Files
cozystack/docs
Andrei Kvapil eef95f456d docs: add CNCF General Technical Review (GTR) questionnaire (#3572)
## What this PR does

Adds the CNCF General Technical Review (GTR) questionnaire for
Cozystack, completed for the Sandbox → Incubation Due Diligence (tracks
cncf/toc#1916). It answers the Day 0 / Day 1 / Day 2 questions from the
CNCF TOC project-reviews template, with versioned links to the v1.6
documentation and to the repo's governance and security files.

**Status: DRAFT / work in progress.** The questionnaire itself is a
living document per the template's guidance. Everything repository
evidence settles has been answered and verified against the tree; the
banner at the top of the file names the seven substantive gaps that need
measurement, publication or a maintainer decision — load/scale results
and tested maximums, published SLOs/SLIs, measured platform baseline
overhead, the upgrade→downgrade CI matrix, whether upgrades trigger
Talos node reboots, the security-team rotation and diversity policy, and
publication of the CVE-scanning pipeline's policy documents.
Version-specific links should be pinned to the submitted tag before
final submission.

## Changes beyond the new file — please read this part

Review feedback found two factual errors that originate **outside** this
questionnaire, so fixing them only in the GTR would have left a reviewer
clicking through to the contradiction. Three existing files are
therefore touched:

- **`SECURITY.md` — supported-versions table. This is a policy change
and needs a policy review, not a wording check.** The table was dated
"As of March 17, 2026" and named `v1.1.x` as the current stable line,
five minors behind `v1.6.1`. It is rewritten to be keyed to **observable
patch activity on a line** — supported means a patch release within the
last 6 months, limited support 6 to 18 months, end of life beyond that —
so an adopter can determine their own status from the Releases page and
the table cannot drift again. Two intermediate versions of this PR got
the policy wrong in opposite directions and both are reverted: one
narrowed support to the latest two minors, which contradicts practice
since several `1.x` lines receive patch releases concurrently; the other
removed the end-of-life category altogether and extended discretionary
backports across all of `0.x`. What lands here restores an end-of-life
category, puts the `v0.41` cutoff back with its last-patch date, and
states explicitly that the six- and eighteen-month marks describe
current behaviour rather than committing the project to patch any line
for that long. `@kvaps`, as a CODEOWNER for this file: please review the
**policy**. If the project would rather state a guaranteed backport
window, or keep support entirely at maintainer discretion with no stated
marks, that is a governance decision and this PR deliberately does not
make it.
- **`SECURITY.md` — automated security analysis.** It said "two scanners
run continuously" and listed CodeQL and Scorecard. It now also describes
`zizmor` (GitHub Actions SAST, gating on PRs), the organization-wide
Trivy CVE-scanning pipeline, and Renovate's actual coverage. It also
records that CodeQL is **not** currently among the required status
checks on `main` — those are `pre-commit` and `E2E Tests` — so the
CodeQL gate is review convention rather than branch protection today.
- **`CONTRIBUTOR_LADDER.md`** — Reviewer nomination described adding a
username to an `OWNERS` file. No `OWNERS` file exists in this
repository; line 158 of the same document already refers to
`CODEOWNERS`. Corrected to name the files that exist. This does not
change the process.
- **`docs/security/self-assessment.md`** — brought in step with the
above on the same three points (CodeQL's gate status, the Trivy pipeline
and its limitations, Renovate's real coverage), so the GTR,
`SECURITY.md` and the self-assessment agree rather than contradict each
other in front of the TOC.

## Two things for `@kvaps` to decide, not to approve as wording

1. **Which release lines are supported — and the evidence points two
ways.** The six-month activity test in the rewritten table classifies
every `1.x` line from `1.0` to `1.6` as supported, because each has had
a patch release inside six months (`v1.1.7` as recently as 2026-06-03,
`v1.0.7` on 2026-03-30). But *recent* activity looks like three lines,
not seven: of the sixteen most recent backport branches, fifteen target
`release-1.4`, `release-1.5` or `release-1.6`, and only `1.4`, `1.5` and
`1.6` have shipped a release since 2026-07-03. Older backport branches
for `release-1.2` and `release-1.3` exist but are months old — and since
branches are never deleted, their existence proves nothing about the
present, which is the same trap the table's own lead-in now warns about.

So the concrete question is: **is the intended set `1.4`/`1.5`/`1.6`
supported with `1.0`–`1.3` on limited support, or is it genuinely all
seven?** If a critical fix would today be backported to `v1.1`, the wide
table is right. If it would not, the six-month window is the wrong
instrument and should be shortened. I have deliberately not chosen —
either answer is defensible and it is a maintainer call, not a
documentation one.

**A third file turns on the same answer.**
[`docs/security/incident-response.md`](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/blob/main/docs/security/incident-response.md)
step 5 says a fix ships "across all affected supported release lines",
pointing at the `SECURITY.md` table — so widening that table to seven
lines widens this commitment with it. This PR does not touch that file
and does not assert the claim, but the two should move together: if the
answer is "all seven", incident response is right and `SECURITY.md`
should stop hedging; if it is "1.4–1.6", the table, the window and that
sentence all change at once.
2. **Whether there is a backport rule at all.** No project document,
public or private, describes how a fix is chosen for backporting to a
given supported line. An intermediate version of this PR asserted one
(by severity, default-config reachability and adopter count); that was
invented and has been removed. The file now says the decision is taken
per fix and the rule is not documented. If a rule exists informally,
writing it down would answer a question the seven-supported-lines table
otherwise raises.

## Gaps this documents rather than fixes

Recorded here because they surfaced while verifying the questionnaire's
claims and each is a real finding:

- CodeQL is not a required status check, though two documents described
it as gating merges.
- There is no top-level `NOTICE` file, for a distribution bundling on
the order of fifty upstream components.
- No default Kubernetes audit policy is shipped; audit logging is opt-in
with the policy left to the adopter.
- Release artifacts are not signed and no issue tracks adding signing;
build provenance is explicitly disabled (`--provenance=false`); SBOM
generation is implemented but defaulted off.
- The CVE-scanning pipeline lives in a repository that returns 404 to
non-members. Its aggregate reporting is now published (below); its
policy documents and scanning scripts, which hold no finding data, are
not, so the method behind the numbers is still not independently
auditable.
- `nightly.yaml` has been failing since 2026-08-02 and `e2e-tag.yaml`
failed around the v1.6.1 release; current CI health is disclosed next to
the workflow links.

## New: published security reporting, and a backlog audit that changes
the SCA answer

`docs/security/reports/` now holds monthly vulnerability-handling
reports plus a [backlog
reconciliation](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/blob/main/docs/security/reports/reconciliation-2026-08.md).
The reconciliation exists because the CVE-scanning pipeline has no
write-back from this repository, so it has never marked a finding as
fixed and its counts were misleading in both directions. Audited against
what actually shipped:

- Remediation did happen — a clear majority of confirmed findings relate
to a component whose in-tree version now carries the fix — but as **one
wave in June 2026**, not a steady stream. The changes that did most of
the work name no CVE at all: re-vendoring the dashboard console removed
the vulnerable npm dependencies rather than upgrading them; refreshing
the Alpine bases cleared fourteen; bringing the Go toolchain current
satisfies all 62 `stdlib` findings.
- **57% of the backlog was never applicable or cannot be assessed.** The
largest block is packages containing no executable vulnerable code —
chiefly kernel headers, since a container never provides a running
kernel, which is the same reasoning the maintainers already applied 80
times to `kernel-headers` and never to `linux-libc-dev`. Reachable
exposure in a stock install is an estimated 2–5% of the tracker.
- **Four component bumps are available upstream and not taken**:
`nats-server`, the CoreDNS image, OpenBao, `fast-uri`.
- Seven defects in the pipeline itself, with a write-back specification
to fix the root cause. Two issues counted as findings are actually
quarterly-review tracking tasks.

The disclosure rule moved in the open direction: findings with no
upstream fix will be named with mitigation guidance, because under the
previous rule that class — a fifth of the backlog — stayed secret
permanently, and it is exactly where an adopter needs to know a
mitigation is the only control. Conversely, remediation is no longer
attributed to individual months, because crossing a count of still-open
findings with one month's publicly enumerable component bumps narrows
the search for unpatched exposure more than a bare count does.

Several findings warrant maintainer attention ahead of the backlog and
are being raised privately rather than named here.

### Downstream repositories

- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change (docs-only; no
code, API, manifest or packaging changes).

### Release note

```release-note
docs: add CNCF General Technical Review (GTR) questionnaire for the Sandbox → Incubation review
```


<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->

## Summary by CodeRabbit

- **Documentation**
- Added a comprehensive technical review covering planning,
installation, operations, architecture, security, and troubleshooting.
- Added April–August 2026 security reports and a complete CVE backlog
reconciliation.
- Expanded security self-assessment, scanning coverage, reporting
guidance, disclosure rules, and audit limitations.
- Clarified supported-version policies, release backport decisions, and
private vulnerability-reporting procedures.

- **Process Updates**
- Updated reviewer nomination requirements to use current ownership and
maintainer records.
- Clarified severity- and risk-based backport decisions for coordinated
security releases.

<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
2026-08-26 16:53:10 +02:00
..