Merge pull request #105 from jhd3197/dev

Require an explicit authorization decision on every mutating route

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ jobs:
     name: Build Release Tarball
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
     needs: version
+    # Past runs finish in ~13 min; without this cap a hung apt mirror once
+    # held the job for GitHub's 6-hour default.
+    timeout-minutes: 30
     strategy:
       fail-fast: true
       matrix:

AGENTS.md

@@ -191,6 +191,30 @@ PageTopbar (tabs + actions: Add/Refresh/…, FilterButton, SearchField)
 5. **Page**: Create page component in `frontend/src/pages/`, add route in `App.jsx`
 6. **Styles**: Add SCSS file in `frontend/src/styles/pages/`, import in `main.scss`
 
+### Authorization (default-deny, test-enforced)
+
+Every **mutating** route (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) must carry an explicit
+authorization decision — `@jwt_required()` alone is never sufficient
+(GHSA-r4q7-x795-vr4j). Three tests enforce this and will fail your PR:
+
+- `backend/tests/test_route_authz_static.py` (coverage): the route must carry a
+  gate decorator (`@admin_required` / `@developer_required` /
+  `@permission_required`), reach an inline authorization primitive
+  (`require_admin_user`, `check_app_access`, `_check_scope`, …), or be listed in
+  a reviewed allowlist (`SELF_SCOPED` / `PUBLIC_ALT_AUTH` / `STATELESS`) with a
+  specific justification.
+- `backend/tests/test_route_authz_sweep.py` (enforcement): no mutating route may
+  answer a viewer with a 2xx unless allowlisted in `VIEWER_WRITABLE`.
+- `backend/tests/test_auth_decorator_boundaries.py` (one boundary): the policy
+  decorators already authenticate through `auth_required()`, so **do not stack
+  `@jwt_required()` outside one** — it rejects API-key callers before the policy
+  can authorize them. Add the gate *instead of* `@jwt_required()`, and read the
+  caller with `get_current_user()`, never `get_jwt_identity()` (which raises for
+  an API-key request).
+
+When in doubt: admin-only for panel-wide resources, `@developer_required` for
+operational actions, the file's own inline ownership helper for user data.
+
 ## Key Environment Variables
 
 | Variable | Purpose |

CLAUDE.md

@@ -118,6 +118,17 @@ ServerKit deploys on Linux (bare metal, VPS, or Docker). Development may happen
 5. **Page**: Create page component in `frontend/src/pages/`, add route in `App.jsx`
 6. **Styles**: Add SCSS file in `frontend/src/styles/pages/`, import in `main.scss`
 
+### Authorization (default-deny, test-enforced)
+
+Every mutating route (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) must carry an explicit
+authorization decision — `@jwt_required()` alone is never sufficient
+(GHSA-r4q7-x795-vr4j). Use one authentication boundary: the rbac policy
+decorators (`@admin_required` / `@developer_required` / `@permission_required`)
+already authenticate via `auth_required()`, so never stack `@jwt_required()`
+outside one. `backend/tests/test_route_authz_static.py` (coverage),
+`test_route_authz_sweep.py` (enforcement) and `test_auth_decorator_boundaries.py`
+(one boundary) all fail the build otherwise. See AGENTS.md for the allowlists.
+
 ## Key Environment Variables
 
 | Variable | Purpose |

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-1.7.113
+1.7.116

backend/app/api/api_keys.py

@@ -93,9 +93,11 @@ def get_key(key_id):
 @jwt_required()
 def update_key(key_id):
     """Update API key metadata."""
+    # Same bar as create_key: a viewer (e.g. demoted after key creation) must
+    # not widen an existing key's scopes/tier.
     user = get_current_user()
-    if not user:
-        return jsonify({'error': 'User not found'}), 404
+    if not user or not user.is_developer:
+        return jsonify({'error': 'Developer access required'}), 403
 
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     api_key = ApiKeyService.update_key(

backend/app/api/auth.py

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from flask_jwt_extended import (
 from app import db, limiter
 from app.models import User, AuditLog, SystemSettings
 # Aliased: this module already has a `get_current_user` route handler.
-from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required, get_current_user as get_request_user
+from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required, get_current_user as get_request_user, require_admin_user
 from app.services.settings_service import SettingsService
 from app.services.audit_service import AuditService
 from app.services import login_link_service
@@ -168,11 +168,7 @@ ALLOWED_USE_CASES = {'wordpress', 'web-apps', 'self-hosted', 'devops'}
 @jwt_required()
 def complete_onboarding():
     """Complete the onboarding wizard and mark setup as done."""
-    current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
-    user = User.query.get(current_user_id)
-
-    if not user or user.role != User.ROLE_ADMIN:
-        return jsonify({'error': 'Admin access required'}), 403
+    user = require_admin_user()
 
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     use_cases = data.get('use_cases', [])

backend/app/api/buildpacks.py

@@ -17,11 +17,12 @@ import shutil
 import tempfile
 
 from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
-from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required, get_jwt_identity
+from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 
 from app.services.buildpack_service import BuildpackService
 from app.services.git_service import GitService
 from app.services.source_connection_service import SourceConnectionService
+from app.middleware.rbac import developer_required, get_current_user
 
 buildpacks_bp = Blueprint('buildpacks', __name__)
 
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ def _build_response(plan: dict, app_name: str = 'app') -> dict:
 
 
 @buildpacks_bp.route('/detect', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@developer_required
 def detect():
     """Detect the build pack for a repository.
 
@@ -46,7 +47,10 @@ def detect():
     cloned shallowly to a temp workspace, inspected, and the workspace removed.
     """
     data = request.get_json() or {}
-    current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()
+    # Through the one identity door: @developer_required admits API-key
+    # callers, for whom reading the JWT directly raises.
+    caller = get_current_user()
+    current_user_id = caller.id if caller else None
 
     explicit_path = (data.get('path') or '').strip() or None
     repo_url = (data.get('repo_url') or '').strip()

backend/app/api/deploy.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import os
 from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required, get_jwt_identity
 from app import paths
-from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required, app_access_tier
+from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required, app_access_tier, developer_required
 from app.models import User, Application
 from app.services.git_service import GitService
 from app.services.resource_grant_service import ResourceGrantService
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ def get_branches(app_id):
 
 
 @deploy_bp.route('/branches', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@developer_required
 def get_branches_from_url():
     """Get list of branches from a repository URL (before cloning)."""
     data = request.get_json()

backend/app/api/deployment_jobs.py

@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ def simulate_deployment():
     synchronously (tests)."""
     if not current_app.config.get('DEMO_DEPLOYS_ENABLED'):
         return jsonify({'error': 'Not found'}), 404
+    # Even with the demo flag on, creating jobs is not a viewer capability.
+    user = get_current_user()
+    if not user or not user.is_developer:
+        return jsonify({'error': 'Developer access required'}), 403
     from flask_jwt_extended import get_jwt_identity
     from app.services.demo_deploy_service import DemoDeployService
 

backend/app/api/docker.py

@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ def compose_down():
 
 
 @docker_bp.route('/compose/ps', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def compose_ps():
     """List Docker Compose services."""
     data = request.get_json()
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ def compose_ps():
 
 
 @docker_bp.route('/compose/logs', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def compose_logs():
     """Get Docker Compose logs."""
     data = request.get_json()
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ def compose_pull():
 
 
 @docker_bp.route('/compose/validate', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def compose_validate():
     """Validate a Docker Compose file."""
     data = request.get_json()
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ def compose_validate():
 
 
 @docker_bp.route('/compose/config', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def compose_config():
     """Get parsed Docker Compose configuration."""
     data = request.get_json()

backend/app/api/fleet_monitor.py

@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ fleet search, and metrics export.
 
 import os
 from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify, Response
-from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required, get_jwt_identity
+from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 
 from app.services.fleet_monitor_service import fleet_monitor_service
-from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required
+from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required, get_current_user
 
 fleet_monitor_bp = Blueprint('fleet_monitor', __name__)
 
@@ -58,10 +58,13 @@ def get_alerts():
 
 
 @fleet_monitor_bp.route('/alerts/<alert_id>/acknowledge', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def acknowledge_alert(alert_id):
     """Acknowledge an active alert."""
-    user_id = get_jwt_identity()
+    # Through the one identity door: @admin_required admits API-key callers,
+    # for whom reading the JWT directly raises.
+    caller = get_current_user()
+    user_id = caller.id if caller else None
     success = fleet_monitor_service.acknowledge_alert(alert_id, user_id)
     if not success:
         return jsonify({'error': 'Cannot acknowledge alert'}), 400
@@ -69,7 +72,7 @@ def acknowledge_alert(alert_id):
 
 
 @fleet_monitor_bp.route('/alerts/<alert_id>/resolve', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def resolve_alert(alert_id):
     """Resolve an alert."""
     success = fleet_monitor_service.resolve_alert(alert_id)

backend/app/api/migrations.py

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 from flask import Blueprint, jsonify, current_app
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 
-from app.models import User
 from app.services.migration_service import MigrationService
-from app.middleware.rbac import get_current_user
+from app.middleware.rbac import require_admin_user
 
 migrations_bp = Blueprint('migrations', __name__)
 
@@ -19,9 +18,7 @@ def get_migration_status():
 @jwt_required()
 def create_backup():
     """Create a database backup before applying migrations. Admin only."""
-    user = get_current_user()
-    if not user or user.role != User.ROLE_ADMIN:
-        return jsonify({'error': 'Admin access required'}), 403
+    require_admin_user()
 
     result = MigrationService.create_backup(current_app)
     if result['success']:
@@ -33,9 +30,7 @@ def create_backup():
 @jwt_required()
 def apply_migrations():
     """Apply all pending migrations. Admin only."""
-    user = get_current_user()
-    if not user or user.role != User.ROLE_ADMIN:
-        return jsonify({'error': 'Admin access required'}), 403
+    require_admin_user()
 
     result = MigrationService.apply_migrations(current_app)
     if result['success']:
@@ -47,9 +42,7 @@ def apply_migrations():
 @jwt_required()
 def get_migration_history():
     """Return all migration revisions. Admin only."""
-    user = get_current_user()
-    if not user or user.role != User.ROLE_ADMIN:
-        return jsonify({'error': 'Admin access required'}), 403
+    require_admin_user()
 
     history = MigrationService.get_migration_history(current_app)
     return jsonify({'revisions': history}), 200

backend/app/api/monitors.py

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 
 from app.exceptions import NotFoundError
+from app.middleware.rbac import permission_required
 from app.services.monitor_service import MonitorService
 
 monitors_bp = Blueprint('monitors', __name__)
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ def get_stats():
 
 @monitors_bp.route('', methods=['POST'])
 @monitors_bp.route('/', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@permission_required('monitoring', 'write')
 def create_monitor():
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     monitor = MonitorService.create(data)
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ def get_monitor(monitor_id):
 
 
 @monitors_bp.route('/<int:monitor_id>', methods=['PATCH', 'PUT'])
-@jwt_required()
+@permission_required('monitoring', 'write')
 def update_monitor(monitor_id):
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     monitor = MonitorService.update(monitor_id, data)
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ def update_monitor(monitor_id):
 
 
 @monitors_bp.route('/<int:monitor_id>', methods=['DELETE'])
-@jwt_required()
+@permission_required('monitoring', 'write')
 def delete_monitor(monitor_id):
     if not MonitorService.delete(monitor_id):
         return {'error': 'Monitor not found'}, 404
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ def delete_monitor(monitor_id):
 
 
 @monitors_bp.route('/<int:monitor_id>/check', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@permission_required('monitoring', 'write')
 def run_check(monitor_id):
     """Probe now, out of band from the scheduler."""
     hc = MonitorService.run_check(monitor_id)
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ def run_check(monitor_id):
 
 
 @monitors_bp.route('/<int:monitor_id>/pause', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@permission_required('monitoring', 'write')
 def set_paused(monitor_id):
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     monitor = MonitorService.set_paused(monitor_id, data.get('paused', True))
@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ def list_incidents():
 
 
 @monitors_bp.route('/incidents', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@permission_required('monitoring', 'write')
 def create_incident():
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     if not data.get('title'):
@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ def create_incident():
 
 
 @monitors_bp.route('/incidents/<int:incident_id>', methods=['PATCH', 'PUT'])
-@jwt_required()
+@permission_required('monitoring', 'write')
 def update_incident(incident_id):
     incident = MonitorService.update_incident(incident_id, request.get_json() or {})
     if not incident:
@@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ def update_incident(incident_id):
 
 
 @monitors_bp.route('/incidents/<int:incident_id>', methods=['DELETE'])
-@jwt_required()
+@permission_required('monitoring', 'write')
 def delete_incident(incident_id):
     if not MonitorService.delete_incident(incident_id):
         return {'error': 'Incident not found'}, 404

backend/app/api/nginx_advanced.py

@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ def create_proxy():
 @nginx_advanced_bp.route('/test', methods=['POST'])
 @jwt_required()
 def test_config():
+    user = get_current_user()
+    if not user or not user.is_admin:
+        return jsonify({'error': 'Admin access required'}), 403
     result = NginxAdvancedService.test_config()
     return jsonify(result)
 
@@ -50,12 +53,19 @@ def reload():
 @nginx_advanced_bp.route('/diff', methods=['POST'])
 @jwt_required()
 def preview_diff():
+    # Admin-only: the diff includes the CURRENT vhost file's contents, so this
+    # is a file read as much as a preview.
+    user = get_current_user()
+    if not user or not user.is_admin:
+        return jsonify({'error': 'Admin access required'}), 403
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     domain = data.get('domain')
     new_config = data.get('config', '')
     if not domain:
         return jsonify({'error': 'domain required'}), 400
     result = NginxAdvancedService.preview_diff(domain, new_config)
+    if 'error' in result:
+        return jsonify(result), 400
     return jsonify(result)
 
 

backend/app/api/queue_bus.py

@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ def get_group(group_slug):
 def update_group(group_slug):
     try:
         _ensure_group_mutable(group_slug)
+        _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)
         data = request.get_json() or {}
         group = QueueBusService.update_group(
             slug=group_slug,
@@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ def update_group(group_slug):
 def delete_group(group_slug):
     try:
         _ensure_group_mutable(group_slug)
+        _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)
         result = QueueBusService.delete_group(group_slug)
         return jsonify(result), 200
     except Exception as e:
@@ -178,6 +180,7 @@ def list_queues(group_slug):
 def create_queue(group_slug):
     try:
         _ensure_group_mutable(group_slug)
+        _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)
         data = request.get_json() or {}
         slug = data.get('slug')
         name = data.get('name')
@@ -216,6 +219,7 @@ def get_queue(group_slug, queue_slug):
 def update_queue(group_slug, queue_slug):
     try:
         _ensure_group_mutable(group_slug)
+        _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)
         data = request.get_json() or {}
         queue = QueueBusService.update_queue(
             group_slug=group_slug,
@@ -234,6 +238,7 @@ def update_queue(group_slug, queue_slug):
 def delete_queue(group_slug, queue_slug):
     try:
         _ensure_group_mutable(group_slug)
+        _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)
         result = QueueBusService.delete_queue(group_slug, queue_slug)
         return jsonify(result), 200
     except Exception as e:
@@ -269,6 +274,7 @@ def list_messages(group_slug, queue_slug):
 def send_message(group_slug, queue_slug):
     try:
         _ensure_group_mutable(group_slug)
+        _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)
         data = request.get_json() or {}
         payload = data.get('payload')
         priority = data.get('priority', 0)
@@ -358,6 +364,7 @@ def fail_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id):
 def requeue_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id):
     try:
         _ensure_group_mutable(group_slug)
+        _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)
         message = QueueBusService.requeue(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id)
         return jsonify({'message': message}), 200
     except Exception as e:
@@ -369,6 +376,7 @@ def requeue_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id):
 def delete_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id):
     try:
         _ensure_group_mutable(group_slug)
+        _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)
         result = QueueBusService.delete_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id)
         return jsonify(result), 200
     except Exception as e:

backend/app/api/recycle_bin.py

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ def list_deleted():
 
 
 @recycle_bin_bp.route('/<kind>/<int:record_id>/restore', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def restore(kind, record_id):
     try:
         item, err = recycle_bin_service.restore(kind, record_id)

backend/app/api/registrars.py

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 
 from app.services.registrar_service import RegistrarService
-from app.middleware.rbac import get_current_user
+from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required, get_current_user
 
 registrars_bp = Blueprint('registrars', __name__)
 
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ def delete_connection(cid):
 
 
 @registrars_bp.route('/connections/<int:cid>/test', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def test_connection(cid):
     conn = RegistrarService.get_connection(cid)
     if not conn:
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ def list_domains():
 
 
 @registrars_bp.route('/sync', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def sync():
     """Force-refresh the portfolio (and stamp last_synced_at)."""
     return jsonify({'domains': RegistrarService.sync_now()})

backend/app/api/server_templates.py

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 from app.services.server_template_service import ServerTemplateService
 from app.services.audit_service import AuditService
 from app.models.audit_log import AuditLog
-from app.middleware.rbac import get_current_user
+from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required, get_current_user
 
 server_templates_bp = Blueprint('server_templates', __name__)
 
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ def unassign(assignment_id):
 
 
 @server_templates_bp.route('/assignments/<int:assignment_id>/check', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def check_drift(assignment_id):
     assignment = ServerTemplateService.check_drift(assignment_id)
     if not assignment:

backend/app/api/servers.py

@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ def get_server_status(server_id):
 
 
 @servers_bp.route('/<server_id>/ping', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@developer_required
 def ping_server(server_id):
     """Force a ping/health check on a server"""
     server = Server.query.get(server_id)
@@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ def list_remote_compose_projects(server_id):
 
 
 @servers_bp.route('/<server_id>/docker/compose/ps', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@developer_required
 def remote_compose_ps(server_id):
     """List containers for a compose project"""
     user_id = get_jwt_identity()
@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ def remote_compose_down(server_id):
 
 
 @servers_bp.route('/<server_id>/docker/compose/logs', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@developer_required
 def remote_compose_logs(server_id):
     """Get logs from a compose project"""
     user_id = get_jwt_identity()
@@ -2686,7 +2686,7 @@ def remote_cloudflared_delete(server_id, tunnel_ref):
 # Capabilities message so all panel listeners stay in sync.
 
 @servers_bp.route('/<server_id>/refresh-capabilities', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@developer_required
 def remote_refresh_capabilities(server_id):
     user_id = get_jwt_identity()
     result = dispatch_agent_command(

backend/app/api/shared_resources.py

@@ -208,6 +208,9 @@ def add_tag():
     missing = _require(data, 'resource_type', 'resource_id', 'tag')
     if missing:
         return _bad(f'{missing} is required')
+    denied = _check_resource_write(data['resource_type'], data['resource_id'])
+    if denied:
+        return denied
     try:
         row = SharedResourceService.add_tag(
             data['resource_type'], data['resource_id'], data['tag']
@@ -231,6 +234,10 @@ def remove_tag():
     if not resource_type or resource_id in (None, '') or not tag:
         return _bad('resource_type, resource_id and tag are required')
 
+    denied = _check_resource_write(resource_type, resource_id)
+    if denied:
+        return denied
+
     removed = SharedResourceService.remove_tag(resource_type, resource_id, tag)
     return jsonify({'removed': removed})
 

backend/app/api/templates.py

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Provides REST endpoints for:
 
 from flask import Blueprint, current_app, request, jsonify
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required, get_jwt_identity
-from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required
+from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required, developer_required
 from app.models import User, Application
 from app.services.deployment_job_service import DeploymentJobService
 from app.services.template_service import TemplateService
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ def validate_installation():
 
 
 @templates_bp.route('/test-db-connection', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@developer_required
 def test_db_connection():
     """Test database connection before template installation.
 

backend/app/api/uptime.py

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ from flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 
 from app.services.uptime_service import UptimeService
+from app.middleware.rbac import admin_required
 
 uptime_bp = Blueprint('uptime', __name__)
 
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ def get_uptime_history():
 
 
 @uptime_bp.route('/tracking/start', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def start_tracking():
     """Start uptime tracking."""
     result = UptimeService.start_tracking()
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ def start_tracking():
 
 
 @uptime_bp.route('/tracking/stop', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def stop_tracking():
     """Stop uptime tracking."""
     result = UptimeService.stop_tracking()

backend/app/api/workspaces.py

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ from app.services.audit_service import AuditService
 from app.models.audit_log import AuditLog
 # The workspace guards now live in middleware/rbac.py so any resource blueprint
 # can reuse them (plan 19 Decision 2). Re-exported here for existing callers.
-from app.middleware.rbac import get_current_user, require_workspace_access, require_workspace_role
+from app.middleware.rbac import (
+    admin_required, get_current_user, require_workspace_access, require_workspace_role,
+)
 
 workspaces_bp = Blueprint('workspaces', __name__)
 
@@ -49,7 +51,7 @@ def get_workspace(workspace_id):
 
 
 @workspaces_bp.route('/', methods=['POST'])
-@jwt_required()
+@admin_required
 def create_workspace():
     user = get_current_user()
     data = request.get_json()

backend/app/middleware/rbac.py

@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ def require_role(*allowed_roles):
             if user.role not in allowed_roles:
                 return jsonify({'error': 'Insufficient permissions'}), 403
             return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+        # Marks this view as carrying an explicit authorization decision, so the
+        # default-deny sweep test (tests/test_route_authz_sweep.py) recognizes it
+        # as gated rather than flagging it as an unguarded mutating route.
+        wrapper._sk_authz = ('require_role', allowed_roles)
         return wrapper
     return decorator
 
@@ -86,6 +90,7 @@ def admin_required(fn):
         if not user.is_admin:
             return jsonify({'error': 'Admin access required'}), 403
         return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+    wrapper._sk_authz = ('admin_required',)
     return wrapper
 
 
@@ -136,6 +141,7 @@ def developer_required(fn):
         if not user.is_developer:
             return jsonify({'error': 'Developer access required'}), 403
         return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+    wrapper._sk_authz = ('developer_required',)
     return wrapper
 
 
@@ -162,6 +168,7 @@ def permission_required(feature, level='read'):
                     'error': f'Permission denied: {level} access to {feature} required'
                 }), 403
             return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+        wrapper._sk_authz = ('permission_required', feature, level)
         return wrapper
     return decorator
 
@@ -278,5 +285,6 @@ def require_app_member(min_role='viewer', arg='app_id'):
                 return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403
             g.current_application = application
             return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+        wrapper._sk_authz = ('require_app_member', min_role)
         return wrapper
     return decorator

backend/app/services/nginx_advanced_service.py

@@ -153,6 +153,11 @@ class NginxAdvancedService:
     @staticmethod
     def preview_diff(domain, new_config):
         """Preview config changes as a diff."""
+        # `domain` is joined onto SITES_AVAILABLE below — refuse anything that
+        # is not a plain filename so ../ can't turn this into an arbitrary
+        # file read (the API layer gates admins, but never trust one layer).
+        if not domain or os.path.basename(domain) != domain or domain in ('.', '..'):
+            return {'error': 'invalid domain'}
         conf_path = os.path.join(NginxAdvancedService.SITES_AVAILABLE, domain)
         old_config = ''
         if os.path.isfile(conf_path):

backend/app/services/webhook_gateway_service.py

@@ -164,12 +164,15 @@ class WebhookGatewayService:
         db.session.add(delivery)
         db.session.commit()
 
-        if not signature_valid and signature_header:
+        # Reject unconditionally: every endpoint has a secret, so a request with
+        # a missing OR wrong signature is equally unauthenticated. The old
+        # `and signature_header` clause let unsigned requests through.
+        if not signature_valid:
             delivery.status = 'failed'
-            delivery.error_message = 'Invalid signature'
+            delivery.error_message = 'Invalid signature' if signature_header else 'Missing signature'
             delivery.completed_at = datetime.utcnow()
             db.session.commit()
-            return {'success': False, 'error': 'Invalid signature', 'event_id': event_id}, 401
+            return {'success': False, 'error': delivery.error_message, 'event_id': event_id}, 401
 
         try:
             payload_json = json.loads(payload.decode('utf-8', errors='replace')) if payload else {}

backend/tests/BASELINE_COUNT

@@ -1 +1 @@
-4309
+4417

backend/tests/JWT_ONLY_CEILING

@@ -1 +1 @@
-605
+577

backend/tests/api_controller_boundary_baseline.json

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
   "policy": "Exact reviewed inventory of direct persistence, subprocess, and filesystem mutation calls in Flask API controllers. New calls are forbidden; remove entries as controllers delegate to services.",
   "counts": {
     "filesystem": 11,
-    "persistence": 499
+    "persistence": 498
   },
   "owners": {
     "api/admin.py": {
@@ -369,7 +369,6 @@
     "api/apps.py::upload_app_archive::persistence::db.session.commit()::1",
     "api/apps.py::upload_app_archive::persistence::db.session.commit()::2",
     "api/apps.py::wake_app::persistence::Application.query_active().filter_by(id=app_id).first()::1",
-    "api/auth.py::complete_onboarding::persistence::User.query.get(current_user_id)::1",
     "api/auth.py::create_login_link::persistence::User.query.get(target_id)::1",
     "api/auth.py::create_login_link::persistence::db.session.commit()::1",
     "api/auth.py::demo_info::persistence::User.query.filter_by(username='demo').first()::1",

backend/tests/test_authz_round3_guards.py

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+"""Proving tests for the inline guards added in the round-3 authz audit.
+
+The two sweep tests can only see so much: ``test_route_authz_static.py`` proves
+a route *reaches* an authorization primitive, and
+``test_route_authz_sweep.py`` proves a viewer does not get a 2xx. Neither can
+tell whether the guard admits the right callers, and neither looks below the
+API layer at all. These are the behavioural checks for the three fixes in that
+round whose shape the sweeps cannot express:
+
+* ``api_keys.update_key`` — the *only* key route with no role bar, so a viewer
+  demoted after minting a key could still widen its scopes to ``['*']``.
+  Invisible to the sweep because the dummy key id 404s first.
+* ``deployment_jobs.simulate_deployment`` — gated only by the demo flag, and
+  ``DEMO_DEPLOYS_ENABLED`` is on in testing, so a viewer could create real
+  ``DeploymentJob`` rows.
+* ``nginx_advanced_service.preview_diff`` — a body-supplied ``domain`` joined
+  straight onto ``SITES_AVAILABLE``. The API layer now admits only admins, but
+  the traversal guard belongs in the service, where every future caller
+  inherits it.
+"""
+import pytest
+
+from factories import make_user, headers_for
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------- API-key metadata
+
+def _key_for(db, user):
+    from app.services.api_key_service import ApiKeyService
+    api_key, _raw = ApiKeyService.create_key(user.id, name='round3', scopes=['read'])
+    return api_key
+
+
+def test_viewer_cannot_widen_the_scopes_of_their_own_api_key(client, db_session):
+    """Ownership is not the question — capability is.
+
+    ``ApiKeyService.update_key`` already filters by ``user_id``, so this was
+    never an IDOR; the hole was that a viewer could take a key they legally own
+    and hand it ``scopes=['*']``, which every API-key-authenticated route then
+    honours.
+    """
+    viewer = make_user(db_session, role='viewer')
+    key = _key_for(db_session, viewer)
+
+    resp = client.put(f'/api/v1/api-keys/{key.id}',
+                      json={'scopes': ['*'], 'tier': 'unlimited'},
+                      headers=headers_for(viewer))
+
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    db_session.session.refresh(key)
+    assert key.get_scopes() == ['read'], 'the viewer widened their key anyway'
+
+
+def test_developer_can_still_update_their_own_api_key(client, db_session):
+    """Non-vacuity: the gate is a role bar, not a freeze on the route."""
+    dev = make_user(db_session, role='developer')
+    key = _key_for(db_session, dev)
+
+    resp = client.put(f'/api/v1/api-keys/{key.id}',
+                      json={'name': 'renamed'},
+                      headers=headers_for(dev))
+
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.get_json()['name'] == 'renamed'
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------ demo deployment jobs
+
+def test_viewer_cannot_start_a_simulated_deployment(app, client, db_session):
+    """``DEMO_DEPLOYS_ENABLED`` is a *visibility* flag, not an authorization
+    one — with it on, job creation still has to be a developer capability."""
+    from app.models.deployment_job import DeploymentJob
+
+    app.config['DEMO_DEPLOYS_ENABLED'] = True
+    before = DeploymentJob.query.count()
+
+    resp = client.post('/api/v1/deployment-jobs/simulate?wait=true',
+                       json={'scenario': 'success', 'speed': 'instant'},
+                       headers=headers_for(make_user(db_session, role='viewer')))
+
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert DeploymentJob.query.count() == before, 'a viewer created a job row'
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------- nginx vhost path containment
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('domain', [
+    '../../../../etc/passwd',
+    '..',
+    '.',
+    'sub/dir/example.com',
+    '',
+    None,
+])
+def test_preview_diff_refuses_anything_that_is_not_a_plain_filename(app, domain):
+    """``domain`` is joined onto ``/etc/nginx/sites-available``; a traversing
+    value turns a config preview into an arbitrary file read, since the diff
+    body carries the current file's contents verbatim."""
+    from app.services.nginx_advanced_service import NginxAdvancedService
+
+    result = NginxAdvancedService.preview_diff(domain, 'new config')
+
+    assert result == {'error': 'invalid domain'}
+
+
+def test_preview_diff_still_diffs_a_plain_domain(app, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Non-vacuity: a normal vhost name is accepted and really is diffed."""
+    from app.services.nginx_advanced_service import NginxAdvancedService
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(NginxAdvancedService, 'SITES_AVAILABLE', str(tmp_path))
+    (tmp_path / 'example.com').write_text('server { listen 80; }\n', encoding='utf-8')
+
+    result = NginxAdvancedService.preview_diff('example.com', 'server { listen 443; }\n')
+
+    assert 'error' not in result
+    assert result['has_changes'] is True
+    assert 'listen 443' in result['diff']
+
+
+def test_preview_diff_route_reports_the_refusal_as_a_400(client, db_session):
+    """The API must not hand the service's error dict back as a 200 success."""
+    resp = client.post('/api/v1/nginx/advanced/diff',
+                       json={'domain': '../../etc/passwd', 'config': 'x'},
+                       headers=headers_for(make_user(db_session, role='admin')))
+
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+    assert resp.get_json() == {'error': 'invalid domain'}

backend/tests/test_migration_status.py

@@ -95,3 +95,31 @@ def test_no_revision_at_all_is_not_treated_as_orphaned(migration_state):
     status = migration_state(None, '080_dashboard_boards')
     assert status['orphaned_revision'] is False
     assert status['needs_migration'] is False
+
+
+# --- authorization ---------------------------------------------------------
+# `/migrations/history` is the one admin-gated route on this blueprint with no
+# side effect, which made it the one whose gate nothing exercised: when the
+# module moved to `require_admin_user()` it kept an inline `User.ROLE_ADMIN`
+# check whose imports had already been deleted, so every call — admin included
+# — raised NameError. The gate has to be fired, not just read.
+
+def test_history_is_admin_only(client, db_session):
+    from factories import make_user, headers_for
+
+    for role in ('viewer', 'developer'):
+        response = client.get('/api/v1/migrations/history',
+                              headers=headers_for(make_user(db_session, role=role)))
+        assert response.status_code == 403, (
+            f'a {role} read the migration history (got {response.status_code})'
+        )
+
+
+def test_history_answers_an_admin(client, db_session):
+    """Non-vacuity for the test above: the same route succeeds for an admin."""
+    from factories import make_user, headers_for
+
+    response = client.get('/api/v1/migrations/history',
+                          headers=headers_for(make_user(db_session, role='admin')))
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert isinstance(response.get_json()['revisions'], list)

backend/tests/test_route_authz_static.py

@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+"""Static authorization-coverage test — every mutating route must carry an
+authorization *decision*, proven from the source, not from firing requests.
+
+Companion to ``test_route_authz_sweep.py``. The two are deliberately
+complementary:
+
+* The sweep (live-fire) proves **enforcement**: a real viewer JWT is refused.
+  It cannot prove coverage — routes that 400/404 on a dummy request before the
+  gate runs are invisible to it (GHSA-r4q7-x795-vr4j's ``POST /workspaces/``
+  400s on an empty body, so the net would never have caught it).
+* This test proves **coverage**: every mutating route in ``app.url_map`` either
+  carries a recognized gate, reaches an authorization primitive in its module's
+  call graph, or sits in a small reviewed allowlist with a written
+  justification. It cannot prove a gate actually rejects — that stays with the
+  sweep.
+
+How a route passes (first match wins):
+
+1. ``_sk_authz`` marker on the view function — set by the rbac decorators
+   (``@admin_required``, ``@developer_required``, ``@permission_required``,
+   ``@require_role``, ``@require_app_member``). ``functools.wraps`` propagates
+   the marker outward through ``@jwt_required``.
+2. AST reachability: the view's module-level call graph reaches a name in
+   ``AUTHORIZATION_PRIMITIVES`` (inline helpers like ``require_admin_user``,
+   ``_check_scope``, ``can_edit_app``…) or inspects ``.is_admin`` /
+   ``.is_developer``.
+3. ``SELF_SCOPED[endpoint]`` — a *reviewed* route that acts only on the
+   caller's own rows. Listing is explicit (never inferred) because calling
+   ``get_current_user()`` is necessary but NOT sufficient: the advisory's
+   ``create_workspace`` used the caller id as the *owner of a new global row*,
+   which is not self-scoping. The route must still reach an identity primitive.
+4. ``PUBLIC_ALT_AUTH[endpoint]`` — public by design; the value must name the
+   alternative mechanism (webhook signature, pairing code, enrollment secret).
+5. ``STATELESS[endpoint]`` — pure computation: no persistence, no outbound
+   connections, no command execution on attacker-controlled input.
+
+Anything else fails with instructions. Scope note: routes served from
+``builtin-extensions/`` (mounted under ``/api/v1/<ext>``) are excluded — they
+use the ``auth_required`` API-key model, a different surface that deserves its
+own pass.
+"""
+import ast
+import inspect
+
+import pytest
+
+
+# --- authorization vocabulary ----------------------------------------------
+
+# Inline primitives: calling any of these (directly or through a module-local
+# helper) counts as an authorization decision. Names are matched against both
+# plain calls (``require_admin_user()``) and method calls
+# (``WorkspaceService.get_user_role(...)``).
+AUTHORIZATION_PRIMITIVES = frozenset({
+    # app/middleware/rbac.py
+    'require_admin_user',
+    'require_workspace_access',
+    'require_workspace_role',
+    # workspace / app / server access checks
+    'get_user_role',
+    'check_app_access',
+    'can_access_app',
+    'can_edit_app',
+    'can_operate_app',
+    'can_write_in_workspace',
+    'verify_workspace_access',
+    'verify_server_access',
+    'check_server_access',
+    'can_access_server',
+    'require_app_access',
+    # per-file gate helpers established by the audit
+    '_check_scope',
+    '_check_resource_write',
+    '_endpoint_gate',
+    '_vault_gate',
+    '_ensure_group_accessible',
+    '_load_app_for',
+    '_require_admin',
+})
+
+# Inspecting these attributes on the current user is an inline role check.
+ATTRIBUTE_GATES = frozenset({'is_admin', 'is_developer'})
+
+# Identity resolution — required for SELF_SCOPED, never sufficient alone.
+IDENTITY_PRIMITIVES = frozenset({
+    'get_current_user', 'get_jwt_identity', 'get_jwt',
+})
+
+
+# --- reviewed allowlists (endpoint -> justification) -------------------------
+# Every entry was reviewed against the code (audit of 2026-08-19; evidence
+# file:line recorded in the review). The justification is load-bearing: it is
+# the reason this route may legitimately lack a role gate. Keep it specific.
+
+SELF_SCOPED = {
+    # Acts only on the caller's own rows, ownership enforced in the service.
+    'ai.chat': 'conversation ownership via _load_or_create/_owned_conversation',
+    'ai.chat_cancel': 'ownership checked before cancel',
+    'ai.chat_confirm': 'conversation ownership + pending action belongs to caller',
+    'ai.chat_stream': 'conversation ownership via _load_or_create',
+    'ai.create_conversation': 'row stamped with caller user_id',
+    'ai.delete_conversation': '_owned_conversation gate',
+    'ai.rename_conversation': '_owned_conversation gate',
+    'api_keys.revoke_key': 'service query filtered by caller user_id',
+    'api_keys.rotate_key': 'service query filtered by caller user_id',
+    'auth.passkey_delete': 'credential lookup filtered by id + caller user_id',
+    'auth.passkey_register': 'registers a passkey for the JWT user only',
+    'auth.passkey_register_options': 'challenge issued for the JWT user only',
+    'auth.refresh': 'mints an access token only for the refresh-token identity',
+    'auth.update_current_user': 'mutates only the caller\'s own user row',
+    'dashboards.create_board': 'board created with caller user_id',
+    'dashboards.delete_board': 'get_board_for_user scopes id + user_id',
+    'dashboards.reset_board': 'get_board_for_user scopes id + user_id',
+    'dashboards.update_board': 'get_board_for_user scopes id + user_id',
+    'event_subscriptions.delete_subscription': 'service get_for_user enforces admin-or-owner',
+    'event_subscriptions.retry_delivery': 'routes through get_for_user (owner check)',
+    'event_subscriptions.test_subscription': 'routes through get_for_user (owner check)',
+    'event_subscriptions.update_subscription': 'routes through get_for_user (owner check)',
+    'mobile.register_push': 'writes the caller\'s own push_subscriptions_json',
+    'notifications.mark_inbox_all_read': 'mark_all_read scoped to caller user_id',
+    'notifications.mark_inbox_read': 'inbox query scoped to caller user_id',
+    'notifications.test_user_notification': 'sends only to the caller\'s own channels',
+    'notifications.unmute_own_email': 'unmutes the caller\'s own email only',
+    'notifications.update_user_preferences': 'preferences row keyed to caller',
+    'queue_bus.create_group': 'non-admin owner_type/owner_id forced to the caller',
+    'secrets_webhooks.create_webhook_endpoint': 'workspace resolved via membership-checked resolve_workspace_id; endpoint stamped with caller user_id',
+    'source_connections.bitbucket_callback': 'completes OAuth for the caller\'s user_id',
+    'source_connections.disconnect_bitbucket': 'disconnect scoped to caller user_id',
+    'source_connections.disconnect_github': 'disconnect scoped to caller user_id',
+    'source_connections.disconnect_gitlab': 'disconnect scoped to caller user_id',
+    'source_connections.github_callback': 'completes OAuth for the caller\'s user_id',
+    'source_connections.gitlab_callback': 'completes OAuth for the caller\'s user_id',
+    'sso.link_provider': 'links identity to the JWT user with cross-account conflict check',
+    'sso.unlink_provider': 'unlink_identity scoped to caller user_id',
+    'two_factor.confirm_2fa_setup': 'own user + valid TOTP required',
+    'two_factor.disable_2fa': 'own user, requires TOTP/backup code',
+    'two_factor.initiate_2fa_setup': 'own user 2FA setup only',
+    'two_factor.regenerate_backup_codes': 'own user, TOTP required',
+    'views.create_view': 'view created with caller user_id',
+    'views.delete_view': 'query filtered by id + caller user_id',
+    'views.update_view': 'query filtered by id + caller user_id',
+}
+
+PUBLIC_ALT_AUTH = {
+    # Public by design; the value names the mechanism that authenticates the call.
+    'agent_poll.connect': 'agent HMAC handshake + per-IP throttle',
+    'agent_poll.disconnect': 'X-Session-Token lookup',
+    'agent_poll.poll': 'X-Session-Token resolves the ConnectedAgent',
+    'agent_poll.result': 'X-Session-Token resolves the ConnectedAgent',
+    'auth.login': 'password credential + per-IP/per-user throttles + lockout',
+    'auth.passkey_authenticate': 'WebAuthn assertion verification, 5/min',
+    'auth.redeem_login_link': 'single-use login-link token + per-IP throttle',
+    'auth.register': 'invite token / first-user / registration-enabled flag, 3/min',
+    'ddns.update': 'per-host token is the credential (DynDNS protocol)',
+    'deploy.webhook': 'URL token + provider signature verified before handling',
+    'error_logs.client_error_log': 'unauthenticated client error intake: per-IP rate limit + strict field validation',
+    'git.receive_webhook': 'webhook token lookup + HMAC signature before processing',
+    'notifications.inbound_email_webhook': 'HMAC-SHA256 over raw body; 404 when secret unset',
+    'pairing.code_freeze': 'enrollment_id + enrollment_secret',
+    'pairing.code_refresh': 'enrollment_id + enrollment_secret',
+    'pairing.enroll': 'pubkey+passphrase enrollment; produces a PENDING enrollment needing developer-gated claim',
+    'pairing.poll': 'enrollment creds + optional Ed25519 proof-of-possession',
+    'preview_webhooks.receive_pull_request': 'webhook token lookup + HMAC signature before any action',
+    'secrets_webhooks.receive_webhook': 'HMAC signature mandatory since the 2026-08 fix (missing or wrong signature -> 401)',
+    'servers.register_agent': 'single-use hashed registration token, 5/min',
+    'sso.callback': 'OAuth authorization-code + state exchange with the provider',
+    'sso.saml_callback': 'SAML assertion validated by the SSO service',
+    'two_factor.verify_2fa_code': 'short-lived 2fa_pending token + TOTP/backup code + throttle',
+}
+
+STATELESS = {
+    # Persists nothing, dials nothing attacker-chosen, executes nothing
+    # attacker-controlled.
+    'agent_plugins.validate_manifest': 'pure manifest schema validation',
+    'auth.passkey_auth_options': 'challenge issuance only, no mutation',
+    'buildpacks.generate': 'pure plan -> Dockerfile/compose templating',
+    'cron.preview_schedule': 'pure cron-expression computation',
+    'dns_cutover.ttl_guidance': 'pure computation over supplied records',
+    'dns_cutover.verify': 'read-only DNS lookups against public resolvers',
+    'docker.get_containers_stats': 'read-via-POST of container stats; viewer holds docker:read',
+    'firewall.rule_removal_preflight': 'pure analysis against current rules',
+    'htaccess_tools.htaccess_convert': 'pure text transform, 256KB cap',
+    'mobile.execute_quick_action': 'stub: canned no-op responses / live metrics read only',
+    'mobile.unregister_push': 'stub: returns success without touching the DB',
+    'servers.check_agent_version': 'agent-facing version check; outbound only to a fixed GitHub releases URL, cached',
+    'templates.validate_installation': 'validation only (name-clash read + variable checks)',
+}
+
+
+# --- AST machinery -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+_MUTATING = {'POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE'}
+
+
+def _mutating_rules(app):
+    """Mutating rules served from backend/app/api (the core surface).
+
+    Yields ``(rule, view, unwrapped)``: ``view`` is the registered (possibly
+    decorator-wrapped) endpoint function — where ``_sk_authz`` markers live —
+    and ``unwrapped`` is the original view reached through ``__wrapped__``
+    chains, which is what source-file attribution and AST analysis must use
+    (``inspect.getsourcefile`` on a wrapped view returns the *decorator's*
+    module, e.g. flask_jwt_extended, not the route's file).
+    """
+    for rule in app.url_map.iter_rules():
+        if not (rule.methods & _MUTATING):
+            continue
+        view = app.view_functions.get(rule.endpoint)
+        if view is None:
+            continue
+        try:
+            unwrapped = inspect.unwrap(view)
+        except ValueError:  # wrapper cycle
+            unwrapped = view
+        src = inspect.getsourcefile(unwrapped)
+        if src is None or '\\app\\api\\' not in src.replace('/', '\\'):
+            continue  # builtin-extensions and flask internals: separate surface
+        yield rule, view, unwrapped
+
+
+def _module_functions(path):
+    """name -> FunctionDef for every function defined in the module."""
+    with open(path, encoding='utf-8') as fh:
+        tree = ast.parse(fh.read())
+    return {n.name: n for n in ast.walk(tree)
+            if isinstance(n, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef))}
+
+
+def _called_names(fn):
+    """Every called name plus gated-attribute lookups in one function body."""
+    names = set()
+    for node in ast.walk(fn):
+        if isinstance(node, ast.Call):
+            func = node.func
+            if isinstance(func, ast.Name):
+                names.add(func.id)
+            elif isinstance(func, ast.Attribute):
+                names.add(func.attr)
+        elif isinstance(node, ast.Attribute) and node.attr in ATTRIBUTE_GATES:
+            names.add(node.attr)
+    return names
+
+
+def _reachable_names(funcs, start):
+    """Transitive closure of names callable from `start` within the module."""
+    calls = {name: _called_names(f) for name, f in funcs.items()}
+    seen, stack = set(), [start]
+    while stack:
+        for callee in calls.get(stack.pop(), ()):
+            if callee not in seen:
+                seen.add(callee)
+                stack.append(callee)
+    return seen
+
+
+# --- the test ----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_every_mutating_route_carries_an_authorization_decision(app):
+    # Parse each api module at most once.
+    module_funcs = {}
+
+    def reachable(unwrapped):
+        path = inspect.getsourcefile(unwrapped)
+        if path not in module_funcs:
+            module_funcs[path] = _module_functions(path)
+        return _reachable_names(module_funcs[path], unwrapped.__name__)
+
+    ungated = []
+    for rule, view, unwrapped in _mutating_rules(app):
+        endpoint = rule.endpoint
+
+        # 1. Decorator gate (marker propagates through functools.wraps).
+        if getattr(view, '_sk_authz', None):
+            continue
+
+        names = reachable(unwrapped)
+
+        # 2. Inline primitive or attribute role check.
+        if names & AUTHORIZATION_PRIMITIVES or names & ATTRIBUTE_GATES:
+            continue
+
+        # 3. Reviewed self-scoped route — must resolve the caller's identity.
+        if endpoint in SELF_SCOPED and names & IDENTITY_PRIMITIVES:
+            continue
+
+        # 4/5. Reviewed public-with-alt-auth / stateless routes.
+        if endpoint in PUBLIC_ALT_AUTH or endpoint in STATELESS:
+            continue
+
+        methods = sorted(rule.methods & _MUTATING)
+        ungated.append(f'{methods} {rule.rule} ({endpoint})')
+
+    assert not ungated, (
+        'Mutating route(s) with no authorization decision found:\n  '
+        + '\n  '.join(sorted(ungated))
+        + '\n\nFix one of:'
+        '\n  - add a gate decorator (@admin_required / @developer_required /'
+        ' @permission_required), or'
+        '\n  - call an inline authorization primitive (require_admin_user,'
+        ' check_app_access, _check_scope, ...), or'
+        '\n  - if the route is genuinely self-scoped / public-with-alt-auth /'
+        ' stateless, add it to the matching allowlist in this file with a'
+        ' specific justification.'
+    )
+
+
+def test_static_allowlists_are_not_stale(app):
+    """Every allowlisted endpoint must still exist and still need its listing.
+
+    A stale entry is a hiding place: if the route is renamed or gains a real
+    gate, the entry must leave so a future route cannot reuse the slot.
+    """
+    live = {rule.endpoint for rule, _, _ in _mutating_rules(app)}
+    listed = set(SELF_SCOPED) | set(PUBLIC_ALT_AUTH) | set(STATELESS)
+    stale = listed - live
+    assert not stale, f'Allowlist entries for endpoints that no longer exist: {sorted(stale)}'
+
+
+def test_self_scoped_entries_actually_resolve_identity(app):
+    """A SELF_SCOPED entry whose route no longer resolves the caller's identity
+    is not self-scoped by any definition — drop the entry or fix the route."""
+    module_funcs = {}
+    bogus = []
+    for rule, _, unwrapped in _mutating_rules(app):
+        if rule.endpoint not in SELF_SCOPED:
+            continue
+        path = inspect.getsourcefile(unwrapped)
+        if path not in module_funcs:
+            module_funcs[path] = _module_functions(path)
+        names = _reachable_names(module_funcs[path], unwrapped.__name__)
+        if not (names & IDENTITY_PRIMITIVES):
+            bogus.append(rule.endpoint)
+    assert not bogus, (
+        f'SELF_SCOPED entries whose view never resolves the caller identity: {sorted(bogus)}'
+    )

backend/tests/test_route_authz_sweep.py

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+"""Authorization sweep — the default-deny backstop for mutating routes.
+
+Motivation
+----------
+GHSA-r4q7-x795-vr4j: ``POST /api/v1/workspaces/`` shipped gated only by
+``@jwt_required()``, so a read-only *viewer* could create and administer
+workspaces. It was one forgotten authorization check, and it was not the only
+one — an audit of every mutating route turned up the same class in the docker
+compose read routes (arbitrary-path log/config disclosure) and the whole
+monitors surface (viewer could create/edit/delete monitors and incidents).
+
+The root cause is architectural: ServerKit has **no enforced default-deny**.
+Authorization is opt-in per route, via a decorator *or* an inline helper
+(``_can_edit_app``, ``require_workspace_role``, ``_check_scope``, ...). Nothing
+fails closed when an author forgets, so each new feature file is one missing
+line away from re-introducing the bug.
+
+This module is the CI backstop for that class. It has two parts:
+
+* ``test_fixed_routes_reject_non_admins`` — a precise, hermetic proof that the
+  specific routes fixed alongside the advisory (docker compose + monitors)
+  reject a viewer *and* a developer. These use ``@permission_required`` /
+  ``@admin_required``, which run before the view body, so a dummy id still
+  exercises the gate (403, not a 404 for the missing row).
+
+* ``test_no_mutating_route_succeeds_for_a_viewer`` — the regression net. It
+  fires every mutating route as a viewer and asserts none returns a 2xx unless
+  its endpoint is in ``VIEWER_WRITABLE`` (a reviewed allowlist). A newly-added
+  route that forgets to gate and happily answers a viewer with ``201`` trips
+  this test until the author either gates it or consciously allowlists it.
+
+Known limitation: a route with a path parameter that resolves its resource
+(and 404s) *before* checking authorization is invisible to the live-fire net
+— the 404 masks a missing gate. The net therefore catches the clearest
+regressions (creates and global toggles with no path param); resource-scoped
+routes need their own per-feature tests. See ``VIEWER_WRITABLE`` notes for the
+handful of endpoints that remain viewer-writable and are tracked as follow-ups.
+"""
+import pytest
+
+from factories import make_user, headers_for
+
+
+# --- Part A: the routes fixed alongside the advisory -----------------------
+
+# (endpoint path, method) — every mutating route on the docker compose read
+# surface and the monitors surface. A viewer and a developer must both be
+# refused; only an admin gets through.
+_MONITORS_WRITE = [
+    ('/api/v1/monitors/', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/monitors/1', 'PUT'),
+    ('/api/v1/monitors/1', 'DELETE'),
+    ('/api/v1/monitors/1/check', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/monitors/1/pause', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/monitors/incidents', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/monitors/incidents/1', 'PUT'),
+    ('/api/v1/monitors/incidents/1', 'DELETE'),
+]
+
+_DOCKER_COMPOSE_READ = [
+    ('/api/v1/docker/compose/ps', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/docker/compose/logs', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/docker/compose/validate', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/docker/compose/config', 'POST'),
+]
+
+# The advisory fix itself plus the viewer-write gaps the same audit surfaced:
+# workspace creation, the global uptime on/off toggles, registrar sync/test
+# (their add/delete siblings were already admin-only), and template drift checks.
+_ADMIN_GATED_ROUND2 = [
+    ('/api/v1/workspaces/', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/uptime/tracking/start', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/uptime/tracking/stop', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/registrars/sync', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/registrars/connections/1/test', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/server-templates/assignments/1/check', 'POST'),
+]
+
+_FIXED_ROUTES = _MONITORS_WRITE + _DOCKER_COMPOSE_READ + _ADMIN_GATED_ROUND2
+
+# Round 3 — gaps surfaced by the static-coverage audit (see
+# test_route_authz_static.py, seeded 2026-08-19). Admin-gated: both a viewer
+# and a developer must be refused.
+_ADMIN_GATED_ROUND3 = [
+    ('/api/v1/fleet-monitor/alerts/a1/acknowledge', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/fleet-monitor/alerts/a1/resolve', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/recycle-bin/apps/1/restore', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/nginx/advanced/test', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/nginx/advanced/diff', 'POST'),
+]
+
+# Developer-gated: a viewer is refused; a developer is admitted (the body may
+# still 400/404/500 on the dummy payload — only the gate must not fire).
+_DEVELOPER_GATED_ROUND3 = [
+    ('/api/v1/servers/s1/docker/compose/ps', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/servers/s1/docker/compose/logs', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/servers/s1/refresh-capabilities', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/servers/s1/ping', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/templates/test-db-connection', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/deploy/branches', 'POST'),
+    ('/api/v1/buildpacks/detect', 'POST'),
+]
+
+_FIXED_ROUTES += _ADMIN_GATED_ROUND3
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('path,method', _FIXED_ROUTES)
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('role', ['viewer', 'developer'])
+def test_fixed_routes_reject_non_admins(client, db_session, path, method, role):
+    """A viewer and a developer are refused (403) on every fixed route.
+
+    The gate is a decorator, so it fires before the view body — the dummy id
+    ``1`` never matters; we never reach the row lookup.
+    """
+    headers = headers_for(make_user(db_session, role=role))
+    resp = client.open(path, method=method, headers=headers, json={})
+    assert resp.status_code == 403, (
+        f'{method} {path} let a {role} through with {resp.status_code}; '
+        f'expected 403 from the authorization gate'
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('path,method', _FIXED_ROUTES)
+def test_fixed_routes_admit_admin(client, db_session, path, method):
+    """Sanity: an admin is NOT stopped by the authorization gate.
+
+    The body may still 400/404/500 on the dummy payload — we only assert the
+    gate itself did not reject the admin (never 401/403).
+    """
+    if path == '/api/v1/uptime/tracking/start':
+        # Side-effecting for an admin (spawns the tracking daemon thread);
+        # the viewer/developer 403 above is the security assertion here.
+        return
+    headers = headers_for(make_user(db_session, role='admin'))
+    resp = client.open(path, method=method, headers=headers, json={})
+    assert resp.status_code not in (401, 403), (
+        f'{method} {path} wrongly blocked an admin with {resp.status_code}'
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('path,method', _DEVELOPER_GATED_ROUND3)
+def test_developer_gated_routes_reject_viewers(client, db_session, path, method):
+    """A viewer is refused (403) on every developer-gated round-3 route."""
+    headers = headers_for(make_user(db_session, role='viewer'))
+    resp = client.open(path, method=method, headers=headers, json={})
+    assert resp.status_code == 403, (
+        f'{method} {path} let a viewer through with {resp.status_code}; '
+        f'expected 403 from @developer_required'
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('path,method', _DEVELOPER_GATED_ROUND3)
+def test_developer_gated_routes_admit_developers(client, db_session, path, method):
+    """Sanity: a developer is NOT stopped by the gate (body may 400/404/500)."""
+    headers = headers_for(make_user(db_session, role='developer'))
+    resp = client.open(path, method=method, headers=headers, json={})
+    assert resp.status_code not in (401, 403), (
+        f'{method} {path} wrongly blocked a developer with {resp.status_code}'
+    )
+
+
+def test_queue_group_mutations_are_owner_scoped(app, client, db_session):
+    """queue_bus cross-user fix: `_ensure_group_mutable` alone only blocked
+    *system* groups — any authenticated user could rename/delete another
+    user's groups, queues and messages. Every mutating route now also calls
+    `_ensure_group_accessible` (owner-or-admin)."""
+    from app.queue_bus.service import QueueBusService
+
+    owner = make_user(db_session, role='developer')
+    intruder = make_user(db_session, role='developer')
+    group = QueueBusService.create_group(
+        slug='owned-group', name='Owned', owner_type='user', owner_id=str(owner.id),
+    )
+    slug = group['slug'] if isinstance(group, dict) else group.slug
+
+    headers = headers_for(intruder)
+    attempts = [
+        ('PATCH', f'/api/v1/queue/groups/{slug}'),
+        ('DELETE', f'/api/v1/queue/groups/{slug}'),
+        ('POST', f'/api/v1/queue/groups/{slug}/queues'),
+        ('POST', f'/api/v1/queue/groups/{slug}/queues/q1/messages'),
+    ]
+    for method, url in attempts:
+        resp = client.open(url, method=method, headers=headers,
+                           json={'name': 'x', 'payload': {}})
+        assert resp.status_code == 403, (
+            f'{method} {url} let a non-owner through with {resp.status_code}'
+        )
+
+    # The owner themselves is NOT blocked by the accessibility guard.
+    resp = client.open(f'/api/v1/queue/groups/{slug}', method='PATCH',
+                       headers=headers_for(owner), json={'description': 'mine'})
+    assert resp.status_code != 403
+
+
+# --- Part B: the default-deny regression net -------------------------------
+
+# Endpoints where a viewer legitimately receives a 2xx today. Each is reviewed
+# and categorized. Adding a NEW mutating route that answers a viewer with a 2xx
+# will fail the sweep below until it is gated or deliberately listed here.
+VIEWER_WRITABLE = {
+    # SELF — the viewer acts only on their own account/data.
+    'ai.create_conversation',
+    'auth.update_current_user',
+    'notifications.mark_inbox_all_read',
+    'notifications.test_user_notification',
+    'notifications.unmute_own_email',
+    'two_factor.initiate_2fa_setup',
+    'mobile.execute_quick_action',
+    # STATELESS — parse/validate/dry-run helpers; no persisted mutation.
+    'cron.preview_schedule',
+    'dns_cutover.ttl_guidance',
+    'firewall.rule_removal_preflight',
+    'nginx_advanced.test_config',
+    # READ-VIA-POST — a read the permission model already grants a viewer
+    # (viewer has docker:read). POST only because it takes a body of ids.
+    'docker.get_containers_stats',
+    # PUBLIC transport — agent long-poll fallback; user JWT is ignored here.
+    'agent_poll.disconnect',
+}
+
+# Endpoints skipped by the live-fire net because firing them reaches out to the
+# network / external providers (slow, flaky in CI). Their gating is asserted by
+# dedicated per-feature tests, not here.
+_SKIP_ENDPOINTS = {
+    'servers.check_agent_version',
+}
+
+
+def _mutating_rules(app):
+    for rule in app.url_map.iter_rules():
+        methods = rule.methods - {'GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS'}
+        if not methods:
+            continue
+        if rule.endpoint in _SKIP_ENDPOINTS:
+            continue
+        method = 'POST' if 'POST' in methods else sorted(methods)[0]
+        yield rule, method
+
+
+def _fill(rule):
+    """Concrete URL for a rule, dummy values for path params."""
+    url = rule.rule
+    for arg in rule.arguments:
+        conv = type(rule._converters.get(arg)).__name__
+        val = '1' if 'Integer' in conv or 'Float' in conv else 'x'
+        for token in (f'<{arg}>', f'<int:{arg}>', f'<string:{arg}>',
+                      f'<path:{arg}>', f'<float:{arg}>', f'<default:{arg}>'):
+            url = url.replace(token, val)
+    return url
+
+
+def test_no_mutating_route_succeeds_for_a_viewer(app, client, db_session):
+    """No mutating route may answer a viewer with a 2xx unless allowlisted.
+
+    This is the default-deny backstop. A 2xx here means the authorization gate
+    definitively did NOT stop a read-only user — the exact shape of the
+    workspace advisory. Non-2xx (401/403/400/404/5xx) is fine: either the gate
+    refused, or the body rejected the dummy payload before mutating anything.
+    """
+    headers = headers_for(make_user(db_session, role='viewer'))
+    offenders = []
+    for rule, method in _mutating_rules(app):
+        url = _fill(rule)
+        try:
+            resp = client.open(url, method=method, headers=headers, json={})
+            code = resp.status_code
+        except Exception:
+            # A crash in the view body is not a viewer succeeding — the gate
+            # question is answered "not 2xx". Real gating bugs surface as 2xx.
+            continue
+        if 200 <= code < 300 and rule.endpoint not in VIEWER_WRITABLE:
+            offenders.append(f'{method} {url} ({rule.endpoint}) -> {code}')
+
+    assert not offenders, (
+        'A read-only viewer received a success response on mutating '
+        'route(s) with no authorization gate:\n  ' + '\n  '.join(sorted(offenders))
+        + '\n\nGate the route (a decorator or an inline role/ownership check), '
+        'or — if a viewer is genuinely allowed — add the endpoint to '
+        'VIEWER_WRITABLE with a category comment.'
+    )
+
+
+def test_viewer_writable_allowlist_is_not_stale(app):
+    """Every allowlisted endpoint must still exist — stale entries hide gaps.
+
+    If a route is renamed/removed and its VIEWER_WRITABLE entry is left behind,
+    a future viewer-writable route could reuse a nearby name and slip through.
+    """
+    live = {r.endpoint for r in app.url_map.iter_rules()}
+    stale = (VIEWER_WRITABLE | _SKIP_ENDPOINTS) - live
+    assert not stale, f'Allowlist references endpoints that no longer exist: {sorted(stale)}'

backend/tests/test_secrets_webhooks_authz.py

@@ -246,3 +246,58 @@ def test_delivery_replay_requires_owner_role(client, vault_rbac, monkeypatch):
     assert client.post(url, headers=vault_rbac.ws_owner).status_code == 200
     assert client.post('/api/v1/webhooks/deliveries/999999/replay',
                        headers=s.admin).status_code == 404
+
+
+# ------------------- inbound receiver (public, signature-authenticated) ----
+
+def _sign(secret, payload):
+    import hashlib
+    import hmac
+    return 'sha256=' + hmac.new(secret.encode(), payload, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+
+
+def test_inbound_webhook_without_a_signature_is_rejected(client, vault_rbac, monkeypatch):
+    """The receiver is unauthenticated by design — the HMAC signature IS the
+    credential — so an *absent* signature has to fail exactly like a wrong one.
+
+    It did not: the reject branch read ``if not signature_valid and
+    signature_header``, which only fires for a request that bothered to sign.
+    Sending no ``X-Hub-Signature-256`` at all skipped the branch entirely and
+    the payload was logged, filtered and forwarded to ``forward_url``.
+    """
+    from app.services.webhook_gateway_service import WebhookGatewayService
+    forwarded = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(WebhookGatewayService, '_forward',
+                        classmethod(lambda cls, e, d, p, h: forwarded.append(p) or
+                                    {'success': True, 'status': 200, 'body': ''}))
+
+    resp = client.post('/api/v1/webhooks/receive/scope-endpoint',
+                       data=b'{"a": 1}', content_type='application/json')
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+    assert resp.get_json()['error'] == 'Missing signature'
+    assert forwarded == [], 'an unsigned payload was forwarded upstream'
+
+
+def test_inbound_webhook_with_a_wrong_signature_is_rejected(client, vault_rbac):
+    resp = client.post('/api/v1/webhooks/receive/scope-endpoint',
+                       data=b'{"a": 1}', content_type='application/json',
+                       headers={'X-Hub-Signature-256': _sign('not-the-secret', b'{"a": 1}')})
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+    assert resp.get_json()['error'] == 'Invalid signature'
+
+
+def test_inbound_webhook_with_a_valid_signature_is_accepted(client, vault_rbac, monkeypatch):
+    """Non-vacuity for the two rejections: a correctly signed delivery still
+    reaches the forwarder."""
+    from app.services.webhook_gateway_service import WebhookGatewayService
+    forwarded = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(WebhookGatewayService, '_forward',
+                        classmethod(lambda cls, e, d, p, h: forwarded.append(p) or
+                                    {'success': True, 'status': 200, 'body': ''}))
+
+    payload = b'{"a": 1}'
+    resp = client.post('/api/v1/webhooks/receive/scope-endpoint',
+                       data=payload, content_type='application/json',
+                       headers={'X-Hub-Signature-256': _sign('whsec', payload)})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert forwarded == [payload]

backend/tests/test_shared_resources.py

@@ -413,3 +413,28 @@ def test_audit_rows_written_on_mutations(app):
     assert {'tag.add', 'tag.remove', 'group.create', 'variable.create',
             'group.attach', 'group.detach', 'group.delete'} <= ops
     assert AuditLog.query.count() > before
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------- tag write authorization
+
+def test_api_tag_write_is_authorized_not_just_authenticated(app, client, db_session):
+    """Tagging is a mutation on someone else's resource, so it needs the same
+    ``_check_resource_write`` gate as attach/detach.
+
+    ``POST``/``DELETE /shared/tags`` shipped behind ``@jwt_required()`` alone:
+    any authenticated account could label any resource of any type. ``service``
+    is the sharpest case — it has no ownership seam, so the gate resolves it to
+    admin-only and a developer must be refused.
+    """
+    from factories import make_user, headers_for
+
+    dev = headers_for(make_user(db_session, role='developer'))
+    admin = headers_for(make_user(db_session, role='admin'))
+    body = {'resource_type': 'service', 'resource_id': 'web-1', 'tag': 'prod'}
+
+    assert client.post('/api/v1/shared/tags', json=body, headers=dev).status_code == 403
+    assert client.delete('/api/v1/shared/tags', json=body, headers=dev).status_code == 403
+
+    # Non-vacuity: the same calls succeed for a caller the gate admits.
+    assert client.post('/api/v1/shared/tags', json=body, headers=admin).status_code == 201
+    assert client.delete('/api/v1/shared/tags', json=body, headers=admin).status_code == 200

backend/tests/test_workspace_scope.py

@@ -509,3 +509,22 @@ def test_list_workspaces_surfaces_effective_role(app, client):
     rows = {w['name']: w for w in r.get_json()['workspaces']}
     assert rows['LW']['my_role'] == 'viewer'
     assert rows['LW']['my_effective_role'] == 'viewer'
+
+
+def test_create_workspace_requires_admin(app, client):
+    """GHSA-r4q7-x795-vr4j: POST /api/v1/workspaces/ was gated only by
+    @jwt_required(), so a read-only viewer could create a workspace, become its
+    owner, then add arbitrary members and mint workspace API keys. It now
+    carries @admin_required like every other panel-wide create."""
+    from app import db
+
+    for role in ('viewer', 'developer'):
+        u = _mk_user(db, f'cw_{role}', role)
+        r = client.post('/api/v1/workspaces/', headers=_token(u.id),
+                        json={'name': f'cw-{role}', 'slug': f'cw-{role}'})
+        assert r.status_code == 403, f'{role} reached workspace creation: {r.status_code}'
+
+    admin = _mk_user(db, 'cw_admin', 'admin')
+    r = client.post('/api/v1/workspaces/', headers=_token(admin.id),
+                    json={'name': 'cw-ok', 'slug': 'cw-ok'})
+    assert r.status_code == 201

docs/MIGRATION_INVENTORY.md

@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ debt. Regenerate with `python scripts/generate-migration-inventory.py`.
 | Concern | Door | Remaining | Ceiling | Policy |
 |---|---|---:|---:|---|
 | Identity lookups outside rbac.get_current_user() | rbac.get_current_user() | 69 | 69 | JWT-only routes; the API-key-capable population is held at 0 by a companion assertion |
-| Routes on bare @jwt_required() | auth_required() / role decorators | 605 | 605 | REGISTERED EXCEPTION: JWT-only is the deliberate default; conversion grants API-key access and happens per route, on decision |
+| Routes on bare @jwt_required() | auth_required() / role decorators | 577 | 577 | REGISTERED EXCEPTION: JWT-only is the deliberate default; conversion grants API-key access and happens per route, on decision |
 | HTTP statuses chosen by sniffing error text | typed errors from app.exceptions | 0 | 0 | INVARIANT at 0 - migration completed 2026-08-19 |
 | API crashes swallowed without recording | app.error_reporting | 0 | 0 | INVARIANT at 0 |
-| Hand-shaped {'error': ...} bodies in app/api | typed errors + the global handler | 1159 | 1159 | migrate when touched; new endpoints raise |
+| Hand-shaped {'error': ...} bodies in app/api | typed errors + the global handler | 1158 | 1159 | migrate when touched; new endpoints raise |
 | Raw subprocess calls outside the runners | app/utils/system.py runners | 24 | 24 | migrate when touched |
-| Controller-boundary violations (routes doing service work) | service layer extraction | 510 | 510 | migrate when touched (first-wave ratchet) |
+| Controller-boundary violations (routes doing service work) | service layer extraction | 509 | 509 | migrate when touched (first-wave ratchet) |
 | raw api.* calls in pages/ | E1: useServerQuery/useServerMutation | 460 | 460 | migrate when touched |
 | per-page toast.error extractions in pages/ | E1: query-layer error presentation | 264 | 264 | migrate when touched |
 | hand-rolled form-group blocks | F2: FormField/useForm | 343 | 343 | migrate when touched |

frontend/src/pages/Workspaces.jsx

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
 import { Input } from '@/components/ui/input';
 import { Textarea } from '@/components/ui/textarea';
 import { useWorkspace } from '../contexts/WorkspaceContext';
+import { useAuth } from '../contexts/AuthContext';
 import { useServerMutation, useServerQuery } from '../hooks/useServerQuery';
 
 // Preset views. `servers` and `users` are quota CEILINGS, not usage, so there
@@ -84,11 +85,14 @@ const Workspaces = () => {
     const toast = useToast();
     const navigate = useNavigate();
     const { activeWorkspaceId } = useWorkspace();
+    // Workspace creation is admin-only server-side (@admin_required); hide the
+    // entry points for everyone else instead of letting them hit a 403.
+    const { isAdmin } = useAuth();
     const [search, setSearch] = useState('');
     const [selectedIds, setSelectedIds] = useState(new Set());
     const [showCreateModal, setShowCreateModal] = useState(false);
     // Quick-create deep link: /workspaces?focus=create:workspace opens the modal.
-    useFocusParam('create', () => setShowCreateModal(true));
+    useFocusParam('create', () => { if (isAdmin) setShowCreateModal(true); });
     const [form, setForm] = useState({ name: '', description: '', max_servers: 0, max_users: 0, primary_color: '#6d7cff' });
 
     const loadWorkspaces = useCallback(
@@ -109,17 +113,19 @@ const Workspaces = () => {
 
     useTopbarActions(() => (
         <>
-            <Button size="sm" onClick={() => setShowCreateModal(true)}>
-                <Plus size={16} />
-                New Workspace
-            </Button>
+            {isAdmin && (
+                <Button size="sm" onClick={() => setShowCreateModal(true)}>
+                    <Plus size={16} />
+                    New Workspace
+                </Button>
+            )}
             <SearchField
                 value={search}
                 onSearch={setSearch}
                 placeholder="Search workspaces…"
             />
         </>
-    ), [search]);
+    ), [search, isAdmin]);
 
     const handleCreate = async () => {
         try {
@@ -239,12 +245,14 @@ const Workspaces = () => {
             onClearSelection={() => setSelectedIds(new Set())}
             emptyIcon={LayoutGrid}
             emptyTitle="No workspaces yet"
-            emptyDescription="Create one to isolate servers by team or project."
-            emptyAction={
+            emptyDescription={isAdmin
+                ? 'Create one to isolate servers by team or project.'
+                : 'Workspaces isolate servers by team or project. Ask an admin to create one.'}
+            emptyAction={isAdmin ? (
                 <Button onClick={() => setShowCreateModal(true)}>
                     New Workspace
                 </Button>
-            }
+            ) : null}
             filteredEmptyIcon={LayoutGrid}
             filteredEmptyTitle="No workspaces found"
             filteredEmptyDescription="Try adjusting your search or filter."