fix(talos-log-collector): add CNI-agnostic NetworkPolicy fallback

Vector binds 0.0.0.0 inside the pod netns and exposes it as a containerPort,
so any pod could reach <podIP>:<listenPort> and inject forged talos_system
log lines. The ingress restriction is therefore load-bearing, not
defence-in-depth as the comment claimed. The CiliumNetworkPolicy only rendered
when the Cilium CRD was present, leaving the receiver unprotected on non-Cilium
variants (e.g. isp-hosted / noop networking). Correct the comment and, when the
Cilium CRD is absent, fall back to a default-deny-ingress networking.k8s.io/v1
NetworkPolicy so the socket is never offered without protection.

Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
IvanHunters committed 2026-07-22 22:14:57 +03:00
1 parent db6c26681f
commit 7451d97c14
1 file changed
+33 -7
@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
# Vector binds 0.0.0.0:<listenPort> inside the pod netns and exposes it as a
# containerPort, so the pod IP is reachable from every pod in the cluster. Any
# workload could open <podIP>:<listenPort> and inject forged JSON lines that the
# pipeline stamps with log_source=talos_system and the real node name, straight
# into VictoriaLogs. This policy is load-bearing, not defence-in-depth: it is
# the only thing restricting the receiver to the node-local push path (Talos
# reaches it on 127.0.0.1:<listenPort>; portmap DNATs to the pod and SNATs the
# source to the node, so legitimate traffic arrives as the host). A CNI that
# does not enforce NetworkPolicy (e.g. the noop networking variant, or a BYO CNI
# without policy support) leaves the socket unprotected regardless.
{{- if .Capabilities.APIVersions.Has "cilium.io/v2/CiliumNetworkPolicy" }}
---
# Talos reaches the receiver on 127.0.0.1:<listenPort>; portmap DNATs that to
# the pod and SNATs the source to the node, so legitimate traffic arrives as
# the "host" entity. Restrict ingress on the listen port to host only, so other
# pods on the pod network cannot inject spoofed talos_system log lines.
# Defense-in-depth and Cilium-only: even without this policy the loopback
# hostPort is not reachable from the pod network, so its absence is safe.
# Cilium is present: restrict ingress on the listen port to the host entity, so
# only the node-local push path is allowed and other pods are denied.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
@@ -24,4 +29,25 @@ spec:
- ports:
- port: "{{ .Values.listenPort }}"
protocol: TCP
{{- else }}
# No Cilium CRD: fall back to a CNI-agnostic default-deny-ingress policy so the
# socket is never offered without protection. This denies ingress from the pod
# network (the injection path) while node-local host traffic keeps flowing, the
# same way liveness/readiness probes from the node are not blocked by a
# default-deny policy; the portmap hostPort path arrives as node-local host
# traffic.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: talos-log-collector
namespace: {{ .Release.Namespace }}
labels:
{{- include "talos-log-collector.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: talos-log-collector
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress: []
{{- end }}