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Myasnikov DaniilandClaude Opus 4.8
e160a0dc87
The default backupStorage.endpoint is http://seaweedfs-s3...svc:8333, but Cozystack ships SeaweedFS with global.seaweedfs.enableSecurity=true, so its in-cluster S3 serves TLS on :8333 behind the self-signed "SeaweedFS CA". Every cozy-default backup (etcd/mariadb/velero/fdb/cnpg) therefore hits a TLS listener over plaintext and fails the handshake. This is fatal for the etcd v1alpha2 adoption migration: its mandatory pre-upgrade safety snapshot writes to this endpoint, so migration 50 hard-fails and blocks the 1.5->1.6 upgrade on any cluster with a legacy etcd. The Etcd Strategy S3 schema has no caCert/insecureSkipVerify field, so it cannot target the self-signed in-cluster endpoint at all. Add a "backupstrategy-controller.endpoint" helper that, for a provisioned bucket, resolves the endpoint from the COSI bucket's system credentials Secret (backupStorage.systemSecretName) — the external S3 ingress with an ACME cert, the same trusted endpoint COSI advertises and every backup operator can verify — and forces the https:// scheme. All Strategy CRs, the Velero BackupStorageLocation and the controller Deployment env are routed through it. It falls back to .Values.backupStorage.endpoint for external S3 (provisionBucket=false) and for offline `helm template`/unit renders and the pre-reconcile first install, where the Secret lookup returns nothing (Flux re-renders on spec.interval once the Secret exists). helm-unittest extended to assert every consumer picks up the resolved endpoint (CNPG/Etcd/Velero keep the full URL, MariaDB/FDB strip the scheme and derive their secure flag) plus the external-S3 verbatim fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>