mirror of
https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack.git
synced 2026-11-22 12:43:32 +09:00
fix(talos-log-collector): add CNI-agnostic NetworkPolicy fallback
Vector binds 0.0.0.0 inside the pod netns and exposes it as a containerPort, so any pod could reach <podIP>:<listenPort> and inject forged talos_system log lines. The ingress restriction is therefore load-bearing, not defence-in-depth as the comment claimed. The CiliumNetworkPolicy only rendered when the Cilium CRD was present, leaving the receiver unprotected on non-Cilium variants (e.g. isp-hosted / noop networking). Correct the comment and, when the Cilium CRD is absent, fall back to a default-deny-ingress networking.k8s.io/v1 NetworkPolicy so the socket is never offered without protection. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
1 file changed
+33
-7
@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
|
||||
# Vector binds 0.0.0.0:<listenPort> inside the pod netns and exposes it as a
|
||||
# containerPort, so the pod IP is reachable from every pod in the cluster. Any
|
||||
# workload could open <podIP>:<listenPort> and inject forged JSON lines that the
|
||||
# pipeline stamps with log_source=talos_system and the real node name, straight
|
||||
# into VictoriaLogs. This policy is load-bearing, not defence-in-depth: it is
|
||||
# the only thing restricting the receiver to the node-local push path (Talos
|
||||
# reaches it on 127.0.0.1:<listenPort>; portmap DNATs to the pod and SNATs the
|
||||
# source to the node, so legitimate traffic arrives as the host). A CNI that
|
||||
# does not enforce NetworkPolicy (e.g. the noop networking variant, or a BYO CNI
|
||||
# without policy support) leaves the socket unprotected regardless.
|
||||
{{- if .Capabilities.APIVersions.Has "cilium.io/v2/CiliumNetworkPolicy" }}
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Talos reaches the receiver on 127.0.0.1:<listenPort>; portmap DNATs that to
|
||||
# the pod and SNATs the source to the node, so legitimate traffic arrives as
|
||||
# the "host" entity. Restrict ingress on the listen port to host only, so other
|
||||
# pods on the pod network cannot inject spoofed talos_system log lines.
|
||||
# Defense-in-depth and Cilium-only: even without this policy the loopback
|
||||
# hostPort is not reachable from the pod network, so its absence is safe.
|
||||
# Cilium is present: restrict ingress on the listen port to the host entity, so
|
||||
# only the node-local push path is allowed and other pods are denied.
|
||||
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
|
||||
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
@@ -24,4 +29,25 @@ spec:
|
||||
- ports:
|
||||
- port: "{{ .Values.listenPort }}"
|
||||
protocol: TCP
|
||||
{{- else }}
|
||||
# No Cilium CRD: fall back to a CNI-agnostic default-deny-ingress policy so the
|
||||
# socket is never offered without protection. This denies ingress from the pod
|
||||
# network (the injection path) while node-local host traffic keeps flowing, the
|
||||
# same way liveness/readiness probes from the node are not blocked by a
|
||||
# default-deny policy; the portmap hostPort path arrives as node-local host
|
||||
# traffic.
|
||||
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
|
||||
kind: NetworkPolicy
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: talos-log-collector
|
||||
namespace: {{ .Release.Namespace }}
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
{{- include "talos-log-collector.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
podSelector:
|
||||
matchLabels:
|
||||
app.kubernetes.io/name: talos-log-collector
|
||||
policyTypes:
|
||||
- Ingress
|
||||
ingress: []
|
||||
{{- end }}
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user