Commit Graph
23 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Myasnikov Daniil b83cc087cc docs: move the repo-only guides onto the website
Seven guides in docs/ were written next to the code and left in the
source tree, where no operator looks. The website carries them now, so
a second copy here only lets the two drift again: the Backup Classes
page had already fallen behind its original.

docs/release.md, docs/deprecating-applications.md and the two SeaweedFS
runbooks in docs/operations stay. A migration, a bats suite, a workflow
or AGENTS.md reads each of them by path, which is the test for keeping
a document in this repository.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
2026-10-21 17:50:46 +05:00
Aleksei Sviridkin d9689bd6e7 fix(gateway): stop describing Cilium 1.19.5 as the shipped release
With Cilium at 1.20.2 the tenant gateway comments, README and one
status message still explained behaviour as that of "the pin" at
1.19.5. Several of those claims no longer hold: a Gateway with two
routed passthrough ports now gets an Envoy listener per port, Cilium
judges a route's kinds against the listener the route names, and the
shipped operator accepts an HTTPS and a passthrough listener on one
port when the passthrough hostname is strictly narrower.

Behaviour that is unchanged is re-anchored on the 1.20.2 source,
behaviour that is gone is stated as history, and the refusal of one
hostname on two passthrough ports no longer blames a Cilium limitation
the shipped release does not have.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-10-10 06:32:42 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin ad3f15d4f3 feat(gateway)!: reserve a passthrough listener's name by the spec alone
The TenantGateway controller withheld the HTTPS-terminate listener for a
name a passthrough listener answers only once a TLSRoute was attached
there and resolved a backend, mirroring how Cilium builds its filter
chains. That kept a served endpoint up on Cilium 1.19.5, but it tied
every route's status to one implementation's translator and needed
Service and ReferenceGrant watches to land the deferred decision.

The shipped operator accepts a wildcard terminate listener beside a
narrower passthrough listener on 443 and keeps conflicting every other
overlap. A terminate listener for the passthrough name itself is not
narrower, so on 443 the rule now protects the dataplane outright; on a
native port Gateway API would serve the pair, and the rule holds as a
policy that keeps a platform name with its passthrough listener. Reading
it off the spec makes the outcome the same on every implementation.

Under http01 an HTTPRoute claiming such a name gets no listener and no
certificate whether or not a TLSRoute is attached. A route whose every
hostname is reserved reads Accepted=False with
NoMatchingListenerHostname; one that also claims a free hostname stays
Accepted and is served there, as Gateway API accepts a route whose
hostnames intersect at least one listener. dns01 and existingSecret are
unchanged: their wildcard listener still covers such a name, and the
passthrough listener answers it by its exact server name.

The chart writes the passthrough services on the publishing tenant
alone, so the names reserved by default are the ones the platform
publishes there through its own TLSRoutes. The shape an upgrade
changes is an HTTPRoute on such a name whose platform TLSRoute forwards
nowhere, because it never attached (the package owning the service is
not installed) or because none of its backends resolve: that route kept
a terminate listener and now gets none.

The backend resolution, its watches and the RBAC rules that served them
go away.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-10-10 06:32:42 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 52f09d1aed fix(gateway)!: render passthrough services only where platform routes attach
The chart wrote the tlsPassthroughServices default onto every non-edge
tenant's TenantGateway, so every tenant Gateway carried tls-api,
tls-vm-exportproxy and tls-cdi-uploadproxy. The TLSRoutes that serve
those names are platform routes: the packages owning the services render
one per name in publishing.exposedServices while gateway.enabled is on,
parented to the publishing tenant's Gateway alone. Everywhere else no
shipped route attached to the listeners, and a passthrough listener
holds its name whether or not anything is routed through it.

The chart now writes the field only on the publishing tenant, with the
same gateway.enabled switch and the same exposedServices filter those
routes use, so a listener exists exactly where a platform route can
attach. A TLSRoute attached by hand to one of those listeners on another
tenant loses its parent.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-10-09 18:46:47 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin d624049a3a feat(gateway): allow tlsPassthroughListeners under dns01 and existingSecret
The refusal existed because Cilium 1.19.5 served every Gateway port
from one Envoy listener matched by SNI alone, so the "*.<apex>"
terminate listener of the wildcard modes and a passthrough listener
under the apex could reach each other's backend. The shipped Cilium
1.20.2 gives each port its own Envoy listener when SNI overlaps across
ports, and Gateway API treats listeners on different ports as
compatible, so the pair is served as declared. edge still refuses the
field: it renders no TLS listener for an entry to bind to.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-10-09 17:53:25 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin e62f510faf chore(deps): move the Kubernetes libraries to v0.37.1
The root module's k8s.io/* move from v0.35 to v0.37.1 and
controller-runtime from v0.23 to v0.25.1, its release for Kubernetes
1.37. Two things held them back: the apimachinery fork, which had to be
rebased onto every minor, and the watch handler that from
k8s.io/apiserver v0.36 panicked on the initial-events-end bookmark the
aggregated storages sent to plain watches. Both are gone.

The rest of the upgrades are what these releases require: cel-go
v0.29.2, the etcd client v3.7.0, kube-openapi, structured-merge-diff and
the x/ modules. code-generator moves with the libraries.

Regenerating the strategy CRDs that embed core types adds the
Kubernetes 1.37 fields and follows one removal: the alpha PodSpec field
workloadRef became schedulingGroup upstream. Once the new CRD is
applied, the apiserver prunes workloadRef from every stored strategy it
serves, and the object's next write erases it from etcd. It only ever
took effect behind an alpha feature gate.

The gateway README and the tenantgateway CRD tests cite the
apiextensions-apiserver list-type ratchet at the pinned version; it is
byte-identical in v0.37.1, so only the version they name changes.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-09-26 16:08:25 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin ae5b626c8f docs(gateway): describe the passthrough listeners and what they shed
The chart README gains the native-port field, the three limitations it
carries and where each comes from, the one that is a phase-1 narrowing
rather than a consequence of the Cilium pin, and the three ways forward
for anything that depended on a terminate listener the change takes
away. The withdrawal is stated as what it is, a change of serving path
rather than the removal of something idle, because on the pinned
version both filter chains carry the SNI today and nothing on the
objects says which one answers.

The layers section is brought back in step with the listeners: which
label each listener class selects on, that the attach set is the whole
inheriting tenant subtree rather than the tenant plus the admin list,
and the route conditions an operator reads, including the one that says
the sectionName itself names nothing.

The platform values comment on gateway.enabled said every exposed
service renders an HTTPRoute, which the chart value the withdrawal
reads contradicts. It now separates them: the services whose TLS the
Gateway terminates get an HTTPRoute, while api, vm-exportproxy and
cdi-uploadproxy get a TLSRoute pinned to their passthrough listener,
one each from the packages that own those services.

The overlap paragraph no longer describes an HTTPRoute wildcard as
keeping its terminate listener. Such a claim is refused under HTTP-01,
which issues no wildcard certificate, and the paragraph says so and
what the render used to do with it. The route-condition list gains
that shape and the port shapes an HTTPRoute now reaches, and the
per-app naming bullets carry the hash suffix the rendered names have.

Two sentences that were false against the code are corrected: a
TLSRoute on a wildcard entry itself leaves the names beneath it their
terminate listeners, and an unusable apex is refused by the containment
rule at admission before the controller's own check is reached. The
edge section says what happens to the entries the HTTP-01 pass wrote
once the mode moves.

The NoMatchingParent sentence now separates the two kinds: an
HTTPRoute pinned to an absent passthrough section is refused whatever
answers its hostname, while a TLSRoute is judged where a passthrough
listener answers it.

A sectionName outside the passthrough prefix is written Accepted like
any attached route rather than left without a verdict, and the text
says so; the port-80 listener's refusal joins the NotAllowedByListeners
shapes and the name-and-port disagreement the NoMatchingParent ones.

The attachedNamespaces comment described the list as reaching every
listener, which the native-port ones do not: they select on
kubernetes.io/metadata.name and name the publishing tenant alone, so a
namespace listed there cannot attach to a database port. It also
credited the wrong label with keeping the list honest; what a listed
entry gets is the namespace.cozystack.io/gateway label, and what keeps
a tenant from stamping it on itself is that no tenant role carries
patch on Namespace.

The class reference is brought along. Its certificate-mode table
promised one Certificate per published hostname under http01, which a
hostname served by a passthrough listener no longer earns, and its
edge table said every attached TLSRoute is refused, where only a route
declaring hostnames is and the rest have this controller's entry
removed instead.

The refusal-shape list is corrected against the code, without a count
of its own so the next correction does not have to move one. A route
the plain-HTTP listener turns away on its namespace
selector was listed under NoMatchingListenerHostname as well as under
NotAllowedByListeners; the controller reports the second. The port
shape standing beside it swept port 80 back in by naming every port
but 443, where a route selecting the plain-HTTP listener is answered
by the namespace shapes and never reaches the port refusal at all. And a
TLSRoute pinned to an absent section is said to carry
NoMatchingListenerHostname where no passthrough listener answers its
hostname, which holds only while no HTTPRoute claims that hostname:
with one there a terminate listener stands on the name, and the route
is judged like any other attached route.

The wildcard shape gains the same qualifier. A wildcard claim is
refused because no terminate listener can carry a certificate HTTP-01
will not issue, so the refusal reaches a route that wanted a terminate
listener and not one that asked for the plain-HTTP listener, which
carries no hostname and serves the claim there.

The Helm merge paragraph named the two-way path as what happens to a
custom resource Helm has no Go type for. That path is one of two in
createPatch, the version deciding which runs, and the version comes
from helm-controller rather than from this tree, so the claim was not
checkable where it was written. It now names both and says the outcome
it rests on holds either way.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-09-10 18:48:38 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 4b2507b7a1 docs(gateway): align gateway prose with the code
The comment on the shared CEL string said what the hostname requirement
is but not what it is worth per kind. Two of the three schemas leave
spec.hostnames optional at every version the vendored bundle serves,
so for HTTPRoute and GRPCRoute this policy is the only rejection a
hostname-less route meets; tlsroutes requires the field at v1 and
v1alpha3 and not at v1alpha2, so there the policy closes the gap for
as long as v1alpha2 is served. State that where the requirement is
stated.

The comment on the port-80 allowedRoutes filter credited the
cert-manager namespace entry for letting ACME complete, which the
paragraph above it retracts: the solver route lives in the tenant
namespace, and that is what keeps ACME working. The same sentence
claimed the filter keeps app routes off port 80, and the Layer 1
paragraph of the gateway README claimed it too. It does not. A tenant
that owns its Gateway is its own gateway namespace, so its app routes
are admitted by this very filter; what it excludes is cozy-* and
inheriting children. Both copies now say that.

Nothing said why naming the apex on the redirect costs no coverage,
which is the question a reader has once the route stops matching every
host. It holds because of the other half of this change: the port-80
listener admits routes only from the tenant namespace and
cert-manager's, and the tightened route policy requires every route
there to declare hostnames inside the apex. An inheriting child does
not widen that set either, and the comment now says so at the point
the hostnames are chosen: the gateway hostname policy compares every
listener against the host label of the Gateway's own namespace, so a
child apex outside it never gets its listener, the Gateway write
carrying it being refused at admission whole, in reconcileGateway and
before this route is rendered, while a child apex under this one
passes that check and the wildcard already covers it.

The empty-apex guard in renderHTTPRedirect, and the test pinning it,
both read as though the guard is what spares an operator an unreadable
schema error. It is, but the condition stated for it named the number
of attached routes, which does not enter into it. In HTTP-01 the
listener set is built from route hostnames alone, so reconcileGateway
never reads the apex ahead of the guard however many routes attach.
DNS-01 and existingSecret render an apex listener, and any
tlsPassthroughServices entry builds <service>.<apex>, so in those the
operator meets the equivalent error against the Gateway first. State
that condition once, at the guard, and let the test defer to it rather
than carry a second copy that can drift; the test stays green either
way because the fake client does not validate against the CRD schema.

The e2e suite explained omitting the TLSRoute empty-list probe by the
v1 schema rejecting an empty list. Both halves of that are true and
the conclusion does not follow: the probe runs at v1alpha2, which
marks spec.hostnames neither required nor minItems, so an empty list
reaches admission there exactly as an absent field does. What makes
the omission safe is that all three policies render one byte-identical
CEL string, so the HTTPRoute pair proves that term already.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-09-04 18:08:02 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 900711567a fix(cozystack-basics): require route hostnames in tenant namespaces
The route hostname policy short-circuited on an absent field. Its CEL
opened with `!has(object.spec.hostnames) ||`, so an HTTPRoute,
TLSRoute or GRPCRoute declaring no hostnames satisfied the first
operand and was
admitted without a single hostname compared against the tenant apex.
An explicitly empty list reached the same outcome by a different path,
because `all()` over an empty list is vacuously true.

A route that names no hostname does not match nothing. Under Gateway
API it inherits the hostnames of every listener it attaches to, so it
covers whatever that listener covers. Require the field to be present
and non-empty before validating it.

All three policies rendered by the template share one CEL string, so
HTTPRoute, TLSRoute and GRPCRoute pick the change up together. The denial message
now names the missing-hostnames case, and the Gateway e2e grep moves to
the part of that message common to every denial it issues.

The Gateway e2e suite carried the one fixture that relied on the old
behaviour: its parentRef probe declared no hostnames and is applied
into the suite's tenant namespace. It now reads the apex from the
namespace label and names a hostname under it, as the neighbouring
cases in that suite already did.

Radius is unchanged: the policy still matches only tenant-* namespaces.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-09-04 18:08:02 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 5976ddf02f fix(gateway): normalise the GatewayClass name and refuse a blank one
The class lists arrive over the values channel comma-joined, so every
reader trims each entry as it splits them. The scalar those entries are
compared against was not trimmed anywhere. A class name carrying a
stray space therefore failed `has` against its own padded self, and the
two readers of that scalar disagreed about the same class: the gateway
chart put the tenant on an edge-terminated class, while the
cluster-wide ACME issuers still pinned their solver to a listener an
edge Gateway does not render. That stops every HTTP-01 certificate in
the cluster from issuing, with nothing in any status naming the cause.

Normalise once at the single writer so both readers see a clean value,
and keep a defensive trim at each reader. The tenant's own choice does
not travel that channel — it comes from tenant.spec.gatewayClass — so
it is trimmed where the gateway chart reads it.

Unset and whitespace-only are different events and no longer share an
outcome. Unset means the choice was not made, and falling back to the
bundled class stays its documented behaviour. Whitespace-only means a
choice was made and is garbage, in the field that decides where TLS
terminates: resolving it quietly would take a tenant the operator meant
to put behind an edge terminator and publish it directly, with a real
certificate on a real address. Both the platform default and the
tenant's own choice now refuse it by name.

The kind check beside that refusal is part of the same fix, not a tidy
up. Through Helm's values path an unquoted numeric scalar arrives as a
float64, and the whitespace check compares it against a string, so
`className: 123` dies at that comparison — one line before the trim —
with an error naming neither the key nor the file. Refusing whitespace
without checking the kind first would therefore have made the numeric
case worse than it was. `kindIs "string"` is the right test because it
never has to name the type that actually arrived.

The order of the guard's steps is part of the guard. The value is read
before anything normalises it, so a default that fires on any falsy
value cannot launder 0 or false into the empty string and resolve them
to the bundled class ahead of the kind check. Unset is the one case
that still falls back, and each of those four inputs is pinned, so a
normalisation drifting back ahead of a check fails rather than quietly
covering only the loudest bad input.

Also correct a cleanup log line: the wildcard Certificate is deleted
for every mode that is not DNS-01, so naming HTTP-01 in that message is
wrong for existingSecret and for edge alike. And state the listener
name invariant plainly: the cap is 253, not the 63 of a DNS label, and
the longest name the builders produce is 84.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com>
2026-09-04 14:33:35 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 7851969448 docs(gateway): document GatewayClass selection and edge TLS termination
An operator setting up a class whose provider terminates TLS upstream
had no page answering their questions: which platform values bound the
choice, what a tenant writes to make it, what a move between classes
does to certificates and to the replicated wildcard Secret, and how the
mechanism fails when a configured class name matches nothing installed.

Add docs/gateway-classes.md covering that surface. Describe the mode
and its consequences in the chart README alongside the other three,
including the one constraint stated nowhere else: the publishing tenant
cannot select a class whose TLS termination differs from the platform
default, because the cluster-wide ACME issuers derive their solver pin
from that default alone.

State the blast radius where it actually applies. The endpoints an edge
Gateway stops publishing exist only where those routes are rendered at
all, and both pages say what the transition does to the route
conditions the controller owns, so a reader is not left inferring it
from the code.

The security model names the selector each listener really carries. The
port-80 listener selects on the built-in kubernetes.io/metadata.name
label, which kube-apiserver writes and a namespace cannot forge; the
HTTPS and TLS-passthrough listeners select on
namespace.cozystack.io/gateway, written by the tenant chart and the
controller, so that guarantee does not extend to them. What closes the
exposure is that Namespace is cluster-scoped with no tenant verb on it,
and that the route-hostname policies bound what a labelled namespace
could publish.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com>
2026-09-04 14:33:29 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 487cafac3e feat(platform): let a tenant pick its Gateway class from an allowlist
Tenant Gateways were pinned to the bundled Cilium class. Give the
platform a default in gateway.className, the set a tenant may choose
from in gateway.tenantSelectableClasses, and the set whose provider
terminates TLS upstream of the Gateway in
gateway.edgeTerminatedClasses. A tenant picks its own with
tenant.spec.gatewayClass, read only when it owns a Gateway; an
inheriting tenant runs on its ancestor's.

The selectable set is an allowlist rather than free choice because
Tenant is a tenant-writable object while a GatewayClass is
cluster-scoped: without it a tenant could attach its Gateway to a class
an admin keeps for internal-only traffic. Naming anything outside the
set fails that tenant's own gateway release and reaches no other
tenant.

Where TLS ends is a property of the class, so the gateway chart derives
certMode from whichever class the tenant landed on instead of taking it
as a separate input. The two therefore cannot be configured out of
step.

The publishing tenant cannot cross that line by itself. The
cluster-wide ACME issuers point their HTTP-01 solver at its Gateway and
are rendered from the platform default alone, so a mismatch would pin
the solver to a listener that Gateway does not have. Those issuers now
drop the sectionName pin when the default class is edge-terminated,
letting the challenge attach by hostname instead.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com>
2026-09-04 14:26:54 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin af19aa933c docs(security): record GRPCRoute in the route hostname policy set
The port-443 kinds set still excludes GRPCRoute, TCPRoute and UDPRoute.
cilium#45559 governs only that every port-443 listener carries the same
set, not what is in it, so the contents are a least-privilege choice:
nothing the platform ships needs gRPC, TCP or UDP routing on port 443.
TCPRoute and UDPRoute additionally carry no hostname and no admission
rule gates them.

The gateway README described HTTPS and TLS-passthrough listeners as
carrying different kinds. They carry the same one, which is what
cilium#45559 requires.

The threat model and the self-assessment enumerate which route kinds the
hostname policies cover, and both listed two.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-09-03 22:17:29 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 70a675fd6b feat(cozystack-basics): gate GRPCRoute hostnames in tenant namespaces
The route hostname policy covered HTTPRoute and TLSRoute. GRPCRoute
carries spec.hostnames too, and it can reach a tenant Gateway: the
port-443 listeners pin allowedRoutes.kinds to HTTPRoute and TLSRoute,
but the port-80 listener leaves kinds unset, and an unset list resolves
to the kinds the listener protocol supports, which for HTTP includes
GRPCRoute. A GRPCRoute in a tenant namespace could therefore claim any
hostname on the plaintext listener with nothing checking it.

Tenants hold no gateway.networking.k8s.io RBAC, so this is the same
defence-in-depth against a chart bug that the other two rules are, not a
tenant-user control. The new rule is the HTTPRoute rule with grpcroutes
in place of httproutes and the single served version the bundle
provides; the coverage guard pins that list to the bundle like the
others.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-09-03 22:17:28 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 7ba22369d4 fix(cozystack-basics): match every served TLSRoute version in the hostname policy
The tenant route hostname policy names v1alpha2 alone while the vendored
Gateway API bundle serves tlsroutes at v1, v1alpha2 and v1alpha3: three
served versions against one named. The gap is not new. The v1.5.1 bundle
this package shipped before and the v1.6.1 one it ships now serve the
same three versions, with the same two marked deprecated, so nothing in
this change created or widened it -- a bundle bump is simply when
someone last opened the file.

Coverage of the two unnamed versions rested entirely on request
conversion. matchConstraints.matchPolicy is unset on both rules in this
file and so defaults to Equivalent, which rewrites a request submitted
under any served version into the one the rule names before the policy
sees it. That is why there is no bypass to demonstrate, and equally why
the arrangement is brittle: the conversion has nothing left to convert
into once no named version is served, and a rule that selects nothing is
not caught by failurePolicy: Fail, because nothing failed -- there was
simply no match.

Name all three served versions, which is the shape the HTTPRoute rule
directly above already uses. The defect is a version list drifting from
the bundle it must track, so a longer list on its own would not catch
the next drift: add a check that reads the served versions out of the
vendored bundle and fails when a policy does not cover every one of
them, in either direction. Both rules get an exact-value assertion in
the chart's own suite, so the coverage check and the pinned value fail
for different reasons and neither stands alone.

The header comment being replaced claimed TLSRoute stays at v1alpha2
through Gateway API v1.4-v1.5 and that its promotion to v1 was still
upstream-only. TLSRoute has been served at v1 since v1.5.0, so that was
already false, and false in the direction that hid this gap: a reader
who believed it had no reason to look at the version list at all.

Widening the rule then falsified every remaining place that restated
which versions it matches -- the template's own header, the
security-model layer list in packages/extra/gateway/README.md, and the
name of the test case that asserts the value. Rather than resync three
copies of a list that will move again, they now say which kinds are
gated and point at the rule and its guard for the versions.

A comment in the same test file now states only the behaviour it
guards: an earlier form of the CEL used `... ? true : (...)`, which
allowed routes in any tenant-* namespace whose host label was missing
or scrubbed.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com>
2026-09-03 22:17:01 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 249f7b5a5e feat(platform, ingress): propagate operator wildcard certificate to per-tenant termination points (#2990)
## What this PR does

The operator-provided wildcard certificate
(`publishing.certificates.wildcardSecretName`) currently serves the root
tenant only: everything is same-namespace, so the root ingress
controller and Gateway read the operator's TLS Secret directly. Child
tenants run their own ingress controller / Gateway in their own
namespace under a default-deny policy and cannot read that Secret across
namespaces, so they fall back to per-host ACME.

This propagates the operator wildcard to per-tenant termination points
by replicating the Secret into each tenant namespace that owns one,
keeping the root-MVP invariant intact: the wildcard is deliberately
distributed to tenant namespaces, but no tenant RBAC is widened — every
consumer reads only its own-namespace copy.

A new controller in `cozystack-controller` does the replication with no
extra operator input. It reads the same platform values channel the
consumers read (`cozy-system/cozystack-values`): the wildcard Secret
name from `_cluster.wildcard-secret-name` and the publishing namespace
from `_cluster.expose-ingress`. It mirrors that Secret into every tenant
namespace whose `namespace.cozystack.io/ingress` or
`namespace.cozystack.io/gateway` label equals its own name — i.e. the
namespace runs its own controller / Gateway. Because the source is
derived from the same value that makes the consumers reference it, the
replica is created whenever the consumers expect it — no manual
labelling and no upgrade hazard where a child controller references a
Secret that nothing creates.

Replicas are refreshed on rotation and pruned when a namespace stops
terminating TLS. Teardown of every replica happens on exactly one
trigger: clearing `wildcardSecretName` (explicit disable). A source that
is merely absent or mistyped, or a transiently-missing values channel,
leaves existing replicas in place, so a brief gap, a delete+recreate
rotation, or a misconfigured publishing namespace never drops tenant
TLS. The platform controller's own ServiceAccount gains Secret writes;
tenant RBAC is untouched.

The controller does not cache every Secret in the cluster: the manager's
Secret informer is scoped to managed replicas and the values channel
only, and the operator source / foreign collisions are read through the
uncached APIReader. The source is not watched (its name is dynamic), so
an in-place rotation is picked up by a bounded periodic resync while the
publishing tenant serves the source with no lag.

On the consumer side, each tenant ingress controller now sets
`--default-ssl-certificate` to the wildcard Secret in its own namespace
(`.Release.Namespace/<name>`), so a child tenant serves the replica
instead of minting per-host ACME. The Gateway path already renders
`certMode: existingSecret` with a same-namespace `wildcardSecretRef` for
every tenant, so it consumes the replica with no chart change.

### Why not clustersecret-operator

The issue proposed the shipped `clustersecret-operator`. It materializes
inline template data into selected namespaces; it cannot mirror an
existing source Secret, and it is not installed in any default bundle.
Driving it would mean embedding the certificate and private key as
literal data in a cluster-scoped object rendered from a Helm `lookup` —
that broadcasts key material the design keeps off any shared channel,
and a `lookup` is invisible to the Flux helm-controller digest so it
would not re-render on rotation. Its namespace selector also cannot
express "the namespace whose owner label equals its own name", so it
would over-replicate the key into every tenant namespace. A small
dedicated reconciler targets exactly the termination namespaces and
keeps the key off the values channel.

### Coverage caveat

Replication delivers the certificate bytes, not SAN coverage: a single
`*.<root-host>` does not match `*.<child-apex>`. Operators serving
child-tenant subdomains supply a certificate whose SANs cover those
apexes; the docs spell this out. The replica carries the wildcard
private key into each terminating tenant namespace — the same exposure
as the per-host ACME Secret it replaces, now shared across tenants.

### Tests

- Go fake-client tests for the reconciler: termination-only replication
(ingress-owning and gateway-owning namespaces only, never inheriting
ones, never over the source), copy markers, rotation, prune on namespace
demotion, the non-destructive source-deletion contract, replica
self-heal after out-of-band deletion, the publishing-namespace
self-replication guard, disable-via-config teardown, source rename,
foreign-Secret collision safety (no overwrite, no requeue, does not
block siblings), transient-error requeue, non-TLS source ignored,
absent-channel keeps replicas, publishing-namespace mismatch keeps and
requeues, the cache-scope pin, the enqueue-wiring map, an
`ownsTerminationPoint` table, and the active-only requeue contract.
- helm-unittest for the ingress `default-ssl-certificate` wiring
(including a child-tenant controller pointing at its own-namespace
replica) and for the cozystack-controller ClusterRole's new Secret-write
rule.

### Screenshots

N/A — no UI changes.

### Release note

```release-note
feat(platform): the operator-provided wildcard TLS certificate (`publishing.certificates.wildcardSecretName`) is now served by per-tenant ingress controllers and Gateways automatically — the platform controller replicates it into each tenant namespace that terminates TLS, with no extra operator input and no cross-namespace Secret read
```

Closes #2820

Part of #2811


<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit

## Release Notes

* **New Features**
* Wildcard TLS Secret now replicates from the platform to tenant
namespaces that terminate TLS via their own ingress controller or
Gateway, including child-tenant scenarios.

* **Documentation**
* Clarified configuration, timing, and SAN matching requirements for
wildcard replication.
* Updated gateway and ingress-nginx default certificate documentation
for replica mirroring behavior.

* **Bug Fixes**
* Improved handling for missing/invalid source secrets (no unnecessary
pruning) and safe collision behavior.

* **Tests**
  * Added comprehensive reconciliation/replication test coverage.
  * Added Helm unittest target for the controller chart.

* **Chores**
  * Updated controller RBAC to support wildcard TLS Secret replication.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
2026-07-15 11:32:08 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin d89ad70698 fix(cozystack-basics): validate legacy Ingress hostnames against the tenant apex
The Gateway (cozystack-gateway-hostname-policy) and Route
(cozystack-route-hostname-policy) admission policies constrain tenant
hostnames on the Gateway API path. Gateway API is opt-in and off by
default, so in the default configuration tenant applications publish
through a legacy networking.k8s.io/Ingress on the shared ingress-nginx,
which had no equivalent policy.

Add a fail-closed ValidatingAdmissionPolicy + Binding for Ingress in
tenant-* namespaces. A hostname on spec.rules[].host or spec.tls[].hosts[]
is allowed when it is within the namespace's own apex
(namespace.cozystack.io/host), or when it is a concrete (non-wildcard)
name entirely outside the platform root apex (_cluster.root-host); a
hostname under the platform root apex but outside the namespace's own
apex, and a wildcard taken through the outside-root path (which could
match the platform apex itself), are rejected. The outside-root branch
keeps the kubernetes app's Proxied exposeMethod working, since it routes
a user-supplied external domain to a nested cluster. A rule with no host
(absent or empty, an unbounded catch-all) and spec.defaultBackend are
also rejected.

The policy templates the platform root apex into its CEL and renders
only when _cluster.root-host is set, so it is never shipped in a state
that would admit every hostname. A tenant-* namespace missing its own
apex label is denied.

Cover the policy with helm-unittest (render, including the root-host,
empty-host, and wildcard guards) and behavioral admission tests against
the live apiserver (in-apex allow, external-domain allow,
own-apex-wildcard allow, external-tls allow, under-root-outside-apex
deny, prefix-adjacent-under-root deny, wildcard-matching-apex deny,
hostless deny, empty-string-host deny, defaultBackend deny), and document
it as an additional layer in the gateway security model.

Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-07-04 22:38:39 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin c841c70866 feat(operator): replicate operator wildcard certificate to tenant namespaces
The operator-provided wildcard MVP serves the root tenant only: the root
ingress controller and Gateway read a TLS Secret from their own namespace.
Child tenants run their own ingress controller / Gateway in a separate,
default-deny namespace and cannot read that Secret cross-namespace.

Add a controller that mirrors the operator wildcard Secret into every
tenant namespace that owns a TLS termination point (its
namespace.cozystack.io/ingress or .../gateway label equals its own name).
The source is identified by name from the platform values channel
(_cluster.wildcard-secret-name) with no extra operator input; replicas
carry a managed-by label and refresh on rotation. An individual replica is
removed when its namespace stops terminating TLS; every replica is torn
down only on an explicit disable (clearing wildcard-secret-name). A missing
or mistyped source, or a transiently-absent values channel, keeps existing
replicas, so tenant TLS never drops on a transient gap. The controller's
Secret cache is scoped to managed replicas and the values channel, not
every cluster Secret. Only the platform controller's ServiceAccount gains
Secret writes — no tenant RBAC is widened, and every consumer reads only
its own-namespace copy.

Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-07-01 10:47:14 +03:00
Алексей Артамонов 6e093f11bc fix(gateway): clean up orphaned ACME account secret on tenant module delete (#3089)
When the gateway tenant module is disabled, cert-manager's ACME account
private-key secret cozystack-acme-account was left orphaned (no ownerRef).
Add a post-delete cleanup hook that deletes it by name. Verified the secret
is referenced only by the gateway module's own cozystack-gateway Issuer, so
removing it on gateway teardown is safe. The cleanup Job runs non-root with a
read-only root fs and dropped capabilities; RBAC is scoped via resourceNames.

Signed-off-by: Алексей Артамонов <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io>
2026-06-26 17:29:44 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 6e219c241b feat(platform,gateway): distribute operator wildcard secret name
Add publishing.certificates.wildcardSecretName to the platform chart
and propagate it through the cozystack-values channel as
_cluster.wildcard-secret-name. Only the Secret NAME travels — the
cert/key material is never broadcast, unlike the public kube-root-ca
that already rides this channel.

When the key is set, the gateway chart switches the rendered
TenantGateway to certMode=existingSecret with a wildcardSecretRef
pointing at the operator-supplied Secret, and skips the ACME
solver/provider/issuer validations that no longer apply. Wildcard mode
takes precedence over solver=dns01. TLS-passthrough services and
attached namespaces continue to render unchanged.

Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-06-10 03:08:07 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 6e0c2d609d docs(gateway): describe inheritance model and DNS-01 SAN expansion
Replace the 'Inheritance from parent Gateway' known-limitation entry
(which described inheritance as deferred) with:

* A top-of-README 'Inheritance: when to opt in for a separate
  Gateway' section explaining when a tenant owns its Gateway vs
  inherits, and how the namespace.cozystack.io/gateway label is
  written by apps/tenant chart and patched onto cozy-* by the
  controller.
* DNS-01 cert-mode docs spell out SAN expansion for child apexes:
  the wildcard Certificate now carries <child-apex> + *.<child-apex>
  per inheriting tenant, with a per-child *.<child-apex> listener
  on the parent Gateway. Documents the DNS-provider-permission
  requirement for deeply-nested children (ACME challenge writes
  TXT under each apex zone, so zone delegation or wide-scope
  provider creds are needed for grandchild apexes).
* New known-limitation entries: 64-listener cap on the parent
  Gateway under inheritance (with the high-fanout escape via
  tenant.spec.gateway=true), and Cilium sharing-key port-collision
  (multiple per-tenant Gateways still each take their own LB IP
  until ListenerSet ships in Cilium).

Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-05-25 19:02:22 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin 7c893bc653 docs(gateway): security model as three groups, mechanism-agnostic IP allocation
Security model section split into three groups by who they defend
against, anchoring the framing in the apps.cozystack.io/* tenant API
surface (tenants do not write Gateway API resources directly, so most
of the seven layers are not protecting against tenant-user input):

- tenant-user-input gates: Layer 4 (cozystack-tenant-host-policy)
  via cozystack-api admission. Tenant.spec.host is the user-supplied
  field that surfaces as a security boundary.
- defense-in-depth: Layers 1, 2, 5, 6, 7. Cover bugs in
  cozystack-controller / Flux, supply-chain compromise of an app
  chart, confused-deputy admin mistakes. Fail-closed.
- admin-against-themselves: Layer 3 (cozystack-gateway-attached-
  namespaces-policy). Catches kubectl edit on the platform Package.

Layer 7 wording fix: drop the implication that a tenant user with
HTTPRoute RBAC could exploit the cross-apex hostname surface — that
RBAC is not granted in Cozystack. Reframed as defense-in-depth
against an app chart bug or supply-chain compromise.

External IP allocation section reframed as admin-side concern:
allocator (MetalLB / Cilium LB-IPAM / robotlb / externalIPs) is
configured at the platform layer, tenant API stays
mechanism-agnostic. Per-Service IP uniqueness is the allocator's
responsibility — same shape as for any LoadBalancer Service.

Inheritance Known limitations entry: spell out both upstream gaps
(Gateway API 64-listener cap, Cilium sharing-key inactive on
443/TCP via cilium#42756) so readers understand why per-tenant
Gateway is the only scalable shape today.

publishing.gateway.attachedNamespaces -> gateway.attachedNamespaces
fix: the values block is at top-level, not under publishing.

Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-05-25 17:07:02 +03:00
Aleksei Sviridkin d2e851f63b feat: Gateway API support via Cilium
Replace ingress-nginx as the default ingress layer for cozystack-native
services with Cilium Gateway API, materialised per-tenant via a new
TenantGateway CRD reconciled by cozystack-controller.

The extra/gateway chart renders one gateway.cozystack.io/v1alpha1
TenantGateway per tenant; the controller owns the resulting Gateway,
per-tenant Issuer, Certificate(s), and the http->https redirect
HTTPRoute. This avoids the helm-vs-controller race on
Gateway.spec.listeners when route-driven listeners are added.

publishing.certificates.solver selects HTTP-01 (default; per-app HTTPS
listener + per-app Certificate) or DNS-01 (opt-in; single wildcard
Certificate per apex; providers: cloudflare, route53, digitalocean,
rfc2136). HTTP-01 keeps zero-config per-app onboarding; DNS-01 saves
Let's Encrypt budget on apex-shared clusters.

Security model -- seven independent layers, all admission-time gates
fail-closed:

  1. Listener allowedRoutes namespace whitelist via the
     kube-apiserver-written kubernetes.io/metadata.name label;
     plain-HTTP listener is strictly narrower than HTTPS, and HTTPS /
     passthrough listeners restrict allowedRoutes.kinds to
     HTTPRoute / TLSRoute respectively.
  2. cozystack-gateway-hostname-policy VAP on Gateway.
  3. cozystack-gateway-attached-namespaces-policy VAP on Package --
     blocks tenant-* in gateway.attachedNamespaces.
  4. cozystack-tenant-host-policy VAP on Tenant -- blocks spec.host
     writes from non-trusted callers.
  5. cozystack-namespace-host-label-policy VAP on Namespace -- blocks
     writes to namespace.cozystack.io/host from non-trusted callers.
  6. Render-time fail in cozystack-basics for tenant-* in
     gateway.attachedNamespaces.
  7. cozystack-route-hostname-policy VAP on HTTPRoute / TLSRoute,
     scoped to tenant-* namespaces.

Within-apex cross-namespace hostname conflict is resolved at reconcile
time by a HostnameConflict condition (cozy-* namespace wins).

Five reconcile paths refuse to rewrite pre-existing objects with the
controller-derived name but no OwnerReference back to the
TenantGateway: Gateway, redirect HTTPRoute, per-tenant Issuer, wildcard
Certificate, per-listener Certificate.

Derived-apex tenants (tenants whose host is a subdomain of a parent
tenant's) auto-enable Gateway when the platform-level gateway.enabled
is on.

Bonus fix: pkg/registry/apps/application/rest.go was ignoring the
createValidation and deleteValidation callbacks that genericapiserver
hands to every storage method, silently bypassing admission for Create
and Delete on every apps.cozystack.io resource (Tenant, MariaDB,
Postgres, Kubernetes, ...). Aligned with the existing updateValidation
pattern.

Always-on changes: cilium.envoy.enabled + cilium.gatewayAPI.enabled
flip to true (extra cilium-envoy DaemonSet, ~100 MB RAM/node idle),
and the cozystack-api admission-chain fix. Everything else is gated
behind gateway.enabled=false and tenant.spec.gateway=false; existing
clusters see no behavioural change until an operator opts in.

Tests: 60+ Go cases in internal/controller/tenantgateway/, admission-
chain regression tests in pkg/registry/apps/application/, helm-unittest
across 7 charts (extra/gateway, core/platform, apps/tenant,
system/cozystack-basics, system/cert-manager-issuers,
system/cozystack-api, system/dashboard), and 14 e2e bats scenarios in
hack/e2e-apps/gateway.bats. New make test-controllers target wired
into pull-requests.yaml.

Deps: sigs.k8s.io/gateway-api v1.4.1, cert-manager v1.17.4.

Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la>
2026-05-25 17:07:02 +03:00