenant causes
lets that burst through again on every pod.

The replica bound that keeps that allowance small now applies only to
a central tenant's collector, whose render fails above ten replicas: a
collector writing to the tenant's own store has no rate, and the
replica counts it shipped with stay valid.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io>
2026-10-06 09:39:04 +03:00
Alexey Artamonov 177b207a27 feat(monitoring): hold each shared-central tenant to a write rate
The design has the per-tenant collector rate-limit its tenant, so that
a noisy or hostile tenant cannot exhaust a shared backend. The disk cap
alone does not do that: VictoriaTraces always keeps the last two days,
so a tenant writing faster than the cap allows over two days fills the
disk for every tenant on the store.

The platform sets the rate with
monitoring.tracingCentralTenantBytesPerSecond, and it reaches every
tenant in _cluster through the cozystack-values Secret. A change there is a change in the values each
monitoring HelmRelease reads, so Flux upgrades them all; a rate read
with lookup at render time would never reach a tenant whose release is
already in sync. The platform writes the key only when it is set, since
every release in every tenant reads that Secret. Without it the
collector holds the tenant to the rate of a default 10Gi store.

Each central tenant's collector splits the rate across its replicas
and refuses data above it before the batch processor, so the sender
sees the refusal. An OTLP/HTTP sender gets a 429 and retries; the
limiter answers gRPC with RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED and no RetryInfo, which
the OTLP specification makes final, so central tenants should export
over HTTP.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io>
2026-10-06 09:39:04 +03:00
Alexey Artamonov 69a16bd2da docs(tenant): shorten the tracingCentral description
The description ships in the godoc, the schema, the README, the
ApplicationDefinition and the dashboard's field help, and at about
2,800 characters it buried what an operator needs to decide on the
field. It now says what the field does, what tenant-root has to host
first, and who is inside the shared store's trust boundary; the
lifecycle details move to the user guide.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io>
2026-10-01 18:02:22 +03:00
Alexey Artamonov 2d10565873 feat(tenant): let a tenant opt into shared-central tracing
tracingCentral turns the shared-central topology on for a tenant with
its own Monitoring: it publishes _namespace.tracingCentral for the
tenant's monitoring charts and renders the only two cross-boundary
paths that topology needs, the collector and Grafana each to the
tenant-root vmauth. Both come from one condition, so a tenant never
exports to the shared store without the path, or gets the path without
opting in, and tenant-root, which hosts the store, gets neither. The
flag is written only for tenants that opt in: every application in a
tenant reads that Secret, and a new key for all of them would
re-upgrade them all on the platform upgrade.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io>
2026-09-30 22:23:47 +03:00
IvanHunters eedb446e8a docs(tenant): clarify that gateway=false behaves like unset
The rewritten gateway description claimed setting false opts out of
Gateway publishing entirely, including inheritance. It does not:
tenant.gatewayEffective returns "false" for both an explicit false and
an unset key, so namespace.yaml keeps _namespace.gateway pointing at the
nearest ancestor that owns a Gateway and the tenant still publishes
through it. State that false currently behaves the same as unset, and
fix the matching stale comment in gateway_default_test.yaml.

Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com>
2026-09-28 15:52:46 +03:00
IvanHunters 784d290c42 docs(tenant): correct gateway param description to match behavior
The gateway parameter description claimed the chart auto-enables a
Gateway for tenants whose apex is derived from the parent (empty host)
and leaves it off for custom-apex tenants. The resolver
tenant.gatewayEffective never inspects host: an unset gateway key
always means the tenant owns no Gateway and publishes through the
nearest ancestor that owns one, regardless of host. The unit tests in
gateway_default_test.yaml already pin this real behavior.

Rewrite the description to match the code and regenerate the schema,
README, Go types and the tenant-rd CRD.

Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com>
2026-09-28 14:07:51 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 487cafac3e feat(platform): let a tenant pick its Gateway class from an allowlist
Tenant Gateways were pinned to the bundled Cilium class. Give the
platform a default in gateway.className, the set a tenant may choose
from in gateway.tenantSelectableClasses, and the set whose provider
terminates TLS upstream of the Gateway in
gateway.edgeTerminatedClasses. A tenant picks its own with
tenant.spec.gatewayClass, read only when it owns a Gateway; an
inheriting tenant runs on its ancestor's.

The selectable set is an allowlist rather than free choice because
Tenant is a tenant-writable object while a GatewayClass is
cluster-scoped: without it a tenant could attach its Gateway to a class
an admin keeps for internal-only traffic. Naming anything outside the
set fails that tenant's own gateway release and reaches no other
tenant.

Where TLS ends is a property of the class, so the gateway chart derives
certMode from whichever class the tenant landed on instead of taking it
as a separate input. The two therefore cannot be configured out of
step.

The publishing tenant cannot cross that line by itself. The
cluster-wide ACME issuers point their HTTP-01 solver at its Gateway and
are rendered from the platform default alone, so a mismatch would pin
the solver to a listener that Gateway does not have. Those issuers now
drop the sectionName pin when the default class is edge-terminated,
letting the challenge attach by hostname instead.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com>
2026-09-04 14:26:54 +03:00
Andrei Kvapil 8fc8d23dfd fix(computeplane): address review round three
Gate the Proxied ingress Service on _namespace.etcd like the addon
HelmRelease it fronts, so an etcd-less tenant with the addon pinned on does
not get a selector-less Service (+ test). Correct the secrets framing: the
tenant-visible surface is an allowlist (include: [] withholds everything),
so drop the never-load-bearing exclude entry, the bats cross-check and the
rename-coupling comments, and state the real mechanism. Fix the etcd
prerequisite docs (an ancestor's etcd satisfies the wrapped chart; the
awaiting-etcd beacon is the diagnostic), reword the tenant toggle to stop
advertising the not-yet-shipped placement routing, require maxReplicas >= 1
on the ingress-role node group, and fix comment drift (Service name after
the release rename, placement-hook label, package-guard lookup semantics).

Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io>
2026-07-28 18:08:03 +02:00
Andrei Kvapil b2232904b6 feat(tenant): add the computeplane module toggle
Wire the computeplane module into the tenant chart as a bool toggle, matching
the other tenant modules. The module's own Helm release takes the -module
suffix so the canonical release name computeplane (and with it the
computeplane-admin-kubeconfig Secret) stays reserved for the cluster
HelmRelease the module renders.

Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io>
2026-07-28 18:08:02 +02:00
Aleksei Sviridkin d2e851f63b feat: Gateway API support via Cilium
Replace ingress-nginx as the default ingress layer for cozystack-native
services with Cilium Gateway API, materialised per-tenant via a new
TenantGateway CRD reconciled by cozystack-controller.

The extra/gateway chart renders one gateway.cozystack.io/v1alpha1
TenantGateway per tenant; the controller owns the resulting Gateway,
per-tenant Issuer, Certificate(s), and the http->https redirect
HTTPRoute. This avoids the helm-vs-controller race on
Gateway.spec.listeners when route-driven listeners are added.

publishing.certificates.solver selects HTTP-01 (default; per-app HTTPS
listener + per-app Certificate) or DNS-01 (opt-in; single wildcard
Certificate per apex; providers: cloudflare, route53, digitalocean,
rfc2136). HTTP-01 keeps zero-config per-app onboarding; DNS-01 saves
Let's Encrypt budget on apex-shared clusters.

Security model -- seven independent layers, all admission-time gates
fail-closed:

  1. Listener allowedRoutes namespace whitelist via the
     kube-apiserver-written kubernetes.io/metadata.name label;
     plain-HTTP listener is strictly narrower than HTTPS, and HTTPS /
     passthrough listeners restrict allowedRoutes.kinds to
     HTTPRoute / TLSRoute respectively.
  2. cozystack-gateway-hostname-policy VAP on Gateway.
  3. cozystack-gateway-attached-namespaces-policy VAP on Package --
     blocks tenant-* in gateway.attachedNamespaces.
  4. cozystack-tenant-host-policy VAP on Tenant -- blocks spec.host
     writes from non-trusted callers.
  5. cozystack-namespace-host-label-policy VAP on Namespace -- blocks
     writes to namespace.cozystack.io/host from non-trusted callers.
  6. Render-time fail in cozystack-basics for tenant-* in
     gateway.attachedNamespaces.
  7. cozystack-route-hostname-policy VAP on HTTPRoute / TLSRoute,
     scoped to tenant-* namespaces.

Within-apex cross-namespace hostname conflict is resolved at reconcile
time by a HostnameConflict condition (cozy-* namespace wins).

Five reconcile paths refuse to rewrite pre-existing objects with the
controller-derived name but no OwnerReference back to the
TenantGateway: Gateway, redirect HTTPRoute, per-tenant Issuer, wildcard
Certificate, per-listener Certificate.

Derived-apex tenants (tenants whose host is a subdomain of a parent
tenant's) auto-enable Gateway when the platform-level gateway.enabled
is on.

Bonus fix: pkg/registry/apps/application/rest.go was ignoring the
createValidation and deleteValidation callbacks that genericapiserver
hands to every storage method, silently bypassing admission for Create
and Delete on every apps.cozystack.io resource (Tenant, MariaDB,
Postgres, Kubernetes, ...). Aligned with the existing updateValidation
pattern.

Always-on changes: cilium.envoy.enabled + cilium.gatewayAPI.enabled
flip to true (extra cilium-envoy DaemonSet, ~100 MB RAM/node idle),
and the cozystack-api admission-chain fix. Everything else is gated
behind gateway.enabled=false and tenant.spec.gateway=false; existing
clusters see no behavioural change until an operator opts in.

Tests: 60+ Go cases in internal/controller/tenantgateway/, admission-
chain regression tests in pkg/registry/apps/application/, helm-unittest
across 7 charts (extra/gateway, core/platform, apps/tenant,
system/cozystack-basics, system/cert-manager-issuers,
system/cozystack-api, system/dashboard), and 14 e2e bats scenarios in
hack/e2e-apps/gateway.bats. New make test-controllers target wired
into pull-requests.yaml.

Deps: sigs.k8s.io/gateway-api v1.4.1, cert-manager v1.17.4.

Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-05-25 17:07:02 +03:00
Myasnikov Daniil e0ab4d0639 [docs] Fixed controller-gen markers
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
2026-03-25 15:57:25 +05:00
Myasnikov Daniil 9e55552910 [docs] Updated app go types
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
2026-03-25 15:57:25 +05:00
Myasnikov Daniil 733e87137f [docs] Added deepcopy methods to go types
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
2026-03-25 15:57:25 +05:00
Myasnikov Daniil e090e2f317 [docs] Added go types codegeneration for managed apps
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
2026-03-25 15:57:13 +05:00