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Commits
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5bcdb8cfb8 |
fix(postgres): let in-place restore re-bootstrap instead of wedging
An in-place RestoreJob (targetApplicationRef omitted) re-bootstraps the
Postgres app under its own name. On stock v1.6.2 it never comes back up,
for two independent reasons in the same restore patch - both surface only
in place, because a to-copy restore targets a different app.
1. Archive-vs-recovery serverName collision. The driver set the restored
cluster's WAL-archive serverName equal to the recovery source
(bootstrap.serverName = bootstrap.oldName = sourceServerName) while the
chart pinned the archiver serverName to the release name. In place those
coincide, so the cluster archived onto the source's own WAL prefix and
barman-cloud-check-wal-archive refused to start ("Expected empty
archive"). Fixed by giving the restored cluster a fresh
bootstrap.newServerName, keyed by the RestoreJob UID (unique per
restore, stable across reconciles); the chart archives there while
externalClusters still recovers from bootstrap.serverName. This is what
the manual CNPG strategies hit (serverName defaults to the cluster
name); the cozy-default flow dodged it (serverName is <ns>-<app>).
2. useSystemBucket guard. The restore populates explicit S3 coordinates
(destinationPath / s3CredentialsSecret / endpointCA) but left
backup.useSystemBucket=true, so the chart's "bootstrap.enabled is
incompatible with useSystemBucket" guard failed the HelmRelease upgrade
and the cluster never re-rendered. This is what the cozy-default
(system-bucket) flow hits on an in-place restore. Fixed by clearing
useSystemBucket in the restore patch, since the app is now on the
explicit-creds path. The driver's app view (postgresapp.Backup) gains
the field, without omitempty so a false survives the merge patch.
Both are exercised only by an in-place restore; the postgres backup e2e
drove only to-copy, so neither surfaced in CI. A step 50 in-place restore
now guards reason 1 (manual-strategy flow); reason 2 is covered by a Go
unit assertion (a system-bucket in-place e2e needs the platform bucket in
CI and is left as a follow-up).
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kolkov <androndo@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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517e33f67b |
fix(keycloak): pin the Vault leg to the configured CA and roll on rotation
SSL_CERT_FILE alone does not narrow trust. crypto/x509 replaces only its file list and then scans SSL_CERT_DIR unconditionally, and the pinned proxy image ships /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt, so the connection guarding the KEK trusted the private CA plus every public root — a mis-issued certificate for the Vault hostname was still accepted. Set SSL_CERT_DIR to the mount as well, which collapses the pool to the CA the operator configured. An unvalidated caBundle failed open on top of that: a non-PEM value is dropped silently by AppendCertsFromPEM, leaving the proxy on the image's roots with no error at all. Reject it at render time, the way backend and auth already are. Rotating an inline caBundle had no effect either. The pod template did not change, so no new pods, and crypto/x509 memoizes the pool per process — the upgrade reported success while the old CA stayed in use until some later restart. Derive a checksum/vault-ca annotation from the bundle so the rollout happens with the change. Also add vault.caSecretKey: the projected key was hardcoded to ca.crt, and a bundle stored under another name (a cert-manager Certificate from an ACME issuer emits no ca.crt at all) wedged the pod at mount time with no way to correct it from values. Drop the claim that the database leg verifies against its own CA pool: the chart never sets KKP_BACKEND_CA_FILE, so that leg is plaintext today, as the note 30 lines above already says. The conclusion holds — it never consults the system trust store — but for the other reason. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill Ilin <stitch14@yandex.ru> |
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98ef5413f4 |
fix(keycloak): keep the Vault CA options inert on the static KMS backend
The volume and mount that consume the Vault CA sit at pod level, outside the vault-transit env block, while $vaultCASecret was seeded from caSecretName regardless of the backend. With kms.backend=static and caSecretName set, the Deployment mounted a Secret the chart never renders, so the proxy — the single choke point for all Keycloak DB traffic — would sit in ContainerCreating. Gate both CA keys, and the mutual-exclusion check between them, on vault-transit, so the whole vault.* subtree behaves the same way under static: ignored. Project only ca.crt from a pre-seeded Secret, which keeps a cert-manager tls.key out of the container and turns a bundle stored under another key into a mount failure rather than an opaque TLS error later. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill Ilin <stitch14@yandex.ru> |
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3531553176 |
feat(keycloak): let the KMS proxy trust a private Vault CA
The proxy could only reach a Vault whose certificate chains to a publicly trusted root, so a Vault fronted by an internal load balancer with a self-signed certificate was unreachable over HTTPS. Allow the CA to be supplied inline (caBundle, the chart renders the Secret) or as a pre-seeded Secret (caSecretName), mounted and exposed as SSL_CERT_FILE. That redirects only the system trust store, which nothing but the Vault client consults — the database leg verifies against its own CA pool. Assisted-By: Claude AI Signed-off-by: Kirill Ilin <stitch14@yandex.ru> |
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652231e0cc |
docs: add public ROADMAP.md (2026-2028) (#2666)
## Summary This PR adds a public `ROADMAP.md` covering the project's direction over the two-year window May 2026 – May 2028, aligned with the CNCF Sandbox → Incubating → Graduated trajectory. ## What A single living document organized into 11 strategic tracks: 1. Platform Core 2. Testing & Conformance 3. Security, Certifications & Compliance (largest track — covers OSPS Baseline L1–L3, OpenSSF Best Practices Passing/Silver/Gold, Scorecard, SLSA Build L1–L3, CLOMonitor, CNCF TAG Security self-assessment and third-party audit, EU CRA posture, SOC 2 evidence pack, PCI DSS v4.0.1 reference architecture, ISO/IEC 5230) 4. Storage Independence (blockstor) 5. Host OS Strategy 6. AI/ML Platform 7. AI Inside Cozystack 8. Marketplace & Application Ecosystem 9. Multi-Cluster & Federation 10. Developer Experience & Reference Architectures 11. Ecosystem Standardization & Community ## Why The CNCF Incubation review (targeted for late Q3 2026) expects a public, readable roadmap in-tree. The existing Project V2 board ([#1](https://github.com/orgs/cozystack/projects/1)) is the issue-level source of truth, but a multi-quarter narrative view is needed for adopters, downstream vendors, and TAG reviewers. ## Preview The document is a living artifact: updated quarterly via a public roadmap review, with material changes routed through CzEP (Cozystack Enhancement Proposal) in \`cozystack/community/design-proposals/\`. ## Notes for reviewers - Content is intended as a discussion starting point; expect refinements in subsequent PRs once SIGs form. - Certification timelines are aspirational targets, not commitments — refinement expected once a SIG-Security charter is ratified. - Cross-references to other Cozystack repositories (blockstor, community, cozystack-ui) reflect current state on \`main\` as of 2026-05-18. ## Test plan - [ ] Markdown renders correctly on GitHub - [ ] All internal repo links resolve (\`./GOVERNANCE.md\`, \`./MAINTAINERS.md\`, \`./SECURITY.md\`, \`./CONTRIBUTOR_LADDER.md\`) - [ ] All external references in §10 resolve - [ ] Maintainer review of certification timelines (Track 3) for feasibility - [ ] Maintainer review of SIG formation timeline (Track 11) <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Documentation** * Updated the public roadmap for August 2026 with clearer commitment and direction horizons. * Refreshed current-state information, release details, in-flight initiatives, and milestone planning. * Added platform milestones for service exposure, readiness, quotas, autoscaling, and secrets management. * Strengthened end-to-end quality gates and reproducible benchmarking guidance. * Revised plans for AI/ML, self-hosted assistance, CLI development, governance, conformance, risks, and maintenance. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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32ec1b5a00 |
fix(migrations): correct unadopted-record count semantics and stale comments
- The unadopted-record WARNING said "N pool(s)" but counted SKIPPED_FILE lines, and the foreign-owner branch writes one line per object (so a single pool with MD+MHC+WM reported "3 pools"). Reword to "N record(s) ... one line per object or pool ... not a distinct-pool count" so the number does not mislead. - The inline-chart restamp comment implied the cozystack-apps source is enforced; it is not (matching by chart name only is a deliberate trade-off: gating on the historical sourceRef risks under-matching a real legacy parent, which loses its workers, whereas the loose match's worst case is a harmless mislabel). Spell out the trade-off and that the render guard is the data-loss backstop. - The overflow comment cited "up to 42 chars per rest.go"; the enforced cap is 32 (maxKubernetesClusterName = 53 - 17 - 4). Correct it and note legacy/hand-created names can still be longer, which is why the overflow branch exists. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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3630842172 |
fix(computeplane): reject non-RFC-1123 pool keys at render time
The pool key becomes the pool HelmRelease name and its CAPI object names, which must be RFC-1123 labels, but only the length was guarded. An uppercase/underscore key rendered an invalid metadata.name the apiserver rejects, and a key containing ':' rendered invalid YAML that failed the whole module render -- a non-uniform, late failure next to the guarded length case. Add a render-time RFC-1123 guard on the key alongside the length guard (mirrors migration 56's child-name guard), and pin the length guard's derived remedy budget (15) in the overflow test so a wrong computation is caught, not just the presence of the error. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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2619c91f09 |
docs: add public ROADMAP.md (2026-2028)
Adds an in-tree public roadmap giving adopters, downstream vendors and CNCF TAG reviewers a multi-quarter narrative view alongside the issue-level Project V2 board. The document covers twelve tracks, the certification and compliance programme, the standardization strategy and the SIG formation plan. It marks which horizons are commitments with owners and capacity behind them and which are direction, and it states plainly that the board remains the issue-level source of truth. Co-authored-by: Andrei Kvapil <kvapss@gmail.com> Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Timur Tukaev <timur.tukaev@aenix.io> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <kvapss@gmail.com> |
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c0fcdd767c |
fix(migrations): discover pre-chartRef parents via inline spec.chart in the restamp
The restamp discovered unlabelled parent kubernetes releases by spec.chartRef only, but that misses the population it exists for. The apps.cozystack.io/ application.kind label was introduced 2025-12-19 ( |
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c6b6755eec |
fix(migrations): record foreign-owner skips, harden record_skip, scope restamp to kubernetes- names
Three hardening fixes on migration 56's new code: - The foreign-owner branch in adopt_one pins the object prune-proof but does not adopt it (the child release can then stay Failed on the ownership conflict), yet it was the one warn+pin+skip path that did not record itself in the durable unadopted ConfigMap -- so an operator relying on that record to find stuck pools would miss it. Record it like every sibling branch. - record_skip ran a bare append under set -e inside skip branches that are designed never to abort; a failed write (e.g. /tmp full) could deadlock the fleet upgrade for one tenant. Make it fail-open, matching the branches' intent. - The restamp selector matched any release by chartRef; scope it to names starting with kubernetes- so it cannot mislabel (and then have the sweep skip) a non-standard release, keeping restamp and the sweep's contract in sync. Also fix the previously-vacuous negative restamp test (its fixture lacked the chartRef, so it never reached the label guard it claimed to check). Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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c2ee58756e |
fix(computeplane): allowlist pool values instead of denylisting, derive length-guard prefix
The pool-value splice used omit (a denylist), which leaks every key it does not name. Since this module runs untrusted tenant code and the NodeGroup schema has no additionalProperties:false, a tenant could pass the platform-injected _cluster object (cluster-domain/oidc/dns01/proxy, delivered via cozystack-values and merged UNDER spec.values, so a tenant key wins) or nameOverride straight through to the pool chart -- and any future kubernetes-nodes top-level value would silently re-open the same hole. Switch to pick: pass through only the enumerated per-pool shape fields, so everything cluster-level or module-owned is dropped by construction (fail-closed for new fields). Also derive the length-guard's release-name prefix from $clusterRelease so it cannot drift from the name actually rendered. Regression-tested: _cluster and nameOverride no longer reach the child values; maxUnhealthy and the module wiring still do. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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30af0e1f60 |
docs(postgres-operator): update values comment for the native 1.30.0 bump
The explanatory comment in values.yaml still described the removed patches/cloudnative-pg-1.28.2.patch mechanism and the old 0.27.1/1.28.1 versions, and pointed at an "edit the patch" workflow that no longer exists. Rewrite it to describe the native 0.29.0/1.30.0 chart bump (operator and CRDs aligned by construction, no patch step) while preserving the still-valid guidance: do not pin image.tag, keep the operator and CRDs in lockstep, since a mismatched pin prunes CRD status fields and fails backups cluster-wide. Addresses review feedback on #3951 (IvanHunters, CodeRabbit). Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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3d1a83f419 |
fix(migrations): make the unadopted-pools record publish best-effort
The durable-record ConfigMap write sat under set -euo pipefail right before the version stamp, so a permanent failure (e.g. the record exceeding etcd's object size limit at a very large skip count) would abort the migration and deadlock the fleet upgrade with no path out -- even though every skipped pool was already pinned prune-proof earlier in the sweep, so the workers are safe regardless of whether the record lands. The record is a convenience artifact, not a safety mechanism, so swallow its failure with a warning instead of failing closed. Covered by a bats case that fails the publish and asserts the run still stamps. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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12fc8365bb |
fix(kubernetes): make the worker-adoption guard remedy actionable
The guard's refusal message told the operator to run the platform migration, but the case that reaches it is precisely one the migration already ran and stamped for (its slot was renumbered out on a backport, or the parent HelmRelease predates the application.kind label and the selector skipped it) -- re-running does nothing. Name the manual recovery instead: annotate resource-policy=keep on the listed MachineDeployments, then stamp the cozystack-version ConfigMap back below the worker-adoption migration so it re-runs. Also note in the Phase 2 README that computeplane clusters render their worker pools as separate KubernetesNodes releases too. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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952901776a |
fix(migrations): adopt unlabelled parent kubernetes releases and record unadopted pools in migration 56
The worker-adoption sweep selected parents by the apps.cozystack.io/ application.kind label, which postdates v1.2. A parent kubernetes HelmRelease older than that, or one restored by hand, lacks the label: the sweep skipped it, stamped, and the parent's control-plane-only re-render then pruned its un-pinned workers with no pin and no warning. Discover such releases by their chartRef instead and restamp the three application labels before the sweep (additive, cannot corrupt a release, and repairs it for cozystack-api too). Every warn+pin+skip branch leaves a pool pinned prune-proof but unadopted, recorded only in the Job log, which the next upgrade reaps; the migration does not re-run, so an operator cannot find those pools afterward. Accumulate the skips and publish them as configmap/cozystack-migration-56-unadopted before the stamp. Extend the fake kubectl and add bats coverage for the restamp (positive and negative) and the unadopted-ConfigMap paths. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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34e801cb9e |
fix(computeplane): stop tenant pool values leaking cluster-level keys and overflowing release names
The per-pool child HelmRelease spliced the tenant nodeGroup dict verbatim (toYaml) after setting cluster/clusterReleaseName, and the NodeGroup schema has no additionalProperties:false. A tenant could therefore (a) set a duplicate cluster/clusterReleaseName key that wins the YAML merge and re-parents the pool onto a tenant-controlled cluster, or (b) pass talos/ version/images through a shape-only knob and pick the worker OS image, installer and kubelet version. omit those five keys at the splice so only the pool's own shape flows through (tolerated extras like maxUnhealthy still do). Separately, each pool renders a 38-char fixed release-name prefix against Helm's 53-char cap, so a nodeGroup key over 15 chars created a HelmRelease the apiserver accepts but Flux never reconciles, with no other signal. Guard the length at render time, next to the ingress-role guard, mirroring the migration overflow branch and the aggregated API's validateNameLength. Also refresh the generated values doc: the module now materialises its own default md0 and pool storageClass falls back to the kubernetes-nodes chart default, not the wrapped kubernetes app. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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6663c44dd5 |
ci(labeler): map the kubeovn-webhook scope to area/networking
The package has its own scope in commit history but no entry, so its PRs land on the area/uncategorized fallback. It is a kube-ovn admission component, which is the same area as the kube-ovn scope beside it. Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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cdc34d6e34 |
fix(kubeovn-webhook): restrict the webhook port to the API server
The /mutate-pods handler returns namespace-derived annotations to any caller that reaches it (GHSA-g883-q79m-8225), and until now nothing stopped an arbitrary in-cluster pod from being that caller. Client-certificate verification, added in #2698, cannot close this on its own. Enabling --client-ca-file requires the API server to *present* a certificate, which it does only when its AdmissionConfiguration names a kubeConfigFile for the webhook plugins. Checked on a running Cozystack control plane: the AdmissionConfiguration carries a PodSecurity block and nothing else, so no certificate is offered at all. Flipping to RequireAndVerifyClientCert there would reject the API server itself, and with failurePolicy: Fail that stops pod creation cluster-wide. No amount of log observation changes that — it is a property of the control plane's configuration, not of the traffic. So the network is where the caller can actually be constrained. The policy denies pod and world traffic to the serving port and needs no carve-out: the API server runs on the host network, so it is not a Cilium endpoint and fromEndpoints never matches it. Unlike the ingress-nginx admission webhook this component exists only on the management cluster, so there is no konnectivity-tunnelled caller to exempt either, and no forgeable pod label anywhere in the selector. It is a CiliumNetworkPolicy rather than a core NetworkPolicy, and that distinction is why it works at all: kube-ovn runs with ENABLE_NP: false and programs no ACLs, so a core NetworkPolicy would be created and never enforced. The values comment claiming NetworkPolicy was simply not an option is corrected — it was true only of the core kind. Deny-only with default-deny disabled, matching the ingress-nginx admission policy: putting these pods behind a default-deny would mean enumerating every port they serve and breaking traffic on the first one forgotten. Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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4689b2b844 |
feat(kubeovn-webhook): add client-certificate verification, off by default (#2698)
## What this PR does Adds client-certificate verification to the kube-ovn webhook, and turns it on only when an operator supplies a CA bundle. `--client-ca-file` is new and empty by default. With it empty the server sets `tls.RequestClientCert`: it asks callers for a certificate, records the issuer of whatever arrives, and serves the request either way. Set the flag and the server switches to `tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert`, so a caller without a certificate signed by that CA is refused at the TLS handshake. **This is step one of two, and on its own it does not close [GHSA-g883-q79m-8225](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack/security/advisories/GHSA-g883-q79m-8225).** With the default empty value nothing is rejected — the webhook still answers an unauthenticated caller, and the only change is that the caller's issuer now appears in the logs. That is deliberate: switching straight to `RequireAndVerifyClientCert` would break every cluster whose API server sends no client certificate, and there is no way to know from here which those are. The logs are how we find out. Step two, in a follow-up: read a day of issuer logs on a Talos cluster and on `isp-full-generic`, confirm the API server presents a certificate we can pin, then set the CA bundle so verification becomes mandatory. The advisory should be published as fixed only after that lands — not with this PR. An earlier revision also carried a NetworkPolicy restricting ingress to `kube-system`. It was dropped, and the title has been corrected to match; only the TLS path is left here. ### Screenshots N/A — no user-facing or UI change. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: Walked the trigger map against the diff: no row matches. The change touches one system package and the Go image it builds — no app package, no `values.schema.json`, no `ApplicationDefinition`, no platform variant, no node prerequisite. ### Release note ```release-note feat(kubeovn-webhook): the webhook now accepts --client-ca-file. Left empty (the default) it requests and logs client certificates without requiring them; set to a CA bundle it rejects callers that do not present a certificate signed by that CA. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added optional client-certificate verification for the pod mutation webhook through configurable CA settings. * Added separate rate limits for requests with and without client certificates. * Added remote-address logging and clearer verification status reporting. * **Security** * Requests continue to be forwarded while certificate observations are recorded when verification is disabled. * Serving-certificate updates remain supported; client CA changes require a webhook restart. * **Documentation** * Documented client CA configuration and current certificate rotation limitations. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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35668dd27c |
feat(dashboard): rework the Marketplace entry point and the Admin portal (#3928)
## What this PR does Makes the Console the dashboard's entry point, reworks the Marketplace into an ordinary destination, and turns the Admin portal into the place where tenant-wide administration actually lives. **The Console is where the dashboard opens.** Visiting the dashboard without a path lands on the Console, which shows what the tenant already runs — what someone opening it almost always came for — and the header gives the Console the primary emphasis. The Marketplace is a place you go deliberately, when the intent is to add something new, and it is one click away from its own tab, from the Console overview and from the command palette. **Marketplace** opens the grouped application list directly. The "Choose a product to deploy" landing page and its Show-all-apps button are gone, and category links keep filtering to a single category. **Administration moves from Console to Admin.** Tenants, Modules, External IPs and the per-tenant Info page need no special permission, so the Admin tab is now always visible instead of being gated. The two cluster-wide operator areas keep their own independent gates, so Capacity and Backup Classes still appear only for users who can open them. Resource routes became portal-aware, so a detail, edit or order page opened from Admin stays under `/admin` instead of jumping back to `/console`. **Tenants** is a hierarchy tree instead of a flat table. It is built from `TenantNamespace` labels (`tenant.cozystack.io/<ancestor-ns>`), so a tenant whose parent is not accessible attaches to its nearest visible ancestor rather than disappearing, and rows are named relative to that parent — a sub-tenant reads as `crpjxhwm`, not `whmcs-crpjxhwm`. Each row carries its own actions: open that tenant's Info, or create a sub-tenant at any level of the tree. **Modules** is rebuilt around the same tree. It previously showed only the selected tenant's modules as Enabled or Disabled cards, which meant a module provided by a parent tenant looked disabled, and clicking it navigated to a Tenant CR that does not exist in the child's namespace — an endless spinner. The page now covers every tenant the user can access, with each tenant's modules as chips showing the module icon, the namespace running it and its readiness. Availability comes from the `namespace.cozystack.io/<module>` label on each `TenantNamespace`, which names the providing namespace: the tenant itself for a local module, an ancestor for an inherited one. An inherited chip is shown only when that ancestor is out of the user's reach, since otherwise its own chip already shows the module. Clicking any chip opens the module in whichever tenant runs it. Tenants whose whole subtree has no modules collapse into a "+ N tenants" branch. **External IPs** lists LoadBalancer services across every accessible tenant in one table with a Namespace column, instead of only the selected tenant. A namespace whose services the user cannot list contributes no rows rather than failing the page. Two navigation fixes come along with this. Detail pages offered a fixed tab set, so Info showed Workloads, Services and Ingresses tabs it never fills — tabs now appear only for resource groups the instance actually owns, probed through the tabs' own list refs so they share one cache entry and one watch. Back and the sidebar followed the resource plural rather than the entry point, so a module page sent the user to a one-item list and highlighted nothing; module pages now return to Modules and keep it highlighted, while Info returns to Tenants. Finally, copying a secret key no longer requires revealing it on screen first, and the button briefly turns into a check mark so it is visible that the value reached the clipboard. ### Screenshots <img width="1720" height="1374" alt="Screenshot 2026-08-20 at 21-08-30 Cozystack" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8499577c-8f9e-4df9-a6bb-df507497a4a0" /> <img width="1720" height="1374" alt="Screenshot 2026-08-20 at 21-08-40 Cozystack" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/01d256e9-2585-41fd-8070-b910f03d8f3f" /> ### Downstream repositories The diff touches only `packages/system/dashboard/images/console`. The console is vendored in this repository (`cozystack-ui` is archived), and the change adds no package, no values schema, no `ApplicationDefinition` semantics and nothing under `hack/`, so no repository in the trigger map is reached. - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note feat(dashboard): the dashboard now opens on the Console rather than the Marketplace, the Marketplace opens the application list directly, and tenant administration moves into the Admin portal, which is now always available. Tenants and Modules are shown as the tenant hierarchy across every tenant the user can access: a module provided by a parent tenant is no longer reported as disabled, and opening it lands on the tenant that actually runs it instead of hanging. External IPs covers every accessible tenant in one table, detail pages only offer tabs the instance has resources for, and a secret key can be copied while it stays masked. ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit - **New Features** - Administration now includes dedicated tenant, module, external IP, and information pages. - Tenants appear in a collapsible hierarchy with creation, editing, and detail navigation. - Modules and external IPs are shown across accessible tenant namespaces, including inherited modules. - Application details show tabs only for available resources. - Secret values can be copied while remaining masked. - Console is now the primary landing page, with Marketplace available separately. - **Bug Fixes** - Improved sidebar highlighting for nested pages. - Administration is accessible without operator permissions, while restricted areas remain protected. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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3c78c0be56 |
feat(clickhouse): add configurable version parameter
Add a `version` value (v25.8, v25.3, v24.9; default v24.9) to the ClickHouse chart, backed by files/versions.yaml and resolved by templates/_versions.tpl for both the ClickHouse server and Keeper images, so the Cozystack API returns the engine version (spec.version) like the other managed-DB charts. Default v24.9 -> 24.9.2.42 keeps existing installations byte-for-byte identical. The maintainer-run hack/update-versions.sh generator intersects the server/keeper Docker Hub tags byte-collated (LC_ALL=C) so comm keeps tags across the X.9 -> X.10 boundary; freezes the default major to the tag it already ships (read from versions.yaml, so the freeze follows the default); errors on a dropped default or an unresolvable major; writes atomically; and runs on stock macOS bash 3.2 / BSD. Covered by hack/clickhouse-update-versions_test.bats (10 cases) and the tests/version_test.yaml helm-unittest suite. Refs: #1246 Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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b20e8ee91a |
fix(postgres-operator): bump CloudNativePG to 1.30.0 for the Cluster scale-subresource selector
Bump the vendored cloudnative-pg chart 0.27.1 -> 0.29.0 (operator + CRDs 1.28.1-patched-to-1.28.2 -> 1.30.0) and drop the hand-maintained cloudnative-pg-1.28.2.patch entirely — 0.29.0 is a published chart, so no version-alignment patch is needed. Why this is required -------------------- Database read-replica autoscaling (community proposal design-proposals/database-horizontal-autoscaling) drives the CNPG Cluster scale subresource with a stock HPA (via KEDA). That only works when the subresource serves status.selector, which cloudnative-pg#8996 added and shipped in CNPG 1.28.4 / 1.29.2 / 1.30.0. cozystack shipped 1.28.2, whose scale subresource has no selector, so the HPA fails with InvalidSelector. Why 1.30.0 and not 1.28.4 ------------------------- The floor is >= 1.28.4, but the upstream chart repo publishes no chart for 1.28.4 (the 1.28 line stops at chart 0.27.1 / appVersion 1.28.1), so 1.28.4 could only be reached by hand-patching the 0.27.1 chart's operator image and CRDs up to the backport. A live PoC on a dev cluster proved that path is broken: the 1.28.4 operator running under the 0.27.1 (1.28.1) chart templates crash-loops on a missing RBAC grant it needs but the older chart does not provide — endpointslices.discovery.k8s.io is forbidden: ... cannot list resource "endpointslices" — so status.selector is never populated and the HPA still cannot scale. The hand-patch would have to port the operator's RBAC (and any other template delta) from 1.28.1 to 1.28.4 by hand, with no published chart to diff against. 1.30.0 (chart 0.29.0) is the only published chart that carries the selector together with matching RBAC/CRDs/templates, and the 1.28 line is EOL (2026-06-30), so 1.30.0 also keeps us on a supported release. cozystack uses the barman-cloud plugin (not native barman, removed in 1.31) and no CNPG Poolers, so the 1.30 deprecations and the known pooler bug do not apply. Update the version-guard unittest to 1.30.0 and assert the clusters CRD scale subresource carries labelSelectorPath: .status.selector. Signed-off-by: Alexey Artamonov <aleksei.artamonov@aenix.io> |
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724354ffe1 |
fix(console): address the review findings on the Admin portal rework
Four of the five findings share one root cause: a node in the tenant
tree can attach to its nearest *visible* ancestor when its real parent
is inaccessible, and per-row actions then derived their target from
that bridged ancestor.
The Edit action on a bridged tenant row pointed at a Tenant CR that
does not exist. The CR lives in the real parent's namespace, so the
target now comes from realParentNamespace — and Edit is offered only
when that namespace is readable, because otherwise there is no CR the
user could open and the button could only ever dead-end. The test that
asserted two Edit buttons had frozen the broken target as expected
behaviour; it now names the rows it expects, and the Edit button gained
a title so that assertion means something.
An inherited module chip is rendered only when the providing tenant is
NOT visible, yet it was a live button: clicking it denied the instance
GET and switched the active tenant to a namespace outside the visible
set, which the selector then bounced to an arbitrary fallback. It is
now an inert badge that states where the module comes from.
InfoRedirect's missing-definition branch hardcoded /console, throwing an
admin out of the portal its own docstring promises to preserve.
The sidebar's alsoMatch used a bare startsWith, so /admin/apps would
light up for /admin/apps-v2. It now matches whole path segments.
And SecretsTab let a rejected clipboard write escape as an unhandled
rejection, leaving the button silent — a denied permission or an
insecure context was indistinguishable from a no-op. It now reports the
failure.
Declined: CodeRabbit asked to split `import { useK8sList, type K8sResource }`
into a separate `import type`. The inline modifier is valid under
verbatimModuleSyntax and is what 26 other imports in this console use,
so the change would make the file the odd one out.
Reported-by: Ivan Okhotnikov <ivan.okhotnikov@aenix.io>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io>
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5b08d48632 |
docs(migrations): pin DEFAULT_MD0 provenance to the pre-removal helper commit
The kubernetes.nodeGroups helper that DEFAULT_MD0 reproduces was deleted in this line of work, so nothing in-tree diffs against it and a future edit to the constant (instanceType/diskSize/...) would silently rename the content-hashed KubevirtMachineTemplate and roll every implicit-md0 pool. Reference the pre-removal definition (git show 92b9785da^:.../kubernetes/templates/_helpers.tpl) so the canonical default stays diffable. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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8cf3af7309 |
test(kubernetes-api): cover the removed-fields warning at its Create/Update call sites
TestWarnRemovedKubernetesFields pinned the helper in isolation, so deleting either call site (rest.go Create/Update) left it green while an operator editing a Phase 2 removed field would silently get no warning. These drive Create and Update end to end and assert the warning surfaces; removing a call site now fails loudly (verified by mutation). Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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d93e136e23 |
fix(computeplane): provision worker pools via kubernetes-nodes after Phase 2 split
Phase 2 moved worker nodeGroups out of apps/kubernetes into apps/kubernetes-nodes, but the ComputePlane module still passed nodeGroups to the wrapped kubernetes chart, which now ignores it: a fresh ComputePlane cluster came up with zero workers (and the pinned ingress-nginx addon stuck Pending), while existing ones were unreachable by migration 56 (it only adopts kubernetes-* releases, not computeplane-cluster). The module now emits one kubernetes-nodes child HelmRelease per nodeGroup, shaped like a natively created pool, and materialises the pre-split default md0 (roles: [ingress-nginx]) when nodeGroups is empty. The pool chart's clusterName gains an internal clusterReleaseName override so pools attach to the module's fixed computeplane-cluster release, which is off the aggregated API's kubernetes-<cluster> convention; the default keeps every API-created pool byte-identical. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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334e2d8bf9 |
test(e2e): record the runner's SVM feature flags in the identity capture (#3945)
Adds one line to the runner identity record, taken from the `lscpu` read it already does: ``` svm features: svm npt nrip_save vgif ``` `vgif` decides whether a guest that is itself running a hypervisor pays a VM exit on every `CLGI`/`STGI`. Here that is the sandbox Talos nodes hosting the tenant KubeVirt VMs, so it only bites at double nesting, and the sandbox nodes' own boot is unaffected. Across the archived reports no run missing the flag has passed a tenant-Kubernetes suite: 0 of 62, against 11 of 12 with it. Exposure varies between hosts of the same shape, so it is not a property of the lane and cannot be recovered once the runner is recycled. Recording it on every run, red and green, is what makes the correlation countable rather than reconstructed by hand. `apply` runs `hack/e2e-runner-identity.sh` before `docker run`, and every workflow that runs the suite reaches it through `prepare-env`, so this is captured once per run on both paths. `lscpu` is already answering there: the `cpu model` line in today's records is parsed out of the same table. No new bounded read, no compiler on the runner, no sysfs. Gated on `svm` so an Intel host's `vnmi` is not reported as an SVM feature. Five tests for the reader. Identity suite 62 assertions, `hack/` sweep 732. No behaviour change and no gating on the flag. |
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a94abe0971 |
test(e2e): record the runner's SVM feature flags in the identity capture
Adds one line to the runner identity record, taken from the lscpu read it
already does:
svm features: svm npt nrip_save vgif
vgif decides whether a guest that is itself running a hypervisor pays a VM exit
on every CLGI/STGI. Here that is the sandbox Talos nodes hosting the tenant
KubeVirt VMs, so it only bites at double nesting, and the sandbox nodes' own
boot is unaffected.
Across the archived reports no run missing the flag has passed a
tenant-Kubernetes suite: 0 of 62, against 11 of 12 with it. Exposure varies
between hosts of the same shape, so it is not a property of the lane and cannot
be recovered once the runner is recycled. Recording it on every run, red and
green, is what makes the correlation countable rather than reconstructed by hand.
No new bounded read, no compiler on the runner, no sysfs. Gated on svm so an
Intel host's vnmi is not reported as an SVM feature.
Five tests for the reader. Identity suite 62 assertions, hack/ sweep 732.
No behaviour change and no gating on the flag.
Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Myasnikov Daniil <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com>
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296d3008d9 |
fix(kubernetes): pin KubeVirt CSI sidecars to SIG Storage releases
Signed-off-by: Yan Bondarenko <202671653+yankawai@users.noreply.github.com> |
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8554c036de |
fix(ingress-nginx): confine the konnectivity carve-out to kube-system
The admission-webhook deny exempted any endpoint carrying k8s-app: konnectivity-agent, in any namespace. Because the rule disables default-deny, falling out of the deny is the entire access decision — so any pod anywhere could reach the webhook port by labelling itself, which is precisely the access the policy exists to remove. k8s-app is an ordinary pod label a workload sets on itself. Nothing in the platform constrains pod labels by admission, and Cilium keeps k8s-app identity-relevant (its label filter ships no default whitelist), so the forged label really does change the endpoint's identity rather than being filtered out. The namespace key is derived by Cilium from the pod's actual namespace and cannot be set by the workload. Splitting the deny in two keeps the carve-out and closes the hole: one selector for everything outside kube-system with no label condition at all, one for kube-system carrying the existing NotIn. Only the agent in its own namespace is exempt. Kamaji at the pinned 26.3.6-edge puts nothing but k8s-app: konnectivity-agent on the agent pod template (internal/resources/konnectivity/agent.go), so the label remains the only available discriminator and the namespace confinement is what makes it safe to key on. Tests cover both halves: the outside-kube-system selector must carry no label condition, and the kube-system selector must keep exactly the namespace and label pair. Reported-by: Daniil Myasnikov <myasnikovdaniil2001@gmail.com> Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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3c780acd41 |
test(e2e): stop blocking merges on the tenant node-join deadline (#3932)
## What this PR does The tenant node-join wait in the two kubernetes e2e suites has stopped discriminating. Nested virtualisation on the shared runners degrades far enough that a worker which registers in minutes elsewhere can miss any deadline this test can afford, so a red on that one wait says as much about the machine the run landed on as about the product. What it produces in practice is a re-run, and a signal that teaches people to re-run is a signal that gets the meaningful reds re-run too. The suite still fails on it. That is the part worth reading twice, because it is what separates this from hiding a flake: the script exits non-zero, Chainsaw records a failure, and its whole catch runs (previous-instance container logs, the host snapshot, the data-plane capture, the event dump), every one of which is keyed on the test failing. The JUnit report says a test failed. What changes is one layer up. The wait writes a `SOFT-RED-node-join.txt` marker beside its diagnostics, and a new lane-side gate, `hack/e2e-node-join-soft-red.sh`, reads that marker to decide whether the job blocks. Softening inside the suite would have bought a green check by throwing all of that evidence away. The gate opens on one shape only, every failed test in the run carrying that marker, and blocks on everything else, including every way it can fail to answer the question: a report it cannot read, a failed test the report does not name, a failure with no marker, a run whose report records no failure at all. A marker is written only when `timeout` reports 124 on that one wait, so an assertion after the join, or the wait failing to run, stays an ordinary red. What the marker attributes is the test rather than the individual failure: Chainsaw writes one testcase per Test and combines that Test's step errors into its single failure element, so a second step error rides soft alongside the deadline, while a failed `catch`, `finally` or step-level `cleanup` rides soft for a different reason worth keeping apart, since at the pinned version those run with no step report and never reach the failure element at all. The convention doc states both rather than working around the granularity, since the suite stops at the wait and nothing it exists to prove runs after the marker. Only the lanes that block a merge ask the gate. `pull-requests` and `e2e-fork` do; `nightly` and `e2e-tag` run the same suites and stay hard. `e2e-tag` is the release candidate's own e2e check, where a soft pass would ship a release whose tenant clusters brought up no worker nodes. `nightly` is the only place an e2e failure reaches anyone who did not open a pull request, since nothing in this tree sends a notification anywhere, so the red job is the notification. A unit guard holds that split in both directions and derives the lane set from the workflows that run the suite, so a new lane has to be placed on one side or the other before it passes. One consequence of a softened red is worth naming rather than discovering later: the job finishes green, so its result stops answering whether the suite passed, and it has two kinds of consumer that each break their own way. A step gated on the job failing silently stops running. The SSH breakpoint in `pull-requests` is that case, and it is the only interactive way into a sandbox whose node-join never finished, so the E2E step records what the gate decided and the breakpoint's condition reads it back; the step is label-gated, so the session opens for a PR someone deliberately marked for debugging rather than on every softened run. A job that reports the result silently starts reporting a pass. That is the required `E2E Tests` commit status in both pull-request lanes, and on a softened run it now says the node-join deadline was missed, that the suite failed, and that the merge is not blocked on it, instead of saying the suite passed. The handover is four links long, and a guard reads each of them inside the block it has to live in rather than anywhere in the lane: the step carrying the gate's id writes the decision to the output sink, the job that runs the suite publishes it naming that step, the job that reports the result reads it off that job, and it branches on the value ahead of the branch that would otherwise call the run a pass. A link matched file-wide passes while it sits on a neighbour, and the value is then empty for good with nothing to say so. The first link is read tighter still, and in both directions: the write has to be an unconditional statement in the same branch as the exit that makes the job green, that branch has to fall through to a written non-zero exit, no other green exit may leave the step, the step may not be marked unable to fail, and the write may not appear anywhere else. A write under a condition of its own records the decision on some runs and not others; an exit that escapes the branch turns a red the gate REFUSED to soften into a green job with nothing recorded; and a write on the passing path would report a suite that passed as one that missed the deadline. What the guard cannot do is stated with it: it cannot tell one reporter from two, it reads the branch as text rather than evaluating it, and every block it reads is delimited by indentation. What is given up is real. A regression whose only symptom is that workers never reach Ready no longer blocks a merge, and these two suites are the only ones in the tree that boot tenant worker nodes. The mechanism sees a timer, not a cause, so a deterministic node-join regression rides soft as readily as a slow runner does, and the failed job stops being the thing that opens a debugging path on its own. That is a debt rather than a design, and the way out is written down beside the convention it bends: calibrate the runner canary against real lane data, then move the tolerance under the canary's alert so the lane softens a run measured as degraded and blocks one measured as healthy. Until that calibration exists the canary cannot carry the decision, which is why it does not carry it today. The deadline goes from 18m to 29m, and the reason is bounded on purpose. 29m is this test's own budget and nothing else: its clock starts where the wait starts, after the machinedeployment wait, the LoadBalancer assignment and the healthz probe, each with a ceiling of its own, while the chart's timers have been running since the Machine was created. The autoscaler's `maxNodeProvisionTime` measures from that creation and the MachineHealthCheck's `nodeStartupTimeout` from the later of creation and `InfrastructureReady`, restarting at that transition, so the offset is not fixed and no ordering against either timer is claimed. What the chart's 20m and 30m give is a scale to pick against: a budget over the first leaves room for a remediation cycle to fit inside the window, which is a possibility rather than a guarantee, since a run can spend the whole window on one worker that never comes back. The operation ceiling both suites give the script rises with the deadline (50m to 67m), and the diagnostics phase budget rises inside it (7m to 8m), because the collectors gated ahead of the serial console cost more between them than the old budget covered. Both budget guards read their terms from the sources that set them rather than restating them. The e2e job cap rises from 180 to 215 minutes in all four lanes, and its guard is honest about what it can hold: it derives the pair's operation and catch ceilings from source and requires one figure across every lane that runs the suite, and it records that the suites' full summed ceilings (226 minutes counting the `finally` legs and the storageclass-fallback Test) have never fit any cap in that file, including at 180. The margin above the derivable bound is empirical instead: three nightlies that failed both bringup Tests ran their full-suite e2e job in 149, 158 and 160 minutes under the previous ceilings, a run of that shape gains at most 12 minutes per suite here, and 215 clears the resulting projection by about 30 minutes where 180 cleared its measurement by 20. The prose that restates the cap outside the workflows moves with it, in the Chainsaw config and in the two report collectors that derive their own headroom from it. Test coverage: a new unit suite for the gate pins the direction it fails in (an unreadable report, a failed testcase the report leaves unnamed or names with the empty string or with blanks only, a failure without a marker, and a report recording no failure all block), the lane split in both directions, the four-link handover of the softening decision, and the job cap. The fixtures put the unnameable case ahead of a named suite on purpose, because an awk record runs to the next testcase and a case placed last cannot exercise the leak the tally exists to catch. The existing node-join suite gains guards that the marker is written only under the status meaning the deadline expired, that it is written ahead of the diagnostics phase rather than behind it, and that the deadline quoted in prose across the tree is the one the wait gives, in words as well as in minutes. Every one of those guards was checked by mutating the thing it protects and confirming it, and only it, goes red. ### Screenshots No UI change. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note test(e2e): the tenant node-join deadline still fails its suite and still collects its diagnostics, but no longer blocks a merge in the pull-request lanes; nightly and the release-tag lane stay hard ``` <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit - **New Features** - E2E checks can now report a successful, non-blocking status when the only failure is the recognized tenant node-join deadline. - Failure diagnostics and suite results remain available for these tolerated failures. - **Bug Fixes** - Improved detection and attribution of node-join deadline failures, avoiding false-positive soft passes. - **Documentation** - Updated E2E timing, diagnostic budgets, and failure-handling guidance to reflect the longer test windows. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> |
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ad62a8d62b |
test(e2e): stop blocking merges on the tenant node-join deadline
The tenant node-join wait no longer discriminates. Nested virtualisation on the shared runners degrades far enough that a guest which registers in minutes on real hardware can miss any deadline this test can afford, so a red on that one wait says as much about the machine the run landed on as about the product, and it teaches a reader to re-run the job. The suite still fails on it. That is what keeps Chainsaw's catch running: the previous-instance container logs, the host snapshot, the data-plane capture and the event dump are all keyed on the test failing, and the report stays honest. What changes is one layer up. The wait writes a marker beside its diagnostics, and a new lane-side gate reads that marker to decide whether the job blocks. It opens only when every failed test in the run carries one, and blocks on anything it cannot attribute: a report it could not read, a failed test the report does not name, a failure with no marker. Only the lanes that block a merge ask it. The two pull-request lanes do; nightly and the tag lane run the same suites and stay hard. A soft pass on the tag lane would ship a release candidate whose tenant clusters brought up no worker nodes, and nightly is the only place an e2e failure reaches anyone who did not open a pull request, since no lane in this tree notifies anywhere. A softened red finishes the job green, so the job's result stops answering whether the suite passed, and both kinds of consumer are handed the decision instead of inferring it. A step gated on the job failing would silently stop running: the SSH breakpoint is that case, and it still opens for a pull request marked for debugging. A job that reports the result would silently start reporting a pass: the required commit status now says the deadline was missed and that the merge is not blocked on it, rather than that the suite passed. The deadline goes to 29m. That is the test's own budget and nothing more: its clock starts after the machinedeployment wait, the LoadBalancer assignment and the healthz probe, while the chart's autoscaler and health-check timers have been running since the Machine was created, so no ordering against them is claimed. The chart's 20m and 30m give a scale to pick against, and a budget over the first leaves room for a remediation cycle without promising that one fits. The operation ceiling both suites give the script rises with the deadline, and the diagnostics phase budget rises inside it, because the collectors gated ahead of the serial console cost more between them than the old budget covered. Both budget guards read their terms from the sources that set them. The e2e job cap rises with them, and its guard holds what a guard can hold: the pair's operation and catch ceilings, and one figure across every lane that runs the suite. It also records that the suites' full summed ceilings have never fit any cap in that file, so the margin above the bound is taken from a measured run instead. The prose that restates the cap elsewhere moves with it, and the sweep that holds the deadline's restatements now reads the figure spelled in words as well as in minutes. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <f@lex.la> |
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bfd4ea0643 |
feat(dashboard): land on the Console instead of the Marketplace
Opening the dashboard without a path sent the user to the catalog, and the header gave Marketplace the primary emphasis. The Console is the better entry point: it shows what the tenant already runs, which is what someone opening the dashboard almost always came for. The Marketplace stays one click away for when the intent is to add something new. The landing path becomes a named constant beside the portal helper, so the redirect and the tab emphasis cannot drift apart, and the library's own default tab set is reordered to match rather than contradict its only consumer. Assisted-By: Claude Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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a00421aa17 |
feat(kubernetes-api): warn on Phase 2 removed fields and document them
The Kubernetes CR still accepts and stores spec.nodeGroups, spec.nodeHealthCheck and spec.maxNodeProvisionTime after the Phase 2 split (the adoption migration leaves them on an upgraded CR rather than rewriting parent values mid-upgrade), but they no longer render anything, so an operator scaling via spec.nodeGroups.<x>.minReplicas silently got nothing. Emit a non-blocking client-facing admission warning on Create/Update when any of these fields is present, pointing the operator at the KubernetesNodes resources. A hard rejection is intentionally avoided: it would break edits to already-upgraded clusters that still carry the fields. Also enumerate all the Phase 2 breaking changes (three removed fields, two KubernetesNodes immutability rules, the 32-char cluster-name cap) in the chart README. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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69da032103 |
docs(kubernetes): point references at migration 56 after the renumber
The merge renumbered the worker-pool adoption migration from 54 to 56, but six references still named 54 (README, pre-delete-unpin hook, cluster.yaml, worker_adoption_guard test), which now points at main's redis-operator adoption migration. Repoint them at 56. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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7a9226da15 |
test(kubernetes): make control-plane-only negative asserts actually check
The 'emits no worker-pool objects' assertions used 'not: true' with 'documentIndex: -1', which scopes the check to the last rendered document only, so a stray MachineDeployment/KubevirtMachineTemplate/MachineHealthCheck/ TalosConfigTemplate anywhere else passed silently. Move 'any: true' inside the containsDocument matcher and drop documentIndex so the negation covers every document. Verified the asserts now redden when a worker object is present. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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5ca679f023 |
fix(kubernetes-api): cap Kubernetes cluster name so worker pools can render
A Kubernetes cluster's worker pools are separate KubernetesNodes releases named "kubernetes-nodes-<cluster>-<pool>". validateNameLength only checked the parent's own "kubernetes-" prefix budget (42 chars), so a cluster name of 33-42 chars was admitted while every child pool release overflowed the 53-char Helm limit and could not render -- the migration then pinned and skipped the pool, leaving the cluster with no way to add workers. Pre-split nodeGroups had no such constraint, so this was a regression. Add a kind-specific 32-char cap for the Kubernetes kind so the overflow fails at admission on the parent CR instead of at render time on an un-creatable child. Signed-off-by: IvanHunters <xorokhotnikov@gmail.com> |
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cfd5444f16 |
fix(dashboard): let a masked secret be copied and confirm the copy
Copying a secret key required revealing it on screen first, and the button gave no sign that anything reached the clipboard. The value the list already carries is enough to copy, so the button works while the key stays masked, and it briefly turns into a check mark to confirm. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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e75500682c |
fix(dashboard): tie navigation to where a page was opened from
Detail pages offered a fixed tab set, so Info showed Workloads, Services and Ingresses tabs it never fills; tabs now appear only for resource groups the instance actually owns. The probes reuse the tabs' own list refs and label selector, so they share one cache entry and one watch. Back and the sidebar followed the plural instead of the entry point: a module page sent the user to a one-item list and lit nothing in the sidebar. Module pages now return to Modules and keep it highlighted, while Info returns to Tenants and highlights that, matching the trees they are reached from. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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1279652b56 |
feat(dashboard): list External IPs across every accessible tenant
The page showed LoadBalancer services of the selected tenant only, so an operator had to switch tenants one by one to find an address. It now lists them for every visible TenantNamespace in a single table with a Namespace column. A namespace whose services the user cannot list contributes no rows instead of failing the page. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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21b8a0e2f0 |
feat(dashboard): rebuild Modules as a tenant tree of module chips
The Modules page listed the selected tenant's modules as Enabled or Disabled cards, so a module a parent tenant provides looked disabled and clicking it led to a Tenant CR that does not exist in the child's namespace — an endless spinner. It now covers every tenant the user can access, as the same hierarchy tree the Tenants page draws, with each tenant's modules as chips carrying the module icon, the namespace running it and its readiness. Availability comes from the `namespace.cozystack.io/<module>` label on each TenantNamespace, which names the providing namespace: the tenant itself for a local module, an ancestor for an inherited one. An inherited chip appears only when that ancestor is out of the user's reach, since otherwise its own chip already shows the module. Clicking any chip opens the module in whichever tenant runs it. Tenants whose whole subtree has no modules collapse into a "+ N tenants" branch, and the Info module is left out entirely as every tenant carries it. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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7a48d455ac |
feat(dashboard): show the tenant hierarchy on the Tenants page
The flat table becomes a tree built from TenantNamespaces, whose `tenant.cozystack.io/<ancestor-ns>` labels carry the full ancestry. A tenant whose parent is not accessible attaches to its nearest visible ancestor instead of disappearing, and rows are labelled relative to that parent, so a sub-tenant reads as `crpjxhwm` rather than `whmcs-crpjxhwm`. Subtrees collapse from the row itself. Each row also carries its own actions: Info opens that tenant's Info page, and Create Tenant orders a sub-tenant at any level of the tree. Editing a tenant switches to the namespace holding its Tenant CR — the parent's, or its own for the hierarchy root. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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ef73a0e47c |
feat(dashboard): move Administration into the Admin portal
Administration (Tenants, Modules, External IPs, per-tenant Info) leaves the Console sidebar for Admin, which is now always visible: those pages need no special permission. The two cluster-wide operator areas keep their own gates, so Capacity and Backup Classes still appear only for users who can open them. Resource routes become portal-aware through a shared base-path helper, so a detail, edit or order page opened from Admin stays under /admin instead of jumping back to /console. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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5178e169b1 |
feat(dashboard): drop the Marketplace landing page
Open the grouped application list right away instead of the "Choose a product to deploy" page and its Show-all-apps button. Category links keep filtering to a single category. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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9c7bfb830b |
ci(workflows): make the E2E breakpoint fully label opt-in (#3926)
## What this PR does The SSH debug breakpoint that opens on a failed end-to-end run used to open automatically for pull requests authored by any project maintainer, even when nobody intended to use it, in addition to opening for pull requests carrying an explicit label. Every red end-to-end run on such a pull request held an ephemeral CI runner open for up to twenty minutes for a breakpoint nobody attached to, which adds up across an ordinary day of pull requests. This change makes the breakpoint strictly opt-in: it now opens only when the pull request carries the debug label or the release label. A maintainer who wants to attach adds the debug label before or after the run fails. The step's explanatory comment is trimmed to match: the paragraph describing the removed authorship path, including a claim about runner selection that no longer applied to the current workflow, is removed rather than rewritten. ### Screenshots Not applicable: this is a CI workflow text change with no user interface. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note NONE ``` |
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61f7939ab7 |
ci(workflows): make E2E breakpoint opt-in via labels only
Drop the author-association branch from the "Breakpoint on E2E failure" step condition, so a red end-to-end run only opens an SSH breakpoint when the pull request carries the debug or release label. The dropped branch held an ephemeral CI runner open for up to twenty minutes on every red maintainer-authored pull request, whether or not anyone intended to attach. Trim the step's explanatory comment to match: drop the paragraph about the removed authorship path, including its stale claim that only the debug label affects runner selection, since this workflow has no conditional runs-on to begin with. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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4ebf9c25b4 |
test(e2e): capture CertificateSigningRequests in cozyreport (#3925)
## What this PR does hack/cozyreport.sh never captured CertificateSigningRequests, so the hypothesis that a node join hangs on kubelet certificate issuance (bootstrap token, CSR, approval) had no artifact to check it against. This adds a bounded CSR list and a per object yaml capture for the host cluster, next to the existing node walk, plus the same capture for every tenant Kubernetes cluster whose kubeconfig a failed kubernetes-* Chainsaw test left on disk under tenantkubeconfig-<test>. Both captures reuse the existing bounded read helpers (cozyreport_read_object, cozyreport_select_objects), so a cut off or refused read leaves the same truncation and failure markers every other capture in the file already produces, and an empty CSR list is not treated as an error. The tenant walk globs tenantkubeconfig-* and skips silently when nothing matches, which is the ordinary case for every suite that is not kubernetes-* and for a kubernetes-* run that passed and cleaned up after itself. Neither walk carries a count cap or an object time budget, unlike the VM/VMI/service walks in the same section: this follows the file's own documented convention that an uncapped per-object walk is acceptable when the collection step's own ceiling is the backstop, and CSR count on a freshly provisioned e2e cluster is bounded by node count and kubelet retry frequency rather than by workload scale; if a real collected report ever shows the CSR walk taking a meaningful share of collection time, add the existing count-cap-plus-time-budget pattern here and update the header's BUDGETS arithmetic to match. A bats test pins the shape of both walks against the script source, and a second test proves the tenant walk never invokes kubectl when no tenant kubeconfig is present on disk. ### Screenshots Not applicable, this changes an e2e diagnostic collector script, not the UI. ### Downstream repositories - [x] No downstream repository is affected by this change - [ ] [cozystack/website](https://github.com/cozystack/website) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/terraform-provider-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ansible-cozystack](https://github.com/cozystack/ansible-cozystack) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/ccp](https://github.com/cozystack/ccp) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/talm](https://github.com/cozystack/talm) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozyhr](https://github.com/cozystack/cozyhr) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozy-proxy](https://github.com/cozystack/cozy-proxy) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server](https://github.com/cozystack/cozystack-telemetry-server) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/external-apps-example](https://github.com/cozystack/external-apps-example) - follow-up: - [ ] [cozystack/examples](https://github.com/cozystack/examples) - follow-up: ### Release note ```release-note NONE ``` |
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e6be333c06 |
test(e2e): capture CertificateSigningRequests in cozyreport
hack/cozyreport.sh never captured CertificateSigningRequests, leaving the hypothesis that a node join hangs on kubelet certificate issuance (bootstrap token, CSR, approval) unverifiable from the collected artifact. Add a bounded CSR list and a per object yaml capture for the host cluster, next to the existing node walk, and the same capture for every tenant Kubernetes cluster whose kubeconfig a failed kubernetes-* Chainsaw test left on disk. Both walks reuse the existing bounded read helpers, so a cut off or refused read produces the same truncation and failure markers every other capture in the file already writes, and an empty CSR list is not treated as an error. Assisted-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksei Sviridkin <3811295@gmail.com> |
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2eb5374e90 |
fix(kubeovn-webhook): make the observation unforgeable and stop advertising an enable path that does not exist
Review found the observation could be silenced and the feature could not be turned on. Both are fixed here; enforcement itself stays out of scope for this step. Rate-limit the observation instead of remembering issuers. Keying on the issuer was the mistake: with RequestClientCert that string comes from the caller, so a bounded set of first-seen values can be filled with 32 fabricated issuers before the API server's first call, permanently suppressing the signal the feature exists to produce, while an unbounded one grows without limit. A rate limit cannot be starved -- a burst costs the current interval and the next real handshake is logged in the one after. The two outcomes are limited separately so a flood of one cannot hide the other, and both lines now carry the peer address, since 'none presented' fires for any certless caller and was not attributable. Say 'verified' rather than 'UNVERIFIED' once enforcement is on, where the handshake really has checked the chain. Stop telling operators to point --client-ca-file at an in-pod path. No such path exists: the pod mounts only its own serving secret, whose ca.crt is this webhook's serving CA, so every value either aborts startup or rejects the API server -- and with failurePolicy: Fail that stops pod creation cluster-wide. Say what is actually true and defer enabling to the step that adds the volume. Correct the claim in cert.go that this webhook configures no ClientCAs. It can now, that pool is read once at startup and never reloaded, and the comment justified skipping reload on the old premise. Record that reloading has to land together with the mount, since neither is usable alone. Cover the observation with tests: rate limiting, the burst it exists to survive, concurrency, both branches, the enforcing wording, and that admission is never blocked by logging. Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |
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07fd4d9a2c |
fix(kubeovn-webhook): bound the issuer observation and mark it untrusted
Both points came out of review of this branch, and both live in the observation path added for the staged rollout. The set of seen issuers was unbounded. With tls.RequestClientCert the server accepts whatever certificate a caller offers, so the issuer string is supplied by that caller: anyone able to open a connection could mint fresh issuers and grow the map and the log without limit. Cap it, and say once when the cap is reached -- a cap hit on a quiet cluster is itself the signal that the issuers are fabricated. The log also invited the operator to pin '--client-ca-file' to whichever CA it had just printed. That CA is unverified by construction, so an attacker who can reach the port can propose one. Say plainly in the log and in the comment that the value is a claim rather than an identity, and that it has to be confirmed out of band. Enforcement still depends only on --client-ca-file, which is trusted control-plane configuration. Signed-off-by: Andrei Kvapil <andrei.kvapil@aenix.io> |