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Myasnikov Daniil
9fa8eeeda2
Three review findings on the new promotion steps.
`yq` was fetched from `releases/latest/download` in all three steps this
pipeline installs it in — the promote dispatch, the promote PR gate and
finalize. That makes an unpinned moving dependency part of what decides
whether a stable release may be created, and part of what rewrites the
installer pin: two promotions of the same rc can be served different
binaries. Pin it the way FLUX_VERSION already is, version-gated so a
matching preinstalled yq is reused, on the version the e2e sandbox image
already tracks.
A version authenticates nothing about the bytes it names, though, and
these are the workflows that mint write-once stable names. yq is
therefore also pinned BY CONTENT: its SHA-256 is committed beside its
version and verified before install.
Scoped to yq deliberately. It is the one downloaded binary with write
authority over what a release contains — it stamps the candidate digest
into installer values at promote time and platformVersion into the
stable chart at finalize. skopeo, helm and oras only move bytes that are
already digest-addressed, so a substituted one is caught downstream; a
substituted yq writes the wrong pin and every later check verifies that
pin faithfully.
The Flux installer is left as it is, on purpose. It fetches
flux_${FLUX_VERSION}_checksums.txt from the pinned release and verifies
the binary against it, so the binary is not the exposure — the ~6 KB
bootstrap script from fluxcd.io is, and it is mutable by design and
fetched identically in ten other workflows here. Pinning its bytes in
these three files would break on the next regeneration of a script the
project does not control while leaving the same fetch unpinned
everywhere else. The comment names the residual risk instead.
No precedent existed either way: nothing under .github/workflows/ or
hack/ verified a downloaded tool before this, and every version-pinned
download in the tree (oras 1.2.0, cozyvalues-gen 1.6.0) is unverified.
This is a new convention rather than an application of one, confined to
the release path and justified by write authority, and the comment says
so where the next reader will be standing. The three unpinned fetches
outside this pipeline (nightly.yaml, e2e-fork.yaml) are left alone.
The checksum is trust-on-first-use, which is the honest description: it
fixes the bytes to what was checked when the version was chosen and
makes any later substitution loud. Provenance is the release's own
published checksums list cross-checked against the downloaded asset;
both agree on
fa52a4e758c63d38299163fbdd1edfb4c4963247918bf9c1c5d31d84789eded4, and
that binary self-reports v4.53.3.
Verified locally against the real asset: the version gate skips a
matching preinstalled yq and re-installs a mismatched one, the checksum
line reports OK for the genuine binary and exits 1 for a tampered copy,
which aborts the step under the runner's `bash -e`.
`verify-release-candidate` had no `timeout-minutes`, so it inherited the
6-hour default while `e2e-report` waits on it through `needs` — a
stalled `flux pull artifact` would hold the required `E2E Tests` status
pending for the whole of it. 30 minutes, matching `checks` and
`finalize`.
The contract pins that all three install steps carry both versions and
the checksum, run the checksum check, name no `latest/download`, and
agree on one yq version and one checksum. So the unpinned one-line idiom
cannot come back into a release step by copy-paste from the workflows
that still use it, and bumping the version in one file without its
checksum cannot pass. Both mutations are caught.
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>