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526f08e17d |
fix(mariadb): restore the dump a Backup was taken as (#5227)
## What this PR does A RestoreJob that names a MariaDB `Backup` restored the newest dump of the application, not the dump of that `Backup`. The driver created the operator `Restore` with only `backupRef`, and mariadb-operator then restores the dump nearest to the moment the restore starts, from the prefix every run of the app shares. Restoring an older `Backup` brought back the latest data, and when its own dump was already gone it silently restored another one. The `Backup` now records the dump its operator `Backup` wrote, the file name in `k8s.mariadb.com/dump-file` and the timestamp from that name in `k8s.mariadb.com/dump-time`. They come from the ownership-proven match the size probe already makes, and nothing is recorded when ownership is not proven. A restore first checks with a bounded S3 listing of the operator `Backup`'s own storage that the dump still exists, then sets `targetRecoveryTime` on the operator `Restore` to the dump's own timestamp, which mariadb-operator matches exactly. If the dump is gone the RestoreJob fails and names it. If the check cannot be made it waits with `Ready=False/DumpCheckPending` until the restore deadline and then fails with the cause. `Backup`s taken before this stay restorable. The restore makes the same ownership-proven match against their operator `Backup` and pins the dump when it is provable, otherwise it restores the newest dump as before and a `BestEffortDump` warning event on the RestoreJob says so. One case is not covered: the `Backup`'s own dump is gone, a neighbour's dump from within the minute of slack is still there and its operator `Backup` was deleted, so that dump is taken as the match. Nothing in the platform deletes operator `Backup`s, it needs someone to delete one by hand. A `Backup` made of an operator `Backup` whose Job failed (`Complete` with reason `JobFailed`) has no dump, so its RestoreJob now fails instead of restoring another run's dump. Stacked on https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/pull/5223 and targets its branch until that merges, only the last three commits belong here. Checked on a test cluster with mariadb-operator 25.10.2. An operator `Restore` of an older `Backup` with `targetRecoveryTime` set to its dump timestamp restored exactly that dump (`obtained target backup` names it and a row inserted after it is absent from the target), the same `Restore` without the target restored the newest one. Against the real bucket and operator `Backup`s the recording probe attributed to each `Backup` the dump its backup pod logged, the existence check passed for those dumps and refused a pruned one, legacy `Backup`s with a provable dump got pinned while back-to-back runs fell back with the warning, and the two failed runs on that cluster were refused. The controller itself was not run on the cluster, only its code driven by a test against the real bucket. Fixes https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/issues/5196 ### Screenshots Not a UI change. ### Downstream repositories The diff is confined to the backup controller's Go code. It changes no CRD or API type (`driverMetadata` is an opaque map), no chart, values, package layout or `hack/` script, so no entry of the trigger map applies. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(mariadb): a RestoreJob now restores the dump of the Backup it names instead of the newest dump of the application. It fails with a clear message when that dump no longer exists in storage, or when the Backup was made of a failed backup run. Backups taken before this release are restored by the one dump that can be matched to them, or else, as before, by the newest dump, with a BestEffortDump warning event on the RestoreJob. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * MariaDB backups now record the selected dump’s filename and timestamp, allowing restores to target the corresponding recovery time. * For older backups without dump metadata, restores use a uniquely matched dump when possible or fall back to the latest dump with a warning. * Restore processing verifies recorded dumps, retries temporary storage checks, and reports failures for invalid or missing recorded dumps. * **Bug Fixes** * Deleting a MariaDB backup now removes its associated dump and operator backup when ownership is verified and no restore is active. Cleanup avoids deleting artifacts when it cannot safely identify them. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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f12300943d |
chore: clear golangci-lint findings and handle the errors they flagged (#5306)
## What this PR does
This clears the golangci-lint findings on main and fixes the errors
several of them pointed at. With the default linter set (errcheck,
govet, ineffassign, staticcheck, unused), main had 197 findings when
this branch started. Rebased on main at
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5d453c4d23 |
test(backups): give the fake S3 bucket a StatObject
main added StatObject to the object lister interface, so the fake bucket the MariaDB cleanup tests use has to implement it to compile. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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8a37a70681 |
Merge branch 'main' into fix/mariadb-restore-dump
Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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7c46e1e384 |
fix(backups): give the barman-cloud sidecar an explicit CPU limit (#5280)
## What this PR does The barman-cloud sidecar of Postgres backups is deliberately left without a CPU limit, so that a throttled sidecar slows WAL archiving down instead of failing it. In a tenant with `resourceQuotas` set that intent does not hold: `packages/apps/tenant/templates/quota.yaml` creates the `tenant-range-limits` LimitRange, whose default CPU limit is `250m`, and the sidecar receives it. Full backups and WAL segments are then gzip-compressed on a quarter of a core. On a production tenant the first full backup of a 1.6 GB database took 30 minutes, uploading at about 0.5 MB/s with the sidecar pinned at its 250m limit, while a small database on the same destination finished in 35 seconds. This sets an explicit `limits.cpu: "1"` on the sidecar, in the two places that build its configuration: `barmanSidecarConfiguration` in the backup driver (platform-managed ObjectStores) and `cozy-lib.barman.sidecarConfiguration` (ObjectStores rendered by the postgres and keycloak charts). This mirrors how the memory request and limit there already override the LimitRange's 128Mi default. One core removes the 250m ceiling without letting the sidecar starve the instance. Inside a tenant it counts against the `limits.cpu` quota, one core per instance pod; the comments now say so. The sidecar is injected when the instance pod is created, so existing instances pick the new limit up at their next restart. Tests: the Go test that asserted the absence of a CPU limit now asserts one core, and so does `packages/apps/postgres/tests/barman_resources_test.yaml`. Both fail with the implementation reverted and pass with it. `go test ./internal/backupcontroller/`, `helm unittest packages/apps/postgres` (220) and `helm unittest packages/system/keycloak` (121) pass. ### Screenshots Not a UI change. ### Downstream repositories Walked the trigger map against the diff (the backup driver, `cozy-lib`'s barman template, two tests): no app, value, schema, default, CRD, annotation or tooling change, so none of the listed repositories restates anything touched here. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note fix(backups): the barman-cloud sidecar of Postgres backups now has an explicit one-core CPU limit instead of inheriting the tenant LimitRange's 250m default, which made full backups and WAL archiving several times slower. Each instance pod of a tenant with a CPU quota now counts 750m more against `limits.cpu`; check the headroom before instance pods are recreated. Existing ObjectStores pick the limit up at their next backup (platform-managed) or HelmRelease upgrade (chart-rendered), and running pods at their next restart. ``` |
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6cab97f010 |
style: use tagged switches and drop unused test assignments
Use tagged switches where staticcheck suggests them and drop two test assignments whose values are never read. Behaviour is unchanged. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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87b794a992 |
chore: handle errors dropped in cleanup paths and tests
The drain tests now assert that RunThenDrain returns the run's nil error, the idle-tail test fails on any error other than the stream ending or being cut, and a test fixture file fails the test when it cannot be closed. Removing a temporary directory and closing a response body that has been read are best-effort: a failure leaves nothing for the caller to act on and does not change any result, so those errors are discarded explicitly. The same holds for the stub servers' response writes, whose failure surfaces on the client side of the test. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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906eeb2372 |
feat(backups): add Kubernetes backup strategy for tenant clusters (#4931)
## What this PR does
Adds a `Kubernetes` backup strategy so a tenant Kubernetes application
can be backed up and restored through the backups framework, and routes
`apps.cozystack.io/Kubernetes` to it in `cozy-default`.
None of the existing strategies fits a tenant cluster:
- Its API state is a key prefix (`/<namespace>_<release>/`, the
TenantControlPlane's datastore schema) in the etcd `DataStore` shared by
every cluster of the tenant. The `Etcd` strategy snapshots the whole
DataStore, so restoring it would roll every tenant cluster back at once.
- Its control-plane CA, front-proxy CA, service-account key and Talos
secrets cannot be regenerated: new ones break every node, kubeconfig and
token issued under the old ones.
- Its PersistentVolumes are DataVolumes in the tenant namespace
(`pvc-<tenant pvc uid>`, labelled `cluster.x-k8s.io/cluster-name`), and
deleting the application deletes them.
**Backup** (`strategy.backups.cozystack.io/Kubernetes`, driver in
`internal/backupcontroller/kubernetesstrategy_*.go`):
1. Checks the control-plane and Talos certificates and sets a
`CertificatesExpiring` condition (plus a Warning event) when a CA
expires before the backup's TTL or a leaf within
`certificateWarningThreshold` (720h). This never fails the run.
2. A Job in the application namespace dumps the cluster's prefix with
`etcdctl` to the platform bucket. It authenticates with the cluster's
own `kubernetes-<name>-datastore-certificate`, the one its
kube-apiserver uses. It runs on a new `kubernetes-backup` image (alpine
+ curl + jq + etcdctl matching the platform's etcd).
3. A Velero backup takes the PKI Secrets (selected by
`kamaji.clastix.io/name` / `app.kubernetes.io/instance`; the driver adds
the instance label to the cert-manager-issued Talos CA Secrets, which
carry neither) and the data DataVolumes/PVCs. Worker system disks are
not backed up.
4. The Backup records the prefix, the endpoints, the data DataVolumes
and the HelmReleases of the cluster and its `KubernetesNodes` pools. The
HelmReleases are not in Velero because the lineage webhook labels worker
disks after the same applications, so a label selector for the releases
would also pick the disks.
**Restore** goes into the application the backup came from (rename /
cross-namespace is rejected). `RestoreJob.spec.options` takes `etcd` and
`volumes` (both default `true`) to restore either half alone:
- **Application gone**:
1. Restore the PKI Secrets and the volumes.
2. Recreate the cluster's HelmRelease. The Kamaji release this repo
ships gives a new TenantControlPlane a UID-keyed datastore schema, so
the restore waits for that schema.
3. Stop the new control plane, write the dump under the new prefix (keys
are moved from the old prefix), and start it again.
4. Recreate the worker pools last, so workers join the restored cluster
with the restored CA and Talos secrets rather than an empty one.
- **Application live**: suspend the cluster's HelmReleases, then stop
the MachineDeployments and the cluster-autoscaler (for `volumes`,
deleting the backed-up DataVolumes/PVCs once the Machines are gone), and
then the KamajiControlPlane (for `etcd`). Workers go first because CAPI
removes a worker's Node through the tenant API. Then write the selected
halves back and restore every replica count. Each original count is
recorded on the object it belongs to, so the cluster is put back on
success, on failure, after a 30-minute stop deadline, and when the
RestoreJob is deleted midway. A retry keeps the counts from before the
first attempt, and a HelmRelease suspended before the restore stays
suspended.
Before changing anything, a restore checks that the Velero backup is
still there and Completed, and that the dump object exists (a
verify-mode run of the Job). The restore mode is recorded in the
RestoreJob's status, so a RestoreJob cannot claim that a live cluster is
gone.
Before it runs `del --prefix`, the restore Job downloads and validates
the dump and saves the current prefix to `<dump>.pre-restore`. That copy
is never overwritten, so a retry cannot replace it with a partial
prefix, and it is dropped after a successful restore. The Job writes a
marker to its termination message, and the outcome depends on it:
- A failure before `del` resumes the cluster.
- A failure after `del` leaves the control plane stopped
(`KubernetesEtcdWriteFailed`) rather than started on a partial prefix.
- Deleting the RestoreJob while its restore Job runs also leaves it
stopped.
Events and master leases are skipped only as top-level resources. Velero
cannot overwrite an existing claim, so a live-cluster volume restore
deletes the current claims first; this is documented.
A backup whose Velero half fails deletes the etcd dump it already
uploaded, and a transient error creating the Backup is retried rather
than failing the run. Deleting a Backup removes the Velero backup
(DeleteBackupRequest) and the dump object plus its pre-restore copy (a
cleanup-mode Job, given up after five failed attempts with a Warning,
plus the same skip-artifact-cleanup escape hatch as Redis/Rabbitmq).
With `velero.bslEnabled=false` the strategy is not rendered, and the
DefaultObjectsGate does not count it as missing, the same as the Velero
strategies. Like every default strategy, it is also gated on its CRD
being established, so the upgrade that first ships the CRD to an
installed chart cannot wedge the release.
Also included: RBAC for
TenantControlPlanes/DataStores/KamajiControlPlanes/MachineDeployments/Machines/Deployments,
chart values (`kubernetesBackupClientImage`,
`kubernetesBackupActiveDeadlineSeconds`, `kubernetesBackupResources`), a
`make image-kubernetes-backup` target, docs in
`docs/operations/backup-classes.md`, and the
`examples/backups/kubernetes/` walkthrough.
### Verification
- `go test ./internal/backupcontroller/`: the new tests cover:
- the certificate windows, pool HelmRelease discovery, option parsing
and the restore-phase selectors;
- the full backup path;
- in-place restores with default options and etcd only;
- a pre-suspended HelmRelease;
- a failed etcd write leaving the control plane stopped, including on
RestoreJob deletion;
- RestoreJob deletion resuming a stopped cluster;
- the stop deadline;
- the preflight: missing or incomplete Velero backup, missing dump;
- a rebuild, and an unreadable HelmRelease record;
- rename rejection, a non-etcd datastore, and the cleanup attempt limit.
Each safeguard in the Go driver was checked by mutating it out and
confirming that a test fails. The rendered Job script has no committed
test: a unit test would have to extract the script from the rendered
chart, and its behaviour belongs in the chainsaw e2e follow-up instead.
It was run against stub `etcdctl`/`curl` in every mode and branch:
- a foreign key or an empty value stops it before any etcd call;
- an S3 answer other than 200/404 on the pre-restore copy stops it
before any etcd call;
- an existing copy is kept, and a missing one is uploaded before `del`;
- keys are moved from the old prefix to the new one;
- an object in a namespace named `events` is kept.
- `helm unittest` (29/29), `hack/backupstrategy-crd-gate.bats` and `helm
lint` on `backupstrategy-controller`.
- On a live cluster (Velero 1.18.1), with a tenant cluster holding a
ConfigMap marker and a file on a PVC:
- The same flow done by hand before the driver existed: back up, delete
the application, rebuild. The CA, front-proxy CA, SA key and Talos
secrets were byte-identical afterwards, the pre-backup admin kubeconfig
still worked, namespace and ConfigMap UIDs were unchanged, and the PVC
data came back.
- Through this driver: the BackupJob succeeded (432 keys dumped, Velero
backup Completed, Backup metadata as described above). The tenant
namespace holding the markers was then deleted, which also deleted its
PVC and the backing DataVolume, and a RestoreJob with default options
rolled the live cluster back. It stopped the workers and then the
control plane, wrote the prefix back, restored the volume, and restored
the control plane to 2 replicas, the pool and the autoscaler to 1, and
unsuspended the HelmRelease. A new worker joined. The namespace came
back with its original UID, the ConfigMap and the PVC (bound to the same
volume) with their data. That run caught an ordering bug, now fixed and
covered by a test: scaling the control plane down first left the old
Machine stuck in `Deleting`, because CAPI removes the Node through the
tenant API.
- On the current head, through the driver, against the same tenant
cluster:
- **Backup.** It succeeded. The volume list it recorded was taken before
Velero started.
- **`{"volumes":false}` restore after a ConfigMap was deleted and
another created.** The deleted ConfigMap came back and the newer one was
gone. The worker was left running and the volume data was untouched. The
restore waited for terminating control-plane Pods before writing. The
pre-restore copy was saved before `del` and dropped afterwards.
- **Rebuild after the application was deleted, with default options.**
It ran the full sequence: secrets, volumes, cluster HelmRelease,
datastore schema, stop, etcd write, resume. It succeeded in about 3
minutes. The CA and Talos CA were byte-identical, a new worker joined,
and the namespace and ConfigMap UIDs and the PVC data were back. The
tenant cluster runs on a Kamaji that still names schemas `<ns>_<name>`,
so this run did not exercise a prefix change; that path is covered by
the unit tests and the stub runs.
### Not in this PR
- A chainsaw e2e. The tenant Kubernetes suites are bounded by tight op
budgets that tests pin, so the round trip needs its own suite or a
budget change; it will be a follow-up.
- `rotationPolicy` on the Talos CA Certificate in the kubernetes chart
(cert-manager's default `Always` would rotate the CA key at renewal).
- Restore into another application name or namespace.
- The tenant's shared etcd DataStore runs with auth disabled, so any
cluster's datastore certificate can read its neighbours' prefixes. This
predates this change; the dump Job uses the same certificate the
cluster's kube-apiserver already holds.
### Screenshots
N/A — no UI changes.
### Downstream repositories
- [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change
- [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) -
follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server)
- follow-up:
- [ ]
[cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example)
- follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) -
follow-up:
- [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) -
follow-up:
Walked against the diff: no package under `packages/apps|extra` is added
or renamed, `packages/core/platform` and installer values are untouched,
the new CRD is in `strategy.backups.cozystack.io` (not typed by
terraform-provider), and `RestoreJob.spec.options` stays opaque JSON.
### Release note
```release-note
feat(backups): tenant Kubernetes applications can now be backed up and restored through the cozy-default BackupClass. A backup captures the cluster's etcd state and its control-plane PKI and PersistentVolume data, and warns when a control-plane CA would expire before the backup does. A restore rebuilds a deleted cluster with its original CA or rolls a live one back, and can restore the etcd state and the volumes separately via RestoreJob options `etcd` and `volumes`.
```
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
<!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 -->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
- **New Features**
- Added Kubernetes application backup and restore support, including
etcd data and persistent volumes.
- The default backup class now routes Kubernetes applications to the new
strategy.
- Added an end-to-end walkthrough for creating a cluster, backing it up,
restoring it in place or after deletion, and cleaning up.
- Backup status can report expiring certificates, and restore validation
helps protect cluster identity and state.
- **Documentation**
- Added guidance on backup contents, restore behavior, and walkthrough
configuration.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
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04fa87ccd1 |
style(backups): clear staticcheck findings in overlapping controllers
Drop a field-manager constant nothing uses in the MariaDB driver, switch on the MongoDB operator's state as a tagged switch, and reword the error strings of the MongoDB driver and the workload monitor so they do not start with a capital. The errors keep their meaning and nothing matches their text. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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4c3a4b42cc |
style: clear unused code and style findings reported by staticcheck
Remove helpers and constants nothing references, escape format characters in test literals, and take the simplifications staticcheck suggests where they read the same. Error strings no longer start with a capital: they keep their meaning, with the kind or component name moved out of first position. Callers match errors by type, not text; the one test that matches text, for Kafka, keeps the phrase it looks for. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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e978ed7f2f |
fix(postgres): stop backup jobs from fighting over the WAL archive destination (#5221)
## What this PR does Part of #5202. A second PR will restore the last good destination when a job that changed it fails. The ObjectStore a Postgres Cluster archives its WAL to is shared by every backup of the application, yet every running BackupJob server-side applied its own strategy's destination onto it every five seconds with forced ownership. Two BackupJobs of one application with different BackupClasses flipped the destination back and forth until the healthy backup failed too, and a webhook or apiserver blip during that apply failed the BackupJob at once. - A BackupJob writes the destination and the Cluster plugin only before its `cnpg.io/Backup` exists. Afterwards it only reads the live Cluster, and a failed read is returned for a controller retry instead of failing the running backup. - Before writing, a BackupJob waits, with a `Ready=False` / `WaitingForOtherBackup` condition naming the other job, while another running BackupJob of the application has a `cnpg.io/Backup` in flight. The wait is not capped, for the same reason as in #5211. The queue reads the Cluster's own Backups from the apiserver; with leader election one reconcile runs at a time, so only a leader handover can still let two jobs through. An atomic per-application claim is #4559. - Before writing, a BackupJob also checks the apiserver for a restore of its application and holds while one runs, including a job released from the queue: a write landing during the restore would put the restored Cluster back on the source's WAL prefix. - Write errors that cannot succeed on retry (invalid, bad request, forbidden) still fail the job at once. Any other is retried with a `ClusterPluginApplyRetrying` condition for the backup deadline, counted from the first failure since the job last waited, and recorded in a new `DestinationApplied` condition. - The pass that creates the `cnpg.io/Backup` records on it the destination, endpoint, credentials Secret and serverName it wrote (`backups.cozystack.io/cnpg-written-destination`), and the artifact and its size probe are built from that record, so a strategy edited, or a Cluster re-rendered, while the backup runs does not redirect the artifact. A Backup without the record falls back to the strategy as before. - The plugin rollout deadline and the instance check count from the write that attached the plugin, not from the job's start. The apply that attaches it also stamps the time on the Cluster (`backups.cozystack.io/barman-plugin-attached-at`), so a lost BackupJob status write after the attach does not fall back to an older time, and a job that starts while another job's recent attach is still rolling waits for that rollout too. A stamp a few minutes ahead of the controller's clock is waited out; one further ahead is treated as corrupt. Tests drive the reconciler through a running backup that must not rewrite the destination, the queue and its release, a restore starting while a job waits, each class of write error, a recovered write, a failed Cluster read while the Backup runs, lost status writes around the attach, another job's rollout, clock drift on the attach stamp, the recorded destination and serverName, and the rollout deadline. Each guard was checked by mutation. ### Screenshots <!-- REQUIRED for UI changes: attach screenshots or screen recordings demonstrating the visual impact of your changes. PRs with UI changes without screenshots will not be merged. --> ### Downstream repositories <!-- Cozystack is upstream for repositories that are NOT kept in sync with it automatically, and nothing in CI compares the two sides, so a change here can break them silently. Which change forces what, and which file to touch, is the trigger map in docs/agents/contributing.md under "Downstream Repositories". Walk it before you tick anything. IF YOU ARE AN AI AGENT OR AN LLM, THIS IS PART OF THE TASK, NOT A FORM TO FILL IN: 1. Walk the trigger map against the actual diff of this PR, file by file. Do not decide from the PR title or from your memory of what you changed. 2. For every repository you tick, open the follow-up PR there and link it on the same line. A ticked box with no link claims work that does not exist, which is worse than an empty box. Search that repository for an open PR or issue covering it first, and link that instead of filing a duplicate. 3. When the follow-up is out of scope, or needs a decision that is not yours to make, open an issue in that repository instead, link that, and say so in the PR body. Do not push a speculative PR into another repository just to fill a line here. 4. Do not tick "No downstream repository is affected" to make the checklist go away. If you are unsure, leave every box empty and say so in the PR body, so a human decides. --> - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note <!-- Write a release note: - Explain what has changed internally and for users. - Start with the same `type(scope):` prefix as in the PR title - Follow the guidelines at https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/guide/release-notes.md. --> ```release-note fix(postgres): Postgres BackupJobs of the same application no longer overwrite each other's WAL archive destination: a job writes it only before its backup starts and waits while another backup or a restore of the application is in flight. A transient error while writing it is retried instead of failing the job at once, and the backup artifact names the destination and serverName the backup was actually written to. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Reliability** * CNPG backups wait while another backup or restore is using the shared destination, and retry temporary destination-write failures while observing the backup deadline. * Backup artifacts and size checks use the destination recorded when the backup was created, even if destination settings later change. * Backup processing handles plugin rollout timing and destination-hold release more consistently. * **Restore** * Restore operations account for shared WAL archive destination conflicts and guard against incompatible backup selections. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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583f18437d |
test(clickhouse): give the credentials-wait BackupJob a UID
The test pins that a backup held for late bucket credentials keeps its archive name, and a run's archive name now carries part of the BackupJob's UID, so the fixture needs one for the name it expects to be the name the controller mints. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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dae76d186c |
Merge branch 'main' into fix/clickhouse-idle-before-backup
main pins the archive name a backup Pod keeps across a wait for late bucket credentials, against the controller's archive helper. That helper now names a run's archive with part of the BackupJob's UID, so the merged test has to give its BackupJob one. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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5c6fc10a23 |
test(postgres): pin three guards no test caught when changed
A job whose own Backup exists skips the wait for another job's plugin rollout, and the size probe keeps the strategy's Secret key names while it takes the Secret from the record, adding a credentials block only when the strategy has none. Each of these could be changed with the suite still green: dropping the own-Backup check, or forcing the missing-credentials branch either way. Cases for a job with a running Backup next to a recent foreign attach, a strategy without credentials and a strategy with custom key names now fail on each change. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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b3ca798bc4 |
fix(backups): read the runs that may own a MariaDB dump uncached
Before deleting a dump the cleanup checks every other operator Backup on the same prefix that could have written it, and it read them from the informer cache. A run whose operator Backup had not reached the cache yet but had already uploaded its dump was missed, and its dump deleted as this Backup's. Both the recorded and the legacy paths now list the runs from the API server, as the restore checks already do. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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238b3ee491 |
fix(seaweedfs): enforce S3 bucket lifecycle rules (#5228)
<!-- Thank you for making a contribution! Here are some tips for you: - Use Conventional Commits for the PR title: `type(scope): description` - Types: feat, fix, docs, style, refactor, perf, test, build, ci, chore - Scopes are not an exhaustive list — pick the most specific scope for the change and extend the list when a genuinely new area appears. Examples: - System components: dashboard, platform, operator, cilium, kube-ovn, linstor, fluxcd, cluster-api - Managed apps: postgres, mariadb, redis, kafka, clickhouse, virtual-machine, kubernetes - Development and maintenance: api, hack, tests, ci, docs, maintenance - Breaking changes: append `!` after type/scope (`feat(api)!: ...`) or add a `BREAKING CHANGE:` footer - If it's a work in progress, consider creating this PR as a draft. - Don't hesistate to ask for opinion and review in the community chats, even if it's still a draft. - Add the label `kind/backport` if it's a bugfix that needs to be backported to a previous version. --> ## What this PR does SeaweedFS accepts and stores an S3 bucket lifecycle configuration, but only the `s3_lifecycle` job of its plugin worker applies it, and that job is scheduled by the admin server. Cozystack deployed neither, so a lifecycle rule returned 200 and no object ever expired, on the platform backup bucket and on tenant buckets alike. That also made the documented way to bound backup storage a no-op. This PR adds the admin server and a worker to Simple and MultiZone SeaweedFS instances, behind a new `lifecycle.enabled` value that is **off by default**. A Client instance is unchanged, because its rules are enforced where the instance it connects to runs. The worker registers for `s3_lifecycle` only, so vacuum, balancing and erasure coding are not started as a side effect. The admin keeps its job state on a 1Gi volume on `lifecycle.storageClass`, or on the cluster default when that is empty; `volume.storageClass` is not reused, because in MultiZone it can name a class local to one zone or node. The admin UI is protected by a generated password, because a tenant namespace admits traffic from the whole cluster. The dashboard Role lists the two new WorkloadMonitors. Enabling the worker alone was not enough on SeaweedFS 4.45. Its chart renders no `[grpc.s3]` section, so the s3 gateway served its internal gRPC in plaintext while the worker dials it with mTLS, and every lifecycle delete failed the TLS handshake. The section is backported from upstream (seaweedfs/seaweedfs#11157, released in 4.46) as a chart patch, applied with `--forward` so the next `make update` stops at the point where the patch must be dropped instead of silently reversing it. The s3 pods are restarted once so they load the section. This also repairs IAM cache propagation between s3 replicas, which failed in the same way, and it applies whether or not lifecycle is enabled. The data-plane release now retries a failed install or upgrade in place (`RetryOnFailure`) instead of rolling it back. With the previous default remediation and unlimited retries, an upgrade that waited out its timeout, for example on a tenant quota with no room for the admin volume, rolled back and retried forever, restarting the s3 pods twice per cycle. The worker's hostname anti-affinity is relaxed to a preference so a rollout finishes on a single-node cluster. #### Why lifecycle is off by default The daily walk that SeaweedFS uses to expire objects sends its deletes without an object identity, and the s3 server skips its compare-and-swap when no identity is given; it does not re-check the object's age either. A key overwritten between the walk's listing and the delete loses its new content. This path is unchanged from 4.45 through 4.52 and on upstream master (`weed/s3api/s3lifecycle/dailyrun/walker_dispatcher.go`, `identityMatches` in `weed/s3api/s3api_internal_lifecycle.go`). Backup buckets write unique keys and are barely exposed; a tenant bucket that rewrites a fixed key is. On top of that, turning enforcement on would start applying, on upgrade, every rule that was stored and ignored until now. Both are retention changes an operator should choose, so nothing changes for existing instances until `lifecycle.enabled` is set. Making it the default again is left to a separate PR that carries object identity on the walk path; upstream report: https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/issues/12451. #### Turning lifecycle on and off When `lifecycle.enabled` is set, rules that have been stored but ignored start applying within minutes, and objects they have already expired are deleted on that first pass, so review existing bucket lifecycle rules first. Set `lifecycle.storageClass` before enabling, and prefer a replicated class: the class is part of the admin StatefulSet's volume claim template, which cannot change, so changing it while lifecycle is on makes every upgrade of the instance fail until it is reverted. Moving the volume means disabling lifecycle, deleting the `admin-data-seaweedfs-admin-0` PVC, changing the class and enabling lifecycle again. Each instance gains two small pods and a 1Gi PVC; when the tenant quota has no room for them, the data-plane release keeps retrying in place until it has. When `lifecycle.enabled` is turned off again, the parent release removes the admin credentials Secret while the data-plane release removes the admin StatefulSet only on its own reconcile, shortly after. An admin pod that restarts in that window fails to start on the missing Secret until the StatefulSet is gone; nothing is lost, and the order is left as is. The admin PVC stays until the instance is deleted, and a later re-enable starts the admin with a new password. Verified on a test cluster with the 4.45 chart: without the backport, the worker found the expired objects and every delete failed with `tls: first record does not look like a TLS handshake`; with this branch and lifecycle enabled, a rule with a past expiration date removed the matching objects and left the others, both on a manual run and on the first scheduled pass. ### Screenshots <!-- REQUIRED for UI changes: attach screenshots or screen recordings demonstrating the visual impact of your changes. PRs with UI changes without screenshots will not be merged. --> ### Downstream repositories <!-- Cozystack is upstream for repositories that are NOT kept in sync with it automatically, and nothing in CI compares the two sides, so a change here can break them silently. Which change forces what, and which file to touch, is the trigger map in docs/agents/contributing.md under "Downstream Repositories". Walk it before you tick anything. IF YOU ARE AN AI AGENT OR AN LLM, THIS IS PART OF THE TASK, NOT A FORM TO FILL IN: 1. Walk the trigger map against the actual diff of this PR, file by file. Do not decide from the PR title or from your memory of what you changed. 2. For every repository you tick, open the follow-up PR there and link it on the same line. A ticked box with no link claims work that does not exist, which is worse than an empty box. Search that repository for an open PR or issue covering it first, and link that instead of filing a duplicate. 3. When the follow-up is out of scope, or needs a decision that is not yours to make, open an issue in that repository instead, link that, and say so in the PR body. Do not push a speculative PR into another repository just to fill a line here. 4. Do not tick "No downstream repository is affected" to make the checklist go away. If you are unsure, leave every box empty and say so in the PR body, so a human decides. --> - [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up needed, not opened yet: `operations/services/backup-classes.md` (v1.7 and next) advises an S3 lifecycle policy, which the bundled SeaweedFS applies only once `lifecycle.enabled` is set; the SeaweedFS reference page gains `lifecycle.enabled` and `lifecycle.storageClass` from the regenerated README on the next release - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: The terraform provider does not model the SeaweedFS application, so the new values do not reach it. ### Release note <!-- Write a release note: - Explain what has changed internally and for users. - Start with the same `type(scope):` prefix as in the PR title - Follow the guidelines at https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/guide/release-notes.md. --> ```release-note fix(seaweedfs): S3 bucket lifecycle rules can now be enforced. Simple and MultiZone SeaweedFS instances run the SeaweedFS admin server and a lifecycle worker when the new `lifecycle.enabled` value is set; it is off by default, so existing instances keep their current behaviour. It stays off by default because the upstream daily expiry walk deletes without checking that the object it listed is still the one stored, so an object overwritten in that window can be deleted although it is new. When enabled, rules that were stored but ignored start applying within minutes and objects they have already expired are deleted on that first pass; review existing rules first. Each enabled instance gains two small pods and a 1Gi volume, placed on `lifecycle.storageClass` or the cluster default. Independently of the switch, the s3 gateway now serves its internal gRPC over mTLS, which repairs IAM cache propagation between s3 replicas and restarts the s3 pods once on upgrade. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added optional, daily S3 bucket lifecycle-rule processing for supported SeaweedFS configurations. It is disabled by default; Client instances rely on lifecycle rules configured on the connected SeaweedFS. * Added configurable storage for lifecycle job state and dashboard visibility for lifecycle components. * Enabled the S3 gRPC server to use its internal TLS identity when security is configured. * **Bug Fixes** * Improved storage-class handling so numeric-looking names remain strings and unset classes are omitted where appropriate. * Clarified backup cleanup guidance, including when lifecycle rules apply and how to reclaim storage. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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3badbdef74 |
fix(clickhouse): let a running backup sidecar pick up system-bucket credentials (#5232)
<!-- Thank you for making a contribution! Here are some tips for you: - Use Conventional Commits for the PR title: `type(scope): description` - Types: feat, fix, docs, style, refactor, perf, test, build, ci, chore - Scopes are not an exhaustive list — pick the most specific scope for the change and extend the list when a genuinely new area appears. Examples: - System components: dashboard, platform, operator, cilium, kube-ovn, linstor, fluxcd, cluster-api - Managed apps: postgres, mariadb, redis, kafka, clickhouse, virtual-machine, kubernetes - Development and maintenance: api, hack, tests, ci, docs, maintenance - Breaking changes: append `!` after type/scope (`feat(api)!: ...`) or add a `BREAKING CHANGE:` footer - If it's a work in progress, consider creating this PR as a draft. - Don't hesistate to ask for opinion and review in the community chats, even if it's still a draft. - Add the label `kind/backport` if it's a bugfix that needs to be backported to a previous version. --> ## What this PR does A ClickHouse release with `backup.useSystemBucket: true` can start before the platform projects `cozy-backups-creds` into its namespace. Its `clickhouse-backup` sidecar took the S3 settings from environment variables, which are fixed when the container starts, so the first BackupJob or RestoreJob of such a release failed with `no EC2 IMDS role found` until the Pod was restarted, and a rotated key stayed stale the same way. The projector now also writes a `clickhouse-backup.yml` key into `cozy-backups-creds` (bucket, `https://` endpoint, region when set, keys, `force_path_style` from `backupStorage.forcePathStyle`). On the system-bucket flow the chart mounts that key as an optional Secret volume and points `CLICKHOUSE_BACKUP_CONFIG` at it, instead of setting `S3_*` variables. clickhouse-backup reloads its config file in each API handler that reaches S3 (among them the `create_remote`, `restore_remote` and `list` calls the strategy makes; the `status` and `actions` reads it polls with do not) and kubelet rewrites a mounted Secret in place, so credentials projected after the Pod started, or rotated since, reach the running sidecar. `S3_PATH` stays in the environment because the prefix belongs to the release. Kubelet takes about a minute to refresh the volume, so the projector stamps `backups.cozystack.io/credentials-updated-at` when the projected content changes, and the Altinity driver holds a new backup or restore Job for up to two minutes after that stamp, with `Ready=False` and reason `WaitingForCredentials`; the condition is dropped once the Job runs. A stamp that cannot be read, or one further ahead than clock skew explains, is logged and ignored rather than holding the namespace's jobs for good. The hold applies to every Altinity job in a namespace whose projected Secret just changed, including releases on their own Secret, where it is only a delay. The new e2e Test `clickhouse-3-system-bucket-roundtrip` starts a ClickHouse on the system bucket with no projected Secret, then runs a backup and an in-place restore through `cozy-default` and checks that the sidecar that started without credentials served both jobs. In CI the system bucket's advertised host `s3.example.org` neither resolves nor gets an ACME certificate, so for the duration of its own step the Test serves a SeaweedFS-CA certificate under the S3 Ingress TLS Secret name and adds a marked `rewrite name exact` line for that host to the host CoreDNS Corefile, removing both on exit; it proves the served certificate before any job starts. The bug was reproduced on a test cluster running the code before this change: a ClickHouse started before the projection failed its first BackupJob with `no EC2 IMDS role found`. The new e2e Test has not run green yet outside CI, because it edits the host CoreDNS, which is shared on that cluster. ### Screenshots <!-- REQUIRED for UI changes: attach screenshots or screen recordings demonstrating the visual impact of your changes. PRs with UI changes without screenshots will not be merged. --> ### Downstream repositories <!-- Cozystack is upstream for repositories that are NOT kept in sync with it automatically, and nothing in CI compares the two sides, so a change here can break them silently. Which change forces what, and which file to touch, is the trigger map in docs/agents/contributing.md under "Downstream Repositories". Walk it before you tick anything. IF YOU ARE AN AI AGENT OR AN LLM, THIS IS PART OF THE TASK, NOT A FORM TO FILL IN: 1. Walk the trigger map against the actual diff of this PR, file by file. Do not decide from the PR title or from your memory of what you changed. 2. For every repository you tick, open the follow-up PR there and link it on the same line. A ticked box with no link claims work that does not exist, which is worse than an empty box. Search that repository for an open PR or issue covering it first, and link that instead of filing a duplicate. 3. When the follow-up is out of scope, or needs a decision that is not yours to make, open an issue in that repository instead, link that, and say so in the PR body. Do not push a speculative PR into another repository just to fill a line here. 4. Do not tick "No downstream repository is affected" to make the checklist go away. If you are unsure, leave every box empty and say so in the PR body, so a human decides. --> - [ ] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [x] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: cozystack/website#799 (draft until this PR merges): `operations/services/backup-classes.md` for the mounted config file, the credentials wait and the upgrade window, without the Pod restart this change removes - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note <!-- Write a release note: - Explain what has changed internally and for users. - Start with the same `type(scope):` prefix as in the PR title - Follow the guidelines at https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/guide/release-notes.md. --> ```release-note fix(clickhouse): a ClickHouse release on the platform system bucket (`backup.useSystemBucket: true`) now backs up and restores without a Pod restart when its namespace had no projected backup credentials at start, and picks up rotated credentials while running. The sidecar reads its S3 settings from a `clickhouse-backup.yml` file in `cozy-backups-creds` instead of environment variables, so the upgrade rolls every such ClickHouse Pod once. The first Altinity backup or restore in a namespace after its projected credentials change waits up to two minutes (`WaitingForCredentials`) for them to reach the sidecar. Upgrade the platform as a whole: a system-bucket BackupJob started while the new chart runs against the previous controller fails, because that controller does not write the new key. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * ClickHouse system-bucket backups now use a projected configuration file for S3 settings, supporting HTTPS endpoints and optional region and path-style settings. * Backup and restore jobs wait briefly for recently updated projected credentials before starting. * Path-style settings accept common true and false values and are normalized consistently across backup storage integrations. * **Tests** * Added end-to-end coverage for system-bucket backup and restore, verifying restored data without restarting the ClickHouse Pod or backup sidecar. * Added checks for TLS certificate validation and safe restoration of shared network and ingress settings. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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1d22013646 |
fix(postgres): hold a backup until the plugin sees its new destination
The plugin-barman-cloud sidecar reads the ObjectStore through its own cache, kept for ten seconds (DefaultTTLSeconds in plugin-barman-cloud v0.13.0) and invalidated only by the sidecar's own writes, and WAL archiving keeps it warm. The pass that changed the destination created the cnpg.io/Backup a moment later, so the base backup could be taken against the previous destination while the artifact names the new one, and a restore from it finds nothing. On a live cluster with the shipped plugin, a Backup created two to four seconds after switching the destination landed in the old bucket in two of three tries; with a fifteen second wait it landed in the new one every time. The apply that changes the ObjectStore configuration now stamps the time on the ObjectStore itself, so the record cannot be lost apart from the change, and the job creates its Backup only once that change is older than the cache can be. A change is judged on the configuration a server-side dry run of the same apply returns, so values the apiserver defaults or another field manager owns do not read as a change on every pass. That wait leaves a job with the destination written and no Backup yet, which the queue, looking only for Backups in flight, did not see: a second job with another destination wrote its own, the first took that as a change and stamped again, and the two restarted each other's wait forever. Every apply of the ObjectStore therefore also names the job that made it, which only a job without a Backup of its own and let through by the queue does, and the queue holds every other job while that one runs and has no Backup yet. Once it has one, that Backup holds the destination for as long as CloudNativePG runs it, as before, so a job stuck after its Backup finished does not hold every later backup of the application. This also covers a job waiting for the rollout of the plugin it attached, during which a second job used to switch the destination as well, including when its own write left the configuration as a restore had re-rendered it. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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5a95bcdd64 |
fix(clickhouse): keep a run's archive name within the old name's length
The archive name is part of every object key, a key is capped at 1024 bytes, and the legacy s3PathOverride prefix has no length limit. The full UID made the name 37 characters longer than before, so a prefix that fit the old name pushed the manifest key past the cap and failed the backup. The run's name now drops "clickhouse-" and the "T" and "Z" of the timestamp and spends the room on the first 12 hex digits of the UID, so it is exactly as long as the old name for every application. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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a6a704768c |
test(backups): pin a failed RestoreJob listing in the MariaDB cleanup
A RestoreJob listing that fails says nothing about whether a restore reads the dump. Swallowing that error left the whole suite green, while it would let the cleanup delete the dump under a running restore. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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f2507b4b84 |
docs(backups): name what the MariaDB cleanup reads uncached
The reader's comment named only RestoreJobs, and the restore path said the cleanup holds a Backup only for RestoreJobs it can see, while the cleanup now lists both RestoreJobs and operator Restores straight from the API server. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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0195a66fae |
fix(backups): release a MariaDB Backup when the operator CRDs are gone
Listing the operator Restores of a Backup before reading its operator Backup made the cleanup fail on a cluster without the mariadb-operator CRDs, retried for good, so the Backup and its namespace never went away. The operator Backup read that follows already releases the Backup in that case; with no Restore kind no restore can run, so the listing now lets the cleanup reach it. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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8246808289 |
fix(backups): hold a MariaDB dump while an operator Restore reads it
The cleanup waited for a restore by the phase of its RestoreJob, but the phase is not the restore: a RestoreJob fails on its deadline while the operator Restore it created keeps running, and that Restore still reads the dump. Deleting the dump then made mariadb-operator restore the nearest other one. The cleanup now also holds the Backup while an operator Restore of its operator Backup has not been marked Complete, which mariadb-operator does once the Restore's Job has completed or failed, so what keeps the dump is the restore that reads it rather than the status of the request. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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ee6404a0c8 |
fix(backups): retry a failed lookup of a MariaDB operator Restore
The lookup now goes to the API server, which can time out or throttle, and a failed lookup failed the RestoreJob. It says nothing about whether the operator Restore exists, so the RestoreJob could be failed while its Restore was running, and the Backup's cleanup would then stop waiting for it and delete the dump the Restore reads. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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14a842ad16 |
fix(backups): find a MariaDB operator Restore the cache has not seen
The MariaDB restore creates its operator Restore once and then follows it, finding it by label in the informer cache. Nothing watches operator Restores, so a reconcile that ran before the new Restore reached the cache saw none: it created a second one, or, now that a restore refuses a Backup being deleted, failed the RestoreJob while its Restore was still running, after which the cleanup deleted the dump that Restore was reading. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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d57ebbe808 |
docs(backups): state what the MariaDB dump delete does not cover
The comment on who deletes a MariaDB Backup listed namespace teardown without saying that teardown can remove the operator Backup first, in which case the dump is left behind with a Warning, so it promised a delete the code does not make. The remover contract claimed a missing key is never an error, which holds only for a backend that answers the delete with 204, the one status minio-go accepts. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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3334152da7 |
fix(backups): report a recorded MariaDB dump that was not found
A recorded dump missing from the listing was logged as deleted, with no event. That is right when an earlier attempt or maxRetention removed it, but the listing goes through the platform's current endpoint, and after an endpoint move the dump can still sit on the old storage: the cleanup then deleted the operator Backup that pointed at it and said it had deleted the dump. The cleanup now records a Normal ArtifactAlreadyAbsent event naming the key and the endpoint it listed, so whoever later looks for that dump can tell where it was not found. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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bbeca34535 |
fix(backups): retry a failed read of the platform backup credentials
The MariaDB cleanup reaches the platform bucket through the platform's current endpoint so that a Backup taken before the endpoint moved is still deleted. A failed read of the platform credentials made it fall back to the endpoint recorded on the operator Backup, which may be the old address: there the dump is not found, a missing dump counts as already deleted, and the operator Backup that pointed at the real dump was deleted with a success log. A read that fails with an API error now holds the Backup and retries. A missing or malformed platform Secret still falls back, since it is a standing state that a retry would not change. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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37a74e5939 |
test(backups): reach the S3 calls the MariaDB cleanup timeout bounds
Contesting a recorded dump lists the bucket before the delete, and the timeout test supplied no lister, so a real client failed on DNS before the blocking delete was ever called and the suite stayed green with the timeout removed. The test now lists the dump through the fake bucket, blocks in the listing and in the delete in turn, and requires that the blocking call was entered. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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654c543264 |
fix(backups): see a MariaDB restore the cache has not caught up with
A MariaDB restore now checks on the API server that its Backup is not being deleted before it starts, so a restore that started first exists on the API server before the delete. The cleanup read RestoreJobs from the informer cache, which can lag behind, and could delete the dump under a restore it had not seen yet. Reading them uncached closes that window from both sides. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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320d0299ad |
fix(backups): refuse a MariaDB restore from a Backup being deleted
Deleting a MariaDB Backup now deletes its dump, and mariadb-operator restores the dump nearest the requested time when the exact one is gone. A restore that starts while the Backup's cleanup runs can lose its dump between the check and the operator's read, and then completes on another run's data without any error. The restore now reads the Backup from the API server before creating the operator Restore and fails when it is being deleted or is gone. The copy the reconcile was handed comes from the cache and can predate the delete; a transient read error keeps the RestoreJob waiting like any other failed dump check. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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8ba0380043 |
docs(clickhouse): name the clickhouse-backup handlers that reload the config
clickhouse-backup reloads its config file in each handler that reaches S3, among them the create_remote, restore_remote and list calls the strategy makes. The status and action-log endpoints the strategy polls read in-memory state and do not reload it, so the mounted file reaches the sidecar on the calls that need credentials rather than on every request. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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3b4db69f8e |
feat(backups): record the RDB snapshot location and size for Redis backups (#5046)
## What this PR does Builds on the shared S3 probe from #5223 (MariaDB and CNPG), which is on `main`. Refs #4316. Backups made by the Redis strategy carry no `Backup.status.artifact` at all: no URI and no size. This covers both the Redis and Valkey apps, which share the driver. The snapshot is a single object per backup, `<namespace>/<app>/<backup>.rdb` (`redisObjectKey`). The driver already records that key in `driverMetadata`. The default strategy uploads the object using the S3 coordinates from the backup credentials Secret, which the controller projects into the application namespace (`endpoint`, `bucketName`, `region` and the access keys). When a backup completes, the driver now: 1. reads that projected Secret (`CredentialsConfig.TargetSecretName`) in the application namespace. The projector stores its `endpoint` without a scheme, and the strategy script reaches it over https; an endpoint with a path prefix is refused by minio-go, which leaves the artifact unset; 2. reads the TLS trust from the pod spec of the completed backup Job, in the order the script applies it: `ca.crt`, then `tls.crt`, from the Secret mounted as the `s3-ca` volume (`backupStorage.endpointCASecretName`). Only when there is no `s3-ca` volume does it honour `S3_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY=true`, and only when every container of the pod sets it, since the probe cannot tell which container uploaded. The Secret is read at probe time; the default strategy mounts `s3-ca` only when an endpoint CA is configured, so when the volume yields no CA now (the Secret is gone or lacks both keys, or the volume is not a Secret), the probe leaves the artifact unset rather than trust the system roots or skip verification where the Job may have verified. The CA is trusted on its own, as `curl --cacert` does, not on top of the system roots; 3. runs `StatObject` on the recorded key; a response without `Content-Length`, which minio-go reports as size -1, counts as unmeasured; 4. records `status.artifact.uri = s3://<bucket>/<key>` and `status.artifact.sizeBytes` = the object's size. An empty object is recorded too, but `sizeBytes` is `omitempty`, so on the Backup it reads like an unmeasured size; since a valid RDB snapshot always carries a header, a Warning `EmptySnapshot` Event on the BackupJob flags it as a broken backup. The artifact is set **only when the object is found**. A custom strategy that writes elsewhere would otherwise get a URI pointing at an object that does not exist. On any failure (Secret missing or incomplete, endpoint invalid, CA unreadable, object not found, TLS error) the artifact stays absent and the backup still succeeds. The full error is logged at info, and once the Backup is created a Normal `ArtifactNotMeasured` Event on the BackupJob gives a fixed reason, also when a failed existence check skipped the probe; the Event lives in the application namespace, so it never carries the raw error, which may name the platform's endpoint and bucket. The probe shares the 10s timeout of the MariaDB and CNPG probes. The retry check is shared with those drivers too: a `Backup` that already exists is returned without probing, a failed existence check creates the Backup without probing, a `Create` collision is resolved by reading past the cache, and an existing Backup that cannot be read back is retried with `Ready=False` instead of failing the BackupJob. The size is useful because an RDB snapshot is the compressed dataset. It shows growth, and a snapshot that is suddenly tiny is a broken backup. Kafka is deliberately left out. Its backup is a topic-metadata export of a few kilobytes, so the size would say nothing about the data and might suggest the data itself was backed up. Tests: - the stat uses the projected credentials; - every path that leaves the artifact unset: object missing, Secret missing, bucket, endpoint, access key or secret key missing, no target Secret configured, a size the endpoint did not report; - trust resolution: `ca.crt` wins over `tls.crt` and skip-verify; `items` remapping of the volume, and a key the `items` do not project is never trusted; the Redis CA volume mounted next to `s3-ca` is not taken as the S3 CA; an `s3-ca` volume that yields no CA (Secret gone, Secret without the keys, a ConfigMap source) is refused with and without skip-verify; skip-verify applies only on an exact `true` of that variable in every container, the last entry of a repeated variable winning; - the real minio client against a TLS stub: its certificate is trusted only through the `s3-ca` volume or skip-verify, a CA that did not sign it is refused even with skip-verify set on the Job, and the shared client enforces a configured CA with and without the system roots; the client sends a signed `HEAD` and parses `Content-Length`; - the Events: an unmeasured artifact or a failed existence check raises `ArtifactNotMeasured` without the raw error; an empty snapshot is recorded and raises a Warning `EmptySnapshot`; a measured artifact, a rejected `Create` and a `Create` collision raise none; - a reconcile test pinning that the completed Job's pod spec reaches the probe; a Backup that already exists is returned without a probe or a `Create`; the `Create` collision is read back from the API server past the cache. The suite fails if any guard of the trust lookup (volume name, Secret source, variable name, every-container rule, refusal of an unreadable CA), the CA enforcement in the transport, the negative-size check, the Events, the reason-only message, their place after `Create`, the empty-snapshot warning, the existing-Backup check, the wiring, any term of the Secret check, or the API-server read-back is removed. ### Screenshots N/A — no UI changes. ### Downstream repositories I walked the trigger map against the diff. The change is Go-only in `internal/backupcontroller`, with no API, CRD, chart, value or schema change. Existing `Backup` fields are now filled for one more driver. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note feat(backups): Redis and Valkey backups now record `status.artifact` with the `s3://` location and the size of the RDB snapshot. If the snapshot cannot be found with the platform backup credentials, the artifact stays unset and a Normal `ArtifactNotMeasured` Event on the BackupJob says why. An empty snapshot raises a Warning `EmptySnapshot` Event. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Redis backups now include artifact location and size when they can be measured. * Backups are still created when artifact measurement fails, with status reporting that the artifact was not measured. * **Bug Fixes** * Improved handling of existing backups and temporary read-back failures to support reliable reconciliation. * Improved compatibility with S3 endpoints using custom certificate authorities or configured TLS verification settings. * Zero-size snapshots are now reported with a warning. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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f1dd2d17fc |
fix(backups): give the barman-cloud sidecar an explicit CPU limit
The sidecar was left without a CPU limit so that a throttled sidecar would slow WAL archiving down rather than fail it. In a tenant with resourceQuotas that does not hold: the tenant LimitRange gives every container a 250m CPU limit by default, so the sidecar gets it and compresses full backups and WAL segments on a quarter of a core. A 1.6 GB database took 30 minutes to back up. Set an explicit one-core limit in both places that build the sidecar configuration, the backup driver and cozy-lib, the same way the memory request and limit already override the LimitRange defaults. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Mattia Eleuteri <mattia@hidora.io> |
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59a11c1788 |
refactor(postgres): judge an attach record's clock drift in one place
The job that attached the plugin and a job waiting on another job's attach each parsed the Cluster's attach record and applied the clock-drift margin on their own, so the two could drift apart on the next change. Both now take the record from one parser that also refuses one too far ahead, and differ only in what they do with a record they cannot use. The margin is now pinned for the waiting job from both sides: a record a minute ahead still holds it for the rollout. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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0f44cf9e25 |
feat(backups): add Kubernetes backup strategy for tenant clusters
A tenant Kubernetes application had no backup route in cozy-default, and none of the existing strategies fits it. Its API state is a key prefix in the etcd DataStore the whole tenant shares, so the Etcd strategy's snapshot would roll every tenant cluster back at once; its control-plane CA, service account key and Talos secrets cannot be regenerated without breaking every node and credential issued under them; and its PersistentVolumes are DataVolumes in the tenant namespace that the application's own deletion removes. The new Kubernetes strategy backs up the cluster's etcd prefix with a Job that authenticates with the cluster's own datastore certificate, and the PKI Secrets and data DataVolumes with Velero. The HelmReleases of the cluster and its node pools are recorded on the Backup rather than in Velero, because a label selector for them would also pick up the worker system disks. A backup warns when a CA would expire before the backup does. A restore rebuilds a deleted cluster under its old CA, or rolls a live one back after stopping its control plane and workers, and lets the etcd prefix and the volumes be restored separately. Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> Assisted-by: LLM |
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456473dec1 |
fix(mariadb): fail backup and restore jobs whose operator Job failed (#5207)
<!-- Thank you for making a contribution! Here are some tips for you: - Use Conventional Commits for the PR title: `type(scope): description` - Types: feat, fix, docs, style, refactor, perf, test, build, ci, chore - Scopes are not an exhaustive list — pick the most specific scope for the change and extend the list when a genuinely new area appears. Examples: - System components: dashboard, platform, operator, cilium, kube-ovn, linstor, fluxcd, cluster-api - Managed apps: postgres, mariadb, redis, kafka, clickhouse, virtual-machine, kubernetes - Development and maintenance: api, hack, tests, ci, docs, maintenance - Breaking changes: append `!` after type/scope (`feat(api)!: ...`) or add a `BREAKING CHANGE:` footer - If it's a work in progress, consider creating this PR as a draft. - Don't hesistate to ask for opinion and review in the community chats, even if it's still a draft. - Add the label `kind/backport` if it's a bugfix that needs to be backported to a previous version. --> ## What this PR does When the Job behind a mariadb-operator `Backup` or `Restore` fails, the operator sets `Complete=True` with reason `JobFailed` (`SetCompleteWithJob` in mariadb-operator 25.10.2). The MariaDB driver read `Complete=True` alone as success, so a backup whose dump or upload failed ended `Succeeded` and produced a `Ready` Cozystack `Backup` pointing at an archive that does not exist, and a failed restore ended `Succeeded` too. A scheduled `Plan` kept producing such backups. The driver now treats `Complete=True` as success only with reason `JobComplete`, and fails the BackupJob or RestoreJob on `JobFailed` whatever the status, without creating a `Backup`. The failure message names the operator object and carries the Job's own `Failed` reason and message, since the operator's condition message is only `Failed` and the Job's pod, with its logs, is already deleted when the Job fails. A Job that is missing or cannot be read is named in the message instead. Any other `Complete` state keeps waiting under the existing deadline, as before; that includes `Complete=False` with reason `Failed`, which the operator sets with its own cause (`Error creating Job`, `Backup not complete`) for a failure outside the Job and then retries, and the deadline failure now carries that message. Regression tests drive the backup and restore reconcilers through every `Complete` status/reason combination, an absent `Complete` condition, and expired deadlines for an absent condition, an unknown reason and reason `Failed`. They assert the job phase and message as persisted in the API rather than on the in-memory object, a requeue while the run is in progress, and, for backups, that no `Backup` is created on failure. Separate tests cover the failure message for a Job that cannot be read and for a Job without a `Failed` condition. Backups that already exist are not touched. A `Ready` MariaDB `Backup` created by a failed run before this fix may have no archive of its own. Restoring from it can fail or select another dump from the shared prefix. ### Screenshots <!-- REQUIRED for UI changes: attach screenshots or screen recordings demonstrating the visual impact of your changes. PRs with UI changes without screenshots will not be merged. --> ### Downstream repositories <!-- Cozystack is upstream for repositories that are NOT kept in sync with it automatically, and nothing in CI compares the two sides, so a change here can break them silently. Which change forces what, and which file to touch, is the trigger map in docs/agents/contributing.md under "Downstream Repositories". Walk it before you tick anything. IF YOU ARE AN AI AGENT OR AN LLM, THIS IS PART OF THE TASK, NOT A FORM TO FILL IN: 1. Walk the trigger map against the actual diff of this PR, file by file. Do not decide from the PR title or from your memory of what you changed. 2. For every repository you tick, open the follow-up PR there and link it on the same line. A ticked box with no link claims work that does not exist, which is worse than an empty box. Search that repository for an open PR or issue covering it first, and link that instead of filing a duplicate. 3. When the follow-up is out of scope, or needs a decision that is not yours to make, open an issue in that repository instead, link that, and say so in the PR body. Do not push a speculative PR into another repository just to fill a line here. 4. Do not tick "No downstream repository is affected" to make the checklist go away. If you are unsure, leave every box empty and say so in the PR body, so a human decides. --> - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/community](https://github.com/cozystack/community) - follow-up: ### Release note <!-- Write a release note: - Explain what has changed internally and for users. - Start with the same `type(scope):` prefix as in the PR title - Follow the guidelines at https://github.com/kubernetes/community/blob/master/contributors/guide/release-notes.md. --> ```release-note fix(mariadb): a MariaDB BackupJob or RestoreJob whose operator Job failed now ends Failed instead of Succeeded, and a failed backup no longer creates a Ready Backup without an archive. Backups created by failed runs before this fix are not removed; restoring from one can fail or select another dump from the shared prefix. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Bug Fixes** * Backup and restore operations now report failed jobs as failures, including details from the underlying job when available. * Operations are marked successful only when the job completes successfully. Other outcomes continue to be monitored until the existing deadline, after which failures include available condition details. * Failed backups no longer create backup artifacts. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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1093f390ae |
feat(backups): warn on the BackupJob when the Redis snapshot is empty
A valid RDB snapshot always carries a header, so a 0-byte object means the backup is broken. sizeBytes is omitempty, though, so such a Backup read exactly like one whose size was never measured. The controller still records the artifact, and now raises a Warning EmptySnapshot Event on the BackupJob once the Backup is created. A test now also pins that a retry over an existing Backup returns it without calling Create. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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2013e624ca |
fix(backups): raise ArtifactNotMeasured only for a Backup this pass created
The Event was recorded before the Backup was created, so a Create that then failed left the BackupJob Failed next to an Event saying the backup succeeded, and a Create that collided with a Backup another pass had made reported on that pass's Backup. The Event is now recorded once Create succeeds. It also covers the one unmeasured path that had none: a failed existence check, which skips the probe. A test now also pins that a CA Secret key the s3-ca volume's items do not project is never trusted. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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6f3d26c491 |
feat(backups): tell on the BackupJob why a Redis artifact was not recorded
A Backup without status.artifact looked the same whether a custom strategy wrote elsewhere, the credentials Secret was unusable or the endpoint CA was gone; only the controller log told them apart. The probe now returns why it gave up, and the controller records it as a Normal ArtifactNotMeasured Event on the BackupJob. The Event lives in the application namespace, so it carries a fixed reason only; the raw error, which may name the platform's endpoint and bucket, stays in the log. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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d61a5054a1 |
fix(backups): refuse to probe a Redis snapshot behind a CA that is gone
The default strategy mounts the s3-ca volume only when the admin configured an endpoint CA, and the script then trusts that CA alone. When the volume yields no CA by the time the probe runs, because the Secret was deleted or emptied after the Job or the volume has another source, the probe used to fall back to the system roots, trusting more than the Job may have. It now leaves the artifact unset instead, with or without skip-verify. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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43bed8f6d9 |
fix(backups): keep the Redis probe verifying TLS unless every container skips
The probe read S3_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY from any container of the backup Job, so a custom strategy whose sidecar sets it while the uploading container verifies made the probe skip verification the upload did not. The probe cannot tell which container uploaded, so it now skips only when every container sets the variable to true, the last entry winning as in the kubelet. An s3-ca volume of a source other than a Secret yields no CA the probe can read; it is now treated like a CA Secret that is gone, so it never turns into skip-verify. Tests pin the guards that decide the probe's trust: the Redis CA volume mounted next to the S3 one, a decoy variable set to true, a CA that did not sign the endpoint, and the AlreadyExists read-back past the cache. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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e03986e8d0 |
fix(backups): treat an S3 object without a reported size as unmeasured
minio-go returns size -1 when a HEAD answer carries no Content-Length, which would land in Backup.status.artifact.sizeBytes as -1. The probe now reports such an object as unmeasured, so the field stays unset. The shared client's trust settings also gain a test against an endpoint whose certificate the configured CA did not sign, with the CA alone and on top of the system roots: nothing pinned that a configured CA is actually enforced. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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631f6cfc0d |
fix(backups): mirror the Redis script's CA trust exactly
The script passes the endpoint CA as curl --cacert, which replaces the default trust store, while the probe trusted the system roots on top of it. Trust only the CA, as the script does. A mounted CA Secret that is still there but no longer carries ca.crt or tls.crt let the probe skip TLS verification when the strategy opts into it, although the Job may have verified against a key since removed. Treat a volume that yields no CA now like a vanished Secret and refuse to skip verification in its place. Pin the probe timeout and the reconcile's retry of an unreadable Backup for Redis with tests. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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50b1a2e5ee |
test(backups): pin the Redis retry check
Cover the two retry-check paths the Redis driver shares with MariaDB and CNPG: a failed existence check creates the Backup without probing the bucket, and an existing Backup that cannot be read back is returned as errBackupNotReadBack so the reconcile is retried. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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bfea468b6c |
fix(backups): never skip TLS verification in place of a vanished CA
The Redis probe reads the CA Secret when it runs, not when the backup Job did. If the pod mounted a CA Secret that has since been deleted and the strategy also opts into S3_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY, the probe skipped verification against an endpoint the Job may have verified. Refuse to probe in that case. Without skip-verify a missing CA Secret still falls back to the system roots, as the script does. The endpoint comment claimed a bare host; it can carry a path, which the shared client now refuses. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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2ff547348d |
fix(backups): probe the Redis snapshot with the trust its Job used
The default Redis strategy script verifies the S3 endpoint against ca.crt, then tls.crt, from the Secret mounted as the s3-ca volume (backupStorage.endpointCASecretName), and only without either honours S3_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY=true. The probe always verified against the system roots, so on a cluster with a private CA, such as a self-signed SeaweedFS, every Redis and Valkey backup succeeded with no artifact. Read the same settings from the pod spec of the completed backup Job, in the order the script applies them, and pass them to the S3 connection. The shared transport gains an InsecureSkipVerify switch that is set only from that explicit opt-in. The projector always stores the endpoint as a bare host, so the branch that parsed a scheme out of it was unreachable; drop it and its test. Cover the endpoint and access-key terms of the Secret completeness check. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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c8cdefc665 |
feat(backups): record the RDB snapshot location and size for Redis backups
Backups made by the Redis strategy, which also serves Valkey, carried no Backup.status.artifact at all: neither a URI nor a size. The snapshot is one object per backup, <namespace>/<app>/<backup>.rdb, whose key the driver already records, and the default strategy uploads it with the S3 coordinates of the backup credentials Secret the controller projects into the application namespace. On completion the driver now stats that object with the same coordinates and records its s3:// URI and size. The artifact is set only when the object is found, so a custom strategy that writes elsewhere gets no URI pointing at a missing object. A Backup that already exists is returned without probing, as for the MariaDB and CNPG drivers. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com> |
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5635d9d815 |
test(postgres): pin that a rollout dated by the attach record runs out
The deadline tests dated every rollout by the job's own condition, so a change that let a rollout dated by the Cluster's attach record wait forever would have passed them. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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a27de054ca |
fix(postgres): wait for the rollout another backup job's attach started
Only the job that attaches the barman-cloud plugin waited for the instance rollout it causes. A second job of the same application that started meanwhile found the plugin already there, had no rollout of its own to wait for and created its cnpg.io/Backup at once, against instances CNPG was still recreating, and such a Backup fails for good. The queue does not hold it either, since the attaching job has no Backup yet. The attach record on the Cluster says when the plugin was attached, so a job without a rollout of its own now waits for instances newer than it while the attach is recent enough for that rollout to be running. An older attach has had its rollout judged by the job that made it. The record belongs to that job, so one this job cannot read, or one further ahead than controller clocks drift, is skipped rather than failing it; the latter would otherwise hold every later job of the application for as long as it lies ahead. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |