mirror of
https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack.git
synced 2026-11-22 12:43:32 +09:00
The /mutate-pods handler returns namespace-derived annotations to any caller that reaches it (GHSA-g883-q79m-8225), and until now nothing stopped an arbitrary in-cluster pod from being that caller. Client-certificate verification, added in #2698, cannot close this on its own. Enabling --client-ca-file requires the API server to *present* a certificate, which it does only when its AdmissionConfiguration names a kubeConfigFile for the webhook plugins. Checked on a running Cozystack control plane: the AdmissionConfiguration carries a PodSecurity block and nothing else, so no certificate is offered at all. Flipping to RequireAndVerifyClientCert there would reject the API server itself, and with failurePolicy: Fail that stops pod creation cluster-wide. No amount of log observation changes that — it is a property of the control plane's configuration, not of the traffic. So the network is where the caller can actually be constrained. The policy denies pod and world traffic to the serving port and needs no carve-out: the API server runs on the host network, so it is not a Cilium endpoint and fromEndpoints never matches it. Unlike the ingress-nginx admission webhook this component exists only on the management cluster, so there is no konnectivity-tunnelled caller to exempt either, and no forgeable pod label anywhere in the selector. It is a CiliumNetworkPolicy rather than a core NetworkPolicy, and that distinction is why it works at all: kube-ovn runs with ENABLE_NP: false and programs no ACLs, so a core NetworkPolicy would be created and never enforced. The values comment claiming NetworkPolicy was simply not an option is corrected — it was true only of the core kind. Deny-only with default-deny disabled, matching the ingress-nginx admission policy: putting these pods behind a default-deny would mean enumerating every port they serve and breaking traffic on the first one forgotten. Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io>