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cozystack/packages
Andrei Kvapil 8554c036de fix(ingress-nginx): confine the konnectivity carve-out to kube-system
The admission-webhook deny exempted any endpoint carrying
k8s-app: konnectivity-agent, in any namespace. Because the rule
disables default-deny, falling out of the deny is the entire access
decision — so any pod anywhere could reach the webhook port by
labelling itself, which is precisely the access the policy exists to
remove.

k8s-app is an ordinary pod label a workload sets on itself. Nothing in
the platform constrains pod labels by admission, and Cilium keeps
k8s-app identity-relevant (its label filter ships no default
whitelist), so the forged label really does change the endpoint's
identity rather than being filtered out.

The namespace key is derived by Cilium from the pod's actual namespace
and cannot be set by the workload. Splitting the deny in two keeps the
carve-out and closes the hole: one selector for everything outside
kube-system with no label condition at all, one for kube-system
carrying the existing NotIn. Only the agent in its own namespace is
exempt.

Kamaji at the pinned 26.3.6-edge puts nothing but
k8s-app: konnectivity-agent on the agent pod template
(internal/resources/konnectivity/agent.go), so the label remains the
only available discriminator and the namespace confinement is what
makes it safe to key on.

Tests cover both halves: the outside-kube-system selector must carry no
label condition, and the kube-system selector must keep exactly the
namespace and label pair.

Reported-by: Daniil Myasnikov <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
Assisted-By: Claude
Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io>
2026-08-21 14:41:27 +02:00
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