Files
ruflo/v3/@claude-flow/security
rUvandClaude 1bd734e272 dream(security): #3102 bind ADR-377 caller-identity verification into live authorizeMcpTool chokepoint (evaluated, ACCEPT-with-caveats) (#3103)
* dream(security): #TBD bind ADR-377 caller-identity verification into live authorizeMcpTool chokepoint (evaluated, ACCEPT-with-caveats)

authorizeMcpTool() trusted the plain, unsigned CLAUDE_FLOW_PRINCIPAL_ID env
var as caller identity with zero verification (OWASP ASI07-class gap).
ADR-377 Phase 3 already implemented Ed25519 issueInvocationToken/
verifyInvocationToken but never wired it into a live dispatch path.

Binds the two: DualModeOrchestrator mints a per-worker signed
InvocationToken at spawn (worker-lifetime TTL, wildcard tool scope --
disclosed reduction from the primitive's original per-call design);
authorizeMcpTool verifies it before trusting identity, failing closed on
missing/forged/expired tokens. Off by default (CLAUDE_FLOW_MCP_CALLER_AUTH).

6 new deterministic Vitest scenarios plus an independent adversarial
critique (fresh session, verdict CONFIRMED-SAFE-WITH-CAVEATS) are recorded
in docs/dream-cycle/dream-gist-2026-08-26.md. Darwin skipped (scope
mismatch -- binary crypto gate, no tunable parameter space).

Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015bfVASxkNXKpZbMSLhVU1L

* fix(ci): register ADR-377 Phase 3 caller-identity env vars as known escape hatches

CLAUDE_FLOW_MCP_CALLER_PUBKEY and CLAUDE_FLOW_MCP_INVOCATION_TOKEN
(DualModeOrchestrator's per-worker Ed25519 credential pair, read by
resolveMcpCallerIdentity()) weren't registered in
audit-env-var-precedence.mjs's KNOWN_ESCAPE_HATCHES, so the audit flagged
CLAUDE_FLOW_MCP_CALLER_PUBKEY as a real violation (exit 1). Same no-CLI-flag
reasoning as the existing CLAUDE_FLOW_PRINCIPAL_ID entry: these are
credentials minted into a spawned worker's own environment, not a value
any caller should be able to select via a flag.

Verified: audit-env-var-precedence.mjs now exits 0. policy-runtime.test.ts
still 18/18.

Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RYP825phHMjPRmmjkcAWpq

* fix(ci): regenerate root package-lock.json for codex's new @claude-flow/security dep

The CI Test Suite job runs plain `npm ci` at repo root (no v3 pnpm
install step), so it resolves workspace deps strictly from
package-lock.json — not from v3/pnpm-lock.yaml, which this PR had
already updated. codex/package.json's new @claude-flow/security
dependency was missing from package-lock.json's codex entry, so CI's
npm ci never linked it and every dual-mode test importing
orchestrator.ts failed with "Cannot find package '@claude-flow/security'".

Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RYP825phHMjPRmmjkcAWpq

* fix(ci): build @claude-flow/security before Test Suite runs it

Complements d492ea835 (codex's package-lock.json entry) rather than
duplicating it: that commit fixed `npm ci` not *linking*
@claude-flow/security for codex at all ("Cannot find package"); this
fixes the fact that even where it IS linked (codex now, @claude-flow/cli
already), nothing builds its dist/ before tests run, so importers hit
ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND on dist/index.js instead.

This was already a known, pre-existing gap for @claude-flow/cli:
v3/@claude-flow/cli/__tests__/policy-runtime.test.ts has carried a
scripts/ci-test-baseline.txt entry for exactly this reason since before
this PR existed. dual-mode.test.ts and dual-mode-stdin-2947.test.ts
(added by the caller-identity candidate on this branch) newly trip the
same gap in @claude-flow/codex, confirmed by diffing main's own Test
Suite ratchet failures (3, pre-existing, unrelated oauth/publisher
plugin tests) against this branch's (5: the same 3 plus these 2). Adding
new files to ci-test-baseline.txt to paper over this is explicitly
forbidden by that file's own header ("Never add entries to make a
regression green"), and gutting the tests to avoid the import would
remove real coverage of the orchestrator/security integration point.

Real fix: build @claude-flow/security before "Run all tests", using its
own existing `npm run build` (tsc && verify-oauth-exports.mjs). Verified
locally end-to-end by removing both dist/ and the stale
tsconfig.tsbuildinfo (simulating a fresh CI checkout, since both are
gitignored) -- the build step produces a full dist/, both new codex test
files pass, and (bonus, explicitly allowed by the baseline file's own
"remove entries when fixed" rule) the pre-existing policy-runtime.test.ts
baseline entry is now consistently green too, so it's removed here.

Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015bfVASxkNXKpZbMSLhVU1L

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 21:05:45 +00:00
..
2026-01-04 17:48:23 +00:00

@claude-flow/security

npm version npm downloads License: MIT TypeScript Security Audit

Comprehensive security module for Claude Flow V3 - CVE fixes, input validation, path security, and secure credential management.

Features

  • CVE Remediation - Fixes for CVE-2 (Weak Password Hashing), CVE-3 (Hardcoded Credentials), HIGH-1 (Command Injection), HIGH-2 (Path Traversal)
  • Password Hashing - Secure bcrypt-based password hashing with configurable rounds (12+ recommended)
  • Credential Generation - Cryptographically secure credential and API key generation
  • Safe Command Execution - Allowlist-based command execution preventing injection attacks
  • Path Validation - Protection against path traversal and symlink attacks
  • Input Validation - Zod-based schema validation for all input types
  • Token Generation - Secure token creation with HMAC signing

Installation

npm install @claude-flow/security

Standalone use (without the Ruflo CLI)

This is a plain library — every primitive (PasswordHasher, PathValidator, SafeExecutor, InputValidator, CredentialGenerator) is independently importable. No CLI, no MCP server, no daemon. The primitives close CVE-2 (weak hashing), CVE-3 (default credentials), HIGH-1 (command injection), and HIGH-2 (path traversal) — drop them into any Node app that needs to validate at a system boundary.

Recipe — Validate input, hash a password, generate an API key

// recipe.mjs
import {
  InputValidator,
  EmailSchema,
  PasswordHasher,
  createCredentialGenerator,
} from '@claude-flow/security';

// 1. Validate user input at the boundary (Zod schemas, no surprises)
const email = InputValidator.validate(EmailSchema, 'user@example.com');
//             ↳ throws if invalid; returns the typed value otherwise

// 2. Hash a password with bcrypt at the recommended cost (CVE-2)
//    Default policy: ≥8 chars, ≥1 upper, ≥1 lower, ≥1 digit.
//    Tune with new PasswordHasher({ rounds, requireUppercase, ... }).
const hasher = new PasswordHasher({ rounds: 12 });
const hash   = await hasher.hash('CorrectHorseBatteryStaple9');
const ok     = await hasher.verify('CorrectHorseBatteryStaple9', hash); // true

// 3. Generate a high-entropy API key (CVE-3) — uses crypto.randomBytes
//    under the hood and refuses to emit keys below 32 bytes of entropy.
const creds = createCredentialGenerator();
const apiKey = creds.generateApiKey('ck_live_');
console.log(apiKey.keyId, apiKey.key.slice(0, 16) + '…');
// → 7e2b1a9c-…  ck_live_xX9aQ…

Recipe — Refuse command injection + path traversal

import {
  createDevelopmentExecutor,
  createProjectPathValidator,
} from '@claude-flow/security';

// SafeExecutor — only the allow-listed commands ever run (HIGH-1)
const exec = createDevelopmentExecutor({ projectRoot: process.cwd() });
const { stdout } = await exec.execute('git', ['status', '--porcelain']);

// PathValidator — refuses traversal and symlinks out of the project (HIGH-2)
const paths = createProjectPathValidator(process.cwd());
const result = await paths.validate('../../etc/passwd');
if (!result.isValid) console.log('blocked:', result.errors.join('; '));
// → blocked: Path traversal pattern detected

Quick Start

import { createSecurityModule } from '@claude-flow/security';

// Create a complete security module
const security = createSecurityModule({
  projectRoot: '/workspaces/project',
  hmacSecret: process.env.HMAC_SECRET!,
  bcryptRounds: 12,
  allowedCommands: ['git', 'npm', 'node']
});

// Hash a password
const hash = await security.passwordHasher.hash('userPassword123');

// Validate a path
const pathResult = await security.pathValidator.validate('/workspaces/project/src/file.ts');

// Execute command safely
const output = await security.safeExecutor.execute('git', ['status']);

// Generate secure credentials
const creds = await security.credentialGenerator.generate();

API Reference

Password Hashing (CVE-2 Fix)

import { PasswordHasher, createPasswordHasher } from '@claude-flow/security';

const hasher = createPasswordHasher({ rounds: 12 });

// Hash password
const hash = await hasher.hash('password');

// Verify password
const isValid = await hasher.verify('password', hash);

// Check if hash needs rehashing
const needsRehash = hasher.needsRehash(hash);

Credential Generation (CVE-3 Fix)

import { CredentialGenerator, generateCredentials } from '@claude-flow/security';

const generator = new CredentialGenerator();

// Generate API key
const apiKey = await generator.generateApiKey({
  prefix: 'cf',
  length: 32
});

// Generate complete credentials
const creds = generateCredentials({
  includeApiKey: true,
  includeSecret: true
});

Safe Command Execution (HIGH-1 Fix)

import { SafeExecutor, createDevelopmentExecutor } from '@claude-flow/security';

const executor = createDevelopmentExecutor();

// Execute allowed command
const result = await executor.execute('git', ['status']);

// With timeout
const result2 = await executor.execute('npm', ['install'], {
  timeout: 60000,
  cwd: '/workspaces/project'
});

Path Validation (HIGH-2 Fix)

import { PathValidator, createProjectPathValidator } from '@claude-flow/security';

const validator = createProjectPathValidator('/workspaces/project');

// Validate path
const result = await validator.validate('../../../etc/passwd');
// { valid: false, reason: 'Path traversal detected' }

// Safe path
const result2 = await validator.validate('/workspaces/project/src/index.ts');
// { valid: true, normalized: '/workspaces/project/src/index.ts' }

Input Validation

import {
  InputValidator,
  SafeStringSchema,
  EmailSchema,
  PasswordSchema,
  SpawnAgentSchema
} from '@claude-flow/security';

// Validate email
const email = EmailSchema.parse('user@example.com');

// Validate password
const password = PasswordSchema.parse('SecurePass123!');

// Validate agent spawn request
const agentRequest = SpawnAgentSchema.parse({
  type: 'coder',
  name: 'code-agent-1'
});

// Sanitize HTML
import { sanitizeHtml } from '@claude-flow/security';
const safe = sanitizeHtml('<script>alert("xss")</script>Hello');
// 'Hello'

Token Generation

import { TokenGenerator, quickGenerate } from '@claude-flow/security';

const generator = new TokenGenerator({
  hmacSecret: process.env.HMAC_SECRET!
});

// Generate signed token
const token = await generator.generate({
  type: 'session',
  expiresIn: 3600
});

// Verify token
const verified = await generator.verify(token);

// Quick generation
const sessionToken = quickGenerate.sessionToken();
const verificationCode = quickGenerate.verificationCode();

Security Constants

import {
  MIN_BCRYPT_ROUNDS,      // 12
  MAX_BCRYPT_ROUNDS,      // 14
  MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,    // 8
  MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH,    // 72 (bcrypt limit)
  DEFAULT_TOKEN_EXPIRATION,   // 3600 (1 hour)
  DEFAULT_SESSION_EXPIRATION  // 86400 (24 hours)
} from '@claude-flow/security';

Security Audit

import { auditSecurityConfig } from '@claude-flow/security';

const warnings = auditSecurityConfig({
  bcryptRounds: 10,
  hmacSecret: 'short'
});

// ['bcryptRounds (10) below recommended minimum (12)',
//  'hmacSecret should be at least 32 characters']

Validation Schemas

Schema Description
SafeStringSchema Basic safe string with length limits
IdentifierSchema Alphanumeric identifiers
FilenameSchema Safe filenames
EmailSchema Email addresses
PasswordSchema Secure passwords
UUIDSchema UUID v4 format
HttpsUrlSchema HTTPS URLs only
SemverSchema Semantic versions
PortSchema Valid port numbers
IPv4Schema IPv4 addresses
SpawnAgentSchema Agent spawn requests
TaskInputSchema Task definitions
SecurityConfigSchema Security configuration

Dependencies

  • bcrypt - Password hashing
  • zod - Schema validation

License

MIT