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docs/role-nomination-template
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9aa9d3df22 |
docs(community): separate the issue vote from the promotion decision
"Approve" meant both the +1 in the issue and the approval of the promotion pull request, so a +1 could be read as the decision itself. The issue vote now reads as a show of support and the pull request as the decision. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Timur Tukaev <timur.tukaev@aenix.io> |
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cc46167ff3 |
docs(community): align the nomination template with the ladder
Add the Reviewer requirement the checklist had dropped (responsibility for the area) and the second half of the supportiveness one, stop stating a self-nomination rule the ladder does not contain, and make the sponsor line apply to both roles as the ladder does. The "once approved" heading contradicted the Approval section, where the pull request is the approval, so the steps now follow support rather than approval. For a Reviewer, write access has to come before the CODEOWNERS entry is merged, because an entry for a handle without it is ignored without an error. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Timur Tukaev <timur.tukaev@aenix.io> |
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a02e2a348b |
docs(community): say the maintainer decision is the approval on the promotion PR
CONTRIBUTOR_LADDER.md makes a majority approval of the promotion pull request the deciding step. The template described only the +1 vote in the issue, which is how past nominations ran but not what the ladder requires. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Timur Tukaev <timur.tukaev@aenix.io> |
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b759740cd0 |
docs(community): split the nomination template by role and fix rule provenance
CONTRIBUTOR_LADDER.md runs the two promotions differently, and the template applied one process to both. A Reviewer may be nominated by anyone and is approved on the pull request by two Approvers of the owning team; a Maintainer must be nominated by a current Maintainer, must already be a Reviewer, and needs a majority of the current maintainers. The template now states who may open each nomination, how each is approved, and what each pull request touches, including the Reviewers section of MAINTAINERS.md and the nominee's agreement comment on a Maintainer PR. The majority rule was attributed to GOVERNANCE.md, which contains neither it nor any voting window. It is now cited from CONTRIBUTOR_LADDER.md, and the 5-day window is described as the practice established in #2343 and #2344 rather than a written rule. The requirements checklist now mirrors the ladder per role, including the condition that both sponsors are themselves Reviewers or Maintainers. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Timur Tukaev <timur.tukaev@aenix.io> |
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ff1c2ccee8 |
docs(community): keep the governance contact link to a plain pointer
The about text of the governance contact link carried a justification for why nominations stay in this repository. A contact-link blurb is not the place to argue process, and the colon in that sentence also made the line invalid YAML. The link now only says where governance lives and points nominators to the Role nomination template. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Timur Tukaev <timur.tukaev@aenix.io> |
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6f756fa584 |
docs(community): add a Role nomination issue template
Both Hidora maintainers were promoted through a well-run public vote in #2343 and #2344: a written rationale, representative contributions, a 5-day window, +1/0/-1 from the maintainer roster, the nominee confirming acceptance, and explicit next steps. None of that shape was written down anywhere afterwards, so the next nomination has to reinvent it, and the Reviewer rung added in July has no filed nomination at all. This template is that issue turned into a form, covering both roles. It states what the ladder requires, asks for an honest note when a requirement is not met rather than a quietly unticked box, and records that the promotion itself lands through a pull request against CODEOWNERS or MAINTAINERS.md — the three current entries were added by direct commit, which the ladder does not describe. The config.yml routing sends governance to the community repo; nominations are the exception, because MAINTAINERS.md, CODEOWNERS and CONTRIBUTOR_LADDER.md all live here and this is where the two prior votes happened. Signed-off-by: Timur Tukaev <timur.tukaev@aenix.io> |
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04b7426706 |
chore(codeowners): don't gate per-app generated files on architect review (#3507)
## What this PR does `.github/CODEOWNERS` scopes `/api/` to the architects (`@kvaps @lllamnyp`), meant for hand-authored API surface: the aggregated apiserver, the registry, the core API types. But `api/apps/v1alpha1/<name>/types.go` and `api/apps/v1alpha1/<name>/zz_generated.deepcopy.go` are entirely produced by `make generate` from each app's own `values.yaml`/`values.schema.json` — 23 of the 32 packages under `packages/apps/` and `packages/extra/` wire this into their `generate` target. Since CODEOWNERS applies the last matching pattern and nothing more specific overrode `/api/` for these paths, any PR that edits an app's `values.yaml` documentation and reruns `make generate` (mandatory per the contributing guide) ends up requiring an architect review, no matter which area actually changed — even though the app's own reviewers already cover the source file that produced the diff. `packages/system/<name>-rd/cozyrds/<name>.yaml` has the same problem in a milder form: it isn't scoped by CODEOWNERS at all, so it falls through to the generic `/packages/` owners instead of the app's own team, again just because it's a generated mirror. This adds a CODEOWNERS entry with no owner for these three generated paths, so touching them alone does not pull in any codeowner requirement beyond what the source `values.yaml` already needs. This is intentional and safe: both are verified by the existing pre-commit CI (`run-make-generate` / `run-make-generate-root`), which reruns the generator and fails the check if the committed output does not match — a stronger, mechanical guarantee against drift or hand-tampering than a human skim of a generated diff would be. While in there: `api/.gitattributes` had a stale `linguist-generated` pattern (`zz_generated_deepcopy.go`) that has never matched any real file in this repo — the actual generated files are named `zz_generated.deepcopy.go` (dot, not underscore, matching the standard controller-gen output). Fixed the pattern and added the same treatment for the per-app `types.go` files and for `packages/system/*/cozyrds/*.yaml`, so all of them collapse in the PR diff view instead of just some. ### Screenshots Not applicable — no UI change. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change This only touches `.github/CODEOWNERS` and `.gitattributes` files; it changes neither the `values.schema.json` contract, generated CRDs, version enums, nor anything else in the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md`. ### Release note ```release-note chore(codeowners): per-app generated API type mirrors and cozyrds manifests no longer require architect review on their own — only the source values.yaml they're generated from does, with the existing make-generate CI check guarding against drift. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Chores** * Updated repository metadata to better identify generated API and application artifacts. * Added ownership exceptions for generated files and application-specific configuration directories. * Marked generated CozyRDS configuration files for improved repository classification. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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e5d4940338 |
chore(codeowners): don't gate per-app generated files on architect review
api/apps/v1alpha1/*/types.go and packages/system/*/cozyrds/*.yaml are entirely produced by `make generate` from each app's own values.yaml, but the /api/ codeowner rule pulled every app's regenerated types.go into an architect-only review, regardless of which area actually changed. Correctness there is already enforced by the pre-commit make-generate CI hooks, not by human review, so list no owner for these generated paths and let that check carry the weight instead. Also fixes a stale api/.gitattributes pattern that never matched any real file (zz_generated_deepcopy.go vs the actual zz_generated.deepcopy.go), and adds a matching linguist-generated attribute for the cozyrds ApplicationDefinition manifests, so both collapse in the PR diff view like the Go files already do. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Timofei Larkin <lllamnyp@gmail.com> |
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10554f9dce |
[cozystack-scheduler] Publish SchedulingClass demo (#2252)
## What this PR does Publish the scripts used for running the Cozystack scheduler demo at the community meetup on 19.03.2026. ### Release note ```release-note [cozystack-scheduler] Add demo scripts to the cozystack-scheduler system packages. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added a complete set of interactive Bash demo scripts covering scheduling classes: creating scheduling classes and tenants, colocating pods on a single node, spreading replicas evenly, enforcing one-pod-per-node anti-affinity, and pinning workloads to a specific node. * Included guided scaling steps plus cleanup and teardown scripts to remove demo resources. * **Documentation** * Introduced a shared demo helper with colored, step-by-step terminal logging and Kubernetes polling to wait for pods and Redis readiness, improving clarity and consistency across demos. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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e16df56019 |
chore(codeowners): scope CODEOWNERS to per-area reviewers (#3228)
## What this PR does Replaces the single catch-all owner line in `.github/CODEOWNERS` with area-scoped reviewer ownership, so each part of the tree routes to the people who actually own it (per the Contributor Ladder), instead of requiring the whole roster on every change. Highlights: - Architects (`@kvaps @lllamnyp`) are the default owner and own the API surface (`/api/`) and the VPC app. - CI / automation → `@myasnikovdaniil @sircthulhu`; backups → `@androndo @lllamnyp`; virtualization (kubevirt, vm-instance/disk) → `@scooby87 @lllamnyp @kvaps @myasnikovdaniil`. - `cozystack-api` / controller / lineage webhook → `@IvanHunters @kvaps @lllamnyp`. - General packages / apps / CLI ownership → `@lexfrei @IvanHunters @myasnikovdaniil` (+ `@scooby87` for apps), with `kubernetes` and `extra` scoped separately. - Flux → `@kingdonb`; GPU (hami, gpu-operator, GPU dashboards) → `@lexfrei`; metrics-server and seaweedfs → `@nbykov0`. - Governance / licensing files → `@tym83 @kvaps`. Ordering follows "last match wins" (broad → specific). The API review gate block is kept last so it cannot be overridden. This is review-routing only — no runtime/functional change — and only binds once "Require review from Code Owners" is enabled in branch protection. This file is what the CNCF Incubation review reads as "code ownership", so it is paired with #3462, which documents the same people in `MAINTAINERS.md` and introduces the Reviewers table the ladder already defined. Merging one without the other leaves the two describing different projects, which is the gap both PRs exist to close. Three of the people named here — `@kingdonb`, `@matthieu-robin`, `@mattia-eleuteri` — hold only read access today, and a CODEOWNERS entry for someone without write is silently ignored by GitHub, so the org-side permission changes have to land alongside. ### Screenshots N/A — governance/config change, no user-facing or UI impact. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: Walked the trigger map against the diff: no row matches. The change touches only `.github/CODEOWNERS` — no package, no `values.schema.json`, no `ApplicationDefinition`, no platform variant, no release asset, no node prerequisite. Every path named here was checked against current `main`; all 65 exist. ### Release note ```release-note NONE ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Documentation** * Updated CODEOWNERS from a single catch-all to an ordered, path-scoped reviewer mapping. * Clarified “last matching pattern wins” behavior and ensured the API review gate rules remain last to avoid overrides. * Expanded explicit ownership coverage across dashboards/examples, packages and Go components, apps, platform/infrastructure modules, CI/automation, and governance/licensing documentation (including SECURITY). <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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337bb4933e |
[cozystack-scheduler] Publish SchedulingClass demo
## What this PR does Publish the scripts used for running the Cozystack scheduler demo at the community meetup on 19.03.2026. ### Release note ```release-note [cozystack-scheduler] Add demo scripts to the cozystack-scheduler system packages. ``` Signed-off-by: Timofei Larkin <lllamnyp@gmail.com> |
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0f0204a6c2 |
fix(e2e): disable guest fsync on ephemeral CI VM disks (#3455)
## What this PR does The e2e QEMU guests are launched in `hack/e2e-prepare-cluster.bats` with three `-drive … if=virtio,format=raw` lines that carry no `cache=` option, so QEMU falls back to its `cache=writeback` default, which honors every guest fsync against the host-backed raw disk files. The management-cluster Talos etcd — which holds every operator's leader-election lease — fsyncs on each Raft commit. During the VM-heavy suites, containerd is simultaneously unpacking dozens of images and CDI is importing multi-GB VM disks onto the same host-backed raw files. The resulting fsync storm serializes etcd's writes into multi-second stalls, so the management apiserver returns `context deadline exceeded` on lease PUTs, and several operators (capk, etcd-operator, fdb-operator, cilium-operator, kamaji) lose leadership at the same moment. Whichever chainsaw suite is mid-flight then fails — a different one each run (vmcluster, kubernetes-latest, vmdisk), which is the fingerprint of shared-resource contention rather than a bug in any single suite. This adds `cache=unsafe` to each guest drive. That makes guest flushes no-ops against the host page cache, which removes the fsync-gated etcd stalls at the root of the flakiness. It is safe here precisely because these CI VMs are ephemeral and destroyed at the end of every run — a crash before writeback loses only throwaway state — and it must never be used for real data. The change is minimal and uniform across all three guest drives; no non-guest drive is touched (there are none in this file). Runner sizing alone (#3251) did not resolve this, because more CPU and memory do not change the I/O path: the guest fsyncs still propagate through `cache=writeback` to the host, and etcd still stalls behind the same fsync storm. This addresses the I/O path directly. `git log -S 'cache='` on this file is empty, so a cache mode has never previously been set here. ### Screenshots Not applicable — no UI changes. ### Downstream repositories I walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the actual diff. The only entries that reference `hack/e2e-prepare-cluster.bats` (ansible-cozystack and ccp) are scoped to node prerequisites — kernel modules, containerd settings, the LVM `global_filter`, and the cluster domain. This change touches none of those: it adds a QEMU host-side hypervisor flag (`cache=unsafe`) to the CI VM `-drive` options, which is invisible to the guest OS and to any real node. No downstream repository is affected. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(e2e): boot e2e QEMU guests with cache=unsafe so ephemeral CI VM fsyncs no longer stall the management-cluster etcd, removing the cross-operator leader-election flakiness that failed a different chainsaw suite each run ``` --- This PR was prepared with the assistance of an AI agent (Claude). A human maintainer reviewed the diff and the reasoning before submission and remains responsible for the change. <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Tests** * Updated end-to-end virtual machine startup testing to use optimized QEMU disk caching settings for improved reliability and performance. * Improved end-to-end Kubernetes cluster readiness checks under load by extending the deadline for reaching “at least 2 nodes Ready,” and aligned related messaging and failure diagnostics accordingly. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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3dc0f56477 |
feat(kube-ovn): build the chart and image in-tree, retiring the wrapper repo (#3460)
## What this PR does Brings the `kubeovn-chart` wrapper into the tree, so `cozystack/kubeovn-chart` can be archived. Until now `packages/system/kubeovn` pulled a chart tarball from the latest `cozystack/kubeovn-chart` tag at `make update` time, and that repository also built and pushed the `kubeovn` image. The wrapper existed only to cache the upstream chart; with the current caching approach that reason is gone, and the split cost a second repository, a second release step, and a package whose provenance a reader cannot follow without leaving the tree. The package is now shaped like `packages/system/cilium`: - `update` pulls the upstream `kubeovn/kube-ovn` chart directly and applies `patches/mtu.diff`, then syncs the version into the Dockerfile. The MTU patch already carried monorepo-relative paths, so it applies unchanged. - `image` builds `images/kubeovn` (carrying the existing `fix-keepvmip-portgroup` patch) and pins the digest into `values.yaml`, using the shared `image-tags` / `cache-args` helpers. It also carries `cozystack/kubeovn-chart#5`, which never got a tag: `OVN_IPSEC_KEY_DIR` is pinned under `/var/lib`. The kube-ovn default sits in `/etc/origin`, which a Talos node cannot create, so enabling IPsec left the node without ESP security associations. ### The nightly host rewrite had to be fixed first Moving the image build here activates a gap recorded in `docs/agents/image-refs.md`. The nightly host rewrite is a literal `<src-registry>/` substring replace, and kubeovn keeps its host in `global.registry.address` with the bare repository in a sibling key — no trailing slash, no match. While the image came from a separate repository the baked reference carried the public host and the ownership filter skipped it; once CI builds the image here it stamps the build-registry host into that key, and the result is an image mirrored to the public registry while the published tree keeps pointing at the private build registry. The second commit adds an end-of-line-anchored expression that fires only when the source registry is the complete scalar value, so a contiguous reference — which continues past the host — is still handled by the first expression and the two can never both fire on one reference. `keycloak-operator` splits at a different boundary and stays unfixed; that is documented, and dormant while no CI path rebuilds it. Verified: `hack/nightly-mirror_test.bats` passes with the new case and the case fails without the fix; `promote-retag` and `promote-rewrite-tags` suites unaffected; `helm template` and `helm unittest` on the package pass. The pre-existing `helm lint` complaint about a missing `kube-ovn` dependency reproduces on `main` and is left alone. ### Follow-ups this PR does not do - `cozystack/kubeovn-chart` should be archived once this merges, with a pointer here. Its open PR #5 is carried by this change and needs no separate landing. - `cozystack/website` links the Kube-OVN license at `cozystack/kubeovn-chart` in `operations/configuration/licenses.md` and `guides/platform-stack/_index.md` (all versions, including `next`). Archived repositories stay readable so nothing breaks, but the link should move upstream or in-tree. **No follow-up has been opened yet** — flagging rather than ticking the box. ### Screenshots N/A — build and packaging change, no user-facing or UI impact. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: Walked the trigger map against the diff. The website row matches — not through the app-list or platform-component triggers, but because two of its pages link the repository being archived. Left unticked because no follow-up exists there yet; a human should decide whether the license link moves to `kubeovn/kube-ovn` or to this package. No other row matches: the change touches no `packages/apps/` or `packages/extra/` package, no `values.schema.json`, no `ApplicationDefinition`, no platform variant, and no node prerequisite. ### Release note ```release-note feat(kube-ovn): the Kube-OVN chart and image are now built in this repository instead of cozystack/kubeovn-chart. OVN_IPSEC_KEY_DIR now defaults to /var/lib/ovs_ipsec_keys, so enabling IPsec on Talos nodes no longer leaves them without ESP security associations. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit - **New Features** - Updated Kube-OVN image build to use upstream chart metadata and keep registry/version alignment during `update`. - Added conditional MTU support for the OVN CNI DS via chart values. - Introduced `OVN_IPSEC_KEY_DIR` to standardize the OVN IPsec keys directory. - **Bug Fixes** - Preserved VM networking port-group assignments during live migration when an alive virt-launcher sibling pod exists. - Improved nightly mirror host rewriting for split and standalone registry host formats. - **Tests** - Added coverage for the end-of-line “whole scalar value” host rewrite case. - **Documentation** - Refreshed “Known gaps” guidance for nightly mirror host rewriting behavior and limitations. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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cc44f6c981 |
ci(release): move release validation to rc time — e2e lane, changelog button, promote gate, docs at promote (#3449)
## What this PR does Moves release validation from promote time to rc time, making promotion itself a pure retag operation. This is the follow-up to the v1.6.0 retrospective: the promote flow's checks ran on the promote PR (coupled to promotion, skippable by never promoting), the changelog and website docs were produced only after the release went public, and the finalize tag push silently failed to trigger `tags.yaml` at all (persisted-credential bug, root-caused below). The release lifecycle after this PR: 1. `cut-prerelease.yaml` cuts an rc; `tags.yaml` builds, drafts, pushes the staging branch — and now runs a **mandatory full e2e** for every `-rc.N` tag via the new reusable `e2e-tag.yaml` lane. Alpha/beta (and any published tag) get the same validation as a **manual button** (`workflow_dispatch`). 2. Optionally, a maintainer presses the **`changelog-rc.yaml` button**: the release changelog is generated from the rc tag (reusable `changelog-generate.yaml`) and committed to the rc staging branch, ready for review long before promotion. 3. `promote-rc.yaml` dispatch is **gated on green rc e2e** (evidence: the rc's `tags.yaml` run containing a successful `rc-e2e` job, or a successful manual `e2e-tag` dispatch for the tag; `skip_e2e_gate` input for emergencies, always surfaced in the PR body as ✅/⚠️). Promote stages the release, picks up the rc-time changelog (or generates one), and **opens the website docs PR** on cozystack/website from the staging branch — parked with an explicit DO-NOT-MERGE-until-finalize contract. 4. The promote PR **no longer gets `full-e2e` automatically** — its tree is the rc's already-validated digests with only tag strings rewritten; a maintainer can still add the label manually to force the suite. 5. Finalize performs the irreversible side effects (tag, publish, retag, chart) — and with `persist-credentials: false` its tag push now actually authenticates as the CI app, so the `tags.yaml` backstops (`generate-changelog`, `update-website-docs`) fire for promoted tags. This is the one-line fix for the v1.6.0 incident where the tag triggered nothing: the checkout's persisted `GITHUB_TOKEN` `http.extraheader` silently defeats the app token injected via `git remote set-url`, and `GITHUB_TOKEN` pushes create no workflow runs. Everything is pinned by executable contract tests (`hack/promote-gate-contract.bats`, extended `hack/release-changelog-contract.bats` / `release-changelog-behaviour.bats` — 48 tests total, including behaviour tests that execute the new `hack/parse-rc-tag.sh` and `hack/select-changelog-source.sh` for real), and `docs/release.md` is rewritten to describe the new lifecycle end-to-end. ### Commit map (review commit-by-commit) - `75b5192f1`…`dd308644c` + `6fc970851` — the pre-existing changelog-before-publication rework (changelog generated at promote, committed to the staging branch before the PR opens, finalize publishes it as the release body; tags.yaml job becomes a verbatim-port backstop), rebased onto main. - `5aec70b3a` — `e2e-tag.yaml`: reusable published-tag e2e lane (prerelease → staging branch, stable → tag; draft releases fail fast; dispatch-only SSH `debug` breakpoint; tag-suffixed artifacts). - `025564d96` — `tags.yaml::rc-e2e`: mandatory full e2e for freshly cut rc tags (also on `release_exists` re-runs); fixes the `cut-prerelease.yaml` comment that falsely claimed e2e already existed. - `2dfbeea77` — `changelog-generate.yaml` (reusable core) + `changelog-rc.yaml` (rc-time button committing to the staging branch); promote-rc gains a top-level `parse` job with a strict no-whitespace tag policy (`hack/parse-rc-tag.sh`); source selection is validate-then-fallthrough (`hack/select-changelog-source.sh`) so an invalid higher-priority changelog can never silently win. - `ff7ddd3c9` — the promote e2e gate + `skip_e2e_gate` override + removal of the automatic `full-e2e` label (pull-requests.yaml release-path e2e now requires an explicit label; a post-open label now actually starts the run). - `936190d4b` — `website-docs` job at promote time behind a FETCH_REF-support guard (see dependency below), with the DO-NOT-MERGE-until-finalize contract and a pin-freshness pass before `release-next`; `tags.yaml::update-website-docs` stays as the backstop. - `01e1e7188` — the `persist-credentials: false` finalize fix (v1.6.0 root cause). - `717c8860f` — `docs/release.md` coherence pass over the whole new lifecycle. ### Dependency The promote-time website docs job needs cozystack/website#631 (`FETCH_REF` + fail-loud fetch). Until that merges, the job's guard detects the missing support and degrades to a ⚠️ line in the promote PR body — promotion is unaffected and the tag-time backstop backfills, so this PR is safe to merge first. ### Merge instructions Please **merge-commit, do not squash**: the 13 commits are deliberately atomic (the credential root-cause fix is separable from the feature work) and squashing would collapse ~3k lines into one commit, hurting bisectability. ### First live run The e2e lane is verified by lint, contract tests and dry-traces, but has not yet executed against a real tag; the intended first live run is a manual `e2e-tag.yaml` dispatch against an existing published rc tag before the gate is relied on for a real promotion. ### Release note ```release-note NONE ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added reusable changelog generation with validation, “present” signaling, and safe artifact upload behavior (including RC-time support). * Added an E2E release-tag workflow with tag parsing, deterministic sandboxing, and comprehensive report collection. * Improved RC promotion with a stricter parse front-door, verified E2E green gate (optional bypass), and earlier parallel changelog/asset staging. * **Documentation** * Refreshed release-process docs to match the updated RC-to-stable, changelog, and website-docs timing rules. * **Bug Fixes** * Improved PR finalization to source release bodies from verified changelogs and warn/fallback on missing or empty content. * Tightened label gating so E2E runs only under the intended conditions. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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5d420475f4 |
refactor(ci): drop the vestigial /tmp workspace from e2e (both workflows) (#3454)
## What this PR does
The E2E job's `if: always()` cleanup ran `rm -rf /tmp/$SANDBOX_NAME`
with no check that `SANDBOX_NAME` was ever set. `Set sandbox ID` carries
no condition, so it inherits the implicit `success()` every
unconditional step gets: any failure ahead of it — a conflicting
`pr.patch`, a `download-artifact` miss, `Checkout code`, the
release-path `curl` — or a cancellation that reaches the job after it
has started (the job condition is `!cancelled()`) skips it, and
`SANDBOX_NAME` is never written to `$GITHUB_ENV`. The `if: always()`
steps then run anyway and interpolate the empty value; `Remove
workspace` is the destructive one, expanding to `rm -rf /tmp/` and
failing the cleanup step against root-owned entries in the runner's
`/tmp`. This is not a "re-run skips the setup" bug: a re-run restarts
the job at step one and re-runs the unconditional `Set sandbox ID` — the
trigger is incomplete initialization, by any of the routes above.
The `/tmp/$SANDBOX_NAME` workspace is a vestige of the retired multi-job
self-hosted-runner design, where several `runs-on: [self-hosted]` jobs
shared no state and rendezvoused through a `sha256(REPO:WORKFLOW:REF)`
key, with a per-run `cp -r` of the checkout into `/tmp`. Since CI moved
onto the ephemeral pool (`runs-on: oracle-vm-32cpu-128gb-x86-64`) it is
a single job: there is no cross-job rendezvous and the checkout is never
reused across runs, so copying it into `/tmp` and removing it afterwards
is dead weight. (An earlier review justified the change by "wiping the
entire `/tmp` of the self-hosted runner" — that describes the topology
we retired; the hazard is real, but not for that reason.)
So this drops the workspace rather than guarding the `rm`. Both the PR
(`pull-requests.yaml`) and nightly (`nightly.yaml`) E2E jobs now run in
`$GITHUB_WORKSPACE`: the `Prepare workspace` and `Remove workspace`
steps are gone, the `cd /tmp/$SANDBOX_NAME` prefixes are dropped, and
the upload paths point at `_out/…` instead of
`/tmp/${SANDBOX_NAME}/_out/…`. That takes the empty-value expansion out
of the `cd`s, the stray `mkdir`, the upload paths and the destructive
`rm` in one move, across both workflows rather than one step of many.
`Set sandbox ID` stays: the job still reads `$SANDBOX_NAME` directly
(failure diagnostics, the chainsaw `docker cp`, teardown, and every
`make SANDBOX_NAME=…` argument) — the container needs a name, just not a
directory.
It also removes the dead code the single-runner retirement left in
`packages/core/testing/Makefile`: the world-writable `mkdir -p
/tmp/${SANDBOX_NAME}` + `chmod 777` in the `apply` target (they backed a
`-v /tmp/${SANDBOX_NAME}:/workspace/hosttmp` bind mount that was later
removed — nothing under `images/e2e-sandbox/` references
`/workspace/hosttmp`), and the `-e SANDBOX_NAME=${SANDBOX_NAME}` passed
into the container (nothing under `images/e2e-sandbox/` reads it). Every
other use of `SANDBOX_NAME` — the container name and the `make`
arguments — is kept.
Note this cannot make a job with an empty `SANDBOX_NAME` go green: such
a job already failed initialization or was cancelled, so its conclusion
is fixed before cleanup runs. It removes a second, destructive failure
the old cleanup piled on top, and it does not change whether re-runs
work in general — they do.
The diagnosis of the real trigger, the corrected blast radius, and the
scope across both workflows plus the Makefile are credited to the
maintainer review on this PR.
### Evidence
Run [30067779342 attempt
3](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/actions/runs/30067779342/attempts/3)
exhibits the mechanism: `Download Talos image (regular PR)` failed on
`GetSignedArtifactURL` with a 404, which skipped `Set sandbox ID`, and
the `always()` steps then ran on an empty value — `Collect chainsaw
report` created `/tmp/_out`, the uploads resolved to `/tmp//_out/…`, and
`Remove workspace` did:
```
rm: cannot remove '/tmp/systemd-private-…-systemd-timedated.service-1oADZP': Operation not permitted
rm: cannot remove '/tmp/.X11-unix': Operation not permitted
##[error]Process completed with exit code 1.
```
The step ran unprivileged in `/home/ubuntu/_work/…`, so all it could hit
was `Operation not permitted` on root-owned entries in the sticky `/tmp`
— it deleted nothing. That run is a later, independent occurrence (it
started well after this PR was opened), not this change's motivating
case. The 404 that triggered it is a separate, non-deterministic problem
— the artifact listing succeeded and only the signed-URL call failed
~190 ms in, `download-artifact` treats 404 as non-retryable, and attempt
2 of the same run fetched the artifact fine — and it deserves its own
issue rather than being folded in here.
### Screenshots
Not applicable — CI workflow change only.
### Downstream repositories
The change is confined to this repo's E2E CI
(`.github/workflows/pull-requests.yaml`,
`.github/workflows/nightly.yaml`) and its testing Makefile
(`packages/core/testing/Makefile`). No downstream repository consumes
it.
- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change
### Release note
```release-note
refactor(ci): drop the vestigial /tmp/$SANDBOX_NAME workspace from the E2E PR and nightly jobs — they now run in $GITHUB_WORKSPACE, removing an unguarded `rm -rf /tmp/$SANDBOX_NAME` cleanup that failed the job on cleanup when SANDBOX_NAME was empty
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **Bug Fixes**
* Improved end-to-end test environment setup and sandbox cleanup.
* Updated test reporting and artifact collection for more reliable
results.
* Ensured OpenAPI and full-suite tests run from the correct prepared
environment.
* **Chores**
* Simplified container and workflow configuration for sandbox-based
testing.
* Clarified checkout token handling in nightly workflows.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
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9ed5483260 |
feat(computeplane): provision a ComputePlane tenant module for untrusted-code apps (#3280)
## What this PR does Implements the ComputePlane per the merged design proposal ([cozystack/community design-proposals/compute-plane](https://github.com/cozystack/community/tree/main/design-proposals/compute-plane); supersedes the earlier #3150 which was built on the pre-revision surface and came from a fork): a managed, isolated environment for running code-executing (untrusted-code) catalog applications. ComputePlane is delivered as an operator-owned **tenant module**: - **`packages/extra/computeplane`** — the module chart. Provisions a single-tenant, Cozystack-managed cluster by deploying the ordinary `apps/kubernetes` chart (Kamaji control plane + KubeVirt-VM workers) with operator-fixed values: the Cozystack-enablement addons (`fluxcd` + pinned distribution artifact, `certManager`, `ingressNginx` with `exposeMethod: Proxied`) are inline `spec.values`, so nothing injected via `valuesFrom` can disable them. The tenant can set cluster *shape* (`nodeGroups`, schema-validated) and receives no admin kubeconfig. - **Release naming**: neither HelmRelease sets `spec.releaseName` — the aggregated API rebuilds HelmRelease specs without that field, so both releases derive names from their object names. The cluster HelmRelease object is `computeplane-cluster`, and Kamaji writes the admin kubeconfig to the derived Secret **`computeplane-cluster-admin-kubeconfig`** — the contract future `placement: ComputePlane` routing consumes. Tenant-visible secrets are an allowlist (`include: []` withholds everything), so the credential is withheld by construction. - **`packages/system/computeplane-rd`** — registers the `ComputePlane` module-kind (`ApplicationDefinition`, `dashboard.module: true`). - **`packages/core/platform/sources/computeplane-application.yaml`** — self-contained package source: re-declares `apps/kubernetes` as its own source-only component; `dependsOn` cozystack-engine (ApplicationDefinition CRD) and kubernetes-application (registration ordering). Ships in the `iaas` bundle (variant `kubevirt`). - **Tenant toggle** — `computeplane: false` bool. The tenant chart fails loudly when the module is toggled on without the iaas package. Note: automatic `placement: ComputePlane` routing is a deferred follow-up and is not part of this PR; until it lands, external catalogs target the cluster via its kubeconfig Secret. - **`apps/kubernetes` fix** — the Proxied ingress `Service` renders only when the ingress-nginx addon is enabled **and** the tenant has etcd (mirroring the addon HelmRelease gates), independent of the `hosts` list. Follow-ups tracked separately: `placement` routing in cozystack-api, scoped per-service egress, visibility/mutation access control, e2e (#3369), release-name guards for the remaining extra charts (#3371). Tests: helm-unittest suites pin the module contract (object names, no explicit releaseName, tamper-proof inline addons, nodeGroups validation + ingress-role guard, unlisted-field pass-through), the tenant toggle, the package-source/bundle wiring, and the ingress Service gates. ### Screenshots Not a UI change. ### Release note ```release-note feat(computeplane): ComputePlane tenant module — a single-tenant, Cozystack-managed cluster for untrusted-code applications, delivered as an operator-owned extra module wrapping the kubernetes app. Enable with `computeplane: true` on the Tenant; the tenant receives no admin kubeconfig for it, and the cluster's admin kubeconfig Secret is `computeplane-cluster-admin-kubeconfig`. Catalog routing (`placement: ComputePlane`) ships separately. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added a new **ComputePlane** tenant option (`computeplane`, default off) to provision an isolated single-tenant environment for untrusted-code applications, including cluster creation and configurable **node groups**. * **Bug Fixes** * Refined ingress-nginx proxied rendering rules to avoid emitting incomplete resources: Ingress/Services are now gated on addon enablement (and etcd-backed tenancy), with correct behavior when hosts aren’t provided. * **Documentation / Tests** * Updated tenant and ComputePlane documentation; added/extended rendering tests for the new ComputePlane module and ingress-nginx gating (including release-name and etcd-less cases). <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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e6460dbefe |
docs(governance): document the Reviewer role and align the maintainer roster (#3462)
## What this PR does
Makes the documented roster match who actually holds write access, which
CNCF Incubation checks directly through the API ("Code and Doc ownership
in GitHub matches documented governance roles", Required).
The two lists currently describe different projects. Ten people hold
write or admin on this repository without appearing in `MAINTAINERS.md`;
three people listed there — `@kingdonb`, `@matthieu-robin`,
`@mattia-eleuteri` — hold only read, one of them while carrying "CSI,
Storage, Networking & Security" as a documented responsibility. There is
no in-between state a reviewer will accept: someone with write is either
a maintainer or a reviewer, and should be findable as one.
**Maintainers, +3.** `@lexfrei`, `@myasnikovdaniil` and `@IvanHunters`
work across the whole tree rather than in one area, and already review
other people's changes at maintainer volume.
**Reviewers, new table.** `@sircthulhu`, `@androndo` and `@scooby87` own
a specific area with write access, without the project-wide
responsibilities of a maintainer. The role is not invented here, and it
is not new in practice either: `CONTRIBUTOR_LADDER.md` defines a
Reviewer as someone named in the owners file for one or more
directories, and `.github/CODEOWNERS` has named people since August 2024
— these three among them since February and April. What was missing is
that `MAINTAINERS.md` never said so, which is why the roster and the
access rights read as unrelated. The authoritative area-to-owner mapping
stays in `.github/CODEOWNERS`; this table only names the people.
**Emeritus, +2.** `@gecube` and `@nbykov0` move to the emeritus section.
Neither is carrying the responsibilities the ladder attaches to the role
— reviewing at least 40 pull requests a year and taking part in the
project's technical direction — and the section exists to record exactly
that, as a note on past contribution rather than a withdrawal of it.
**Security contacts.** `SECURITY.md` already routes reports correctly;
this names the maintainers who triage them, so the Required "contact
information" item points at people.
### What this PR does not do, and depends on
- `.github/CODEOWNERS` on `main` is still a single wildcard line naming
seven people, five of whom are not in `MAINTAINERS.md`. Aligning it is
#3228, which already scopes ownership by area and has been in draft
since 7 July. **This PR should land with or after it** — until then the
Reviewers table points at a file that does not yet reflect it. The area
additions still missing from #3228 (`@kingdonb` on
`packages/system/fluxcd*`, GPU/HAMi, `metrics-server`/`seaweedfs`) are
prepared and not pushed, because that branch is not mine to force.
- Permission changes themselves are not in any PR: raising `@kingdonb`,
`@matthieu-robin` and `@mattia-eleuteri` to write, and dropping write
from the four contributors who are neither maintainers nor reviewers, is
done by hand in the org.
- Two cells need confirmation from the people involved: `@scooby87`
publishes no name or company, and `@androndo`'s "Independent" is
inferred rather than stated. Both are placeholders, not claims.
### Screenshots
N/A — documentation change.
### Downstream repositories
- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:
Walked the trigger map against the diff: no row matches. The change
touches no package, no schema, no `ApplicationDefinition`, no platform
variant, no release asset and no node prerequisite. The website carries
no page mirroring `MAINTAINERS.md` — only blog posts that mention
maintainers in passing, which are historical and not regenerated.
The CNCF `.project` metadata does mirror this file, and is being updated
in a companion PR in
[cozystack/.project](https://github.com/cozystack/.project):
`project_lead` there still points at an emeritus maintainer, and the
roster needs the same three additions plus the reviewers team. That
repository is not on this checklist because it is CNCF automation
metadata rather than a downstream consumer of the platform.
### Release note
```release-note
NONE
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **Documentation**
* Expanded maintainer and reviewer listings, including area ownership
guidance.
* Clarified vulnerability reporting instructions with specific private
contact options and security triage details.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
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93338cc434 |
refactor(computeplane): drop the in-cluster Flux pin
The fluxcd addon pin was a holdover from the #3150-era model where app charts rendered nested HelmReleases into the target cluster and needed an in-cluster helm-controller. Consumers now keep their releases on the management cluster and remote-apply via spec.kubeConfig, so the management Flux resolves charts and applies manifests — nothing inside the ComputePlane reconciles HelmReleases. This also decouples the module from the FluxCD addon removal (#3379). certManager and ingressNginx stay pinned: Certificate and Ingress objects land inside the cluster and need their controllers there. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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2ff9c30d04 |
docs(kubernetes): note the etcd gate in the Proxied Service comment
The Proxied ingress Service is gated on _namespace.etcd as well as the addon toggle and exposeMethod, but the comment above it still described only the addon+exposeMethod gate — comment drift from the etcd-gate change. State both gates so the comment matches the condition it sits on. Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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8fc8d23dfd |
fix(computeplane): address review round three
Gate the Proxied ingress Service on _namespace.etcd like the addon HelmRelease it fronts, so an etcd-less tenant with the addon pinned on does not get a selector-less Service (+ test). Correct the secrets framing: the tenant-visible surface is an allowlist (include: [] withholds everything), so drop the never-load-bearing exclude entry, the bats cross-check and the rename-coupling comments, and state the real mechanism. Fix the etcd prerequisite docs (an ancestor's etcd satisfies the wrapped chart; the awaiting-etcd beacon is the diagnostic), reword the tenant toggle to stop advertising the not-yet-shipped placement routing, require maxReplicas >= 1 on the ingress-role node group, and fix comment drift (Service name after the release rename, placement-hook label, package-guard lookup semantics). Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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366268d9f5 |
test(kubernetes): pin that a disabled ingress addon renders nothing with hosts set
hosts with the addon disabled used to render the Ingress; the addon gate makes 'the addon is off' mean nothing renders. Pin the combination so the behaviour change reads as a decision. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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5a3d25b8f5 |
docs(computeplane): document the etcd prerequisite and unlisted-field pass-through
The tenant Kubernetes machinery — including the cluster-autoscaler that brings up the default scale-from-zero md0 group — is backed by the tenant's etcd module, so a ComputePlane without it provisions no workers and gives no diagnostic; state the prerequisite in the README. Also state plainly that unlisted NodeGroup fields pass through to the wrapped chart unvalidated (the schema generator cannot close the object), with a test pinning that behaviour. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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6dcf5373e7 |
fix(computeplane): let Flux derive both release names
The aggregated API cannot represent spec.releaseName: the conversion rebuilds HelmRelease specs without it, so the first tenant edit through the API dropped the module's explicit computeplane-module release name, let it default to the object name computeplane, and collided with the Helm storage record the cluster release owned — with the tenant chart writing the old name back every interval. Drop releaseName from both HelmReleases and derive names from object names, like every other tenant module. Kamaji now writes the admin kubeconfig to computeplane-cluster-admin-kubeconfig; the computeplane-rd secrets.exclude entry follows in the same change, and a bats test pins the exclusion to the name the cluster release actually produces so a future rename cannot silently re-expose the credential. Also add the check-release-name guard the other extra modules carry, and pin the fluxcd addon's distribution artifact to the flux-operator version vendored in system/fluxcd-operator instead of :latest. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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ebeeab77aa |
docs(platform): correct the computeplane dependsOn and variant comments
The dependsOn comment claimed the kubernetes-application edge orders the addon artifacts the wrapped chart references; variant dependsOn only gates install: components — the operative effect is ordering the computeplane-rd install so the ComputePlane kind is not registered before the kubernetes machinery exists. Also document why the variant is named kubevirt. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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96842d4a94 |
fix(computeplane): validate nodeGroups and require an ingress-nginx role
nodeGroups was a bare object: typos surfaced as a stuck release deep in the wrapped chart instead of an admission error, and groups without the ingress-nginx role silently left the pinned ingress-nginx controller (and with it the ComputePlane ingress) Pending forever, since supplied groups are not merged with the wrapped chart's default md0. Reuse the kubernetes app's nodeGroups typedefs for the schema and refuse rendering when no group carries the role. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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76374f6472 |
fix(tenant): fail loudly when computeplane is enabled without its package
The computeplane-application package ships in the iaas bundle while the toggle arrives with tenant-rd in the system bundle, and bundles are independent booleans. Refuse the render with a clear diagnostic instead of producing a HelmRelease that retries a nonexistent artifact forever. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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bca5b3f9fb |
fix(kubernetes): render the Proxied ingress Service only when the addon is enabled
exposeMethod defaults to Proxied while the addon defaults to off, so gating the Service on exposeMethod alone emitted a selector-less Service — surfaced in the tenant dashboard — on every cluster that runs no ingress-nginx at all. Gate on the addon instead; ComputePlane sets enabled: true explicitly, and the Service still renders without a hosts list. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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aa5198b758 |
fix(platform): add cozystack-engine dependency to the computeplane package
The computeplane-rd component installs an ApplicationDefinition, whose CRD is served by cozystack-engine — hack/check-applicationdefinition-crd-ordering.bats enforces the edge for every package with a system/*-rd component. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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9cb4f2922d |
fix(kubernetes): create the Proxied ingress Service independently of hosts
The proxy Service was only rendered when addons.ingressNginx.hosts was non-empty, but external consumers — e.g. a ComputePlane app's per-app management Ingress — need to route to the tenant cluster's ingress-nginx without the module knowing every app host in advance. Render the Service whenever exposeMethod is Proxied; the Ingress still requires hosts. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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b2232904b6 |
feat(tenant): add the computeplane module toggle
Wire the computeplane module into the tenant chart as a bool toggle, matching the other tenant modules. The module's own Helm release takes the -module suffix so the canonical release name computeplane (and with it the computeplane-admin-kubeconfig Secret) stays reserved for the cluster HelmRelease the module renders. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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4c3262a4ee |
feat(computeplane): deliver ComputePlane as a tenant module wrapping the kubernetes app
Add the operator-owned computeplane tenant module per the revised design (cozystack/community design-proposals/compute-plane): an extra/computeplane chart that provisions a single-tenant, Cozystack-managed cluster for untrusted-code apps by deploying the ordinary apps/kubernetes chart with operator-fixed values (fluxcd, cert-manager, ingress-nginx Proxied). The package re-declares apps/kubernetes as its own source-only component, so the module is self-contained; the cluster release is named computeplane so Kamaji writes the admin kubeconfig to computeplane-admin-kubeconfig — the contract consumed by placement: ComputePlane applications. The tenant holds no admin kubeconfig and can set cluster shape (nodeGroups) only. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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6cb579338b |
fix(nightly): rewrite an image host that is the whole scalar value
The nightly host rewrite is a literal "<src-registry>/" substring replace, so it only reaches a host sitting contiguously in front of the repository. kubeovn keeps its host in global.registry.address with the bare repository in a sibling key: no trailing slash, no match. The image was mirrored to the public registry and the tree kept pointing at the private build registry. The gap was dormant while kubeovn's image came from a separate repository, because the baked ref carried the public host and the ownership filter skipped it. Building the image in-tree stamps the build-registry host into that key and turns it live, so fix it here. Add an end-of-line-anchored expression that fires only when the source registry is the complete value; a contiguous ref continues past the host, so the two expressions cannot both fire on one reference. keycloak-operator splits at a different boundary and stays unfixed -- neither of its keys holds the source registry as a whole. Documented, and dormant while no CI path rebuilds it. Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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7ebce2e942 |
feat(kubeovn): build the chart and image in-tree
kubeovn was the last package whose chart and image were produced by a separate repository: packages/system/kubeovn pulled a tarball from the latest cozystack/kubeovn-chart tag at update time, and that repository built and pushed the image. The wrapper existed only to cache the upstream chart; with the current caching that reason is gone, and the split cost a second repository, a second release step, and a package whose provenance a reader could not follow without leaving the tree. Move the wrapper in, shaped like packages/system/cilium: update pulls the upstream kube-ovn chart directly and applies patches/mtu.diff, and image builds images/kubeovn and pins the digest into values.yaml. The MTU patch already carried monorepo-relative paths, so it applies here unchanged. Also carries cozystack/kubeovn-chart#5, which never got a tag: pin OVN_IPSEC_KEY_DIR under /var/lib. The kube-ovn default sits in /etc/origin, which a Talos node cannot create, so enabling IPsec left the node without ESP security associations. Co-authored-by: Timofei Larkin <lllamnyp@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Kirill Ilin <stitch14@yandex.ru> Co-authored-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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8b461f0c0b |
feat(monitoring): drop the Grafana rebuild for the upstream image + catalog plugins (#3378)
## What this PR does Cozystack builds and publishes `ghcr.io/cozystack/cozystack/grafana` — a rebuilt Grafana image — and uses it by default in the monitoring stack. Grafana is AGPL-3.0, so publishing a rebuilt binary makes the project a redistributor of an AGPL Grafana build. This is a governance concern for CNCF Incubation (there is no precedent for a CNCF project redistributing an AGPL binary). The only reason the image was ever rebuilt was to bundle the VictoriaLogs datasource plugin, which was not in the official Grafana plugin catalog at the time. It is now published there as a signed plugin (`victoriametrics-logs-datasource`), so the rebuild is no longer necessary. This PR moves the deployment to the upstream `grafana/grafana` image (digest-pinned, routed through `cozy-lib.image` so mirrored-registry installs keep working) and installs the plugins at container startup via `GF_INSTALL_PLUGINS`, with versions pinned: - `victoriametrics-logs-datasource 0.29.0` — the VictoriaLogs datasource (signed; the reason the image was rebuilt) - `natel-discrete-panel 0.1.1`, `grafana-worldmap-panel 1.0.6`, `marcusolsson-dynamictext-panel 6.2.0` — reproduce the panel set the removed Dockerfile vendored **Air-gapped installs keep working.** The plugin zips are not downloaded from the internet at pod startup: they are mirrored from the official catalog into the existing `grafana-dashboards` image at build time and served by that in-cluster static file server, next to the dashboards it already serves. `GF_INSTALL_PLUGINS` points at `http://grafana-dashboards.cozy-grafana-operator.svc/plugins/…`, so the runtime dependency stays inside the cluster and the artifact is mirrored into private registries together with every other first-party image. A new `allow-to-grafana-dashboards` CiliumNetworkPolicy (mirroring `allow-to-keycloak`) opens tenant egress to that server, since tenant egress is default-deny. As a result, `ghcr.io/cozystack/cozystack/grafana` is no longer built or published: the Dockerfile, the pinned image tag, the `image` targets in both monitoring Makefiles, and the build step in the root Makefile are removed. Notes: - The AGPL-3.0 Grafana binary is no longer redistributed; the mirrored plugin zips are Apache-2.0 licensed and are served unmodified from the official catalog builds (signatures intact). - `allow_loading_unsigned_plugins` and the custom `/var/lib/grafana-plugins` path are dropped: the catalog datasource is signed, and plugins install into the writable default `GF_PATHS_PLUGINS` (`/var/lib/grafana/plugins`). - The VictoriaLogs datasource provisioning (the `GrafanaDatasource` CRs pointing at `vlselect`) is unchanged. - Plugins are re-installed on every pod start from the in-cluster server (no PVC involved, ~77 MB per start per replica over the cluster network); a failed download fails the pod loudly instead of silently dropping the datasource. - `natel-discrete-panel` and `grafana-worldmap-panel` are Angular plugins; Angular is disabled by default in Grafana 11, so they do not load — this is unchanged from the current rebuilt image (same Grafana 11.6.15, same config). They are kept for parity and can be dropped as a follow-up. ### How this was verified - `helm unittest` across the repo passes, including new regression tests: the monitoring chart asserts the exact upstream image reference (with and without `images-registry` set) and the exact `GF_INSTALL_PLUGINS` value; the tenant chart asserts the new egress policy. - Local end-to-end of the full chain in Docker: built the modified `grafana-dashboards` image, served it on a shared network, and started upstream `grafana/grafana:11.6.15` with the rendered `GF_INSTALL_PLUGINS` value. All four plugins download from the in-cluster-style URL (no internet egress from Grafana), and `GET /api/plugins` reports `victoriametrics-logs-datasource` v0.29.0 as `enabled: true` with `signature: valid`. ### Screenshots Not applicable — no UI change. Grafana renders the same datasources and panels; only the image source and plugin delivery mechanism change. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map against the diff. This is an internal change to how the monitoring stack sources the Grafana image and its plugins (`packages/system/monitoring`, `packages/system/grafana-operator`, `packages/apps/tenant` network policy). No package is added, renamed or removed; no `values.schema.json`, `ApplicationDefinition`, platform values, release asset, shared `hack/` tooling or `package.mk` contract changes; the added `grafana.image` key is an internal system-chart value, not a user-facing app field. No downstream repository is affected. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note feat(monitoring): Grafana now runs on the upstream `grafana/grafana` image; the VictoriaLogs datasource and panel plugins are mirrored from the official Grafana catalog into the in-cluster `grafana-dashboards` server and installed at startup, so air-gapped installs keep working. Cozystack no longer builds or publishes `ghcr.io/cozystack/cozystack/grafana`. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Improvements** * Grafana in monitoring is now based on a digest-pinned upstream image for more consistent deployments. * Required Grafana plugins are installed automatically at startup via `GF_INSTALL_PLUGINS`; unsigned-plugin configuration was removed. * Tenant networking now includes a new egress rule specifically for Grafana dashboards. * Grafana dashboards image now includes required plugin assets prepared during image build. * **Tests** * Added/updated checks covering digest pinning, mirrored-registry behavior, plugin-installation behavior, and the new Grafana dashboards network policy. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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78fc3f9178 |
refactor(ci): drop the vestigial /tmp workspace from e2e (both workflows)
The E2E job once ran as several state-sharing self-hosted-runner jobs that rendezvoused through a sha256(REPO:WORKFLOW:REF) key and a per-run /tmp/$SANDBOX_NAME copy of the checkout. Since the move to the ephemeral pool it is a single job: there is no cross-job rendezvous and the checkout is never reused, so copying it into /tmp and removing it afterwards is dead weight. Run every step in $GITHUB_WORKSPACE instead: drop the Prepare/Remove workspace steps and the `cd /tmp/$SANDBOX_NAME` prefixes, and point the upload paths at _out/. This deletes the unguarded `rm -rf /tmp/$SANDBOX_NAME` rather than guarding it: when an upstream step fails or the job is cancelled, the unconditional `Set sandbox ID` is skipped, SANDBOX_NAME stays empty, and the `if: always()` steps interpolate it — the removal expanding to `rm -rf /tmp/` and failing the cleanup step. `Set sandbox ID` stays, since the container still needs a name. Apply the same treatment to nightly.yaml, and drop the Makefile dead code the single-runner retirement left behind: the world-writable mkdir/chmod of /tmp/$SANDBOX_NAME (backed a bind mount removed long ago) and the `-e SANDBOX_NAME` container env (nothing in the e2e-sandbox image reads it). Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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330acfe6e2 |
fix(e2e): widen tenant node-join deadline to 18m
The kubernetes-latest and kubernetes-previous suites flaked on the worker node-join wait under host load. In run 30260770694 both failed at exactly 12m with zero tenant Nodes registered and the tenant cilium HR still mid-install: a transient drbd.linbit.com/lost-quorum taint delayed the worker DataVolume imports, so the KubeVirt VMIs were only created ~2m into this wait and the guests then had ~10m to import Talos, boot, register a kubelet and let cilium turn the nodes Ready. This single deadline absorbs the entire worker bring-up (the machinedeployment replicas=2 gate clears before the VMIs even exist), so under storage pressure 12m is too tight. A less-loaded fleet run passed both suites unchanged, confirming load-induced slowness rather than a stuck bring-up. Widen the deadline to 18m, which restores margin and still sits well inside the 40m chainsaw step timeout. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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ad35afa534 |
fix(e2e): disable guest fsync on ephemeral CI VM disks
The e2e QEMU guests boot with three raw virtio -drive lines that carry no cache= option, so QEMU defaults to cache=writeback and honors every guest fsync. The management-cluster Talos etcd fsyncs on each Raft commit, while containerd unpacks dozens of images and CDI imports multi-GB VM disks onto the same host-backed raw files during the VM-heavy suites. The fsync storm serializes etcd's writes into multi-second stalls, the mgmt apiserver times out lease PUTs, and many operators (capk, etcd-operator, fdb-operator, cilium-operator, kamaji) lose leadership at once — failing whichever chainsaw suite is mid-flight, a different one each run. Add cache=unsafe to each guest drive so guest flushes become no-ops against the host page cache, removing the fsync-gated etcd stalls. This is safe only because these CI VMs are ephemeral and destroyed every run; never use it for real data. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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d598e672f2 |
fix(reloader): add startupProbe to survive slow first start under load (#3470)
## What this PR does Adds a startup probe to the reloader deployment, rendered from package values through a patch on the vendored chart. Reloader went into CrashLoopBackOff on a loaded install. Events show `Liveness probe failed: ... connect: connection refused`, repeating on the liveness cadence until the kubelet gave up. A refusal rather than a timeout closes two questions at once. It is an RST from the target netns, so the packet arrived and the pod network is fine. It also rules out the mode in [stakater/Reloader#252](https://github.com/stakater/Reloader/issues/252), where the listener is already up and `/metrics` just answers slowly; that one produces probe timeouts. Nothing was listening on `:9090` yet. `http.ListenAndServe` is the last statement of `startReloader`, so the whole prologue runs before the socket opens. The slow part is not the informers, those are lazy and do their List in a goroutine. It is `IsOpenshift = isOpenshift()` in `pkg/kube`: a package-level var, so it runs at init before `main()`, and it does a `GET /apis/project.openshift.io` on a `context.TODO()` carrying no deadline. The latency is the API server's, and the container waits it out under a 100m CPU limit. Without a startup probe the only grace period is the liveness budget itself, `initialDelaySeconds 10 + periodSeconds 10 * failureThreshold 5`. A start that overruns it gets killed mid-prologue, and the restart re-runs the prologue from the top against an API server that is no less busy, so the loop feeds itself. This reaches past reloader. `packages/core/platform/sources/linstor.yaml` lists `cozystack.reloader` in the LINSTOR stack's `dependsOn`, and `dependsOn` fans out to every component of that stack, so a reloader stuck in this loop blocks that whole install. The probe is `/live` at `periodSeconds 5` and `failureThreshold 45`, about 225s, well inside the 10m install timeout that cozystack-operator stamps on generated HelmReleases. Liveness is suspended while it runs and gets its tight budget back as soon as the listener binds. `timeoutSeconds` is 5 to match the other two probes instead of the kubelet default of 1s, since a throttled process at 100m can hold the socket open and still need more than a second to answer. Both liveness knobs the chart already exposes would work without any patch. Widening `failureThreshold` buys the grace permanently and loosens hang detection for the life of the container. `initialDelaySeconds` is start-up-only and would genuinely do, but it is a fixed blind window on every start, including one that binds in three seconds, and nothing restarts a container that wedges inside it. Adaptive against fixed is the trade. The win is smaller than it sounds while `reloader.enableHA` is unset, since `/live` is a constant 200 then and liveness only catches the listener dying outright. A chart bump does not fix this. 2.2.14 still renders no `startupProbe` anywhere, and v1.4.19 added a second eager package-level call next to `IsOpenshift`, so the prologue got longer instead of shorter. `packages/system/velero` already carries a startupProbe patch on its vendored chart for the same reason. `make update` now drives the shared `%-update` rule with an exact `CHART_VERSION`. It has to be exact. With a stale local repo cache `helm pull --version 2.0.0` fails with version-not-found, while `--version "^2.0.0"` quietly resolves to 2.2.14, whose `deployment.yaml` has the ports block at line 179 instead of 161, so the hunk would fuzz or land somewhere unintended. The patch runs with `--forward` because `patch(1)` defaults diverge between implementations over a tree that already carries the change. GNU 2.7.6 refuses and exits 1. Apple 2.0-12u11 takes its `Assume -R? [y]` default, strips the hunk back out and exits 0. GNU under `--batch` does the same, which is the trap, since `--batch` is what you reach for to make a script non-interactive. `--forward` refuses in all three and leaves a `.rej`. Two things keep the probe from disappearing quietly, and they fire at different times. `--forward` catches it at the moment someone re-runs the patch by hand. The test only catches it at the next run of the suite, late enough for a commit to travel in between. `make test` also checks that the vendored `Chart.yaml` still records the pinned version, so bumping `CHART_VERSION` without re-running `make update` fails instead of leaving the pin and the tree disagreeing. Checked by doing the violation and watching it go red. ### Screenshots Not applicable, no UI change. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map in `docs/agents/contributing.md` against the diff. All five files sit inside one `packages/system` package. No package is added, renamed or removed, nothing under `hack/` is touched, and no CRD, namespace, `packages/core` values key, version enum or release asset changes. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(reloader): add a startup probe so a slow first start is not killed by the liveness probe and left in CrashLoopBackOff, which also unblocks the LINSTOR stack that depends on reloader ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added a configurable startup health probe for the Reloader service. * The probe allows additional time for the service to start before health checks begin. * Documented the probe’s timing and behavior in the chart configuration. * **Bug Fixes** * Preserved existing liveness and readiness probe behavior. * **Tests** * Added coverage for enabled, disabled, and unaffected health probes. * Added validation to ensure the chart version matches the pinned release. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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9fe6ae2ec1 |
fix(keycloak-configure): patch HelmRelease in release namespace on teardown (#3372)
## What this PR does
The `keycloak-configure` pre-delete teardown Job clears the Flux
`HelmRelease` finalizers as its final step so the release can be
uninstalled. That final `kubectl patch` targeted a hardcoded namespace
that does not match where the release actually installs. The release
installs into `cozy-keycloak`, and the teardown Job's own RBAC — a
`Role` + `RoleBinding` granting `patch` on the `HelmRelease` by release
name — is created in the release namespace, but the patch was aimed at
`cozy-system`.
The result is a deadlock: the Job's `ServiceAccount` is `Forbidden` to
patch the `HelmRelease` in the mismatched namespace, so the Job errors
and retries forever, the `HelmRelease` sticks in `Terminating`, and the
Helm release wedges in status `uninstalling`. This blocks any teardown
or reinstall of the component.
The fix templates both the release name and the namespace from `{{
.Release.Name }}` / `{{ .Release.Namespace }}`, so the patch targets the
namespace where the `HelmRelease` lives and where the teardown RBAC
grants access. I also added a helm-unittest that pins the rendered
target, guards against the hardcoded namespace regressing, and asserts
the patch tracks the release name and namespace.
### Screenshots
N/A — no UI changes.
### Release note
```release-note
fix(keycloak-configure): fix the pre-delete teardown Job so uninstalling the release no longer wedges — it now patches the HelmRelease in the release namespace instead of a hardcoded one
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
- **Bug Fixes**
- Improved Helm chart deletion cleanup to patch the correct HelmRelease
using the chart’s release name and namespace instead of fixed values.
- Reduced risk of teardown targeting resources in an unintended
namespace.
- **Tests**
- Added a new delete/teardown YAML test suite to verify correct
parameterization and that only the intended namespace is modified.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
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07cefee158 |
fix(kubernetes): raise kubevirt-csi API client rate limits (#3428)
## What this PR does The kubevirt-csi-driver builds its infra and tenant cluster clients from a `rest.Config` with QPS/Burst left unset, so client-go uses its default 5 QPS / 10 burst. The wrapper's NFS `ControllerPublishVolume` polls the infra PVC once per second for up to two minutes. When a tenant scales out and several volumes attach at once, that shared token bucket starves and the poll returns `client rate limiter Wait returned an error: context deadline exceeded`, which the tenant kubelet reports as `FailedAttachVolume`. It looks like an intermittent E2E failure attaching a tenant volume, with nothing wrong in the storage backend. This sets QPS/Burst to 100/200 on both configs, before any client is built. The new flags `--kube-api-qps` and `--kube-api-burst` make the limits tunable. The compiled-in defaults are the real fix: the deployment passes no client flags, so both configs resolve to the in-cluster config and pick up the new defaults. Non-positive values are rejected, since client-go would read `0` as the starving default and a negative value as no rate limiting. Includes a regression test: a burst of 200 waiters times out against the default 5 QPS / 10 burst limiter and passes against the configured one. ### Screenshots None. No UI changes. ### Downstream repositories The diff touches only the driver's Go source in `packages/apps/kubernetes/images/kubevirt-csi-driver/`. No package was added, renamed or removed, and no `values.schema.json`, chart values, `ApplicationDefinition`, node prerequisite, metric or label changed. Nothing in the downstream trigger map is reached. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(kubernetes): raise the kubevirt-csi-driver API client rate limits (QPS/Burst, tunable via --kube-api-qps and --kube-api-burst) above the client-go defaults so a burst of concurrent volume attaches no longer times out as FailedAttachVolume. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added configurable Kubernetes API request rate limits for improved handling of high-volume operations. * Added validation to prevent invalid or non-positive rate-limit settings. * **Bug Fixes** * Improved reliability during bursts of concurrent volume attachment requests by reducing request throttling and timeout risk. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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b22b7b2431 |
test(e2e): make kuberture split-horizon probes survive Cilium ingress-IP race (#3430)
## What this PR does The split-horizon-routing-proof step ran two external-dns probes as bare Pods and polled them by fixed name. When the Cilium host-scope IPAM plus Gateway API restore race (cilium/cilium#46799) hands a probe the per-node reserved:ingress IP, the sandbox is rejected with "IP already in use" and the e2e leak-healer deletes the wedged pod, expecting a controller to reschedule it onto a free IP. A bare Pod has no controller, so that delete was terminal: the probe vanished and the step failed on a NotFound pod. It surfaces as an intermittent kuberture E2E failure with a `FailedCreatePodSandBox` event on a probe pod. This runs the probes as Jobs. The Job re-creates its pod on a fresh IP after the healer deletes it, so the proof survives the race. Each Job is asserted to reach Complete instead of polling a fixed pod name, and its logs are read by the job-name label. The failure path also gains a catch podLogs selector for the probe pods, so their stdout is captured when a probe fails for a different reason. ### Screenshots None. No UI changes. ### Downstream repositories The diff touches only the kuberture E2E suite under `hack/e2e-chainsaw/kuberture/`. No package, values schema, chart, CRD or platform manifest changed. Nothing in the downstream trigger map is reached. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note NONE ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Bug Fixes** * Improved end-to-end test reliability by hardening the split-horizon routing proof against probe workload churn. * Strengthened route isolation validation between public and internal probes. * Enhanced failure diagnostics by capturing logs from the completed probe Jobs. * **Testing** * Updated DNS EDNS probes to run as Kubernetes Jobs (instead of bare Pods) to support retries and rescheduling. * Added explicit assertions that both public and internal probe Jobs reach **Complete** before running hostname/route isolation checks. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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23f1b926c9 |
chore(codeowners): say that the rules bind today
The header told the reader to enable "Require review from Code Owners" for the rules to take effect. It has been enabled on main all along, so the file reads as a proposal when it is in fact load-bearing from the commit that lands it. Spell out the consequence that follows: because GitHub ignores a handle without write access, scoping a path to someone who lacks it is worse than naming the wrong person. A wrong owner is visible in review; an unhonoured one carves the path out from under the catch-all and gates it on nobody, reporting nothing. Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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bf8c5b3fbc |
chore(codeowners): rework ownership from contribution data
Review on #3228 measured authorship and reviews per path and found the rules named people who had not touched the code while leaving out those who had. Rework accordingly. Close the largest fall-throughs to the catch-all: dashboards, examples (with the backups subtree routed to its controllers' owners) and tests. Widen where the data says the list was too short: @lexfrei on the Go source, cozystack-api, backups and extra; @myasnikovdaniil and @lexfrei on managed Kubernetes, which also grows from one directory to the whole area — node pools, resource definitions, kamaji and the CAPI providers resolved to three different owner sets for one feature. Narrow where it was too wide: drop @myasnikovdaniil from kubevirt and kubevirt-cdi at his own request, since he has no activity there. Drop rules that route nothing: /tools/ and /cmd/cozypkg/ have no human activity, and the metrics-server rule named a maintainer moving to emeritus in #3462 with no active owner to replace him -- all three fall back to a broader rule that already covers them. Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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2c453778f1 |
fix(seaweedfs): make naming audit fail closed on kubectl and payload errors (#3436)
## What this PR does Fixes #3431. `hack/seaweedfs-naming-audit.sh` was fail-open: any kubectl failure produced an empty table indistinguishable from an honestly clean fleet — a failed namespace LIST meant zero namespaces walked, failed secret/PVC/STS LISTs meant zero findings, all silenced by `2>/dev/null` with no error handling anywhere in the script. The runbook uses this output as the gate before PVC deletion, as post-deletion verification, and as an upgrade precondition, so a transient API error could green-light destroying data. Every kubectl call now routes through a `run_kubectl` helper: a non-zero exit prints a FATAL line naming the failed query and the code propagates up the whole chain (enumerations restructured to capture-then-check, since an `exit` inside `$(...)` dies with the subshell). By-name GETs separate existence from extraction: a `--ignore-not-found -o name` probe keeps legitimate absence (Helm-pruned revision, unbound PVC) a clean skip, while everything else fails loudly — including a release Secret that exists but has no decodable payload or decodes without a chart name, which previously dropped the whole tenant from the audit. Incomplete PV-age evidence now marks the generation incomplete and falls to the safe "direction cannot be established" branch, so a failed GET can no longer flip an OVERLAP verdict into a wrong Step-3 deletion candidate. A successful audit prints the same bytes as before. Tests: 14 new cozytest cases — failure injection for every LIST and by-name GET site, corrupt-payload variants (missing `.data.release`, undecodable base64/gzip, chartless `{}`), and full-output golden diffs proving the success paths stay byte-identical to the pre-change script. 25/25 green via `hack/cozytest.sh`. ### Release note ```release-note fix(seaweedfs): the naming-audit script fails loudly when a kubectl query or a Helm release payload read fails, instead of printing an empty table indistinguishable from a clean fleet ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Bug Fixes** * Audits now fail clearly (non-zero exit + fatal messaging) when Kubernetes queries or Helm release data is unavailable or corrupt, instead of producing incomplete results. * Missing release revisions are skipped safely; missing/unreadable PV age evidence no longer leads to incorrect deletion candidates, and MIXED now reports conservative “direction cannot be established” when evidence is incomplete. * Non-SeaweedFS releases remain silently ignored. * **Tests** * Added end-to-end acceptance coverage for fail-closed behavior and byte-for-byte stable output across key naming scenarios. * **Documentation** * Updated the runbook to require relying on the audit script exit code before proceeding, with a dedicated MIXED re-check step. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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49222768ec |
fix(release): make promote-retag digest verification media-type-agnostic (#3435)
## What this PR does
The finalize post-copy verification runs `skopeo inspect --format
'{{.Digest}}'` on every freshly retagged stable ref. For OCI artifacts
that command prints nothing and exits non-zero — `cozystack-packages` is
a flux artifact with `config.mediaType:
application/vnd.cncf.flux.config.v1+json` — so the v1.6.0 finalize (run
29932878820) aborted right after both copies of that artifact had
already succeeded, leaving 32 of 43 repos without stable tags and
skipping the cozy-installer publish. `--dry-run` never reaches this
branch, which is why rehearsals did not catch it.
This PR computes the digest as sha256 over the raw manifest instead
(`skopeo inspect --raw`), which is how registries define the manifest
digest and works identically for container images and OCI artifacts. The
helper gates the hash on skopeo's exit status via a temp file rather
than a pipeline, so a missing tag still resolves to an empty string (the
pre-check reads that as "tag absent, proceed to copy") and never to the
empty-input hash `sha256:e3b0c442…`, and never aborts under `set -eu`.
Verified against live GHCR: the raw-manifest hash of
`cozystack-packages:v1.6.0` matches the digest finalize expected
(`bf68208730860fa8…`), and the old and new methods agree byte-for-byte
on regular multi-arch images (`cozystack-operator`, `kubeovn`,
`cozystack-controller`, `kubevirt-cloud-provider`). New cozytest cases
cover the OCI-artifact digest resolution, a post-copy mismatch, and the
missing-tag path; the mock skopeo asserts `--raw`, so the suite fails
against the old code.
### Release note
```release-note
fix(release): promote's post-copy digest verification no longer breaks on OCI artifacts (cozystack-packages), which aborted the v1.6.0 finalize mid-retag with 32 of 43 repos left untagged
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **Bug Fixes**
* Improved OCI artifact retagging by deriving stable manifest digests
from raw manifests to ensure accurate “already correct” and mismatch
detection.
* Prevented incorrect skips when the stable tag points to an unexpected
digest.
* Added safer handling for missing or unknown stable tags and clearer
failure behavior for unexpected empty manifest responses and transient
registry errors.
* **Tests**
* Expanded promotion/retag test coverage for digest-based resolution,
post-copy verification mismatches, missing-tag behavior, and transient
registry failures.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
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bea9a2b829 |
fix(harbor): guarantee CPU for redis sentinels (#3446)
## What this PR does The harbor e2e suite intermittently times out on the `harbor-test` HelmRelease because the bundled Redis Sentinel set does not converge in time. Sentinels are NotReady by design until the redis-operator elects a master and rewrites their monitored-master config. Normal convergence is 2-3 minutes; on a CPU-contended e2e runner the tail stretches past the old 6m assert. Three changes: - `packages/system/harbor`: the inline RedisFailover ran its three sentinels at 50m CPU request / 100m limit. Now they run at Guaranteed QoS (requests == limits, 250m CPU / 128Mi), so master election gets scheduling shares and is not throttled under node contention. A helm unit test pins the sizing. This reserves 750m CPU / 384Mi per Harbor instance for the sentinel trio, up from 150m / 192Mi requested, paid by every install. It also diverges from the standalone redis app on purpose: its preset-based sentinels are Burstable with a 25m CPU request, and matching that would lower the request and make contention worse. - harbor e2e suite: on failure the catch now collects the redis-operator log, a describe of the RedisFailover, and the rfr-/rfs- pod states and logs. None of these were collected before, so a non-converging sentinel set was undiagnosable from the artifacts. The `harbor-test` HelmRelease wait grows from 6m to 10m, same as the `harbor-test-system` budget in the same suite and the documented longer-wait allowance for harbor. - docs and hack: three copies of a wrong claim that the pinned Chainsaw podLogs collector "exposes only container/tail/selector" are corrected. It accepts name/namespace/selector/container/tail/timeout plus the cluster fields; only `previous` is missing. The wrong list steered catch authors toward imperative scripts for captures podLogs handles declaratively. Caveat: the failing run carried no CPU metrics, so the resource fix is mechanism-backed (CFS shares cycles proportionally to requests), not metric-proven. If the flake recurs, the new diagnostics show which reconcile gate stalled. Closes #3445 ### Screenshots Not a UI change. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: Trigger-map walk against the diff: `packages/system/harbor/` (template and tests) is not in the website app lists (those cover `packages/apps/` and `packages/extra/`) and touches no `values.schema.json`, no values keys, no ApplicationDefinition. `hack/e2e-chainsaw/` and `hack/e2e-capture-previous-logs.sh` appear in no trigger. `docs/agents/e2e-testing.md` is repo-internal agent documentation. Node prerequisites, `hack/package.mk`, and namespaces are untouched. ### Release note ```release-note fix(harbor): the bundled Redis Sentinel pods now run with guaranteed resources (250m CPU / 128Mi, requests == limits) so the HA set converges reliably on CPU-contended nodes ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Bug Fixes** * Increased Redis Sentinel CPU and memory requests/limits to improve reliability during node contention. * Extended Harbor readiness timing for RedisFailover to reduce false failures during initialization. * **Diagnostics** * Improved Harbor e2e failure output by adding RedisFailover-specific details and collecting relevant Redis operator/pod logs, plus best-effort runtime log capture during readiness stalls. * **Tests** * Added a Redis Sentinel sizing test suite to verify the updated request/limit values. * **Documentation** * Clarified guidance on capturing logs for previous container instances in e2e runs, including what gets captured and when. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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7f67d02fb7 |
fix(reloader): add startupProbe to survive slow first start under load
Reloader binds its :9090 listener as the last statement of startReloader, so /live and /metrics answer connection refused until everything before it has finished. The blocking part of that prologue is the package-level IsOpenshift = isOpenshift() in pkg/kube, which issues a GET /apis/project.openshift.io against the API server on a context carrying no deadline, before main() is even entered. That latency belongs to the API server, and the container waits it out at a 100m CPU limit. The chart renders no startupProbe, so the only grace period is the liveness budget: initialDelaySeconds 10 + periodSeconds 10 * failureThreshold 5, about 60 seconds. A first start that needs longer is killed mid-prologue, and the restart does not resume it, it runs it again from the beginning, so the loop sustains itself. The blast radius reaches past reloader: the LINSTOR stack lists cozystack.reloader in dependsOn, which fans out to every component of that stack, so a reloader stuck in this loop blocks the whole install. Render a values-driven startupProbe on /live so liveness only begins evaluating once the listener is up. Budget = periodSeconds 5 times failureThreshold 45, so about 225 seconds. timeoutSeconds matches the 5s the chart already gives liveness rather than the kubelet default of 1s, which a throttled process can exceed while holding the socket open. Both liveness knobs the chart already exposes could buy the same grace with no patch to carry. Widening failureThreshold buys it permanently, loosening hang detection for the life of the container. initialDelaySeconds is start-up-only and would genuinely do, but it is a fixed blind window on every start, whereas a startup probe returns liveness to its tight budget the moment the listener binds. The chart is vendored, so the template change is carried as patches/deployment-startup-probe.diff and reapplied by `make update`, which now drives the shared %-update rule with an exact chart version pin instead of pulling whatever is latest. The patch is applied with --forward because patch(1) defaults diverge by implementation over a tree that already carries the change: GNU 2.7.6 refuses and exits 1, Apple 2.0-12u11 takes its "Assume -R? [y]" default and strips the hunk back out with exit 0, and GNU under --batch does the same. --forward refuses in all three. A helm unittest pins the probe, its budget, the no-op path the template promises for an unset value, and the liveness numbers the budget is sized against, so the documented arithmetic cannot drift away from the chart without a red test. The same target asserts that the vendored Chart.yaml still records the pinned version, so raising the pin without re-running `make update` fails instead of leaving the tree and the pin quietly disagreeing. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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1925a6b7d5 |
docs(governance): fill in the reviewers' names and affiliations
Both rows carried placeholders: @androndo was marked Independent on a guess, and @scooby87 had no name at all because neither is published on their GitHub profile. Both work at Ænix. Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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fd568dee87 |
fix(keycloak-configure): patch HelmRelease in release namespace on teardown
The pre-delete teardown Job clears the HelmRelease finalizers as its final step, but targeted a hardcoded namespace that does not match the namespace where the release and its RBAC live. The Job's Role and RoleBinding are created in the release namespace and grant patch on the HelmRelease by release name, so the ServiceAccount was Forbidden to patch the HelmRelease in the hardcoded namespace. The Job errored and retried forever, the HelmRelease stuck in Terminating, and the Helm release wedged in "uninstalling", blocking any teardown or reinstall. Target the release name and namespace so the patch matches the RBAC that grants it. Add a helm-unittest pinning the rendered namespace. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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2dfe380ac3 |
fix(kubernetes): raise kubevirt-csi API client rate limits
The kubevirt-csi controller built its infra- and tenant-cluster Kubernetes clients on a rest.Config that left QPS/Burst unset, so client-go applied its 5 QPS / 10 burst default. ControllerPublishVolume polls the infra PVC once per second for up to two minutes; when a tenant scales out and several volumes attach at once, the default limiter starves and the poll fails with "client rate limiter Wait returned an error: context deadline exceeded", which the tenant kubelet surfaces as FailedAttachVolume. Set QPS/Burst to 100/200, overridable via --kube-api-qps and --kube-api-burst, on both the infra and tenant configs so a concurrent-attach burst is admitted promptly. Reject non-positive flag values, which client-go would otherwise turn into the starving default (0) or unlimited (<0). Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |