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Commits
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d1c6a24bf4 |
test(nats): state precisely what a label stamp on a key-bearing Secret reaches
The comment claimed a visibility label on either cert-manager Certificate would hand its private key to every tenant subject. It would not, today: tenantsecrets serves only what the lineage webhook marked tenantresource=true, and lineage resolves through ownerReferences or the Flux helm label, neither of which a cert-manager Secret carries while enableCertificateOwnerRef stays false. The assertions stay -- they become load-bearing as soon as either gate moves, and one of them is not this chart's to hold. Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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7a8f27c77b |
test(nats): compare both tenant grant surfaces against their whole form
The guard filtered each surface down to the entries that name a Secret and compared the subset. Every such filter admits the spelling it did not anticipate: on the ResourceDefinition a label selector names no resource, and controller.cert-manager.io/fao is stamped on both key-bearing Secrets, so a selector on it grants the CA private key; on the dashboard Role a rule with no resourceNames names no Secret, a rule with resources ["*"] names no resource, and a ClusterRole is not a Role. All of them passed green. Compare the whole ResourceDefinition include list, the rendered RBAC kinds and the Role's complete rule list instead. Aggregating with eval-all also drops the dependence on the Role being the first rendered document. The header claimed both surfaces are out of reach of helm-unittest for want of a chart template; both are rendered, and what is missing is a suite that asserts on them. Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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736d44674f |
test(nats): pin the trust-anchor sentinel to a single projection entry
hasDocuments counts rendered documents, not list entries, so a second projection naming tls.key as its source rendered inside the same document and left the suite green. The controller refuses a sentinel carrying more than one entry, which makes that a silent loss of the tenant's trust anchor. Assert the list length alongside the entry it pins. Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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ff3294e02d |
fix(e2e): size tenant workers by resources, not by u1.large (#3840)
## What this PR does Follow-up to #3839, which moved the e2e tenant workers to `u1.large` to give them a second vCPU. That instancetype doubles memory along with the vCPUs, and four 8Gi workers do not fit on the sandbox beside the rest of the suite. On the first runs after it landed, the second worker of each cluster stayed Pending with `0/3 nodes are available: 3 Insufficient memory`, so the node group never reached two Ready nodes and node-join failed for a reason unrelated to the CPU ceiling the change was meant to test. The memory estimate in that PR body counted the workers against total node memory and did not account for what the rest of the suite already occupies. This sizes the group with `resources.cpu` and `resources.memory` instead, which keeps the two vCPUs at the 4Gi the workers had before. The chart omits the instancetype from the VM whenever a group sets both fields, since KubeVirt rejects a VM that references an instancetype and also overrides CPU or memory, and the values schema still lists `instanceType` as required, so it stays in the values as the fallback it now is. The measurement from those runs is worth keeping even though the runs were spoiled. Where the workers did start, the two-scrape capture read 1.46 to 1.93 against the new ceiling of 2.0, with 2 to 5 percent of CFS periods throttled, against 0.93 to 0.98 of a 1.0 ceiling at 8 to 13 percent throttled before. The ceiling was binding, and raising it does loosen it; whether that is enough to make the join deadline is what the next runs measure. ### Screenshots Not applicable, no UI change. ### Downstream repositories The diff is one values block inside `hack/e2e-chainsaw/_lib/run-kubernetes.sh`. Nothing under `hack/` is moved or renamed, no make target changes behaviour, no package, schema, default or CRD changes. Nothing in the trigger map is touched. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(e2e): tenant workers in the kubernetes e2e suites keep their two vCPUs but go back to 4Gi of memory, since the larger instancetype left workers unschedulable on the sandbox ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Configuration** * Updated tenant worker nodes to use `u1.medium` instances. * Set each worker’s resources to 2 CPUs and 4 GiB of memory. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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2b3c163d15 |
fix(e2e): size tenant workers by resources, not by u1.large
Sizing the workers with u1.large doubled their memory along with the vCPUs, and four 8Gi workers do not fit on the sandbox beside the rest of the suite: the second worker of each cluster stayed Pending with Insufficient memory on all three nodes, so the node group could never reach two Ready nodes and node-join failed for a reason that has nothing to do with the CPU ceiling it was meant to test. Setting resources.cpu and resources.memory keeps the two vCPUs at the memory the workers had before. The chart drops the instancetype from the VM when a group sets both, and the values schema still requires the field, so it stays in the values as the sizing fallback it now is. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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73bc4c0ae3 |
fix(ci): build the backstop's reason list without a blind pipeline
`unmatched=$(echo … | tr … | sort -u | grep -v '^$' | paste -sd ' ' -)` takes its exit status from paste, so a failure in tr, sort or grep is invisible under set -e. Demonstrated with a sort stub that exits 1: the pipeline reports rc=0 and yields an empty string, so the line becomes `no runnable suite is named by ''`. That is the same last-command blindness this script already handles twice -- for the suite-list find and for the two yq indexes -- and the comments there explain why each was a bug. Selection stays fail-safe because the escalation is decided before the message is built, so the only casualty is the reason line; but the reason line is a contract as of this change set, and a contract that degrades in silence is what the change set exists to remove. Replaced with the shell's own split plus a `case` membership test: no external command, nothing that can half-succeed, dedup preserved, and the same idiom resolve_suites already uses a few lines up. A test feeds two unresolved directories with one repeated and pins the whole line, so a regression to a form that can emit a partial or empty name turns the file red rather than printing a worse message. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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c28d7804af |
fix(ci): enumerate the inert .gitattributes instead of matching by name
The rule was broader than its justification. It read `(^|/)\.gitattributes$`, so it claimed every present and future .gitattributes anywhere, while the argument for it was about content: every one in this tree holds nothing but `linguist-generated` markers, which reach no build, chart or test. The filename does not carry that argument. .gitattributes can also set `filter`, `eol`, `working-tree-encoding` and `export-subst`, each of which changes what lands in the working tree and therefore what gets built, so a by-name rule would eventually make a live file inert with nothing to notice it. Nothing is lost by narrowing, because only three files ever reached the rule: api/.gitattributes and internal/crdinstall/manifests/.gitattributes are escalated by full_suite_pattern first, so entries for them would be dead. Measured against the base selector, those three are exactly the paths whose classification this branch changes, and they still select nothing. Same trade as the workflow enumeration a few lines up, and the same upkeep, which the comment now states: after adding or moving one, re-check with `git ls-files '*.gitattributes' '.gitattributes'` and confirm the contents are still only linguist markers. A .gitattributes not on the list is classified by whatever rule its path falls under -- the graph inside a package, the unclassified fall-through at the root -- and both fail safe. A test pins that root case, so a future widening back to a by-name match turns the file red. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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2d6a7ec777 |
test(ci): pin the unclassified-path reason line
The header claims "a test asserts each line" about the reason-line contract. It was false for one branch: deleting the `unclassified path` echo at the fall-through left `hack/cozytest.sh hack/select-e2e_test.bats` exiting 0. That is the worst one to leave unpinned. It is #3392's own guard, its cause is the one a reader cannot infer from the selection ("a path nobody has classified" is not expressible as a suite list), and the only action it asks for is to classify the path it names. The word "unclassified" appears in seven comments in the test file while pinning it zero times, so the branch read as covered. Verified by mutation both ways: with the assertion added, deleting the echo turns the file red, and a sweep that mutes each of the eleven `select-e2e:` messages in turn now reddens the file for every one of them, so the header's claim holds for the whole set rather than for most of it. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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b2702621d3 |
fix(ci): decide the per-app bats rule per path, not after the merge
Two defects in the hack/e2e-apps/ arm added by the previous commit. The arm set trigger_any=1 for whatever basename it derived and left the verdict to the final intersection. That makes the escalation depend on the REST of the diff: hack/e2e-apps/monitoring-oidc-system.bats alone emptied the selection and the backstop escalated, but the same file beside packages/apps/redis/templates/redis.yaml selected `redis` with nothing on stderr, where the pre-change selector ran all 21 suites. That is the merge-before-escalate shape #3330 removed from the graph walk, reintroduced one rule over. The basename is now membership-tested against the suite list on the spot and an unmatched one sets trigger_full=1 and names the file. POSIX case matches `/` with `*`, so the arm also sees nested paths, and the unanchored capture turned hack/e2e-apps/fixtures/postgres.bats into the "suite" fixtures/postgres -- right outcome by accident, reason line printing a path where a suite name belongs. The capture is anchored to one segment, and what the arm does with anything that is not a top-level <name>.bats is now stated rather than left to fall out of a regex: it is shared material for those suites the way hack/e2e-chainsaw/_lib/ is for the Chainsaw ones, so it escalates for the same reason. Both claims that said otherwise are corrected -- the arm's own comment and docs/agents/e2e-testing.md both asserted the deferred escalation was equivalent to the old fall-through, which held only for a single-file diff. The backstop comment drops the e2e-apps clause it gained last commit, since that route no longer reaches it. The header's "four of the seven" becomes count-free: this commit adds two escalating branches, so a hardcoded total was already stale. Tests: the mixed-diff case is the regression pin (the isolated case passes with the escalation deferred and cannot see the bug), plus a nested-path case and a non-.bats case. Both fixes are mutation-verified -- restoring either defect turns the file red. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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4d4f5edf92 |
fix(ci): escalate only the e2e bats files, not the whole unit lane
full_suite_pattern took every hack/*.bats, so all 63 of them ran the whole Chainsaw suite -- including the 60 that are the unit lane and that the e2e sandbox never executes. The root Makefile is the authority on the split and draws it at exactly the prefix this narrows to: BATS_UNIT_FILES := $(filter-out hack/e2e-%.bats,$(wildcard hack/*.bats)) The 60 files it keeps run under `make unit-tests`; the three it filters out -- e2e-prepare-cluster, e2e-install-cozystack, e2e-test-openapi -- are the ones packages/core/testing's recipes execute inside the sandbox, and those still escalate. So no Chainsaw suite can regress from an edit to one of the 60. Inert here is not a green gate with nothing behind it. `make unit-tests` is gated on pull-requests.yaml's `code` output, computed in the workflow as "any changed path outside docs/" and never from select-e2e.sh, so a bats-only pull request still runs the whole unit lane. The `e2e` job reads the same output, so it still installs the platform and runs the OpenAPI tests before skipping Chainsaw. Two tests: one pins the rule on both sides of the prefix and asserts an inert bats file beside an app path does not mask the selection, and one walks every hack/*.bats in the tree and requires the selector's verdict to agree with the Makefile's split, so a file named to fit neither lane surfaces here rather than on the next PR that touches it. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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33428671fa |
fix(ci): classify hack/e2e-apps/ and packages/tests/ in select-e2e
Three path classes matched no rule in hack/select-e2e.sh and escalated to all 21 Chainsaw suites through the unclassified fall-through -- 7 of the last 150 merged pull requests between them. hack/e2e-apps/<name>.bats now maps to the <name> suite, off the basename exactly as the per-suite rule takes the name off a hack/e2e-chainsaw/<app>/ directory. Not marked inert: what is left in that directory after the Chainsaw migration is wired to nothing, and inert would bake that orphan status into the rule and go quietly wrong the day a lane runs those files again. A basename no suite carries drops out of the intersection at the bottom of the script and escalates through the backstop, which is the outcome those paths already had, so mapping optimistically loses nothing and gains the correct answer for every name that is a suite. packages/tests/ and every .gitattributes join inert_config_pattern, which is what the script's own header says to do with a genuinely inert path rather than widening the fall-through. packages/tests/ is a helm-unittest fixture chart: changing a test OF cozy-lib does not change cozy-lib, no PackageSource lists those paths as a component, and nothing installs them -- a change to the library itself still escalates through packages/library/. .gitattributes is matched by name wherever it lives because every one in this tree is a linguist-generated marker, which reaches no build, chart or test; one under a tree full_suite_pattern already covers still escalates, since that pattern is checked first. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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42bd45a87c |
fix(platform): make etcd-application depend on etcd-operator
extra/etcd renders kind: EtcdCluster from etcd-operator.cozystack.io/v1alpha2, but cozystack.etcd-application declared no dependsOn edge to cozystack.etcd-operator -- the only operator-backed application source in the tree that did not. The edge has been absent since the sources were first added. Two consequences, one per side of the graph. On install this is a latent ordering bug. Without the edge the etcd-rd HelmRelease registers the ApplicationDefinition as soon as cozystack-engine is up, so a tenant can create an Etcd before the operator exists and its HelmRelease then fails with `no matches for kind "EtcdCluster"`. hack/select-install.sh's forward closure for the etcd suite omitted the operator for the same reason, which would install the suite against a cluster with no CRD to apply to. On test selection cozystack.etcd-operator reached no runnable suite, so every change to the operator escalated to all 21 suites -- 5 of the last 150 merged pull requests. The etcd suite exists; only the edge that makes it reachable from the operator was missing. Scope of the ordering change: both Packages are emitted unconditionally by the same bundle (templates/bundles/system.yaml, under the single bundles.system.enabled guard, in every variant), so no supported configuration has one without the other. An admin who lists cozystack.etcd-operator in bundles.disabledPackages while keeping the app now leaves it DependenciesNotReady -- the same exposure postgres, mariadb, kafka and redis already carry, with Package.spec.ignoreDependencies as the escape hatch. select-install.sh --validate confirms the edge adds no cycle and nothing dangling. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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3c3f9450ae |
fix(ci): name the cause on every select-e2e escalation
Seven branches in hack/select-e2e.sh escalate to the full Chainsaw suite and four of them did it in silence: the shared hack/e2e-chainsaw/_lib/ and .chainsaw.yaml case, the full_suite_pattern match, a packages/ path no PackageSource claims, and the empty-selection backstop. "Run everything" is the same 21 suite names whichever rule produced it, so a reason line is the only thing that tells the seven apart. full_suite_pattern is the commonest cause of a full run by a wide margin -- 88 of the last 150 merged pull requests, 68 of them with no other cause -- so the usual answer to "why did this pull request run the whole suite" was the one the log never carried, recoverable only by re-deriving the selection by hand. Each new line names the path that caused it rather than only the rule, and the backstop names the directly-selected names it could not resolve. They go to stderr, never stdout: stdout is the suite list and both e2e lanes parse it, so a reason line there would be read as a suite name. A unit test asserts each of the four messages. A reason that regresses to silence changes no selection, so it is invisible to every other test in the file. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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302b55cc38 |
docs(agents): defer the image-refs routing edit to its own PR
This reverts commit
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6181493d4f |
refactor(dashboard): validate the schema form before page-level checks
In the four backup create pages (Backup, BackupJob, BackupPlan, BackupRestoreJob), run the RJSF SchemaForm.validate() call right after the name check and before the page-level required-field alerts. The submit button lives outside RJSF and bypasses its validation, so each page triggers validate() explicitly; it previously ran only after the manual alert checks, so a schema-required field left empty exited via an alert without RJSF ever rendering its inline errors. Validating first makes inline errors show consistently; the page-level alerts then cover only page-only requirements. Re-applied from cozystack/cozystack-ui#26 onto the in-tree console after the UI was vendored (#2963); the source repo is being archived. Scope is the validation-ordering change only — the original PR's VMDisk/StorageClass parts were obsoleted by the DynamicOptionsWidget refactor (#30) already in the vendored snapshot. Includes the original per-page tests. Co-authored-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <1366514+lexfrei@users.noreply.github.com> Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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71c0fc185b |
test(e2e): give tenant workers two vCPUs (#3839)
## What this PR does One line in the kubernetes e2e suite values: tenant workers move from `u1.medium` to `u1.large`, one vCPU to two. The reason is measured, in two independent ways on cozystack/cozystack#3513. A single-scrape reading on a quiet branch run and the two-scrape instrument from #3836 on a loaded run with six parallel e2e workflows agree: the worker's compute container sits at 93 to 98 percent of its one-core ceiling for the whole node-Ready budget, the sandbox nodes under it show ~0.05 percent steal, and raising the CPU request changes nothing because the workers never lose a scheduling fight. The binding constraint is capacity: one vCPU has to boot Talos and unpack the kubelet image, and its quota also covers the QEMU emulator and IO threads. This is an experiment as much as a fix: the suites run the same assertions, and the next waves of runs under parallel load measure whether the join flake documented in cozystack/cozystack#3513 disappears with the ceiling doubled. The diagnostics landed in #3804 and #3836 stay aboard, so the same instrument reports the new profile. Memory math on the sandbox: two suites with two workers each move from 4Gi to 8Gi guests, and the virt-launcher pods spread across three 24Gi nodes, so the placement still fits. ### Screenshots Not applicable, no UI change. ### Downstream repositories The diff is one value inside `hack/e2e-chainsaw/_lib/run-kubernetes.sh`. Nothing under `hack/` is moved or renamed, no make target changes behaviour, no package, schema, default or CRD changes. Nothing in the trigger map is touched. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note test(e2e): tenant workers in the kubernetes e2e suites run with two vCPUs, since measurements showed the single-vCPU worker saturating its CPU ceiling for the entire node-join budget ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Chores** * Updated the tenant worker node configuration to use a larger instance type, improving available capacity for end-to-end Kubernetes testing. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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3b49be07fa |
test(e2e): give tenant workers two vCPUs
The tenant worker boots Talos and unpacks the kubelet image on a single vCPU whose CFS quota also covers the QEMU emulator and IO threads, and measurements on both quiet and loaded runs show the compute container pinned at 93-98% of that one-core ceiling for the whole node-Ready budget. The join deadline is then decided entirely by how much CPU work the boot happens to need, and under parallel e2e load it does not fit. Doubling the worker to u1.large raises the ceiling instead of the weight, which measurements showed changes nothing since the workers never lose a scheduling fight. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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ef96292b64 |
fix(ci): give the nightly e2e runner headroom over its guest vCPUs (#3833)
## What this PR does The e2e sandbox boots three QEMU nodes at `-smp 8`, so 24 guest vCPUs are committed before any tenant VM exists. Four jobs boot that sandbox. Three run on the 32-vCPU class; nightly ran on the 24-vCPU one, where 24 guests against 24 host vCPUs leaves nothing for QEMU's own emulation and IO threads, containerd, the kernel and the runner agent. The other lanes moved to the larger class at some point and nightly was not moved with them. The sandbox keeps its 24 vCPUs. That guest count is part of what e2e claims to test, and a smaller nightly cluster stops matching the one PRs run against. This is hygiene, not a fix. Measured boot-phase data across 18 runs says the load a workflow puts on the host dominates guest starvation, not the runner class: the lanes already on 32 vCPU boot guests slower than nightly did on 24, and class and workflow kind are fully confounded there, so neither separates out. Do not read this as making anything faster or as addressing a particular red run. What is left is the arithmetic. A 1:1 commit has no headroom at all, and two lanes running the identical sandbox on different classes is drift nothing was watching. The rest is a check, because the guest demand and the runner classes live in different files and nothing compared them. `hack/sandbox-runner-headroom.bats` reads `-smp` and `-m` times the loop count out of `hack/e2e-prepare-cluster.bats`, reads the runner class of every job that calls the sandbox make targets, and wants the runner strictly larger on both axes. Neither side is a hardcoded list, so bumping `-smp`, adding a management node, or adding a fifth lane on a smaller runner turns it red on the same commit. Memory is in there because the same argument applies to it and `-m 24576` sits on the same line as `-smp 8`, not because a class that violates it exists today. It stops instead of guessing when it cannot read something, since a guess comes out smaller than the real demand and passes a runner that cannot hold the sandbox. Refused: a missing or non-literal `-smp` / `-m`, a launch written outside any `@test` block or inside one left open at end of file, a `for` opener the strict pattern does not match, a `for` list holding anything but literal words, a `while` sharing the block, two launches or two loops in one block, and a `runs-on` with no `oracle-vm-<n>cpu-<m>gb` in it. Unparsed loop openers are counted separately from parsed ones, so moving `do` to the next line is refused rather than silently multiplied by one. There is also a cross-check that every workflow calling the sandbox make targets yields at least one matched job, so a renamed target turns the parser red instead of quietly shrinking what it covers. The derivation runs against the live tree, which passes whether or not those refusals still work, so each one is pinned by a fixture that feeds a synthetic file to the same program. That matters more than it sounds: two of the refusals above exist because the first version of this file did not have them, and a launch moved into a file-level helper would have halved the measured demand and stayed green. The numbers come from: ```bash sed -n '98,107p' hack/e2e-prepare-cluster.bats # three nodes, -smp 8, -m 24576 grep -rn 'prepare-env' .github/workflows/ # the four jobs that boot it grep -rn 'runs-on: oracle-vm-' .github/workflows/ # their runner classes ``` The rule also goes into `docs/agents/e2e-testing.md` next to the other environment invariants, so whoever adds the fifth lane picks its runner class from the docs instead of from a red unit suite. Checked that it bites, twice over. Fourteen mutations of the inputs: reverting the runner class, `-smp 11`, a fourth and fifth management node, `-smp cpus=8`, `-m size=24576`, `do` on the next line, `$(seq 1 3)` as the list, a `while` loop, the launch moved into a file-level helper, renaming the make target, `ubuntu-latest`, a matrix expression in `runs-on`, a hypothetical `32cpu-64gb` class, and a new lane on a 4-vCPU runner. Then eleven mutations of the parser itself, one per refusal, each of which kills exactly the fixture that names it and nothing else. Green on this tree, and the same numbers out of gawk, mawk and BSD awk. Closes #3831. ### Screenshots No UI change. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map against the diff. It changes one `runs-on` line plus a comment in `.github/workflows/nightly.yaml` and adds one file under `hack/`. The `ccp` trigger is moving or renaming something under `hack/`, or changing what a make target does; `hack/package.mk` and `hack/common-envs.mk` are untouched, and the new test is picked up by the existing `hack/*.bats` wildcard without the target changing. The `ansible-cozystack` and `talm` triggers are node prerequisites in `hack/e2e-prepare-cluster.bats`, which this reads and does not modify. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(ci): run the nightly e2e suite on a runner class larger than the sandbox's guest vCPU demand, and add a unit check that fails when an e2e lane loses that headroom ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Bug Fixes** * Updated nightly end-to-end testing to run on a higher-capacity runner, improving support for multiple QEMU guests and required resource headroom. * Added validation to prevent sandbox runners from being undersized or oversubscribed. * **Documentation** * Documented the resource requirements and deterministic conventions for end-to-end sandbox testing. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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0cf82ebfe2 |
test(e2e): measure tenant worker CPU as a rate, and the sandbox nodes under it (#3836)
## What this PR does Two instruments for the tenant worker that misses the node-Ready deadline. They are instruments, not a fix: the failure they instrument is cozystack/cozystack#3513, and this PR does not close it. Neither changes what the suites assert. The worker CPU capture now reads `container_cpu_usage_seconds_total` beside the CFS counters it already read, and it is read twice a fixed interval apart instead of once. The throttled counters say a container met its ceiling; they cannot say how much CPU it got, and the two failures behind a stalled worker are exactly those, a guest held at a one-core ceiling and a guest whose vCPU thread is rarely scheduled at all. Both leave throttled periods behind. Every counter involved is cumulative since the container started, so a single reading divides out to an average over the whole uptime and says nothing about the window the deadline covered, which matters here because the profile under investigation is a guest that freezes for tens of seconds and then runs flat out: the average comes out low, the instantaneous figure comes out at the cap, and only the second distinguishes it from a guest that is simply capped. The second instrument is a new subject. The worker captures describe a cgroup, so they are blind to the layer under the sandbox, and a guest that is runnable and never scheduled looks from the cgroup like a guest that asked for nothing. Whether the sandbox node itself was given its turn is recorded only in the steal column of its own `/proc/stat`. No kubelet endpoint carries it, and crust-gather cannot reach it because PodSecurity refuses its node-shell Pod in this cluster, so the capture goes over the Talos API, which is already how the report reads those nodes for dmesg. It is captured verbatim with its column legend beside it rather than reduced to a percentage: `/proc/stat` has no header, steal and guest sit next to each other, and guest is large on a node running VMs and already counted inside user, so reading one as the other turns a fraction of a percent into twenty-odd. Both subjects are read on either side of one shared wait, so the pair pays it once. That wait is guarded like every other external in the block: it is the one call there outside a `|| true`, and under `set -eu` a missing `sleep` would exit 127 and take the collectors after it, two of which the phase's own missing-`timeout` warning promises keep collecting. Without it the two readings are taken back to back and the block says so, which is honest here because the interval is read off the stamps rather than off the knob. The default is 12 seconds and that is the whole wall-clock cost this adds to a failing run. The wait is not the interval either subject's counters span, though: each pass walks its own nodes and the other subject's pass falls between a subject's two readings, and on the run these diagnostics exist for those passes are the slow part rather than the wait. Each capture therefore stamps both ends of its read, so the real interval is subtracted off the pair instead of assumed from the knob, and the width of those brackets is the uncertainty. This matters more on the sandbox side than on the worker side, since a cAdvisor row carries its own sample time and a `/proc/stat` row carries none. That wait is a measurement interval rather than a stand-in for a condition nobody wrote a wait for, so `docs/agents/e2e-testing.md` carves it out by name instead of leaving a reader to decide whether the `TODO(e2e-replace-fixed-timeouts):` marker applies to a gap between two readings of a cumulative counter. The pair is gated below the serial console rather than above it, and its ceiling rather than its worth is the reason. Reading two collectors twice is sixteen bounded reads plus the interval, which at the read bound and the three-node cap is most of the phase budget, and admission gates only when a collector may start. Above the console, a run that hit those bounds would leave the console never started rather than merely cut short, and the console is the only capture that survives a worker which never reached apid, which is the shape this failure usually takes. That overrun is inside the term the budget derivation already allows for one collector admitted a moment before the deadline, and a guard in `hack/run-kubernetes-node-join_test.bats` holds the pair's ceiling against it. Two more guards there hold what may sit ahead of the console: nothing read more than once, and nothing whose ceiling could spend the budget on its own. Failure marking follows the existing collectors rather than inventing a shape: no collector here may leave an empty directory, because an empty directory reads as a healthy node, so a missing binary, a missing talosconfig, a listing that never answered, a node with no address and a read that was cut off each land as a named note or a `COLLECTION-FAILED.txt`. The phase budget is unchanged at 420s and the derivation guard still holds. Covered by `hack/run-kubernetes-sandbox-cpu-time_test.bats` (new) plus additions to the cpu-throttle, node-join and network-counters suites. Each collector was checked against a deliberate break of its own guard: dropping the usage family, ignoring the sample number, removing the interval, accepting a zero interval, swallowing the missing-talosconfig marker, reading the wrong `/proc` file, taking a dual-stack node's second address for a node, counting addresses instead of nodes in the truncation marker, stamping only one end of a read, letting the stamp claim counters were sampled on an arm that read nothing, telling a capture with no counters to subtract a sibling, leaving the sampling wait unguarded, and starving the budget guard of its input. Every one is caught by a named test. ### Screenshots Not applicable, no UI change. ### Downstream repositories The diff touches `hack/e2e-chainsaw/_lib/run-kubernetes.sh`, two `chainsaw-test.yaml` files, four BATS files and one agent doc. Walking the trigger map: nothing under `hack/` is moved or renamed, `hack/package.mk` and `hack/common-envs.mk` are untouched, no make target changes what it does, no package is added or removed, no schema, default, enum, CRD or namespace moves. The one entry that mentions this area is the `ccp` rule about moving or renaming things under `hack/`, and no file is moved or renamed here. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note test(e2e): the node-join failure diagnostics now read the tenant worker CPU counters twice a fixed interval apart, so consumed CPU and throttling are both available as a rate over the same window instead of as an average over the container's uptime, and they add the sandbox node's own /proc/stat over the Talos API, which is the only place the steal time under the sandbox is recorded. Each reading carries the time it was taken, so the interval a rate divides by comes from the captures rather than from the configured wait. ``` |
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527d4ea00f |
test(e2e): measure tenant worker CPU as a rate, and the sandbox nodes under it
Two instruments for the node-join failure the kubernetes-* suites keep hitting. Neither changes what the suites assert. The worker CPU capture now reads container_cpu_usage_seconds_total beside the CFS counters, and reads them twice a fixed interval apart instead of once. The throttled counters say a container met its ceiling and cannot say how much CPU it got, which are the two candidate explanations for a stalled worker: a guest held at a one-core ceiling, and a guest whose vCPU thread is rarely scheduled at all. Both leave throttled periods behind. Every counter involved accumulates from container start, so a single reading is an average over the whole uptime and no rate at all, and the profile under investigation is a guest that freezes for tens of seconds and then runs flat out: the average comes out low, the instantaneous figure comes out at the cap, and only the second separates it from a guest that is simply capped. The sandbox nodes are a new subject. The worker captures describe a cgroup, so a guest that is runnable and never scheduled looks from there like a guest that asked for nothing. Whether the sandbox node itself was given its turn is recorded only in the steal column of its own /proc/stat: no kubelet endpoint carries it, and crust-gather cannot reach it because PodSecurity refuses its node-shell Pod here, so the read goes over the Talos API, which is already how the report reaches those nodes for dmesg. The rows are captured verbatim with their column legend beside them rather than reduced to a percentage, because /proc/stat has no header, steal and guest sit next to each other, and guest is large on a node running VMs and already counted inside user. Both subjects are read on either side of one shared wait, so the pair pays it once. The wait is not the interval either subject's counters span, though: each pass walks its own nodes and the other subject's pass falls between a subject's two readings, and on the run this exists for those passes are the slow part. Each capture therefore stamps both ends of its read, so a rate comes from subtracting stamps rather than from assuming the knob, and the width of those brackets is the uncertainty. That wait is a measurement interval rather than a stand-in for a condition nobody wrote a wait for, so the e2e conventions carve it out by name instead of marking it as a fixed timeout to be replaced. The pair is gated below the serial console rather than above it. Its ceiling is sixteen bounded reads plus the interval, which is most of the phase budget, and admission gates only when a collector may start, so above the console a run that hit those bounds would leave the console never started rather than merely cut short. The console is the only capture that survives a worker which never reached apid, which is the shape this failure usually takes. That overrun is inside the term the budget derivation already allows for one late admission, and a guard holds the pair's ceiling against it. No collector here may leave an empty directory, since an empty directory reads as a healthy node: a missing binary, a missing talosconfig, a listing that never answered, a node with no address and a read that was cut off each land as a named note or a COLLECTION-FAILED.txt. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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3dd142a718 |
fix(e2e): capture both ends of the worker byte path on node-join failure (#3804)
## What this PR does A tenant worker that misses the node-Ready deadline while its kubelet image pull crawls leaves two mechanisms behind one symptom, and the failure artifact could not tell them apart: either the link is slow, or the pull keeps restarting and discarding what it fetched. From inside the guest both are a progress line that barely moves. This adds the host-side counters that separate them, and the guest-side reads that explain a kubelet which never got as far as pulling at all. **Host side.** A per-worker network capture reads the eight `container_network_*` families from the same kubelet cAdvisor endpoint the CPU throttling capture already uses. cAdvisor builds them from the interface counters inside the Pod's own network namespace and publishes one row per interface, so what arrived at the worker is counted there in full, including the bytes a restart threw away, set against the progress the guest reported, that separates a pull which kept restarting from a slow link. Which row answers is not obvious, and getting it wrong inverts the reading, so the collector states it rather than leaving it to the reader. A bridge-bound worker presents four interfaces in its Pod netns: the one still named `eth0` is a dummy that holds the Pod IP so the kubelet's check passes and carries no traffic, so it reports zero, and it is the row a reader reaches for first, by name, where zero reads as a worker that received nothing. The number that answers is the renamed NIC's receive; the bridge counts the same bytes again, and the tap's counters are named from the host's end. The filter deliberately carries no interface predicate, so all four reach the artifact and can be told apart. Two further properties of the family fail by capturing nothing rather than loudly, so both are stated where the filter is: the dropped-packet series are spelled `packets_dropped` and there is no `*_drops_total`, and every row carries an empty container label because cAdvisor publishes them on the Pod sandbox, which means a filter borrowed from the CPU counters beside it matches nothing at all. The fixture's row shape and values are real kubelet output with the identifying labels rewritten. Its four interface names are derived rather than observed: no virt-launcher Pod was available to sample, so they are read from the name generators in the KubeVirt version this repo ships, and the counters attached to them illustrate direction rather than magnitude. **Guest side.** The Talos capture gains the service state machine and the link table. Talos creates a service's log buffer when its runner opens the log writer, as it starts the process, so a kubelet still waiting on its volumes, on time sync, or on the container runtime reporting healthy never reached its runner and has no log at all, and `talosctl logs kubelet` then fails naming a log that was never registered, which is true about the log and silent about the service. `talosctl services` answers with the state and the condition being waited on, in one call for every service, so the runtime a kubelet is blocked behind arrives in the same file. The link table is read as YAML because MTU lives in the `LinkStatus` spec and not among the resource's printed columns, and it is the value that decides whether a path-MTU reading of a stalled transfer survives. Both new reads are made with the short-lived `os:reader` credential the capture already mints; neither needs a wider role. **A worker that answered nothing now says so once, for the worker.** Each read already carried its own error and exit code, which is accurate per file and adds up to a directory indistinguishable from a worker that simply had little to report. ### What this does not do This collects evidence; it fixes nothing and is not expected to change any suite's outcome. The comparison it enables is not symmetric either, and the source says so: the host side reports bytes on an interface, while the guest side reports an image pull's own progress, which is unpacking rather than arrival. They bound each other; they are not two measurements of one quantity. ### Cost The diagnostics phase budget drops from 8m to 7m. That is forced rather than chosen: the inequality that keeps the tenant crust-gather snapshot reachable had ten seconds of slack, and the two added guest reads cost sixty across the minimum worker pool. A shorter budget declines more, and what it declines first is what is gated last: the mirror capture, whose subject is partly recoverable elsewhere, and the image-cache re-probe, which has no substitute and was already first to go. The new network capture also spends a listing and one read per node ahead of the guest captures, so those reach their gate with less headroom than before. All of it is priced where the number lives, as a ceiling the read bounds impose rather than a duration measured on a live cluster, and a collector the budget declines says so in the log rather than going quiet. The remaining slack is ten seconds, which is worth knowing before the next collector is added rather than after: it buys no bounded read at any bound this file uses, so adding one means re-deriving the budget again. ### Testing `hack/run-kubernetes-network-counters_test.bats` is new (15 tests). The node-join, Talos-diagnostics and CPU-throttle suites gain coverage for the phase ordering, the per-worker marker boundary, the spend-order comments in both Chainsaw suites, and the enumeration of collectors that survive a missing `timeout`. Every claim the two Chainsaw comment blocks make about spend order is derived from the source rather than restated, so a collector added without a line there fails. The two cAdvisor captures now run one shared body. They previously carried near-identical copies, and the copies cost more than duplication normally does: the block-level bound audit pins each collector by something only it produces, and two collectors issuing identical reads left neither with anything of its own, so removing one from the audit went unnoticed. Each is now pinned by the report directory it writes. Verified with `hack/cozytest.sh` across eleven suites, checking that the number of tests executed matches the number declared, because an exit code answers "did anything fail", never "did anything run". Each behavioural change was confirmed by mutating the source and observing the intended test fail. ### Screenshots No UI changes. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map file by file against the diff. All seven changed files live under `hack/`, and the change adds one file and modifies six; no repository file is moved, renamed or deleted. The `ccp` entry is the only one that keys on `hack/` at all, and it keys on `hack/package.mk`, `hack/common-envs.mk` and `hack/update-crd.sh` as anchors for `make generate`; none of those is touched, and no make target changes behaviour. Nothing here is a package, a chart value, an `ApplicationDefinition`, a CRD, a release asset, a namespace, a variant, or a node prerequisite, so no other entry applies. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note NONE ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added worker network-counter diagnostics with interface-level and cumulative traffic data. * Expanded Talos diagnostics with service-state and link-state information. * **Bug Fixes** * Improved reporting for partial captures, timeouts, unavailable data, and zero-traffic workers. * Clarified failure reporting and fallback messages when timeout controls are unavailable. * **Documentation** * Updated diagnostic timing and collector documentation for the seven-minute budget and new metrics. * **Tests** * Added comprehensive coverage for network counters, filtering, truncation, and expanded Talos diagnostic scenarios. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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db2ddfab2b |
fix(ci): give the nightly e2e runner headroom over its guest vCPUs
The e2e sandbox boots three QEMU management nodes at `-smp 8`, so 24 guest vCPUs are committed before any tenant VM starts. The nightly lane ran that sandbox on a 24-vCPU runner, a 1:1 commit that leaves the host nothing for QEMU's emulation and IO threads, containerd, the kernel and the runner agent. The tag, fork and pull-request lanes already run the same sandbox on the 32-vCPU class, so move nightly there too. This aligns headroom and claims no performance effect. Measured boot data shows the load a workflow puts on the host, not the runner class, dominates guest starvation, and the two are confounded in that data; no red run is attributed to the class here. The case is the arithmetic: a 1:1 commit leaves no headroom, and two lanes running the identical sandbox on different classes is drift nothing was watching. Add hack/sandbox-runner-headroom.bats to keep the two sides paired. It derives the guest vCPU and memory demand from the sandbox bats file, and the runner class of every job that drives the sandbox make targets, then requires the runner to be strictly larger on both axes. Neither side is a literal list, so raising `-smp`, adding a management node or adding a lane on a smaller runner turns it red instead of drifting apart silently. Input the derivation cannot read in full is refused rather than guessed: a guess produces a demand smaller than the real one, which passes a runner that cannot hold the sandbox, while a refusal names the line. That covers a launch written outside any `@test` block, a block left open at end of file, a `for` opener the strict pattern misses, a non-literal loop list, and a `while` loop sharing the block. The derivation runs against the live tree, which passes whether or not those refusals still work, so each one is pinned by a fixture feeding a synthetic file to the same program. Loosening the parser turns a fixture red rather than quietly widening what the check accepts. Record the rule alongside the other environment invariants in docs/agents/e2e-testing.md, so a new lane picks its runner class from the documentation rather than from a failing unit suite. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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e06932f496 |
test(e2e): stop the mongodb backup suite before the restore leg (#3834)
<!-- Thank you for making a contribution! Here are some tips for you: - Use Conventional Commits for the PR title: `type(scope): description` - Types: feat, fix, docs, style, refactor, perf, test, build, ci, chore - Scopes are not an exhaustive list — pick the most specific scope for the change and extend the list when a genuinely new area appears. Examples: - System components: dashboard, platform, operator, cilium, kube-ovn, linstor, fluxcd, cluster-api - Managed apps: postgres, mariadb, redis, kafka, clickhouse, virtual-machine, kubernetes - Development and maintenance: api, hack, tests, ci, docs, maintenance - Breaking changes: append `!` after type/scope (`feat(api)!: ...`) or add a `BREAKING CHANGE:` footer - If it's a work in progress, consider creating this PR as a draft. - Don't hesistate to ask for opinion and review in the community chats, even if it's still a draft. - Add the label `backport` if it's a bugfix that needs to be backported to a previous version. --> ## What this PR does The `mongodb-2-backup-roundtrip` suite now drives its harness with `SKIP_RESTORE=1`, so it stops once the ad-hoc `BackupJob` reaches `Succeeded` instead of continuing into the to-copy restore. A to-copy restore replays the source cluster's system users into the target. The target's own generated credentials stop authenticating afterwards, so the harness cannot read its sentinel document back out of the restored copy, and the psmdb operator loses access to the cluster it just restored. That behaviour is tracked in #3832 and is not addressed here; this change only stops the suite from asserting a flow that cannot currently succeed. What the suite still proves is unchanged and is the larger half: bucket provisioning, a source MongoDB coming up with backups enabled, a sentinel document written into it, and an ad-hoc `BackupJob` against the `cozy-default` BackupClass completing against S3. The skip is pinned rather than assumed. Exiting zero is also what a completed round-trip does, so a `SKIP_RESTORE` that stopped reaching the harness would be indistinguishable from one that worked. The step therefore also asserts the skip branch's own log line, which the harness writes to stderr. Two places already told the reader that CI covers the restore, and this change is what makes them wrong, so both now say where coverage ends: the header of `30-restorejob-to-copy.yaml` and the example README. The asserted log line is annotated where it is printed, since rewording it would fail the suite on a bare match with nothing pointing at the cause. Coverage returns by dropping `SKIP_RESTORE=1` together with the assertion on that line, once #3832 is fixed. Dropping only the variable would trade this failure for a marker mismatch, so the suite comment spells out both. The test keeps its round-trip name, matching `etcd-2-backup-roundtrip`, which is gated out of CI under the same convention. ### Screenshots <!-- REQUIRED for UI changes: attach screenshots or screen recordings demonstrating the visual impact of your changes. PRs with UI changes without screenshots will not be merged. --> Not a UI change. ### Downstream repositories <!-- Cozystack is upstream for repositories that are NOT kept in sync with it automatically, and nothing in CI compares the two sides, so a change here can break them silently. Which change forces what, and which file to touch, is the trigger map in docs/agents/contributing.md under "Downstream Repositories". Walk it before you tick anything. IF YOU ARE AN AI AGENT OR AN LLM, THIS IS PART OF THE TASK, NOT A FORM TO FILL IN: 1. Walk the trigger map against the actual diff of this PR, file by file. Do not decide from the PR title or from your memory of what you changed. 2. For every repository you tick, open the follow-up PR there and link it on the same line. A ticked box with no link claims work that does not exist, which is worse than an empty box. Search that repository for an open PR or issue covering it first, and link that instead of filing a duplicate. 3. When the follow-up is out of scope, or needs a decision that is not yours to make, open an issue in that repository instead, link that, and say so in the PR body. Do not push a speculative PR into another repository just to fill a line here. 4. Do not tick "No downstream repository is affected" to make the checklist go away. If you are unsure, leave every box empty and say so in the PR body, so a human decides. --> Walked against the diff, which is one Chainsaw suite (`hack/e2e-chainsaw/mongodb/chainsaw-test.yaml`) and three files under `examples/backups/mongodb/` (`run-all.sh`, `30-restorejob-to-copy.yaml`, `README.md`). No package is added, renamed or removed; no `values.schema.json`, version enum, chart default, `ApplicationDefinition` or CRD changes; nothing under `hack/` moves or is renamed and no make target changes behaviour; no telemetry metric changes; and the only entry for `cozystack/examples` is the node and network requirements, which are untouched. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note <!-- Write a release note: - Explain what has changed internally and for users. - Start with the same `type(scope):` prefix as in the PR title - Follow the guidelines at https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/guide/release-notes.md. --> ```release-note test(e2e): the MongoDB backup suite now stops after a successful BackupJob; the to-copy restore leg stays uncovered until the credential handling behind it is fixed ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Documentation** * Updated MongoDB backup and restore guidance to clarify current restore limitations. * Documented how to skip restore operations when needed. * Clarified which restore scenarios are automated and which require manual handling. * **Tests** * MongoDB end-to-end coverage now validates successful backups while restore testing is temporarily skipped. * Added verification that the test harness stops after a successful backup. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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e441edc2aa |
test(e2e): stop the mongodb backup suite before the restore leg
A to-copy restore replays the source cluster's system users into the target, so the target's own generated credentials stop authenticating and the harness cannot read the sentinel back out of the restored copy. The suite has never passed for that reason, holding the in-tree e2e run red on every branch that selects it. Drive run-all.sh with SKIP_RESTORE=1 so the suite still proves the backup half end to end, and pin the skip by asserting the skip branch's own log line: exit zero alone is also what a completed round-trip returns, so without that assertion the step could not tell a skipped flow from a full one, nor notice SKIP_RESTORE failing to reach the harness. The to-copy manifest and the example README both stated that CI covers the restore, which stops being true here, so both now say where coverage ends. The asserted log line is annotated at its source, since rewording it would red the suite with a bare match failure. Coverage returns by dropping SKIP_RESTORE together with the assertion on that line, once the credential handling behind the restore is fixed. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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31fac3c4f1 |
fix(kubernetes): guard on child-release ownership, not parent release-name
The worker-adoption render guard required meta.helm.sh/release-name == the parent release as a precondition to refuse a control-plane-only render. But Helm's prune gates solely on helm.sh/resource-policy=keep and never consults the live release-name (migration 54 documents this and its foreign-owner branch depends on it). A same-cluster, unpinned worker MachineDeployment whose release-name is empty (Helm annotations stripped out-of-band, or a DR restore of the CAPI objects) or foreign therefore slipped past the guard, yet Helm still entered it into the parent's prune set and deleted it on the transition upgrade: the exact worker-VM data loss the guard exists to prevent, in the exact case (migration 54 never ran for this cluster) it was written for. Refuse when a same-cluster, unpinned MachineDeployment is NOT owned by its kubernetes-nodes child release (release-name lacks the kubernetes-nodes-<cluster>- prefix), which catches parent, empty and foreign owners alike while exempting adopted and natively-created child pools. Add a regression fixture with an empty release-name that reddens under the old parent-release-name predicate, and keep every conjunct non-vacuous by mutation. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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adf7913f79 |
test(kubernetes): isolate the clusterName predicate in the adoption guard
Complete the per-conjunct coverage of the guard: add a synthetic fixture where the MachineDeployment carries the parent release-name and no keep pin but names a different cluster, so spec.clusterName is the sole predicate keeping it out of the refusal set. Deleting any one of the guard's three predicates now reddens exactly one fixture (clusterName, release-name, resource-policy=keep). Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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b1ce856c47 |
test(platform): cover the 53-char child-name overflow skip branch
Every warn-pin-skip hardening branch in migration 54 had a regression fixture except the >53-char child-name overflow guard. Add one: a 33-char cluster name plus pool md0 yields a 54-char child release name, so the overflow branch must warn, pin the live pool objects with resource-policy=keep, skip adoption, and let the run stamp. Without the guard the flow reaches kubectl apply of an over-long HelmRelease name, the apiserver rejects it, and set -e exits before the version stamp, deadlocking every tenant's platform upgrade. Verified non-vacuous: neutralising the length guard reddens this fixture. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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c7d3d40810 |
test(platform): assert the non-scalar-field skip branch pins live pool objects
The existing bad-scalar test ran with the pool objects absent, so it pinned the warn+skip+no-child-HR contract but not the pin itself. Add a companion that presents the live MachineDeployment, MachineHealthCheck, WorkloadMonitor and KubevirtMachineTemplate and asserts each is annotated resource-policy=keep with no ownership transfer, mirroring the non-object-nodeGroups companion. Verified non-vacuous: removing the branch's pin_pool_objects call reddens it. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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8046144494 |
docs(kubernetes): scope the adoption guard comment to the etcd-present branch
The guard lives in the else of 'if not $etcd', so it does not run during the awaiting-etcd window, where the chart renders only the status beacon. Note that an owned+unpinned MachineDeployment is not refused in that transient window. This is a pre-existing exposure (the pre-split chart also rendered pools only in this branch) that closes once etcd resolves and a real upgrade re-renders; the comment previously claimed an unconditional refuse-to-render. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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f9065a9455 |
fix(migrations): correct the non-scalar-field skip remedy
The non-scalar scalar-field skip branch told the operator to restore the field and 're-run adoption', but migration 54 stamps the version unconditionally and does not re-run, so that remedy is a dead end. Align it with the sibling skip branches: restore the scalar, then recreate the pool, and state plainly that the migration has already stamped and will not re-run. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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e68784b3b6 |
test(kubernetes): cover the release-name predicate in the worker adoption guard
The adoption guard in cluster.yaml refuses a control-plane-only render only when a MachineDeployment matches all three predicates: spec.clusterName, meta.helm.sh/release-name owned by this parent release, and not pinned with resource-policy=keep. The suite left the release-name predicate untested: the adopted-pool case carried both a child release-name and a keep pin, so the keep predicate alone exempted it and deleting the release-name predicate kept every case green. Add a natively-created (greenfield) fixture: child release-name, no keep pin. Its clusterName and unpinned state are both true, so the release-name predicate is the sole reason it renders. This is the routine post-split parent upgrade of every cluster, the guard's highest-blast-radius path. Per-conjunct mutation now: dropping release-name reddens the greenfield case, dropping keep reddens the pinned case, dropping clusterName reddens nothing (an MD from another cluster cannot carry this release name, so clusterName is belt-and-braces). Baseline 6 of 6 green. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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2f87cdcdfa |
docs(agents): correct the image-refs consumer ordinal
The routing bullet called hack/overlay-main-images.sh "a fourth consumer" from a time when three scripts sourced the enumeration. Four do now, so the ordinal names the wrong thing in the file every agent reads first. State the distinction instead of a count: overlay is the exception because it reads refs and walks the tree itself, so a newly declared file never reaches it, while hack/promote-packages-artifact.sh sources nothing because it publishes the whole tree and consumes no refs. One clause each, with the existing pointer to docs/agents/image-refs.md carrying the rest. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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ffae003d6b |
fix(release): stop a failed org package listing from exiting green
The nightly sweep's own listing shared one `|| true` with the grep that filters it, and grep legitimately exits 1 when no cozystack/* package matches. A failed /orgs/.../packages read therefore arrived as an empty list, took the "No cozystack/* container packages found" branch and exited 0 -- below the nightly sweep but ABOVE the deferred guard, so a protection set that could not be resolved reported success having swept nothing. That bypasses the guard rather than varying it: replaying the step against a stub gh, a failed /pulls combined with a legitimately empty org listing exited 0 after printing its own ::error::. List and filter as two statements so one `|| true` stops meaning two things, handle the listing failure like the other two (::error::, blocked flag, emptied list), and consult the flag before the early exit. That exit is non-zero, matching the other two listing failures: no sweep is left to carry the run down to the guard, so this is the last place the flag can be honoured, and an unresolved protection set is exactly what fail-closed means. The legitimate empty-org case still prints the same line and exits 0. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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a37a3178e5 |
docs(release): name all four sourcers of the image-ref enumeration
The library header still claimed three call sites. There are four: this PR made hack/verify-promoted-packages.sh source it to compare the candidate's refs against the rc artifact's. The historical drift story stays with the original three, since the verifier has only ever read the shared enumeration. The consumer table gained hack/promote-packages-artifact.sh under a bullet requiring every consumer of references to read all three shapes through the library, while the exception below it still named only hack/overlay-main-images.sh. The publisher sources nothing and needs nothing: it hands the whole tree to `flux push artifact` and touches one reference, the installer's own self-pin, by key with yq. Say that, rather than implying a gap it does not have -- the real exception remains overlay-main-images.sh, which does read references and does walk the tree itself. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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dee398f3b3 |
fix(release): defer a retention listing failure to the promotion guard
Both candidate-protection sources open with a `gh api --paginate` listing and neither handled a failure. Under `set -euo pipefail` a transient /pulls or /branches blip therefore exited the step before the unrelated nightly GHCR sweep had run -- the exact coupling the deferred guard at the bottom exists to remove, and which hack/promotion-retention-contract.bats already asserts positionally. Route both listings into that guard instead: raise the blocked flag and empty the list, so the promotion sweep is skipped and the job still fails while the nightly sweep finishes. Emptying is not cosmetic -- a half-paginated list left in place is a smaller protected set, and a smaller protected set is the one shape that can authorise a delete. Replaying the step's real shell against a stub gh: with /pulls failing it exited 5 and never reached the nightly line; it now exits 1 with the nightly sweep done and the promotion sweep skipped. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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b65b6aa3ae |
test(release): pin every requiredBaseFiles entry, not just the list
The promote gate refuses a target base that lacks any of five [path, marker] pairs, and the contract test asserted the list as a block: deleting the whole thing turned it red, deleting the hack/lib/image-refs.sh entry alone did not. Four of five pairs were therefore unpinned individually. Pin the missing one. The verifier sources that library through the same `dirname $0` as lib/promoted-packages.sh, so a base carrying the script without it fails at exactly the same point -- after the candidate, the staging branch and the draft release exist. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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acd0a9e0a2 |
test(release): cover the verifier's rc-reference scan guard
The scan treats any grep diagnostic as a failed scan, because `find ... -exec ... +` reports the legitimate "nothing matched" as a failure too and the `|| true` absorbing that also absorbs a file that went unscanned. Deleting the whole guard left the suite green: its two siblings -- a failing collector and an empty collection -- each have a dedicated test, and this one had none. Reach the state the guard exists for by putting a grep on PATH that answers the scan's invocation the way the real one answers a file it cannot open. A chmod 000 fixture would stop proving anything wherever the suite runs as root. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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04fa8471fe |
docs(release): say what the gates actually guarantee
Three claims that were stronger than the code, plus one legibility fix. The PR gate's comment said a `packages/` edit "on the PR or its base" fails the status before merge. The base half is not true: GitHub fires no `pull_request` event when the base branch advances, it only recomputes refs/pull/N/merge, so a change landing on the base after this went green is never re-verified and the PR merges on the stale result. Checking the merge tree does make base drift visible WHEN the job runs, which is worth keeping — but finalize is what actually catches the drift case, after the merge and before any stable name. Say both, in the workflow and in the reviewer checklist, so nobody reads the green as covering more than it does. "Transactional at every consumer-visible name" is a judgement call dressed as an absolute, inherited from the "this dispatch performs NO registry mutation" it replaced. The dispatch now does write to the registry: the `promotion-*` candidate is a real, publicly listable tag. What it creates is no *stable* name — no vX.Y.Z, no :latest, no stable installer. Stated that way the sentence stops needing the reader to already know which writes were meant. The retention paragraph listed two of the conditions the workflow enforces. It now lists all of them, including the ones the workflow gained here: same-repository, bot-authored, `release-X.Y.Z` branch, the `release` label, exactly one valid digest pin, and protection from a base-branch tip as well as an open PR. Also: `flux pull artifact` reads its credentials from ~/.docker/config.json, which is why finalize now runs `docker login` — but its runner class is not one of the docker-using build ones and the setup step installs everything except docker. Check for it there, where the message can name what is missing, instead of failing with "command not found" halfway down the release path. And the verifier's exclusion list is a restatement of flux's `excludeOCI`, not a derivation — the CLI does not expose it — so the coupling and the pinned version are now written down next to the list. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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820e72d572 |
fix(release): protect a candidate until its retag, not until PR merge
Retention protected a packages candidate only while an OPEN bot release PR pinned its digest. The digest stops being eligible for deletion only when finalize's retag adds a stable tag to the manifest, because that is what makes the `all(tags match promotion-*)` predicate stop matching — and finalize runs after the merge that closes the PR. The window between them is where a half-finished release sits. Finalize creates the write-once stable git tag, then dies before the retag: a lost runner, a 5xx publishing the draft, a non-fast-forward on the maintenance branch. What is left pins the candidate from a merge commit and a tag nobody can move, with no open PR and only a temporary tag on the manifest. Thirty days later retention deletes it, after which re-running finalize 404s at the candidate check and re-dispatching promote is refused because the stable tag exists. The release can then only be finished by hand — the exact class of manual cleanup this design exists to remove. Protect the tips of the branches a promote PR can merge into as well. The two sources are read differently on purpose. An open promote PR's head is supposed to carry exactly one candidate pin, so anything else is an anomaly and blocks. A branch tip is an additional source: every digest pin found is protected and a branch without one contributes nothing, because a maintenance line cut before this pipeline existed cannot pin a candidate and must not wedge retention forever. Blocking now stops the promotion sweep alone. It used to `exit 1` inside the resolution loop, which also killed the unrelated nightly prune further down the same step — so a WIP commit adding a trailing comment to a pin on a release branch would silently stop GHCR nightly pruning. The job still fails; it fails after the nightly sweep has run. Verified by running the step's script against a stubbed `gh`: a digest pinned by main's tip and referenced by no open PR is now excluded while a genuinely abandoned one is still listed; a manifest that also carries a stable tag stays excluded by the existing predicate; and a malformed pin on a PR head leaves the nightly sweep running, skips the promotion sweep and exits 1. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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05b2ce90cf |
fix(release): close the verifier's fail-open paths and cover them
Three gaps in the guards that decide whether the published candidate is still the tree being tagged. All three passed silently rather than failing, which is the worst shape for a check that runs immediately before a write-once name is created. `normalized_refs` piped `collect_image_refs` straight into its parsing loop, so the pipeline reported `sort -u`'s status and the collector's was discarded. POSIX sh has no `pipefail` and this script has to stay POSIX, so `set -e` never saw it: a failed or truncated collection became a smaller set and the rc-vs-candidate comparison matched it happily. The verifier then reported that no container bytes changed across promotion having proven nothing — on the guard that carries that entire claim. Collect into a file first, so a nonzero collector aborts before anything is compared. An empty collection is the same failure wearing a zero exit status and needs its own check: two empty sets compare equal, so the proof passes having examined nothing, and every packages tree carries image references — none means the collector understood nothing it was handed. The rc-leftovers scan swallowed grep's stderr, turning "could not read this file" into "this file is clean" — the silent-skip shape hack/promote-rewrite-tags.sh refuses by name. The `|| true` has to stay, because `-exec … +` reports the legitimate "nothing matched" as a failure too, so the diagnostics are the only remaining signal that a file went unscanned. Fail on any of them. Defence in depth rather than a live hole: a surviving rc string would also fail the per-file compare, since the release tree has none. The per-file content comparison had no test at all. It is the only leg that catches a file present on BOTH sides with different bytes — exactly the threat the job exists for, a maintainer editing packages/ on the release PR after promotion published the candidate. The file-set compare sees the same names, the installer compare reads one file, and the rc-refs compare never looks at the release tree. Replacing the comparison with a no-op left all nine other tests green. Red phases, all observed before the fixes. The content-compare case changes one non-image line on one side, so no other leg can fire and claim the credit; it fails with the comparison no-op'd and passes with it restored. The two collector cases run the verifier from a copy whose sibling lib/ holds a stub — which is how the workflows already invoke it, `.release-tooling/hack/…` with libraries resolved next to the script, so the failure is reached the way production would reach it. Against the piped version both fail on `[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]`: the verifier exits 0 and prints its success line whether the collector returns 3 or returns nothing. Also pins `e2e`'s dependency on the candidate gate. The contract pinned `e2e-report`'s, so removing `verify-release-candidate` from `e2e`'s `needs` together with the `success` clause on its release arm left all six tests green — and running a full-e2e promotion suite against a candidate that never verified is the worse of the two failures. Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9fa8eeeda2 |
ci(release): pin the promotion toolchain and cap the candidate gate
Three review findings on the new promotion steps.
`yq` was fetched from `releases/latest/download` in all three steps this
pipeline installs it in — the promote dispatch, the promote PR gate and
finalize. That makes an unpinned moving dependency part of what decides
whether a stable release may be created, and part of what rewrites the
installer pin: two promotions of the same rc can be served different
binaries. Pin it the way FLUX_VERSION already is, version-gated so a
matching preinstalled yq is reused, on the version the e2e sandbox image
already tracks.
A version authenticates nothing about the bytes it names, though, and
these are the workflows that mint write-once stable names. yq is
therefore also pinned BY CONTENT: its SHA-256 is committed beside its
version and verified before install.
Scoped to yq deliberately. It is the one downloaded binary with write
authority over what a release contains — it stamps the candidate digest
into installer values at promote time and platformVersion into the
stable chart at finalize. skopeo, helm and oras only move bytes that are
already digest-addressed, so a substituted one is caught downstream; a
substituted yq writes the wrong pin and every later check verifies that
pin faithfully.
The Flux installer is left as it is, on purpose. It fetches
flux_${FLUX_VERSION}_checksums.txt from the pinned release and verifies
the binary against it, so the binary is not the exposure — the ~6 KB
bootstrap script from fluxcd.io is, and it is mutable by design and
fetched identically in ten other workflows here. Pinning its bytes in
these three files would break on the next regeneration of a script the
project does not control while leaving the same fetch unpinned
everywhere else. The comment names the residual risk instead.
No precedent existed either way: nothing under .github/workflows/ or
hack/ verified a downloaded tool before this, and every version-pinned
download in the tree (oras 1.2.0, cozyvalues-gen 1.6.0) is unverified.
This is a new convention rather than an application of one, confined to
the release path and justified by write authority, and the comment says
so where the next reader will be standing. The three unpinned fetches
outside this pipeline (nightly.yaml, e2e-fork.yaml) are left alone.
The checksum is trust-on-first-use, which is the honest description: it
fixes the bytes to what was checked when the version was chosen and
makes any later substitution loud. Provenance is the release's own
published checksums list cross-checked against the downloaded asset;
both agree on
fa52a4e758c63d38299163fbdd1edfb4c4963247918bf9c1c5d31d84789eded4, and
that binary self-reports v4.53.3.
Verified locally against the real asset: the version gate skips a
matching preinstalled yq and re-installs a mismatched one, the checksum
line reports OK for the genuine binary and exits 1 for a tampered copy,
which aborts the step under the runner's `bash -e`.
`verify-release-candidate` had no `timeout-minutes`, so it inherited the
6-hour default while `e2e-report` waits on it through `needs` — a
stalled `flux pull artifact` would hold the required `E2E Tests` status
pending for the whole of it. 30 minutes, matching `checks` and
`finalize`.
The contract pins that all three install steps carry both versions and
the checksum, run the checksum check, name no `latest/download`, and
agree on one yq version and one checksum. So the unpinned one-line idiom
cannot come back into a release step by copy-paste from the workflows
that still use it, and bumping the version in one file without its
checksum cannot pass. Both mutations are caught.
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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2d734fb229 |
fix(release): preflight the rc tree's own pin before publishing
hack/promote-packages-artifact.sh pushes the candidate BEFORE rewriting installer values, so the artifact carries the rc tree's platformSourceUrl/platformSourceRef verbatim — and hack/verify-promoted-packages.sh reads exactly those two fields back out of it as the candidate's rc baseline, requiring a trusted repository and an immutable `digest=sha256:<64 hex>` pin. The publisher checked neither. A tag-form ref or an untrusted URL in the rc tree published a candidate and pushed two commits regardless; the refusal arrived later, in the promote PR gate or in finalize, once the staging branch and the draft release already existed. Check both at dispatch time instead, while nothing has been written. A copied regex would drift from the guard it is bringing forward and quietly restore the late failure, so the trusted repository and the digest pattern move into hack/lib/promoted-packages.sh and both halves source it. That makes the library part of what the verifier needs at run time, so promote's base-branch precondition gains it: the list exists because the base's own workflows run after merge, and a base carrying the verifier without its library fails at the same two late points. Tests: both preflights are covered, each asserting the mock registry client was never invoked — "exited non-zero" alone does not say nothing was written. Both fail with the preflight removed. The publisher fixtures now pin the trusted repository the way a real rc tree does, and still send the candidate elsewhere via REGISTRY so the rewrite assertions keep their teeth. Also covers a malformed PROMOTION_ID. It is not attacker-influenced, but it is the run-uniqueness suffix of the candidate tag and retention.yaml deletes a candidate only when every tag on the manifest matches `promotion-v…-run-[0-9]+-[0-9]+`; a value outside that shape publishes an artifact no cleanup pass can ever collect. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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54e8533a9d |
fix(release): compare executable bits unambiguously in the verifier
The mode check was written as a single chain:
if { [ -x "$a" ] && [ ! -x "$r" ] || [ ! -x "$a" ] && [ -x "$r" ]; }
which reads like a symmetric difference and is not one. POSIX gives
`&&` and `||` equal precedence and left associativity, so it groups as
`((A && B) || C) && D` with `D = [ -x "$r" ]`. A file executable in the
candidate and not in the release tree makes `A && B` true but `D`
false, so the whole condition is false and the mismatch is accepted.
Only the mirror case was rejected — and it is the benign one. The
direction that got through is content the merge reviewer never saw made
runnable inside the very artifact the operator installs, which cmp(1)
cannot see because it compares bytes.
Resolve each side to a value and compare those, so no precedence rule
is load-bearing.
Both directions now have coverage. Before the fix the candidate-only
test failed against the shipped condition and the release-only test
passed, which is what makes the pair meaningful rather than a check
that only goes red when the whole block is deleted.
Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
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5d56681f8c |
fix(ci): put every label guard in lockstep, forks included
Promotion needs the `release` label to start work, so this PR added it to the set of labels whose `labeled` event is not discarded. That set is stated in four places and was updated in three. `gate-concurrency-contract.bats` caught the shape of the problem and then became the first casualty of it. It asserted that the concurrency key excludes exactly ONE label from the `-label` group, by counting occurrences of `github.event.label.name != '`. A second publishing label made the count 2, turning the suite red — and with it `checks`, then `finalize`, then `e2e`, then the required `E2E Tests` status. Raising the constant to 2 would re-hardcode the same brittleness one label later and throw away the invariant the test exists for: the set of labels excluded from the `-label` suffix is exactly the set `plan` runs for. Both sets are now extracted from the workflow and compared, so the assertion holds at any number of labels. `resolve_assets` was the guard that got missed. It sits on `e2e`'s release arm, so a label event `plan` runs for and it skips for leaves `e2e` with both arms false — `finalize` is force-skipped for release PRs — while `e2e-report` still runs. On a promote PR already carrying `full-e2e`, re-applying `release` therefore superseded the green run and posted `E2E Tests` = failure, because `full-e2e` bypasses the "e2e not repeated" branch and `E2E_RESULT` is `skipped`. `unlabeled` is not a trigger, so removing the label could not clear it; only a push could. `release` must also not publish on the fork lane. e2e-fork.yaml's `resolve` decides "this run built nothing, so it is not a verdict" by asking whether `Plan build` skipped. Admitting `release` at `plan` made that false: a fork run reaches `plan`, has `build`/`finalize` gated off by its own label, succeeds having produced no pr-patch, and the fork lane fails closed on the missing artifact — red on a suite that was never going to run, on a PR whose only fault is a mislabel. `plan` and `resolve_assets` now admit `release` for same-repo PRs only, and the concurrency key carries the complementary term, so NOT(A OR B OR (C AND NOT F)) stays exactly (NOT A) AND (NOT B) AND (NOT C OR F). For a same-repo PR F is false and every one of them reduces to what it was, so none of this changes non-fork behaviour. The same shape still reaches the fork lane from a PUSH to a fork PR somebody mislabelled `release` — `build` is gated on the label, not on the event, so this predates promotion using the label. Left alone; the comment in e2e-fork.yaml now records it instead of asserting an invariant this PR would have made false. The contract enumerated `plan` and `e2e-report` by name, which is why it did not catch `resolve_assets`: a named-job loop cannot notice a job nobody thought to name. It now derives the job list from the file and requires every job that decides from a label name to decide from the same set, and pins the fork term on both halves of the complement. The file's existing properties are kept — extraction runs over executable-only lines, so a commented-out key cannot satisfy the contract, and every comparison asserts a non-empty input first, so an empty extraction fails closed under both bats and cozytest.sh. Verified by mutation, each caught: excluding a label `plan` skips for, admitting one the key does not exclude, reverting `resolve_assets`, deleting `e2e-report`'s guard, narrowing `verify-release-candidate`'s, renaming the label in one guard only, commenting out the group key, and dropping the fork term from either side alone. Deleting `plan`'s step-level fork guard is caught too, by an assertion that had to stop matching on the bare identifier once `plan`'s own `if:` named it. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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f21d277eba |
fix(release): retain live promotion candidates
Protect package candidates referenced by open release PRs while pruning abandoned run-specific promotion artifacts. Document the stable-candidate lifecycle and maintenance-branch rollout requirement. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Assisted-By: GPT-5 <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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c2e145709b |
fix(release): publish stable packages candidate
Serialize the tag-rewritten packages tree during RC promotion and pin its immutable digest in the installer. Verify the candidate against the prospective merge and the original RC artifact before creating stable names. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Assisted-By: GPT-5 <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> |
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61edf33ef4 |
fix(e2e): capture both ends of the worker byte path on node-join failure
A tenant worker that misses the node-Ready deadline while its kubelet image pull crawls leaves two mechanisms behind one symptom, and the artifact could not tell them apart. Either the link is slow, or the pull keeps restarting and discarding what it fetched; from inside the guest both are a progress line that barely moves. Per-worker network counters, read from the kubelet's cAdvisor endpoint the CPU throttling capture already uses, count every byte that crossed into the Pod including the ones a restart threw away, so the gap between that and the progress the guest reported separates the two. Which row carries it is not obvious and getting it wrong inverts the reading, so the collector states it. cAdvisor publishes one row per interface in the Pod netns, and a bridge-bound worker has four: the one still named eth0 is a dummy holding the Pod IP, carries no traffic, and reports zero -- the row a reader reaches for first, where zero reads as a worker that received nothing. The renamed NIC's receive is the number that answers; the bridge counts the same bytes again and the tap is named from the host's end. No interface predicate is applied, so all four reach the artifact and can be told apart. Two further properties of the family fail by capturing nothing rather than loudly: the dropped-packet series are spelled packets_dropped, and every row carries an empty container label because cAdvisor publishes them on the Pod sandbox, so a filter borrowed from the CPU counters beside it matches nothing at all. Both are stated where the filter is. The fixture's rows are real kubelet output relabelled; its interface names are read from the KubeVirt version this repo ships rather than sampled, since no virt-launcher Pod was available. The guest side gains the service state machine and the link table. Talos creates a service's log buffer when its runner opens the log writer, as it starts the process, so a kubelet still waiting on its volumes, on time sync, or on the container runtime reporting healthy never reached its runner, has no log at all, and the capture recorded an rpc error naming a log that was never registered: true about the log, silent about the service, while the state and the awaited condition were the finding. The link table is read as yaml because MTU lives in the spec rather than among the printed columns, and it is the value that decides whether a path-MTU reading of a stalled transfer survives. Both carry a tighter bound than the two reads beside them, being single tabular RPCs rather than streams, and the walk they sit in is the term the phase budget sizes itself against. A worker whose reads all failed now says so once for the worker. Each log already carried its own error and exit code, which is accurate per file and adds up to a directory indistinguishable from a worker that had little to report. The phase budget drops from 8m to 7m to pay for the two added guest reads, because the inequality keeping the tenant snapshot reachable had ten seconds of slack. A shorter budget declines more, and what it declines first is what is gated last: the mirror capture, whose subject is partly recoverable from its own request counts and the host snapshot, and the image-cache re-probe, which has no substitute and was already the first to go. The second cost lands on the guest captures, which are gated after the new counters and reach their gate with both the shortened budget and a listing plus a read per node already spent -- up to 100s at the read bound and the three-node cap, a ceiling those numbers impose rather than a duration measured on a live cluster. Sharing that read would mean the two captures becoming one walk, which is left out for scope rather than merit: the phase gate is a deadline rather than a per-collector allowance, so one walk admitted at the first of the two gates would cost less and collect more. The cost is stated rather than netted away, and the source says which way the argument runs. Both captures run one shared body, which also settles what the two copies had already broken once: the audit that catches an unbounded read pins each collector by something only it produces, and two collectors issuing byte-identical reads left neither with anything of its own, so stubbing one out of the audit went unnoticed. It is pinned by the report directory each writes. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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1c00ddb0f3 |
fix(platform): give node DaemonSets memory requests and limits (#3495)
## What this PR does Sets memory requests and limits on the node DaemonSets that had none. Companion to the namespace-wide LimitRange; the reasoning for why a limit specifically (and not a request, and not a `PriorityClass`) is in that PR and in `docs/operations/system-memory-limits.md`. Requests come from 14-day peak working set measured on a 3-node dev cluster. Limits are deliberately loose, sized as a runaway backstop rather than a fitted ceiling, for two reasons: several of these scale with cluster size in ways a small dev cluster understates (cilium with endpoint and policy count, fluent-bit with log volume, multus and kube-ovn with pods per node, velero node-agent during a backup), and undersizing converts a rare pressure-driven kill into a deterministic one. This repository already carries a scar from that failure mode, recorded in the `vertical-pod-autoscaler` values where a 110Mi limit OOM-killed the updater and cascaded into failed HelmReleases. Two DaemonSets are not chart-rendered and needed their own seam. `linstor-satellite` goes through the `LinstorSatelliteConfiguration` podTemplate, including the two plunger sidecars — every container in the pod needs a limit for the pod cgroup to get `memory.max`, so one limit-free sidecar would put the whole pod back in the victim set. `virt-handler` goes through KubeVirt `customizeComponents.patches`, because virt-operator owns that DaemonSet and chart values cannot reach it. `linstor-controller` is deliberately left limit-free. It is a JVM that must not be OOM-killed mid-operation, and `cluster_test.yaml` pins that as an invariant. The satellite is a Go binary with a bounded working set, so the opposite call applies there. Not covered, because upstream hardcodes the containers with no `resources` knob: the four frr-k8s `cp-*` init containers, the kube-ovn `hostpath-init` and `install-cni` init containers, and `cozy-proxy`, whose vendored chart exposes no resources value at all. `hami` and `kilo` are left alone as optional components with no usage measurements behind them. All of these still receive a limit from the namespace LimitRange, so they are not left exposed — they simply carry no request. Worth stating plainly: this PR does **not** grant OOM immunity on its own, because the init containers it cannot reach leave the pod cgroup without `memory.max`. That only closes with the LimitRange PR in place. ### Verification Every touched package renders and its helm-unittest suite passes. New assertions cover the metallb speaker and all five frr-k8s containers, the linstor satellite and plunger sidecars, and the KubeVirt patch. The metallb suite was mutation-tested: removing the frr-k8s reloader limit fails it. One gap. The KubeVirt patch shape was validated against the live CRD and pushed through the real update path with `kubectl patch --dry-run=server` (accepted; live object confirmed unchanged), but virt-operator actually reconciling the DaemonSet with those resources has **not** been observed, because that means restarting virt-handler fleet-wide. Worth confirming in e2e or on a dedicated stand before merge. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map against the diff. No entry is triggered: this changes chart values and cozystack-owned templates under `packages/system/`, not the `cozy-proxy` label and annotation contract, not node prerequisites, not an app schema or version enum. Leaving the boxes empty rather than ticking "none affected", because the diff surfaced a real gap in a downstream repository even though nothing here forces a change there: the vendored `cozy-proxy` chart exposes no `resources` value, so its DaemonSet cannot be given one from this side at all. That wants an issue or PR in cozystack/cozy-proxy followed by a re-vendor. Flagging it for a maintainer decision rather than filing speculatively. ### Release note ```release-note fix(platform): node DaemonSets (cilium, metallb speaker and frr-k8s, kube-ovn, linstor-satellite, virt-handler, fluent-bit, node-exporter, multus, velero node-agent, kubevirt-csi-node) now declare memory requests and limits, so they are no longer selected as victims by the Talos userspace OOM handler when an unrelated workload drives node memory pressure. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit - **Resource Management** - Added CPU and memory requests and limits across Cilium, KubeVirt CSI, KubeVirt, Linstor, MetalLB, monitoring agents, Multus, and Velero workloads. - Improved workload stability with defined memory ceilings and resource reservations. - **Multus** - Moved resources to the dedicated `cozy-multus` namespace and configured Cilium as the master CNI. - Added optional CNI plugin staging with enhanced security settings. - **Tests** - Added and expanded Helm tests validating resource configurations and Multus behavior. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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b7b56530b9 |
docs(platform): explain system component memory limits (#3496)
## What this PR does Adds `docs/operations/system-memory-limits.md`, recording why system components carry memory limits — which is not recoverable from the values alone, and is the kind of thing that gets "cleaned up" by a well-meaning future change. The Talos userspace OOM handler (v1.12+) selects victims by ranking cgroups that lack `memory.max`. Three consequences are each easy to get wrong independently: only a limit grants immunity (a request just moves BestEffort to Burstable, which under `strictCgroupClassOrdering` means "killed second"); every container in the pod needs one, init containers included, because kubelet only sets pod-level `memory.max` when they all have it; and `PriorityClass` — `system-node-critical` included — has no effect whatsoever, because the handler walks cgroupfs and never talks to the API server. That last one is the trap, since setting it looks like a fix. The page also covers the two installer knobs and the constraint that makes them dangerous to lower (a defaulted limit below a container's own request fails admission), how to verify a pod cgroup actually carries `memory.max` rather than trusting the QoS class, what is deliberately left uncovered (Kubernetes static pods are Talos-managed; a handful of vendored containers expose no upstream resources knob), and how to relax the global-PSI backstop clause of the trigger for a cluster that trips it persistently. Ordering note: this documents behaviour introduced by the LimitRange and DaemonSet PRs, so it should not merge ahead of them. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map against the diff. This adds one file under `docs/operations/`, alongside the existing pages there; nothing in the map covers that path, and the website keeps its own copy of user-facing documentation rather than generating it from this directory. A maintainer may still want a version of this on the website, which is a judgement call rather than a forced follow-up. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change ### Release note ```release-note docs(platform): document why system components carry memory limits, how the Talos userspace OOM handler selects victims, how to tune or disable the system-namespace LimitRange, and why PriorityClass does not influence any of it. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Documentation** * Added guidance on Talos userspace out-of-memory behavior and system component memory limits. * Documented namespace boundaries, installer tuning, validation constraints, rollout behavior, and verification steps. * Added instructions for inspecting OOM actions, identifying uncovered workloads, evaluating trigger expressions, and configuring optional overrides. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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22ce998890 |
fix(flux-shard-operator): repair sharded helm-controller crashloop behind an HTTP proxy (#3546)
## What this PR does Fixes #3544. `flux-shard-operator` clones the flux-aio `helm-controller` container into each `helm-controller-shard<i>` Deployment. It already sanitises the all-in-one localhost wiring, but keeps two things that stop the standalone shard from starting behind a corporate HTTP proxy: 1. **Inherited `HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`/`NO_PROXY`.** A standalone shard needs no external egress (source-controller fetches artifacts). Behind an unreachable proxy the controller makes a blocking startup HTTPS call that never completes, the manager never serves `/healthz`, and the liveness probe crashloops the pod forever. flux-aio survives only because it starts once and never restarts. On an affected cluster every HelmRelease carrying a `sharding.fluxcd.io/key` (150 of ~240) was frozen for days, silently. 2. **No `startupProbe`.** The clone inherits only a ~30s liveness window, so any slow start (large cache sync) is fatal and unrecoverable. This PR extends the sanitisation to drop the proxy env, and derives a `startupProbe` from the liveness handler with a generous budget so a slow-but-progressing start is not killed. Verified by an A/B on a live cluster (throwaway helm-controller with a non-matching selector): with the proxy env it hangs; without it, it starts cleanly (`Starting workers`). ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change Internal operator behavior only; no API/CRD/values contract change. ### Release note ```release-note fix(flux-shard-operator): sharded helm-controller no longer crashloops at startup behind an HTTP proxy; the cloned controller drops the inherited proxy env and gains a startupProbe, so HelmReleases assigned to shards keep reconciling in proxied environments. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Bug Fixes** * Prevented inherited proxy settings, including uppercase and lowercase variants of `NO_PROXY`, from affecting Flux shard deployments. * Automatically adds a startup health check when only a liveness check is configured. * Preserved the liveness check’s handler and timeout while applying appropriate startup timing and failure settings. * **Documentation** * Documented startup health checks for slow helm-controller startup. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |