Files
cozystack/pkg
IvanHunters f05718b2de feat(redis)!: refuse external access without TLS at admission (#4639)
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## What this PR does

An admission policy now refuses a Redis release that would expose a
plaintext endpoint outside the cluster. Redis never turns TLS on by
itself, so `external: true` without `tls.enabled: true` is exactly that
case. The error names the release and a remedy that works.

The rule has three parts, because TLS is fixed when a Redis instance is
created: the RedisFailover schema refuses a change, while the Redis API
accepts one and the HelmRelease then fails. A spec's `tls.enabled` is
therefore a request, not proof of what the instance runs.

- On create, `external: true` needs `tls.enabled: true`.
- On update, turning `external` on is refused whatever `tls.enabled`
says.
- While `external` stays on, `tls.enabled` cannot change. Before the
first reconcile nothing else stops TLS being dropped from a release
admitted as external with TLS. Withdrawing `external` in the same edit
lifts the freeze, and the callers trusted by
`cozystack-tenant-host-policy` are exempt, so an instance whose TLS was
flipped earlier can still be unblocked.

Edits to a release that was already external pass, so releases exposed
in plaintext before this policy keep working. The guarantee covers the
Redis app. A generic publisher such as `tcp-balancer` can still forward
to a plaintext Redis, by design.

This diverges from the Security section of the
`external-database-exposure` proposal, which refuses only an explicit
`tls.enabled: false` and covers every engine. That rule was written
before redis had TLS and matches only postgres. Postgres is left out
here on purpose: CloudNativePG keeps `ssl=on` and its default pg_hba
accepts plaintext from any client that asks, whatever the chart's
`tls.enabled` says, so an admission rule on that field closes nothing.
That gap is #4619. The proposal update and a decision record are
cozystack/community#91.

The policy follows `cozystack-tenant-host-policy`: a
ValidatingAdmissionPolicy in `cozystack-basics`, enforced inside
`cozystack-api` for the aggregated kind. Its decisions are tested in Go
by compiling the shipped template with the apiserver's own CEL compiler
and running Redis objects through it, including the bypass sequences
found in review. A structural chart test can't show what the policy
admits. The redis README, the `external` field description and the
threat model describe the new rule.

Related: #4622 (valkey `external` is always plaintext), #4624 (the redis
`tls.enabled` description implies a live switch).

### Screenshots

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### Downstream repositories

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- [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) -
follow-up:

I walked the trigger map against the diff and nothing in it fires, but I
left the boxes empty because cozystack/community is reached anyway: the
`external-database-exposure` proposal still states the old admission
rule. Its update and a decision record are cozystack/community#91.

### Release note

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```release-note
feat(redis)!: a Redis release can be exposed outside the cluster only when it is created with `tls.enabled: true`. Creating one with `external: true` and no TLS, turning `external` on for an existing instance, or changing `tls.enabled` while `external` is on is refused at admission. Instances already external without TLS keep working and stay editable.
```


<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->

## Summary by CodeRabbit

* **New Features**
* Redis admission checks now require TLS when external access is enabled
at instance creation. They block enabling external access on an existing
instance and changing TLS while external access remains enabled.
Disabling external access in the same update allows TLS changes.
* Existing instances that already had external access without TLS before
the policy was introduced remain editable.
* **Documentation**
* Updated Redis configuration and security guidance to explain these
restrictions and TLS migration behavior.

<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
2026-10-06 16:39:23 +03:00
..