* feat(federation): ADR-111 Phases 4-6 — firewall projection + witness chain + MCP tools Phases 4-6 of ADR-111. Phase 7 (cross-OS WG mesh bringup) is operator-mediated and lives outside the package — staged but not auto-executed per CLAUDE.md destructive-actions guidance. ## Phase 4 — Trust-graded firewall projection `domain/services/wg-firewall-service.ts` (new) - Two backends: linux-nftables (atomic `nft -f`, table `inet ruflo_fed`, default DROP, interface-scoped) and darwin-pf (anchor-scoped pfctl). - Projects WG_NETWORK_GATES → concrete rule lines per peer. - UNTRUSTED excluded (no mesh IP), peers without wgMeshIP skipped. - Defense-in-depth: regex-validated rule args (no shell metachars in pubkey/IP/iface). - Returns rule file content + the load command the operator runs — service never shells out. - 16 unit tests. ## Phase 5 — Witness attestation chain `domain/services/wg-witness-service.ts` (new) - Append-only chain of Ed25519-signed entries. Each entry hash-links to the previous (`prevHash` = sha256 of previous canonical encoding). - Canonical encoding: sorted keys, no whitespace, omitted-on-undefined. - `verifyWitnessChain` walks the chain and reports `failedAt` + reason (`broken-chain-link` | `invalid-signature-or-hash`). - `attestWgCommand` adapter maps WgCommand.verb → event type. - 11 unit tests (canonicalization stability, deterministic hash, chain link integrity, signature-tamper detection). ## Phase 6 — Operator MCP tools `mcp-tools.ts` (extended) - `federation_wg_status` — per-peer mesh state (trust, meshIP, AllowedIPs, suspended/evicted flags) via `WgMeshService.summarize()`. - `federation_wg_attest` — operator-signed witness chain entry. v1 stub returns wire-up instructions until plugin.ts integrates WgWitnessService. - `federation_wg_keyrotate` — emits a new X25519 keypair (public key only via MCP; private key write is operator-mediated) + the upgrade checklist. Requires `confirm: true` (destructive — drops existing tunnels until peers fetch updated manifest). - `createMcpTools` gets optional `getWgMesh` getter (additive, no break). - `FederationCoordinator.listPeers()` added as public discovery accessor. ## Tests - 543/543 pre-existing + new tests pass (513 + 27 phase 4/5 + 3 plugin test count assertions for the new MCP tools). ## Not in this PR (Phase 7 — operator-mediated) - Real WG mesh bringup on mac↔ruvultra over tailscale: stage configs, operator-approved `wg-quick up`, peer-add via federation manifests, SUSPEND → confirm L3 isolation → reactivate restores, witness-verify the change log. Tracked alongside #1879. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> * fix(federation): security — validate peer wg fields before splice (ADR-111) Manual security audit of ADR-111 Phases 1-6 found a real vulnerability in Phase 2's WgMeshService that the existing tests did not catch. ## The bug `WgMeshService.buildInterfaceConfig()` and `summarize()` spliced `peer.metadata.wgPublicKey` / `wgMeshIP` / `wgEndpoint` into the wg-quick config string *without validation*. The ADR's threat model explicitly includes "compromised federation peer with valid WG key" — that peer signs their own manifest, so the Ed25519 signature only proves origin, not content safety. Concrete attack: a compromised peer publishes wgEndpoint = "host:51820\n[Peer]\nPublicKey = attacker\nEndpoint = ..." and the operator's wg-quick config ends up with an extra [Peer] block. Cross-peer lateral movement, bypassing the per-peer trust gates. Phase 4 (WgFirewallService) already validated meshIP via `assertSafeRuleArg`. Phase 2 didn't — fixed here. ## The fix New `readSafePeerWgFields(peer)` returns the validated triple or null. Three regexes: - wgPublicKey: ^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{43}=$ (base64 X25519, 32 raw bytes) - wgMeshIP: ^d.d.d.d/32$ + octet range check - wgEndpoint: ^(hostname|ipv4|[ipv6]):port$ + port range check Mismatched fields → peer is skipped entirely (no [Peer] block, no AllowedIPs, summarize() returns empty strings). Silent skip beats partial write because partial writes can leak attacker content into operator review while looking syntactically valid. ## Tests 7 new adversarial cases under `WgMeshService — readSafePeerWgFields (compromised-peer defense)`: - newline injection in wgEndpoint - wrong-length / non-base64 wgPublicKey - out-of-range octet in wgMeshIP - missing /32 CIDR - port out of range - IPv6 bracket positive case - summarize() also sanitizes (regression: it used the same unsafe path) Full suite: 550/550 pass. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> * feat(federation): ADR-111 Phase 7 staging helper Generates WG keypair + wg-quick config + per-OS firewall rules on the current host, naming a single peer. Outputs go to /tmp/adr-111-stage. Nothing loaded into the kernel — wg-quick up / nft -f / pfctl -f are operator-mediated. Usage: node scripts/phase7-stage.mjs <localId> <peerId> <peerPk> <peerIP> <peerEndpoint> Workflow: 1. Run on host A with placeholder peer values → emit host-A pubkey 2. Run on host B with placeholder peer values → emit host-B pubkey 3. Re-run on both with the OTHER host's pubkey → final config files 4. Operator reviews + activates per the printed checklist Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> * fix(federation): ADR-111 phase7-stage idempotent — reuse key file Without persistence, every run generates a fresh keypair, which breaks the cross-feed workflow (run on host A → capture pubkey → run on host B with A's pubkey → A regenerates a different key on its next run). Now reads /tmp/adr-111-stage/wg-key-<nodeId>.json if present, falls back to fresh generation if not. Operator can delete the file to force rotation. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> * docs(federation): user guide + Phase 7 bringup procedure + README link Adds: - docs/federation/README.md — full user guide (when to use, MCP tools, trust levels, breaker, ADR-111 mesh layer, claude -p headless usage) - docs/federation/phase7-mesh-bringup.md — step-by-step cross-OS WG mesh activation procedure with operator review checklist - README.md — link to docs/federation/ from the existing Federation section Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> --------- Co-authored-by: Reuven <cohen@ruv-mac-mini.local>
6.4 KiB
ADR-111 Phase 7 — Cross-OS WG mesh bringup
Step-by-step procedure for activating the opt-in WireGuard mesh between two federation peers. This is the operator-mediated step that follows Phases 1-6 (which ship as code in @claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation).
⚠️ Phase 7 is destructive. It modifies host networking and requires root. A typo in the firewall projection can drop ssh. Operator review of the staged configs is mandatory before activation.
Prerequisites
- WireGuard installed on both hosts (
brew install wireguard-toolson mac,apt install wireguardon linux). - Both hosts reachable on a common UDP port (default
51820). Tailscale, a LAN, or a VPN concentrator works. ADR-111 does NOT do NAT traversal. - Federation plugin built on both hosts (
pnpm install && pnpm run buildinv3/@claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation). - Federation Ed25519 identity already initialized — Phase 7 reuses it for manifest signing.
Step 1 — Stage configs on each host
On host A (mac mini in this example):
cd v3/@claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation
node scripts/phase7-stage.mjs \
ruv-mac-mini \
ruvultra \
'<placeholder-pubkey>' \
'10.50.0.0/32' \
'ruvultra-tailnet-name:51820'
The script will print host A's freshly-generated pubkey, e.g.:
publicKey: 61005ZbEMJq0tTIYwSHINdmJEsBM39sM5TIV6p4UfHA=
meshIP: 10.50.119.95/32
On host B (ruvultra):
node scripts/phase7-stage.mjs \
ruvultra \
ruv-mac-mini \
'<placeholder-pubkey>' \
'10.50.0.0/32' \
'mac-mini-tailnet-name:51820'
Note host B's pubkey, e.g.:
publicKey: v+cwXZ3BoYZZAodDI38RYf9UO5c9xz+TkjaAZg8mzhs=
meshIP: 10.50.242.138/32
Step 2 — Re-stage with REAL peer values
Now that both hosts have generated keys, re-run staging with the actual peer pubkey + meshIP. The script reuses each host's own key from /tmp/adr-111-stage/wg-key-<nodeId>.json (idempotent).
On host A:
node scripts/phase7-stage.mjs \
ruv-mac-mini \
ruvultra \
'v+cwXZ3BoYZZAodDI38RYf9UO5c9xz+TkjaAZg8mzhs=' \
'10.50.242.138/32' \
'ruvultra-tailnet:51820'
On host B:
node scripts/phase7-stage.mjs \
ruvultra \
ruv-mac-mini \
'61005ZbEMJq0tTIYwSHINdmJEsBM39sM5TIV6p4UfHA=' \
'10.50.119.95/32' \
'mac-mini-tailnet:51820'
Each host now has cross-coherent staged configs in /tmp/adr-111-stage/.
Step 3 — Operator review checklist
Before activating, inspect each staged file:
cat /tmp/adr-111-stage/ruflo-fed.conf
cat /tmp/adr-111-stage/ruflo-fed.nft # linux only
cat /tmp/adr-111-stage/ruflo-fed.pf # macos only
Checklist:
ruflo-fed.confhas exactly one[Peer]block (per peer expected)- The
[Peer]block'sPublicKeymatches the OTHER host's emitted pubkey AllowedIPslists ONLY the peer's mesh IP — no broader CIDRListenPortis what you expect (default51820)- Firewall projection contains only ATTESTED+ peers
- Default policy is
drop(nftables) / not affecting main pf ruleset (pf anchor-scoped) - No mention of UNTRUSTED peers anywhere
If anything looks off, stop and re-stage with corrected inputs — ruflo-fed.conf is what wg-quick up parses, and a misconfigured rule can drop ssh.
Step 4 — Activate (per host)
After the checklist passes:
# Install the wg-quick config
sudo install -m 0600 /tmp/adr-111-stage/ruflo-fed.conf /etc/wireguard/ruflo-fed.conf
# Load the firewall rules (atomic, scoped to the WG interface or pf anchor)
# Linux:
sudo nft -f /tmp/adr-111-stage/ruflo-fed.nft
# macOS:
sudo pfctl -a ruflo-fed -f /tmp/adr-111-stage/ruflo-fed.pf
# Bring up the WG interface
sudo wg-quick up ruflo-fed
Step 5 — Verify reachability
On host A:
sudo wg show ruflo-fed
# Expected: [Peer] section shows ruvultra's pubkey, last handshake timestamp,
# transfer counters update after activity.
ping 10.50.242.138 # ruvultra's mesh IP — should respond
On host B (mirror):
sudo wg show ruflo-fed
ping 10.50.119.95
Step 6 — Validate breaker → L3 propagation
Trigger an operator-initiated evict on host A and confirm L3 isolation propagates:
# On host A, evict ruvultra at the federation layer
ruflo federation evict --node-id ruvultra
# Or via MCP: federation_evict
# Confirm WG layer responded
sudo wg show ruflo-fed # ruvultra peer's [Peer] line should be gone
# From host A:
ping 10.50.242.138 # NOW unreachable — L3 followed L7 trust eviction
To restore:
ruflo federation reactivate --node-id ruvultra
# A wg set ruflo-fed peer ... allowed-ips ... command is emitted via the
# wgCommandSink the operator wired during plugin init.
sudo wg show ruflo-fed # ruvultra back in [Peer] list
ping 10.50.242.138 # responsive again
Step 7 — Witness verification (optional)
If WgWitnessService is wired into your federation plugin lifecycle (Phase 5 integration — operator-supplied):
cat .claude-flow/federation/wg-changes.log # append-only chain
node plugins/ruflo-core/scripts/witness/verify.mjs \
--manifest .claude-flow/federation/wg-witness.md.json
# Expected: Ed25519 signature valid, chain link verified end-to-end
Rollback
sudo wg-quick down ruflo-fed
# Linux:
sudo nft delete table inet ruflo_fed
# macOS:
sudo pfctl -a ruflo-fed -F all
The configs in /tmp/adr-111-stage/ and /etc/wireguard/ruflo-fed.conf stay on disk — re-run wg-quick up ruflo-fed to reactivate. To fully tear down also delete /etc/wireguard/ruflo-fed.conf (private key inside).
Known limitations (v1)
- No NAT traversal — peers must be direct-UDP reachable. Use Tailscale, a VPN concentrator, or a public IP.
- No DERP-equivalent relay — if direct UDP fails, fall back to Tailscale instead.
- No MagicDNS — mesh IPs are derived from
nodeId, not resolved. - Trust-graded firewall rules use ports — but WG itself routes at L3. The firewall projection ships now and enforces these tighter rules once loaded.
- Mobile / Windows clients — out of scope for v1. Windows requires WireGuard for Windows + a different config-gen path.
When NOT to use ADR-111
| If you... | Use this instead |
|---|---|
| Need NAT traversal | Tailscale or Headscale |
| Have >50 peers | Tailscale (their infra handles your scale) |
| Don't need trust↔L3 coupling | Plain tailnet + federation breaker is simpler |
| Don't need cryptographic provenance of mesh changes | Tailscale's audit log suffices |