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Aleksei Sviridkin
33cf6972bb
## What this PR does The qdrant e2e suite now runs with TLS on and checks the tenant trust anchor end to end. Before this, the fixture left `tls` unset with `external: false`, so the chart rendered no CA and no `TenantProjection`, and nothing in e2e reached the controller or `tenantsecrets`. Setting `tls.enabled: true` turns TLS on without the LoadBalancer that `external: true` would allocate. The first new step checks that the anchor is published. The `qdrant-test-ca` sentinel has to report `Ready=True/Projected`, and `qdrant-test.tenant-ca` has to carry both the `tenant-ca` and `tenantresource=true` labels. The projection must hold only `ca.crt` with the same fingerprint as the chart's CA, and `tenantsecrets` must serve it. The key-bearing `qdrant-test-ca` and `qdrant-test-tls` must answer NotFound there, and any other error fails the step. The second step checks that the anchor is what decides trust. It reads the anchor through `tenantsecrets`, port-forwards the qdrant Service and runs `openssl s_client` with that file as the only CA, hostname check included. A CA with the same subject and another key must fail, and so must the runner's default trust store. A handshake failure counts only when the output shows a verification error, so a refused connection does not pass as a rejection. Plaintext HTTP must get no response. Curl exits 7 and 28 fail the step, and a second verified handshake afterwards proves the forward was still alive. TLS does not break the existing steps, because none of them talk to qdrant. `create-qdrant`, `wait-helmreleases-ready`, `verify-statefulset-and-storage` and `verify-pvc-reclaim-on-delete` only read Kubernetes objects: no `http://`, no port 6333 or 6334, no curl or exec, and the suite has no backup round trip. The release now also renders two Issuers, two Certificates and the sentinel. The chart switches its probes to HTTPS with `enable_tls`, so `readyReplicas: 1` now covers a pod serving TLS. Local checks: `chainsaw lint test` (v0.2.15) says the file is valid. `helm template` with the fixture's spec renders 2 Certificates, 2 Issuers and 1 TenantProjection, and none without TLS. I ran the handshake logic against a local `openssl s_server` with a CA and leaf shaped like the chart's. The anchor passes, the wrong CA and the default store fail on verification, a wrong hostname fails, plaintext gets `000`, and a closed port is not counted as a rejection. A sentinel with a missing source (`SourceNotFound`) is not tested here, the reconciler unit tests cover it. Review notes I left as they are: - Through `kubectl port-forward` the local socket is always accepted, so curl exits 7 and 28 only catch a dead forward process. A false pass would need qdrant to answer plaintext and a pod-side blip on that one request at the same time. - qdrant may reset the socket on the plaintext request, and some kubectl versions drop the whole port-forward on a pod-side error. Then the handshake after it turns the step red, not green. If CI shows `lost connection to pod` there, the plaintext check should get its own port-forward. - The suite's `catch` has no `describe` of the `TenantProjection`. The sentinel assert prints its conditions when it fails, but a red Secret assert or script after it would not. - The vendored chart's `servicemonitor.yaml` hardcodes `scheme: http`, so metrics scraping fails for any qdrant with TLS on. That was already the case before this PR, and the suite does not check metrics. Tracked in #4703. cert-manager does not set owner references here, so `qdrant-test-ca` and `qdrant-test-tls` stay in the namespace with their private keys after the app is deleted. That is tracked in #4704. The nats half of #3706 is tracked in #4702. Closes #3706 ### Screenshots No UI change. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: The diff touches only `hack/e2e-chainsaw/qdrant/`, which no entry in the trigger map covers. ### Release note ```release-note test(qdrant): e2e now runs qdrant with TLS on and checks that a client trusting only the tenant-published CA reaches it, while a wrong or missing anchor and plaintext HTTP are refused. ```