mirror of
https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack.git
synced 2026-11-22 12:43:32 +09:00
The admission webhook is only ever called by the API server, but it was reachable from every pod in the cluster, in any namespace. That is avoidable attack surface: any flaw in the webhook becomes exploitable by any workload, which is what separated CVE-2025-1974 from an ordinary webhook bug. The rule is deny-only and disables default-deny. Any Cilium rule with an ingress section otherwise puts the selected endpoints behind a default-deny, which here would mean enumerating every port the controller serves and breaking traffic on the first one missed. Host-network sources are not Cilium endpoints, so a management cluster's API server is unaffected. Tenant clusters need an explicit carve-out instead: Kamaji places the API server outside the cluster and defines only the "cluster" egress selection, so webhook calls arrive from the konnectivity agent pod rather than from the API server address, and denying it would fail every Ingress create/update in the tenant cluster. Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io>