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cozystack/hack
Aleksei Sviridkin d685fb30ec fix(gateway)!: require tenant routes to declare their hostnames (#3475)
## What this PR does

The tenant route hostname policy skipped the shape it most needed to
check. Its CEL opened with `!has(object.spec.hostnames) ||`, so an
HTTPRoute or TLSRoute declaring no hostnames satisfied the first operand
and got admitted with nothing compared against the tenant apex. An empty
list passed too: `has()` is true on `[]`, and `all()` over an empty list
is vacuously true.

Such a route is not inert. Under Gateway API it inherits the hostnames
of every listener it attaches to, and `parentRefs` can name a Gateway in
another namespace, so it covers whatever that listener covers. Reported
in #3467.

The predicate now requires the field to be present and non-empty before
validating it. Both policies rendered from that template share one CEL
string, so HTTPRoute and TLSRoute get the change together, and both
match `CREATE` and `UPDATE`, so an existing route that drops its
hostnames is denied exactly as a new one is.

The issue is titled after TLSRoute, but the reachable shape is mostly
HTTPRoute. TLSRoute allows a hostname-less route only on the deprecated
`v1alpha2`; at `v1` and `v1alpha3` the bundle this repo vendors marks
`spec.hostnames` required and rejects an empty list on `minItems: 1`,
while `v1alpha2` carries neither constraint. HTTPRoute `v1` carries
neither either, so it accepts both shapes. All four are checkable in
`packages/system/gateway-api-crds/templates/crds-experimental.yaml`.

Checking that turned up a stale claim in the template header, which said
TLSRoute had no `v1` in Gateway API 1.4 to 1.5 and used it to justify
the rule naming only `v1alpha2`. Gateway API 1.5.1, which this repo
vendors, serves TLSRoute at `v1` as the storage version. The rule still
covers every served version because `matchConstraints.matchPolicy`
defaults to `Equivalent`, and that default is now written down, because
setting `matchPolicy: Exact` reads like a tightening and would silently
stop the policy seeing `v1` and `v1alpha3` TLSRoutes. I corrected the
text and left the coverage alone: the wrong sentence predates this
branch, but my change is what makes the file contradict itself, so the
text is mine to fix while widening version coverage is a separate job.

A `ValidatingAdmissionPolicy` has no cross-object lookup, so it cannot
resolve the parent Gateway to see which hostnames a route would inherit.
Requiring the route to name its own is what keeps every admitted
hostname comparable against the apex. That has a cost: a route relying
on listener inheritance now has to spell its hostnames out, and a tenant
that hand-writes one gets a denial where it used to get an admission.

### The controller change belongs in the same PR

`renderHTTPRedirect` built the http-to-https redirect HTTPRoute with no
hostnames on purpose, to catch every host on port 80. It lands in a
`tenant-*` namespace, so the stricter policy denies it,
`reconcileHTTPToHTTPSRedirect` returns that error, and since it runs
before the status update the TenantGateway never reaches Ready. That
redirect is what keeps app routes attaching by hostname from serving
plaintext on port 80. Neither half of this change is safe alone.

The redirect now names the tenant apex and its wildcard. Both entries
are needed: a wildcard hostname is a suffix match over any number of
labels, so `*.<apex>` covers subdomains at every depth but not the bare
`<apex>`. `renderWildcardCertificate` already builds the same pair.

Coverage narrows in one direction. A request on port 80 with a Host
outside the tenant apex now falls through to a 404 instead of a 301.
That narrowing costs no covered host: the port-80 listener admits routes
only from the Gateway's own namespace and cert-manager's, and the
tightened policy requires every route in the tenant namespace to declare
its hostnames inside the apex, so any host published from this namespace
already falls under the apex or its wildcard.

An inheriting child tenant does not widen that set either. Its hostnames
would reach port 443 through a listener on this same Gateway, and
`cozystack-gateway-hostname-policy` compares every listener against the
host label of the Gateway's own namespace, so a child apex outside that
label never gets its listener: the Gateway write carrying it is refused
at admission whole, in `reconcileGateway` and before the redirect is
rendered. A child apex under this one passes that check and the wildcard
already covers it. That holds at merge base as well, so it is not
something this branch changes.

Deriving hostnames from `spec.apex` makes that field load-bearing for
admission, so it gains `MinLength=1`. An empty apex used to reconcile to
Ready, since the redirect declared no hostnames at all; it would now
render `""` and `"*."` and be rejected on the HTTPRoute hostname schema,
surfacing as a validation error naming the route rather than the field.
The renderer checks it too, because the CRD and the controller binary
roll out separately and an older CRD in the cluster will not carry the
bound.

That schema bound is a breaking change to an existing field and the API
review gate flags it as one, so here is what it actually invalidates.
The chart that renders these CRs already fails on an empty
`_namespace.host`, and in DNS-01 or existingSecret mode an empty apex
already broke earlier, in `renderGateway`, on a listener with `hostname:
"*."`. Nothing that works today becomes invalid. What the bound rejects
is a TenantGateway written by hand, past the chart, with an empty apex,
and I would rather that be refused at admission naming the field than at
reconcile time in controller logs, which is why the bound sits in the
CRD as well as the renderer.

Naming those hostnames also meant excluding the redirect from
`collectHostnameClaims`. A route that attaches to the Gateway and
declares hostnames otherwise reads as an app publishing them, and each
claimed hostname becomes an HTTPS listener named after its first label.
The first label of `*.<apex>` is `*`, which the Gateway CRD's
listener-name pattern rejects, so the Gateway write fails and the
reconcile stops before anything downstream. The exclusion matches on
namespace, name and controller ownership rather than on the labels the
renderer stamps: those labels are writable by anyone who can create a
route, and the claim set also drives conflict resolution, so a
label-keyed exception would let any route opt out of being marked
`Accepted=False` when it loses a hostname race. Name and ownership are
each required and each is pinned by its own test, since ownership alone
would exclude any other controller-owned route and name alone would
extend the exception to a route planted under that name by someone else.

### Radius

Only namespaces starting with `tenant-` are matched. The three
first-party TLSRoutes the platform ships, `kubernetes-api` in `default`
plus `cdi-uploadproxy` and `vm-exportproxy`, set hostnames explicitly
and none sits in a `tenant-*` namespace, so nothing changes for them.

I went through every producer of routes in the tree, in three places
rather than one. No Helm template emits an absent or empty hostname list
in any configuration a tenant can reach: the vendored openbao, harbor,
opencost and flux-operator route templates can render one, but each is
behind a flag that defaults off with no values path to turn it on, and
openbao would fail CRD validation first because its default route
apiVersion requires hostnames. Exactly one Go site builds a route, the
redirect fixed here. And one e2e fixture did rely on the old behaviour:
the Gateway suite's parentRef probe declared no hostnames and is applied
into `tenant-test`, which the policy matches, so it now reads the apex
from the namespace label and names a hostname under it, the same way the
neighbouring cases in that suite already did.

cert-manager also writes routes into tenant namespaces, since it creates
the Challenge in the Certificate's own namespace and the HTTP-01 solver
route beside it. That route declares the hostname it is validating, so
the policy admits it.

### Related issues

Two open issues have a text half that this PR happens to settle, and
neither of them closes here. #3788 reports that the port-80 allow-list
contains the namespace its own comment says it excludes; the comment and
the README paragraph now describe what that filter actually does, while
the behavioural exit it names stays open. #3789 reports that the
TLSRoute rule names only the deprecated API version; that premise is now
written down in the template header, including what has to change before
a bundle drops `v1alpha2`, but the rule still names `v1alpha2` alone.
#3787 covers the wildcard-hostname listener name that the apiserver
rejects, which is what makes the claim-set exclusion here load-bearing
rather than tidy.

### Screenshots

N/A (no UI changes).

### Downstream repositories

I walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the
diff, file by file. No package is added, renamed or removed; no
`values.yaml` key, `values.schema.json` field, version enum or default
moves; no `kind` or `plural` changes; no namespace or release-asset name
changes; nothing under `hack/` moves, is renamed, or changes what a make
target does.

One row deserves a sentence rather than a blanket denial, because the
diff does change a CRD schema: `spec.apex` on
`gateway.cozystack.io/v1alpha1 TenantGateway` gains a `minLength` bound,
which lands in the generated `gateway.cozystack.io_tenantgateways.yaml`.
The provider hand-types `Package` under `cozystack.io` and
`Plan`/`RestoreJob` under `backups.cozystack.io`; `gateway.cozystack.io`
is not among them, and a tightening on an existing field adds no new
field for it to offer typed access to. The
`packages/extra/gateway/README.md` edit sits in the `## Security model`
section, below the `## Parameters` block that `cozyvalues-gen`
regenerates, so it survives `make generate`.

- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:

### Release note

```release-note
fix(gateway)!: the tenant route hostname policy now requires an HTTPRoute or TLSRoute in a `tenant-*` namespace to declare a non-empty `spec.hostnames`. A route that omitted the field, or set it to an empty list, was previously admitted without any hostname being checked against the tenant apex, even though such a route inherits the hostnames of the listener it attaches to rather than matching nothing. A route in a `tenant-*` namespace relying on that inheritance is now rejected and has to name its hostnames. The controller-owned http-to-https redirect route names the tenant apex and its wildcard accordingly, so a request reaching port 80 with a Host outside the tenant apex now gets a 404 instead of a 301. `TenantGateway.spec.apex` additionally gains a `minLength: 1` bound, because the redirect derives its hostnames from that field; a TenantGateway written past the chart with an empty apex is now rejected at admission instead of failing later in the controller.
```


<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit

- **New Features**
- Added edge-terminated gateway support with plain-HTTP listeners and
TLS passthrough handling.
- HTTP-to-HTTPS redirects now explicitly cover the tenant apex and
subdomains.
  - Gateway configurations require a non-empty apex hostname.
  - HTTPRoute, TLSRoute, and GRPCRoute resources must declare hostnames.

- **Bug Fixes**
  - Invalid hostname-less routes are now rejected consistently.
- Controller-managed redirects no longer trigger unnecessary hostname
claims, listeners, or certificates.
- Switching certificate modes now cleans up obsolete ACME resources and
route status.

- **Documentation**
- Updated security and gateway guidance for hostname validation, edge
termination, route compatibility, and certificate handling.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
2026-09-07 18:49:04 +04:00
..
2026-02-17 22:54:12 +01:00